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An exploration of how agency and socio-cultural milieu support 
greater or lesser controlled gambling and recovery from 
gambling addiction 
Edward Iain Pyle 
Abstract 
Most gamblers never experience addiction and the majority of those who do eventually 
recover. This thesis investigates how most maintain control over their gambling and 
how the majority of those who do experience gambling addiction regain control. 
Findings are based on 25 qualitative semi-structured interviews with participants who fit 
one of three ideal-type groups: (i) gamblers who have never experienced addiction; (ii) 
gamblers who have regained control after experience of gambling addiction; and (iii) 
gamblers experiencing addiction at time of interview. Participants were recruited who 
had never engaged in formal treatment because existing research suggests most who 
experience gambling addiction and/or recovery never to do so.  
This study is underpinned by a synthesis of Bourdieusian theory and Foucauldian-
inspired governmentality literature which was used to guide the thesis and help explain 
gambling behaviour. Taking a Foucauldian genealogical approach, the dominant theory 
of addiction as a biomedical disorder is critiqued and revealed to be myth. Instead, 
(gambling) addiction is demonstrated to be a social construction which becomes 
embodied within individuals and thereby influences gambling behaviour. 
Consequentially, it is shown that research concerning substance use is applicable to 
the investigation of gambling behaviours. 
Given paucity of gambling research, substance-related literature is drawn upon 
throughout the thesis. Attention is given to research demonstrating regulation over drug 
use to be influenced by the social settings in which consumption takes place as well as 
the wider social and cultural milieus in which the lives of actors are embedded. 
Moreover, particular appreciation is given to literature indicating recovery from 
addiction to be supported by shifts in socio-cultural milieu. In contrast to most existing 
addictions/gambling research, the agential capacities of gamblers to shape their own 
behaviours, albeit in ways heavily constrained by context (or ‘structure’) are 
emphasised throughout the thesis. 
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Data revealed various gambling-related strategies to help constrain gambling and 
minimise harm. These are examined and it is recommended that this knowledge could 
be used to aid development of more effective ‘harm-reduction’ style interventions and 
policies in ways which support less harmful patterns of gambling behaviour. However, 
although valuable, those with greater control tended to rely little on such strategies to 
manage their gambling. Instead, greater control over gambling and recovery from 
gambling addiction was found to have less to do with how participants gamble (e.g. 
whether or not they followed harm-reduction strategies) and far more to do with the 
wider, non-gambling-related, aspects of their lives and the nature of their 
subjectivities/dispositions. 
Principally influential were found to be the qualities of interviewees’ socio-cultural 
milieus. Alongside gambling, those with greater control tended to participate in non-
gambling-related communities with attendant ways of thinking and cultural expectations 
(values/norms) that marginalise (heavier) gambling. Drawing on Bourdieusian and 
Foucauldian governmentality theory, it is argued that, because of their day-to-day 
participation in such communities/milieus, those with greater control embody 
mentalities and expectations which discourage riskier gambling behaviour. This, in turn, 
results in more ‘prudential’ subjectivities which discourage problematic gambling 
behaviour. Participants who had experienced recovery and many of those who had 
never experienced addiction revealed long-term reductions in gambling behaviour. 
Findings suggested these reductions (as well as recovery) to be supported by social 
and cultural processes, occurring over the life-course, which encourage increased 
participation in more ‘conventional’ life/milieus and thereby promote alterations in 
subjectivities in ways more conducive to control. 
A dual approach to discouraging problematic gambling behaviour is recommended. 
Although it is important to promote ‘safer’ ways of gambling (e.g. through promotion of 
harm-reduction style interventions and by designing gambling environments in ways to 
support greater constraint), it is also imperative to support the development of 
lives/milieus and subjectivities more conducive to control (e.g. participation in 
‘conventional’ life and access to resources required to do so).  
Keywords: harm reduction; gambling; addiction; behaviour change; life-course; natural 
recovery; maturing out; Bourdieu; Foucault; Zinberg; socio-cultural milieu. 
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Introduction: situating the thesis 
This chapter introduces and situates this doctoral thesis within the wider academic 
context. A brief overview of the gambling landscape in the UK is provided with 
emphasis on pertaining major themes, trends, and contemporary concerns. Influenced 
by substance addiction literature (Zinberg, 1984), the idea, key to this study, that 
control over gambling (including addiction recovery) is influenced by the milieus in 
which the lives of individuals are embedded is introduced. The research questions 
used to guide the thesis are presented. A summary of the forms that gambling research 
tends to take is presented with a focus on the limitations of that work which are 
addressed in the present project. There is then discussion of the potential value of the 
research before the chapter closes with an outline of the thesis structure. 
 
Defining gambling 
‘Gambling’ refers to any activity in which something of monetary value (the wager), 
typically money, is risked on an uncertain outcome usually with intent or hope of 
winning back something of greater value than was initially risked (Reith, 2007a; Abbott 
et al., 2004a; Nower and Blaszczynski, 2008). Gambling activities are diverse and 
include lotteries, sports betting, bingo, card games, roulette, and various electronic 
gambling machines (EGMs). Wagers are placed in various physical settings such as 
those primarily designated for gambling (e.g. betting shops, bingo halls, and casinos), 
‘ambient’ places where gambling is not a primary but peripheral activity (e.g. pubs, 
clubs, and supermarkets), and at some sporting events (e.g. horseracing), or, if placed 
over the internet, potentially anywhere with connectivity, particularly if a smartphone is 
used (Abbott, 2006; Orford, 2011; Gainsbury et al., 2012). 
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Gambling participation in the UK 
Gambling is popular in the UK. One study estimated that in the UK during 2010 over 
73% of adults (16+) had gambled in the past year and 41% of adults had gambled at 
least weekly (Wardle et al., 2011a). The National Lottery (NL) is the most popular 
gambling activity and in 2010 over half of British adults were estimated to have 
participated in non-NL gambling in the past year (56%: Wardle et al., 2011a). 
Ascertaining trends in gambling participation is difficult because of methodological 
differences between population studies, however data from the three-part British 
Gambling Prevalence Survey (BGPS) series (now discontinued) indicated that the 
popularity of gambling has remained relatively stable between 1999 and 2010 (73% 
past year in 2010 and 68% past year in both 2007 and 1999; Wardle et al., 2011a). 
 
Concerns about gambling 
While gambling can be a harmless leisure pursuit, for a significant minority participation 
in gambling can be difficult to manage and/or may contribute to harm not only for 
themselves but for others close to them (McMillen, 1996; Reith, 2007b; Abbott et al., 
2004a; Dickerson, 2003a). Some gamblers report extreme difficulty or failure to resist 
compulsions to gamble (i.e. gambling addiction) and this often contributes to significant 
negative consequences or harm (problematic gambling) (see chapter two; Dickerson, 
2003a). Predominantly, investigations of gambling difficulties have been concerned 
with uncovering the causes of problematic gambling behaviours and much of this work 
has been medical or psychological, premised on the assumption that such behaviour is 
symptomatic of impaired control caused by an underlying physiological abnormality, 
mental illness, or dysfunction of thought (Reith, 2007a; see chapter two). Since the 
1970s, and especially from the turn of the 21st century, greater accessibility and 
promotion of gambling has contributed to increasing concern about the negative impact 
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of gambling on individuals, families, and communities (Abbott et al., 2004a; Reith, 
2007a). 
 
Prevalence of problematic gambling in the UK 
Despite the popularity of gambling among adults in the UK, estimated rates of 
problematic gambling are, proportionally, low – consistently less than 1% of the adult 
population (Wardle et al., 2011a). While evaluation of such estimates is beyond scope 
of discussion, reflection on how these are produced is salient. 
 
Estimates are produced through survey research designs which incorporate 
instruments developed to screen for problematic gambling behaviour. These are known 
as gambling screens. Along with other criticisms (see chapter four), it has been noted 
that different gambling screens can produce very different estimates of problematic 
gambling not only when conducted on the same population but on the same 
respondents (Currie and Cassie, 2007). Moreover there have been concerns that 
reliance on figures produced through epidemiological studies may underestimate 
prevalence and harm for various reasons: (1) the surveying of stigmatised behaviours 
is sensitive to well-known issues such as recruitment bias, non-response/reporting, 
dishonesty, as well as those surrounding respondent recall and underestimation of 
behaviour (see chapter four); (2) surveys tend to overlook those aged 15 or younger 
and estimates of adolescent problematic gambling have, consistently, been greater 
than those of adults (Griffiths, 2009; Forrest and McHale, 2011); (3) only adults living in 
private households tend to be surveyed which, by definition, excludes groups such as 
homeless people and those living in institutions (e.g. prisons) (Wardle et al., 2011a:75) 
which have been suggested to be more likely to gamble problematically (Abbott et al., 
2005; Rogers et al., 2005:7); and (4) it has been estimated that, on average, for every 
individual who gambles problematically, there may be 8-10 others in their social 
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network who experience harmful consequences (Lobsinger and Bechett, 1996. Cited in 
George and Copello, 2011:318). Nonetheless, even if estimates were indicated to be, 
for example, five times greater, the vast majority of those who gamble would still do so 
without experiencing significant difficulties. 
 
There is very little evidence that the prevalence of problem gambling has increased 
much, if at all, in recent years. The British Gambling Prevalence Survey (BGPS) series 
used a combination of three screening instruments to estimate problem gambling 
prevalence rates (see Wardle et al., 2011a). Using the fourth edition of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) screen, the BGPS series reported 
an estimated problematic gambling prevalence rate of 0.6% in 1999 and 2007 and 
0.9% in 2010 (Wardle et al., 2011a:11). The authors were keen to point out, however, 
that though this may appear to indicate a slight rate increase, this was on the margin of 
statistical significance and quite possibly the result of variability in the data (Wardle et 
al., 2011a:12). Indeed, through use of different screens included in the same survey 
(and thus with the same sample) different problematic gambling rates were suggested: 
the South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS) indicated a rate of 0.8% in 1999 and its 
replacement, the Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI) screen, indicated rates of 
0.5% in 2007 and 0.7% in 2010 (Wardle et al., 2011a, Sproston et al., 2000). 
Furthermore, while the DSM-IV screen indicated a statistically significant increase in 
problem gambling between 2007 and 2010, the PGSI screen did not (Wardle et al., 
2011a:12). Though figures of less than a per cent are a relatively small proportion of 
the adult population, it is worth noting that even a tenth of a per cent may represent a 
sizeable number of individuals whose gambling contributes to harm. The BGPS 2010 
problem gambling estimated prevalence rate of 0.9% represents 451,000 adults living 
in Britain (Wardle et al., 2011a). 
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Gambling landscape in the UK 
Deregulation 
Over the past century, Western societies have increasingly become characterised by 
the principals of neoliberalism and consumerism (see chapters one and two; Reith, 
2007b). Against this backdrop, from the late 20th century gambling has become 
increasingly deregulated (see chapter two; Light, 2007; Reith, 2006). Indeed, prior to 
the 1960s many forms of gambling that are widely marketed today were prohibited (e.g. 
betting shops, casinos, and bingo halls) and though these were then legalised they 
were heavily regulated and promotion strictly restricted (Light, 2007; Griffiths and 
Wood, 2001; Reith, 2006:10). The Gambling Act 2005, implemented in 2007, described 
as ‘most dramatic reorganisation of the gambling climate the U.K. has ever 
experienced’ (Reith, 2006:10), removed various restrictions and, in particular, allowed 
commercial promotion (Light, 2007). An overview of the UK gambling landscape, 
comprised of ‘land-based’ and internet forms, and including major themes and trends is 
now provided.  
 
Land-based gambling 
Popular land-based gambling provision in the UK includes betting shops, bingo halls, 
casinos, and electronic gambling machines (EGMs). Despite news reports of a 
‘proliferation’ of betting shops in the UK in recent years (e.g. Daily Mail, 2014; BBC, 
2014), the number of betting shops have remained relatively stable at around 8,500 
(Association of British Bookmakers, 2012) though these do appear to be increasingly 
clustered on urban thoroughfares rather than on backstreets as had been more the 
case in past decades (Jones et al., 2000:223; Wardle et al., 2011b). Recent years have 
seen a diversification of betting shop provision away from more ‘traditional’ track 
activities (e.g. horse/greyhound racing) to include other activities such as EGMs 
(Cassidy, 2012a). Numbers of bingo halls have declined from a peak of 1,820 in 1974, 
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972 in 1993 (Munting, 1996:165), to 646 in 2012 (Gambling Commission, 2012:23). 
The proportion of offline bingo players in Britain appears to have remained relatively 
stable over recent years; in 2000, 2007, and 2012 7% of adults were estimated to have 
played offline bingo in the past year (Wardle et al., 2011a; Wardle et al., 2014). In 
March 2015 there were 148 casinos in Britain, typically offering table games such as 
blackjack, roulette, and poker as well as various types of EGMs (Gambling 
Commission, 2015a). The proportion of the British population who participated in 
(offline) casino table games in the past year was estimated to be 3% in 1999, 4% in 
both 2007 and 2010, and 3% in 2012 (Wardle et al., 2011a:25; Wardle et al., 2014:14). 
 
Peripheral gambling 
One of the most noticeable changes to the gambling landscape has been the rise of 
‘peripheral’ or ‘convenience’ gambling which refers to gambling provision in places not 
dedicated to gambling (Orford, 2011; Home Office, 2001). EGMs, for example, are 
situated in places such as pubs, bars, cinemas, clubs, bowling alleys, and motorway 
service stations and lotteries and scratch cards may be purchased in corner shops and 
supermarkets (Orford, 2011). 
 
Electronic gambling machines (EGMs) 
Recent years have seen a large rise and diversification in EGMs in Britain (Cassidy, 
2012a; Turner and Horbay, 2004). Examples include ‘fruit’ machines often found in 
pubs, as well as crane grab, coin pusher and penny fall machines often found in 
amusement arcades, and Fixed Odds Betting Terminals (FOBTs) found in betting 
shops (Orford, 2011). Participation data collected in 2012 suggested that of adults 
(16+) in England and Scotland in the past year, 7% had gambled on slot machines and 
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3% had gambled on machines placed in betting shops in the past year (Wardle et al., 
2014).  
 
Internet gambling 
Since the 1990s gambling has become increasingly available in Britain through the 
internet (Wood and Williams, 2011; Gainsbury et al., 2015). Increases in participation 
have been supported by greater accessibility of better quality internet access and 
adoption of mobile internet technologies including smartphones, mobile applications 
(‘apps’), 3G/4G and publically accessible Wi-Fi (Gainsbury et al., 2012; Gordon et al., 
2015). Data collected in 2012 suggested that 7% of adults (aged 16+) in Britain had 
gambled online (excluding the National Lottery) in the past year (Wardle et al., 2014). 
 
There is some evidence to suggest that rates of problematic gambling are significantly 
greater among those who gamble online compared to those who gamble exclusively 
offline (Wardle et al., 2011a; Wood and Williams, 2009; Hing et al., 2015a). Based on 
this data, a number of concerns have been raised about online gambling which have 
been purported to encourage more excessive gambling and increase harm. These 
include use of ‘digital money’, facilitation of solitary gambling, less scrutiny from others, 
and so less fear of embarrassment (Hing et al., 2015a). Of chief concern, however, has 
been greater accessibility facilitated by mobile technologies (Hing et al., 2015a; 
Gainsbury et al., 2012). 
    
Increased promotion and marketing 
The 2005 Gambling Act allowed the commercial promotion and marketing of gambling. 
Gambling products are advertised widely through mediums including print, television, 
radio, at sporting events, the internet (e.g. social networking platforms) (Binde, 2014) 
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and it appears that the volume of gambling advertising to British audiences is rapidly 
increasing (Ofcom, 2013). Academic discussions of gambling promotion are 
predominantly negative (Binde, 2014) and concerns have been raised that greater 
exposure to gambling resulting from increased promotion may encourage greater 
gambling consumption increasing risk, severity and/or duration of problematic gambling 
and related harm (Binde, 2009; Hing et al., 2013; Hing et al., 2015b; Thomas et al., 
2012a; Lamont et al., 2011). It is worth noting, however, that while those experiencing 
gambling difficulties often report that advertising and promotion makes control and/or 
abstinence difficult, studies have not shown that greater exposure to gambling 
advertising leads to increased gambling consumption or problematic gambling 
(Griffiths, 2005:15; Binde, 2007:167; Binde, 2009:541; Hing et al., 2015b). 
 
‘Normalisation’ 
It has been suggested that the contemporary shift towards gambling as a ubiquitous, 
extensively marketed activity, widely viewed as a legitimate, mainstream, leisure 
activity has ‘normalised’ gambling (Hing et al., 2015b; Moodie and Reith, 2009). 
Concerns about normalisation often centre on the view that gambling has the potential 
to be harmful and so the impression that gambling is ‘normal’  and, by implication, 
harmless should be avoided (Hing et al., 2013; Lamont, 2011). Normalisation, however, 
appears inconsistent across disparate forms of gambling and for different individuals. 
The National Lottery, for example, appears particularly normalised to such an extent 
that many ‘players’ do not see themselves as gamblers (Reith, 1999:100), whereas 
gambling on FOBTs, it is reasonable to speculate, may be less so. Research with 
Australian sport-following males aged 18-30 has suggested sports betting to be a 
cultural norm whereas sports betting may be less of a cultural expectation for other 
groups (Gordon et al., 2015). 
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Research focus and approach 
Regulation of gambling behaviour: theories of exposure and adaptation 
As just discussed, forms of gambling are extremely accessible in the UK and, to 
varying degrees, gambling has become a ‘normal’, mainstream, and legitimate leisure 
activity. Indeed, accessibility and promotion mean that citizens in the UK are among 
the most exposed to gambling around the world (Shaffer, 2005:1228). There has been 
concern that greater exposure to gambling leads to greater risk of gambling addiction 
and harm (Orford, 2005a,b; Productivity Commission, 1999; Gambling Review Body, 
2001) – an assumption often referred to as ‘exposure theory’ (Storer et al., 2009; 
Abbott et al., 2014). Given that accessibility is a precondition of gambling participation 
and, in turn, for the experience of gambling addiction and gambling-related harm, such 
assumptions appear reasonable. Exposure theory, however, fails to appreciate that the 
relationship between exposure (including availability and accessibility) and gambling 
behaviour and problems is complex and likely mediated by various other influences 
(Abbott, 2005; Shaffer et al., 2004b; Abbott et al., 2014). At population levels, 
relationships appear non-linear so that when exposure reaches a certain level further 
increases do not necessarily lead to increases in rates of consumption and/or 
problematic gambling (Abbott, 2006). This resonates with the UK context where, 
despite increasing exposure over the past 15 years or so, population studies have 
indicated problem gambling prevalence rates to have remained relatively stable 
(Wardle et al., 2011a). 
 
According to ‘adaptation theory’, through familiarity with gambling, over time, 
populations and citizens develop adaptations which act to buttress control and 
ameliorate gambling-related harm so that despite high, even increasing, gambling 
exposure, rates of participation and problematic gambling prevalence plateau and even 
decline (Abbott et al., 2014; Abbott, 2006; Storer et al., 2009). These adaptations have 
been posited to occur both at societal/community levels (e.g. greater public awareness 
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of problem gambling, expansion and development of mutual help groups, treatment 
services, and regulatory change) as well as at the individual level such as the 
development of informal social controls – strategies used by gamblers to manage their 
gambling (Abbott et al., 2014:987; Storer et al., 2009). Evidence for the adaptation 
thesis, however, has almost exclusively taken the form of secondary analyses of 
population and epidemiological survey data and there has been little examination of 
purported adaptations (Abbott, 2006).  
 
Guiding research questions 
The focus of this doctoral thesis is now explicated. Very few of those who gamble, even 
regularly, experience difficulty of control (addiction) and/or harm and this suggests that, 
despite exposure, most individuals manage their gambling well (Moore et al., 2012; 
Toneatto et al., 2008; Slutske et al., 2009; see chapter two). Moreover, most of those 
who do experience gambling addiction eventually recover – some to abstinence and 
others to continued, but better controlled, gambling (Reith and Dobbie, 2013; Hodgins 
and el-Guebaly, 2000; Slutske et al., 2010; see chapter two). However, despite this 
evidence, there has been very little investigation of how those who gamble without 
difficulties manage their gambling in ways which support greater control and mitigate or 
reduce harm (cf. Dzik, 2006; Reith and Dobbie, 2013) or how many of those who do 
experience difficulty of control and/or harm regain control and/or come to avoid harm. 
 
Though still scant, in comparison, there has been much greater research investigating 
how the majority of those who use substances do so without experiencing addiction 
and/or harm and how many of those who experience addiction eventually come to 
regain control and/or ameliorate harm (Zinberg, 1984; Grund, 1993; Decorte, 2001a; 
Moore, 1993; Waldorf et al., 1991; Cohen, 1999; see chapter two). Much of this work 
has been strongly influenced by Zinberg (1984) who sought to understand how and 
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why some drug users experience difficulties of control and harm by exploring (a) how 
and why others maintain control without such difficulties as well as (b) how and why yet 
others regain control and/or mitigate harm. 
Drawing on Zinberg’s (1984) approach, this thesis is guided by two research questions: 
1. How and why do most of those who gamble never experience gambling 
addiction or significant harm? 
2. How and why do most of those who do experience gambling addiction regain 
control and ameliorate or come to avoid harm? 
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Gambling behaviour: a brief overview of existing research 
A brief overview of existing gambling research and common themes is now provided 
(for further detail see chapter three). The aim is not to provide a literature review or in-
depth critical discussion but to give a sense of the research landscape within which this 
doctoral thesis is situated. In comparison to drug use, for example, gambling is a small 
field that has produced relatively little literature (Reith, 2007a). The field is extremely 
fragmented and has been studied from within various disciplines and subdisciplines 
(e.g. medicine, psychiatry, psychology, sociology, anthropology, and economics; 
McGowan, 2004; Binde, 2009). While there had been very little gambling research 
published before the 1980s, since the mid-1990s, and particularly in the past decade, 
gambling publications have gathered pace (McGowan et al., 2000; Reith, 2007a; 
Binde, 2009). This rise appears to have been encouraged by the expansion of 
gambling opportunities and concurrent concern about increased negative impact on 
communities and individuals (Ferentzy and Turner, 2013). Particularly influential was 
the inclusion of ‘pathological gambling’ into the third edition of the American Psychiatric 
Association’s (APA) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) 
(APA, 1980) as this legitimised problematic gambling behaviour as worthy of study 
(Bernhard, 2007; Reith, 2007a). These developments, along with the invention of 
various screening instruments and the rise of epidemiological studies seem to have 
made the phenomenon of problematic gambling increasingly ‘visible’ and ‘real’ to 
scientific inquiry (Reith, 2007a:11). In 2007, Reith noted that the number of specialised 
academic journals, annual conferences, research institutes, and funding bodies 
dedicated to gambling had grown in the past two decades (Reith, 2007a) and, from the 
present author’s own familiarity with the field, it appears that such developments are 
continuing. 
 
 
 13 
 
Approaches to the study of gambling behaviour 
Broadly speaking, the study of gambling behaviour can be differentiated by 
epistemological position (i.e. interpretivism or positivism) and discipline, however, it is 
important to keep in mind that some research is interdisciplinary and/or takes a ‘mixed-
methods’ approach (see chapter three). Investigations of gambling behaviour have, 
predominantly, been grounded in positivism and have approached problematic 
gambling (including gambling addiction) in terms of the biomedical or psychological 
(Reith, 2007a; Binde, 2009). Indeed, many approaches have come to view problematic 
gambling behaviour as caused by both psychological and biological factors (e.g. 
‘psychobiological’ models; see Blaszczynski et al., 1986; Roy et al., 1988; Griffiths, 
1991). Some epidemiological survey research has noted patterns of problematic 
gambling to be associated with particular sociodemographic factors and so suggested 
that various ‘social’ factors increase risk of gambling problematically (e.g.  Sproston et 
al., 2000; Wardle et al., 2011a). Building on psychobiological theories, this work has led 
to the development of ‘biopsychosocial’ models (e.g. Shaffer et al., 2004a; Orford, 
2001a; Blaszczynski and Nower, 2002). However, in spite of an appreciation that 
problematic gambling often follows particular socio-structural patterning, primacy 
continues to be afforded to the biological and/or psychological while social factors are 
treated as having (only) a mediatory influence over what, in effect, is seen as a 
disorder of the body and/or mind. 
 
This doctorial thesis takes an interpretivist approach (see chapters three and four). It 
will be argued that the positivist methodologies are inappropriate for the study of 
gambling behaviour because many influences over human behaviour cannot be 
quantified (Hanes and Case, 2008; Pitts, 2003; Giddens, 1984). In particular, behaviour 
is strongly influenced by many cultural phenomena (e.g. values/norms) which make no 
sense from positivist paradigms and so are inexplicable using such methods (Giddens, 
1984; Crotty, 1998; see chapter three). With the exception of a handful of sociological 
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and anthropological studies, very few studies have examined gambling behaviour from 
an interpretivist position (Reith, 2007a; Reith and Dobbie, 2011; McGowen, 2004; 
McGowan et al., 2000). Employing ethnographic methods, some research, for 
example, has explored gambling cultures through immersion and, sometimes, 
participation in those cultures (e.g. Newman, 1972; Goffman, 1969; Zola, 1963; 
Devereux, 1980; Malaby, 2003). 
 
Common themes and limitations of existing gambling research 
Discussion now turns to the common themes of existing gambling research. Particular 
emphasis is on the weaknesses of this literature which are addressed in this doctoral 
thesis thereby illustrating the originality of this study. 
 
Gambling screens: identifying and measuring gambling harm and addiction 
Studies of gambling behaviour almost always rely on (quantitative) ‘gambling screens’ 
to identify experience of problematic gambling and measure severity of the experience 
(McGowan et al., 2000). Essentially, these screens involve asking individuals whether 
or not their gambling has contributed to particular predefined harms (known as ‘items’) 
who are, subsequently, scored depending on the number of items they affirm (Reith, 
2007a; Dickerson, 2003a). At a given threshold the individual is deemed to gamble 
problematically and is classified as a ‘problem gambler’ (or ‘pathological gambler’ 
depending on terminology used; Abbott et al., 2004). Indeed, the use of screening 
instruments is so de rigueur in studies that even much research which would otherwise 
be well described as interpretivist relies on quantitative gambling screens to identify 
and classify research participants (e.g. Reith and Dobbie, 2013). As will become clear 
in chapter four, though gambling screens are not designed to identify experience of 
gambling addiction and are unsuitable to do so, they are commonly used as such in 
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research. Not only is the use of harm as proxy for addiction problematic because harm 
is not always product of addiction but the experience of gambling-related harm is 
deeply subjective and does not lend itself to quantification (Griffiths, 2014a; Wakefield, 
1997; see chapter four). Moreover, McGowan et al. (2000) have criticised reliance on 
gambling screens arguing that the methodological diversity of gambling research has 
been seriously hindered by the acceptance of gambling screens as the (only) accepted 
technique for identifying problematic gambling behaviour. 
 
Reliance on gambling screens to identify experience of addiction and harm is rejected 
in this thesis. As will be justified in chapter four and illustrated with empirical data in 
chapter five, a better way to examine experiences of gambling addiction and gambling 
related harm is, more simply, to ask if individuals have experienced significant difficulty 
controlling their gambling (i.e. experienced gambling addiction) and if they felt their 
gambling to have contributed to significant harm. At this point, however, it is important 
to clarify that despite various weaknesses (see chapters four and five), screening 
instruments can still be valuable aids in the clinical assessment of gambling behaviour. 
To give examples, screens may be used in formal treatment to help clients better 
understand and reflect on their gambling behaviour, identify individuals who might 
benefit most from intervention or support, and allocate limited treatment resources 
more effectively (Taxman et al., 2007). As will be discussed further in later chapters, 
the argument germane to this thesis, however, is that, in isolation, screening 
instruments cannot be solely relied upon to identify experience of addiction, harm or 
lack thereof and so cannot be depended on for the case selection of research 
participants (see chapters four and five). 
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Lack of theory in general and as an organising framework in particular  
A systematic review of social and cultural gambling research published in 2000 
concluded that gambling research had tended to neglect theory and was becoming 
increasingly atheoretical (McGowan et al., 2000; McGowan, 2004). Where theory is 
included in gambling publications this tends to be limited to speculation in the 
discussion sections of published papers (McGowan et al., 2000). Given these points, 
there have been calls for researchers to use theory to underpin and organise research 
(McGowan et al., 2000; Shaffer and Korn, 2002). Though these claims and calls were 
made around fifteen years ago, readings of gambling literature for this thesis suggest 
that, with few exceptions (e.g. Reith, 2007b), these have not been heeded. Such 
theoretical parochialism is not confined to the study of gambling behaviour but typifies 
the naturalistic approaches which characterise addiction research more broadly 
(Rhodes et al., 2010). In contrast, the present research is heavily influenced and 
organised by theory. Chapters one, two, three, and four are largely concerned with 
developing the theoretical, conceptual, and methodological underpinnings/frameworks 
of the present work. 
 
Focus on gambling problems rather than gambling in general 
The study of gambling behaviour, like that of addiction in general, tends to rely 
exclusively on data gathered from those who have experienced difficulty managing 
their consumption and/or harm (Reith, 2007a; McGowan 2004; Binde, 2009), the logic 
being that understanding of problematic consumption is best gained through 
investigating how and why some individuals come to consume problematically and how 
and why they came to do so. While this approach is valuable, knowledge that might be 
used to prevent and ameliorate experience of gambling difficulties can also be gained 
via examination of those who consume without ever experiencing significant difficulties 
as well as others who recover from difficulties (Zinberg, 1984; Decorte, 2001a; Waldorf 
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et al., 1991). As noted earlier and discussed more fully in chapter four, this is the 
approach broadly taken in this doctoral thesis.  
  
Approaching individuals as passive and without agency 
Positivist approaches to explaining social action tend to focus on structural forces held 
to impose upon the individual regardless of any meaning for the actor (Bryman, 
2008:15). In biomedical work such forces may have roots in physiology while, in social-
science work, forces may be held as aspects of social structure, external to the actor, 
that impose upon them. This focus on the structural has led to criticism of positivist 
approaches for neglecting agency and treating behaviour as the product of quantifiable 
determinants (Popay, 1998; O’Mahony, 2009) so that action becomes regarded as 
‘nothing more than a system outcome’ (Kelly and Charlton, 1995:81). Indeed, it has 
been argued that in much risk factor research there is no place for agency, free-will or 
self-responsibility because the actor is seen as determined to act by forces outside of 
their control (O'Mahony, 2009:111). Thus, in most existing gambling research 
individuals are seen as passive subjects rather than active, thinking, agents. The 
propensity of most existing gambling research to treat individuals and their actions as 
passive outcomes is misaligned with a central, generally agreed, premise of 
contemporary social theory – that individuals, though strongly influenced by structure, 
also have free-will and agency so that any comprehensive investigation of social action 
must include examination of both structure and agency (see chapter one). Throughout 
this thesis, it is appreciated that whilst individuals may be strongly encouraged to act in 
particular ways by past and present conditions/circumstances, they also have capacity 
(agency) to make decisions to act otherwise (Giddens, 1984). 
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Preoccupation with behaviour at the time of data collection and neglect of the 
processural, dynamic, and longitudinal 
In general, gambling research has neglected to appreciate or explore the variability of 
individuals’ gambling patterns, behaviours, or experiences over their lives. Studies tend 
not to collect data about individuals’ biographies, how their gambling patterns have 
changed, and/or how they came to gamble as they do but, rather, only on how they 
gamble and/or gambling difficulties at the time of data collection. 
Population/epidemiological survey research, for example, tends to follow a cross-
sectional design where quantitative data is solicited from research participants about 
their lives at the time of data collection to provide a ‘snapshot’ of the gambling patterns 
and prevalence of problematic gambling (e.g. Sproston et al., 2003). While such 
studies are often repeated on the same population (albeit with a different sample), 
providing some indication of gambling-related trends, they reveal nothing about how 
the gambling of individuals’ changes over time. Notwithstanding this, a few gambling 
studies have taken a longitudinal approach where the gambling patterns/behaviours of 
particular interviewees are surveyed over time and these have consistently suggested 
that the gambling of both non-problematic and problematic gamblers tends to be highly 
variable with gamblers shifting in and out of heavier and lighter patterns of gambling 
and indicating that some may shift in and out of periods of problematic gambling 
(Slutske, 2007) (see chapter two). Quantitative longitudinal research, however, suffers 
from the general limitations of positivistic approaches which the present research seeks 
to address through interpretivism (see chapter four). In contrast to most existing 
gambling research, the present thesis is particularly concerned with the influence of 
change in aspects of the socio-cultural milieu on gambling behaviour and experience. 
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Potential value of the research 
Knowledge of how gamblers who have never experienced difficulties regulate their 
gambling and how those who recover do so, could be used to develop interventions 
and policies which discourage problematic gambling behaviour and support recovery. 
Such understandings could be used to develop more effective formal treatment 
interventions (Toneatto et al., 2008; Moore et al., 2012). 
  
Development of public health policies and interventions 
Very few of those who experience gambling difficulties seek treatment (Ladouceur, 
2005:51; Ladouceur et al., 2009:189) and, of those who do enter treatment, a high 
proportion drop out prematurely (estimated 30%: Ladouceur, 2005:51; Ladouceur et 
al., 2001). Poor engagement in treatment might be influenced by factors such as lack 
of accessibility (e.g. scarce provision, high cost, and lack of awareness), fear of 
embarrassment, and/or potential for stigmatisation (Hodgins and el-Guebaly, 2000; 
Reith, 2006; Orford et al., 2003). Moreover, most of those who experience gambling-
related difficulties appear often to express a preference to managing their gambling by 
themselves (Thomas et al., 2010; Hodgins and el-Guebaly, 2000:784). Knowledge 
produced by this thesis may have potential value in protecting against problematic 
gambling behaviour as well as in supporting amelioration of difficulties among those 
who never engage with treatment services or drop out. Such interventions may include 
public health messages as well as literature and awareness campaigns (Toneatto et 
al., 2008; Moore et al., 2012). Drawing on drug-use research (Rhodes, 2002), such 
knowledge might also be used to (re)design gambling environments in ways which 
reduce harm, support greater control, and remove barriers to recovery.  
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Thesis structure 
In addition to this introduction, this doctoral thesis is structured according to eight 
chapters. Though rarely made explicit, studies of human behaviour are premised on 
assumptions relating to the structure-agency ‘problem’ – that is, the extent to which 
behaviour is determined by forces outside of individual control or is product of free-will 
(Archer, 1988; Giddens, 1989). This issue is of particular relevance to addiction which 
appears to involve suppression of personal volition (Valverde, 1998; see chapter two). 
Chapter one engages with structure-agency debates to develop a model of social 
action, fashioned from a synthesis of Bourdieusian and (post)Foucauldian theory, to 
underpin and guide the research. This chapter provides the theoretical foundations for 
the thesis and is drawn on in all proceeding chapters. 
 
Chapter two examines the nature of gambling addiction and sets out how the 
phenomenon is approached in this thesis. Taking a Foucauldian approach, the chapter 
traces the intertwined histories of addiction and problematic gambling discourses to 
provide an account of how gambling came to be an addiction. Based on extensive 
evidence, the dominant biomedical addiction model is problematised, rejected, and a 
social-constructionist explanation of (gambling) addiction, far more consistent with 
existing evidence, is presented. It is shown that gambling is no less a genuine addiction 
than substance addictions and that knowledge of the latter is germane to gambling 
behaviour. Evidence that most of those who use objects commonly regarded as 
addictive do not experience addiction and many of those who do so eventually recover 
without formal treatment is examined. Throughout the chapter it is illustrated that 
control over consumption (or lack thereof) is influenced by the social and cultural 
conditions in which individuals’ lives are embedded. 
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Chapter three provides an overview of gambling research and argues interpretivist 
approaches to be better suited to investigation of gambling behaviour than positivist 
ones. The nature of gambling-related harm is explored and the thesis is situated within 
the harm reduction paradigm while appreciating that harm may also involve reductions 
in consumption. Of key concern in the chapter is the development of an analytical 
framework used to structure the empirical data collection and analysis, and this is 
achieved largely through synthesis of Bourdieusian theory and existing 
addictions/recovery literature. The framework is comprised of socio-cultural milieu, 
beliefs, practices, and life-structure. 
 
Chapter four presents the (qualitative) methodology, research design, approach, and 
methods used. The guiding research questions and aims are detailed and the 
underlying philosophical positions from which these are addressed explicated. 
Recruitment via chain referral as well as an online survey is examined and the primary 
method of data collection, semi-structured interviewing, is critically discussed. Chapter 
four closes with discussion of how the data collected is analysed and presented in 
ways which minimise decontextualisation (e.g. through use of vignettes) in later 
chapters. 
 
Chapters five, six, and seven present the findings and, the latter two chapters, in 
particular, concern interpretation and discussion of the findings. Rather than a 
standalone ‘discussion’ chapter, findings are presented alongside discussion as this 
worked well and is much more in keeping with Bourdieu’s approach (Wacquant, 
1989:50). 
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Chapter five commences with presentation of data collected via the recruitment survey 
before turning to introduce the 25 interviewees from whom data was collected, their 
gambling patterns, and trajectories. The chapter closes with discussion of interviewees’ 
gambling experiences and uses vignettes to illustrate gambling-related biographies and 
trajectories. Gambling patterns are presented as dynamic with many interviewees 
suggesting long-term reductions in gambling over their life-courses, which, for those 
who had experienced addiction, was consistent with ‘natural’ recovery (Waldorf et al., 
1991). This sets the scene for more detailed qualitative analyses presented in chapters 
six and seven.  
 
The presentation and discussion of findings continues with chapter six where the 
focus is on how gambling-related aspects of interviewees’ lives/milieus and their 
subjectivities influence gambling behaviour, control, and harm. The chapter begins with 
presentation of strategies used by interviewees to regulate their gambling and 
considers the efficacies of those practices before moving to examine influence of 
mindset and subjectivity. In keeping with the agency-structure position established in 
chapter one, particular consideration is given to how the qualities of spaces/places 
influence gambling behaviour and/or support decisions more conducive to constrained 
and better controlled gambling behaviour. 
 
As with chapter six, chapter seven is concerned with influences on gambling 
behaviour, control, and harm. However, focus goes beyond the gambling-related to 
examine aspects of interviewees’ lives/milieus not directly (or obviously) gambling-
related. In particular, there is greater focus on how the gambling behaviours of 
interviewees changed over gambling careers and life-courses. Drawing on 
Bourdieusian and (post)Foucauldian theory, it is argued that changes in the wider 
socio-cultural milieus in which individuals are embedded encourage shifts in 
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subjectivity in ways which motivate reductions in gambling behaviour (including, where 
applicable, recovery). 
 
Finally, chapter eight concludes the thesis and is concerned with the significance and 
value of the research. As well as discussion of contributions to academia/research, of 
particular focus is the translation of findings into ideas and recommendations for 
interventions/policy in ways aimed at supporting greater constraint/control, addiction 
recovery, and reducing gambling-related harm. In addition, there is a critique of the 
study and this includes ideas about what might have been done differently with 
hindsight and with greater resources. 
. 
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Chapter One: Theoretical framework 
This chapter sets the scene for the thesis by providing a theoretical framework from 
which social action can be understood. This framework will be drawn on throughout the 
thesis to help explain and interpret gambling behaviour and experiences. The chapter: 
1. Explores debates surrounding the structure-agency ‘problem’ and, through critical 
discussion, presents Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice as a suitable model of social 
action that addresses the ‘structure-agency’ issue. 
  
2. Critically explores the offerings of Foucault and others inspired by Foucauldian 
thought to the problem of social action. It is argued that (post)Foucauldian theory 
may be used to supplement the Bourdieusian model thereby locating it within the 
specific structural elements of contemporary culture. This leads to a synthesis of 
Bourdieusian and (post)Foucauldian theory which allows behaviour to be explored 
within the particular historically and culturally situated conditions in which the lives 
of participants in the present research are embedded. 
The chapter is thus broadly dichotomised into the following parts. Part one focuses on 
two closely related issues which have come to be regarded as central to the analysis of 
social action (Giddens, 1979): ‘structure-agency’ and ‘objectivism-subjectivism’. This 
involves exploration of whether behaviour is the result of volition and/or is determined 
by context/circumstance (Ritzer, 2000) – a dichotomy that clearly resonates with 
discourses of addiction which are framed in terms of an addicted state, expressed in 
various ways (i.e. ways of being, e.g. feelings and enactment of particular 
actions/behaviours), and couched in theories that are essentially about free-will/volition 
and determinism. It will be argued that understanding of the subjectivities and actions 
of actors requires both notions of structure (related to determinism) and agency 
(related to volition) as well as, crucially, how these concepts come together. In 
summary, full understanding of complex social action requires structure and agency to 
be viewed in terms of duality. From the presupposition of ontological duality, Bourdieu’s 
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Theory of Practice is critically examined and presented as a potentially fruitful way of 
framing (and explaining) experiences and behaviours of addiction. 
 
The transcultural nature of Bourdieu’s theory of practice means that (without alteration) 
it pays little attention to the particulars and specifics of contemporary cultural conditions 
that impact on the subjectivities of social actors and influence their actions and 
experiences. In part two Foucauldian inspired theory is considered in an effort to frame 
and explore the cultural conditions under which contemporary subjects – and in 
particular the specific participants in the present research – are constituted and act. 
The section introduces fundamental Foucauldian concepts of power and knowledge 
with a particular focus on ‘discourse’. This underpins the theoretical foundations of 
chapter two where addiction is explored as a social construction heavily influenced by 
dominant discourse(s). Discussion then turns to focus, more explicitly, on components 
of governmentality, or the cultural phenomena that shape the conduct of actors specific 
to contemporary society. Along with discourse these components include approaches 
to risk, in particular responsibilisation, which are embedded in neoliberal consumer 
rationalities where the ‘psy' sciences and experts have come to exert social authority 
over social life.  
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Part one: Model of social action 
 
Structure–agency and objectivism-subjectivism dichotomies 
Are actors ‘free’ to act without external constraints and are they in control of their own 
destinies (voluntarism)? Or are actions determined by forces beyond actors’ control 
(determinism)? In broad terms this is the structure-agency ‘problem’ and its place is not 
only central to sociology but the lives of every human being (see Archer, 1988:x). As 
such there has been a long history of attempts to develop theoretical accounts of how 
actors constitute society while simultaneously being constituent of society (see Archer, 
1982:455). Structure-agency approaches have shifted between two main, ‘ideal-type’ 
(Weber), positions. On the one hand from a structuralist/functionalist position dominant 
‘structures’ have been held to operate independently from, and thus regarded as 
impervious to, human action (see Shilling, 1992:78; Sewell, 1992:2) and to determine 
that action (usually more by constraint than opportunity) (see Archer, 1988:x). The 
purest example is Durkheim’s position that human action/behaviour/society is 
organised by ‘social facts’ and ‘rules’. As Durkheim argued: ‘...social life must be 
explained, not by the conception of those who participate in it, but by deep causes 
which lie outside of consciousness’ (Durkheim, 1970 [1897]:250 cited in Bourdieu, 
1989:15). Underpinning this thinking is social objectivism: the view that society can be 
understood as an objective structure, ‘grasped from the outside’, the expressions of 
which can be materially observed, measured, or mapped independently of the social 
individuals who operate within it (Wacquant, 1992:8). Objective structures are held to 
operate independently of the ‘consciousness and will of agents’ and ‘are capable of 
constraining their practices and their representations’ (Bourdieu, 1989:14). At its logical 
extreme social phenomena are held to exist ‘out there’ as ‘true’ and ‘accurate’ 
knowledge (Bourdieu, 1987a:3; Letherby et al., 2013:13). As Bourdieu (1989) points 
out this kind of objectivism often goes hand-in-hand with the ‘positivist proclivity to 
conceive of classification as mere ‘operational’ partitions, or as mechanical recording of 
breaks or ‘objective’ discontinuities’ (1989:15). The point being that ‘otherwise 
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undifferentiated continuum of the social world’ are arbitrarily cut up (Bourdieu, 1987a:3) 
and only exist as distinct (objective) entities insofar as they are classified and recorded 
as such. As Sewell (1992) contends, overly structural approaches have tended to treat 
structures like ‘girders of a building’, ‘reified and treated as primary, hard, and 
immutable’, where structured events and social processes are mutable within structural 
constraints ‘like the layout of offices on floors defined by a skeleton of girders’ (Sewell, 
1992:2). Those critical of structuralism have argued that actors are treated as ‘cleverly 
programmed automatons’ (Sewell, 1992:2), ‘mere marionettes’ (Archer, 1988:x), rule-
following ‘cultural dopes’ (Garﬁnkel, 1967:68) and ‘playthings or puppets of reified 
social systems’ (Stones, 2005:14). 
 
In contrast, from a broadly agential position society is viewed as the sum and product 
of agent’s individual decisions, actions, and acts of interpretation ‘whereby people 
jointly construct meaningful lines of (inter)action’ (Wacquant, 2008:267; see also 
Wacquant, 1992:9). Max Weber (1968 [1922]) held that action was social ‘insofar as 
the acting individual attaches subjective meaning to his [sic] behaviour’ and ‘subjective 
meaning takes account of the behaviour of others and is thereby orientated in its 
course’ (Weber, 1968 [1922]:4. Emphasis added) and thus in order to explain particular 
acts there needs to be interpretive understanding of the subjective meaning that actors 
have for those acts (Verstehen) (Weber, 1968 [1922]:9; Swedberg, 2003:283). 
Similarly, those taking this stance include symbolic interactionists who generally regard 
‘social life as an active accomplishment of purposive, knowledgeable actors’ (Giddens, 
1979:50). Schutz (1962), for example, argued that through a series of common-sense 
constructs human beings pre-select and pre-interpret social reality and it ‘is these 
thought objects constructed of theirs which determine their behaviour by motivating it’ 
(Schutz, 1962:59. Cited in Bourdieu, 1989:15). To give a final example, the 
ethnomethodologist Harold Garfinkel saw the social as the accomplishments of actors 
who continually construct their social world through the ‘organized artful practices of 
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everyday life’ (Garfinkel, 1967:8). As Wacquant points out, the value of this approach 
lies in recognising the part of ‘mundane knowledge, subjective meaning, and practical 
competency in the continual production of society’ (Wacquant, 1992:9). However, as 
Stones (2005:14) argues, subjectivism removes agents from the wider socio-structural 
context, reducing social life to the actions of individual agents and their (immediate) 
interactions. Taking this approach to its logical extreme, class as well as other social 
phenomena categorised by analysts, are seen as nothing more than ‘constructs of the 
scientist, with no foundation whatsoever in reality’ (Bourdieu, 1987a:2). 
 
The polarisation of these perspectives resulted in a stalemate: the two sides of the 
long-running agency-structure debate became ‘virtually impossible to resolve’ 
(Giddens, 1989:250). Common and sustained criticism of these polarised positions 
generally took the form that both structure and agency were ‘indispensable in 
sociological explanation’ (Archer, 1982:455). Rather than treating agency and structure 
as antinomies (Giddens, 1979:49) there has arisen some consensus that in order to 
understand social action there must be consideration of both objective structures and 
subjective interpretations (see e.g. Bourdieu, 1989:15) and appreciation given to the 
idea that individuals are both ‘free and enchained, capable of shaping [their]...own 
future and yet confronted by towering, seemingly impersonal, constraints’ (Archer, 
1988:x). One of the most influential duality theories to unite structure with agency (and 
equally, vice versa) is Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice which is now discussed in detail.  
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Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice 
I can say that all of my thinking started from this point: how can behaviour be 
regulated without being the product of obedience to rules? 
(Bourdieu, 1987b:65) 
 
Ontology: ‘constructivist structuralism’ 
For Bourdieu, the ‘goal of sociology is to uncover the most deeply buried structures of 
different social worlds that make up the social universe, as well as the ‘mechanisms’ 
that tend to ensure their reproduction and transformation’ (Bourdieu, 1998:1). In 
Bourdieu’s ‘social universe’ structures have a double life, existing as two objective 
orders (Wacquant, 1992:7). The first order includes the distribution of material 
resources and ‘species of capital’ (Wacquant, 1992:7) while the second order refers to 
the mental schemata that function as symbolic templates for the practical activities (i.e. 
‘conduct, thoughts, feelings, and judgements’) of agents (Wacqaunt, 1992:7). Bourdieu 
argues that in taking an exclusively objectivist approach (first order), the social scientist 
constructs objective structures by ‘setting aside’ the ‘subjective representations of the 
agents’ resulting in constructed objective structures  that ‘form the basis for these 
representations and constitute the structural constraints that bear upon interactions’ 
(Bourdieu, 1989:15). For Bourdieu, social reality is conceptualised as a space of 
ongoing individual and collective (daily) struggles ‘which purport to transform or 
preserve’ structures (Bourdieu, 1989:15) and in order to account for these struggles it 
is necessary to consider subjective representations (second order) such as individual 
decisions, action, and acts of interpretation enacted by actors (Bourdieu, 1989:15). By 
taking either one of these polarised approaches the analyst neglects to consider that 
‘agents are both classified and classifiers’ of the social world (Bourdieu, 1987a:2) and 
thus Bourdieu argues that instead an approach is needed that utilises the ‘epistemic 
virtues’ of both approaches while ‘skirting the vices of both’ (Wacquant, 1992:7). As 
Bourdieu holds there to be a dialectical relationship between the objectivist structures 
and the cognitive and motivating structures which they produce and which produce 
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them (Bourdieu, 1977:83) any exploration of one is at one and the same time an 
exploration of the other (Bourdieu, 1998:1). It is this constructivist structuralism (equally 
‘structuralist constructivism’) that Bourdieu considers to be an important principal 
characterising his work (see Bourdieu 1989:14). This combination of objectivist and 
subjectivist principles reflects Bourdieu’s central concern with accounting for the fact 
that the actions of agents are neither determined by external social causes nor guided 
solely by internal reasons (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992:136). 
Underpinning the principles of constructivist structuralism, Bourdieu argues that: 
‘...there exists a correspondence between social structures and mental 
structures, between the objective divisions of the social world – especially the 
division into dominant and dominated in the different fields – and the principles 
of vision and division that agents apply to them’   
(Bourdieu, 1998:1) 
 
This correspondence, Bourdieu argues, exists because ‘cumulative exposure to certain 
social conditions instils […] an ensemble of durable and transposable dispositions that 
internalize the necessities of the extant social environment, inscribing inside the 
organism the patterned inertia and constraints of external reality’ (Wacquant, 1992:13). 
These ‘dispositions’ are what Bourdieu terms the ‘habitus’ – a concept that will be 
considered in further depth in due course. The relationship between social (objective) 
structures and cognitive/motivating structures (habitus) is viewed as dialectical by 
Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 1977:83); objective structures are said to produce these mental 
structures but mental structures also reproduced by objective structures (Bourdieu, 
1977:83): 
‘…objectives structures are themselves products of historical practices and are 
constantly reproduced and transformed by historical practices whose principal 
is itself the product of structures which it consequently tends to reproduce…’ 
(Bourdieu, 1977:83) 
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The basis of this relationship is that the mental structures through which actors 
apprehend or perceive the social world (the habitus) are ‘essentially the product of 
internalization of the structures of that world’ (Bourdieu, 1989:18). For the social 
analyst there must be appreciation that ‘the analysis of objective structures logically 
carries over into the analysis of subjective dispositions’ (Bourdieu and de Saint Martin, 
1982:47). This logic calls for investigation of the objective regularities, the process of 
internalisation of that objectivity, as well as the perceptual and evaluative schemata 
(e.g. ‘definitions of the situation, typifications, [and] interpretive procedures’) that agents 
invest in, and draw upon, in their everyday life (Wacquant, 1992:12; 13). 
 
Practical concepts  
In contrast to other theorists (e.g. Giddens, 1979), Bourdieu complements theory with 
practical concepts that were developed through his own empirical research and have 
been drawn on in the empirical work of others (e.g. Bourgois and Schonberg, 2007; 
2009). Bourdieu’s relational logic is both reflected in his central practical concepts as 
well as the way they relate to form a model of practice. Bourdieu presents his model as 
formulaically (Bourdieu, 1984 [1979]:101): 
[(habitus) × (capital)] + field = practices 
These concepts form an integrated system of social practice, one where the theoretical 
concepts of habitus, capital, field, and practices cannot be defined in isolation and 
without reference to one other. Practices produce an environment of objective 
conditions (or external structures) which result in the reproduction of habitus (through 
internalisation of external structures), capital, and field. It is the capacity and nature of 
habitus, through the medium of practice, in relationship with the capital and the 
environment (field) that makes possible the reproduction of collective history and 
objective structures (e.g. of language, economy) (Bourdieu, 1977:85). As an aside, 
Crossley (2001a:96) rightly notes that this formulaic representation is misleading 
because while it gives the gist of Bourdieu’s theory, it conveys a mechanistic 
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presentation that lacks meaning and improvisation belonging to the habitus and 
practices (2001a:96). As will be discussed, Bourdieusian theory is non-mechanistic and 
far more nuanced than has been suggested by the above formula (see also Bourdieu 
and Wacquant, 1992:135). 
 
Habitus 
Bourdieu’s notion of habitus can be regarded as ‘an acquired system of generative 
schemes objectively adjusted to the particular conditions in which it is constituted’ 
(Bourdieu, 1977:95). Schemata are ‘deposited’ within human bodies through the 
internalisation of external structures to take the form of ‘mental and corporal schemata’ 
(Wacquant, 1992:16) of ‘perception, thought, and action’ (Bourdieu, 1990:54) which 
provide know-how and competency (Swartz, 2002:625). Thus, schemata that form 
cognitive and motivating structures are socially constituted within the body (Bourdieu, 
1977:76). Embodied within the agents and constituted through unique experience, no 
two individuals can have an identical habitus (Wainwright et al., 2006:537). Even those 
from the same (objective) lifestyle grouping (e.g. ‘class’) will have different habitus as 
they will not have had the same experiences in the same order (Bourdieu, 1990:60). 
Members of the same grouping are, however, more likely to have confronted more 
similar situations and experiences than members of heterogeneous lifestyle groupings 
(Bourdieu, 1990:60). As a result, everyone has a unique habitus but those with similar 
biographies/experiences have similar habitus. Thus the habitus can be considered 
‘collective individuated through embodiment’ (Wacquant, 1992:18). The shared nature 
of the habitus among those with similar biographies enables ‘practices to be objectively 
harmonized [collectively] without any calculation or conscious reference to a norm and 
mutually adjusted in the absence of direct interaction [...] or explicit co-ordination’ 
(Bourdieu, 1990:59). The habitus only exists (and thus, external structures are only 
internalised) through the practices of actors, their interactions with each other, and their 
interactions with the environment (Jenkins, 1992:75). As a result of these ongoing 
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interactions, the habitus is constantly affected in a way that reinforces or modifies its 
(mental) structures (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992:133) making it durable but still 
changeable (Bourdieu, 1992:133). As interactions through which the habitus is 
reinforced or modified, take the form of practice, practice is the medium through which 
habitus and structure (re)produce one another. As Jenkins puts it, habitus is ‘not just 
manifest in behaviour, it is an integral part of it (and vice versa)’ (1992:75). It follows 
then, that in order to understand human behaviour and action, analysis must focus on 
the medium between habitus and the environment (field), i.e. practice. 
 
While the habitus (in part) produces the social world, which (in part) produces habitus, 
according to Bourdieu this is not a simple, straightforward, deterministic process: the 
notion of habitus is designed to help destroy ‘circular and mechanical models’ which 
propose that ‘structures produce habitus, which determines practices, which 
reproduces structures’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992:135). For Bourdieu, it is not 
external structures that determine thought and action. Rather it is the habitus and its 
relation to the social field that constrains thought and action. Habitus suggests rather 
than determines thought and action and thus Bourdieu rejects the idea that social 
strategy (or action) is directly determined by an agent’s position within the structure 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992:135). Thus, the re(production) of social structures is not 
deterministic because, theoretically, even if it was possible for two agents to have 
exactly the same habitus, practices would depend on what is going on in their 
respective fields (see Jenkins, 1992:82). Moreover, to understand the actions of 
agents, it is not only important to understand the position of the agent in the social 
space but also how they ‘got there’ and from what original point in the social space 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992:136). The future actions of agents are based on 
perceptual and evaluative schemata (habitus) developed from agents historical 
interactions (experience) with other agents and the field (see Bourdieu and Wacquant, 
1992:137). Thus habitus is innovative, creative, and inventive but in a constrained way 
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as it is limited by its structures as the result of its embodiment and formation of the 
social (external) structures that produce it (Wacquant, 1992:19). 
 
A significant aspect of the habitus is its ability to generate strategies that enable 
‘agents to cope with unforeseen and ever-changing situations’ (Bourdieu, 1977:72). 
This capacity comes from the nature of habitus as ‘a system of lasting, transposable 
dispositions which, function at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations, 
and actions’ (Bourdieu, 1977:83). The genesis of these ‘dispositions’ is found in the 
relationship between habitus and the repetition of practice. The transposable nature of 
habitus makes possible ‘the achievement of infinitely diversified tasks’ (Bourdieu, 
1977:83). While infinite in its diversity to generate products (thoughts, perceptions, 
expressions, and actions) the limits of those products are set by ‘historically and 
socially situated conditions of its production’ (Bourdieu, 1990:55). But within these 
limits, the transposable quality of habitus allows it to function and create relevance in 
contexts and fields other than those within which they were originally constituted 
(Jenkins, 1992:78). The transposable nature of the habitus allows existing schemata to 
be modified or adjusted in the wake of new experience (practice). 
 
Field 
Bourdieu conceptualises the field as space consisting of ‘a network, or a configuration, 
or objective relations between positions’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992:97). In 
Bourdieu’s own words: 
‘These positions are objectively defined, in their existence and in the 
determinations they impose upon their occupants [...] by their present and 
potential situation (situs) in the structure of the distribution of species of power 
(or capital) whose possession commands access to the specific profits that are 
at stake in the field, as well as by their objective relation to other positions 
(domination, subordination, homology, etc.)’ 
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(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992:97) 
Bourdieu understands ‘society’ to be an ‘ensemble of relatively autonomous spheres of 
‘play’’ (Wacquant, 1992:17) (or fields) that interweave to create a kind of web of spaces 
of struggle over various kinds of valued resources (see Swartz, 1997:47). Though, 
while fields are in a sense interconnected, they also have a high degree of autonomy 
from other fields (see Bourdieu, 1996 [1992]:47-112) with their own values and 
regulatory principles (Wacquant, 1992:17). Thus different species of capital have 
different hierarchical value across different fields (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992:98). As 
Thompson puts it, each field involves ‘specific forms and combinations of capital and 
value’ (Thompson, 1991:25), and these will carry different ‘weight’ in different fields. 
The field is a social space of conflict and competition in which agents struggle, 
depending on their position within the field, to achieve command, or establish 
monopoly, over the species of capital effective within it (Wacquant, 1992:17). In this 
sense it can be considered a kind of competitive marketplace where different species 
of capital are employed or deployed (Ritzer, 2000:535). Different species of capital are 
more ‘effective’ in different fields, to give examples: cultural authority in the artistic field 
or scientific authority in the scientific field (Wacquant, 1992:17). In the course of 
continual struggle between agents ‘the very shape and divisions of the field become a 
central stake, because to alter the distribution and relative weight [or hierarchy] of 
forms of capital is tantamount to modifying the structure of the field’ (Wacquant, 
1992:18). As a result fields are both dynamic and malleable, avoiding the ‘inflexible 
determinism of classical structuralism’ (Wacquant, 1992:18). Despite this malleability, 
social life is able to retain regular and predictable nature as a result of the habitus and 
the way it reacts to the field in a ‘roughly coherent and systematic manner’ (Wacquant, 
1992:18). However, it is the field of power (or politics) that is held with the utmost 
importance because the ‘hierarchy of power relationships within the political field serve 
to structure all the other fields’ (Ritzer, 2000:535). In other words, the political field has 
the power to decree the hierarchy between all forms of authority in the field of power 
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(Wacquant, 1992:17-18), and is, therefore, the ‘dominant’ field that affects all other 
fields. 
 
Capital 
Forms of capital are accumulated resources appropriated by agents, or groups of 
agents, which enable meaningful participation in the field (Bourdieu, 1986). According 
to Bourdieu (1986), social position within the field is conferred through the possession 
(potential or actual) of resources deemed valuable (i.e. capital) within the particular 
field. In other words, it is the distributive scarcity of forms of capital that, in large part, 
afford value (Bourdieu, 1986:84) – if all had the resource with exactly the same 
qualities then there would be no relative advantage to possession of the resource. The 
value of resources depends on the field and its structure, in particular the unequal 
distribution of valued resources (i.e. capital) (Bourdieu, 1986). Bourdieu (1986) 
presented four forms of cultural capital: economic, social, cultural, and symbolic. 
Critical of Marx’s propensity to explain social action almost exclusively in economic 
terms and with a particular interest in the influence of the socio-cultural on action 
(Bourdieu, 1990), it is perhaps unsurprising that Bourdieu seemed least concerned with 
economic capital (Bourdieu, 1986). 
Social capital refers to the ‘actual or potential resources’ that an actor may access 
through their relationships or (wider) social networks and by virtue of recognised 
community membership (Bourdieu, 1986). Social connections also constitute capital 
(resources) because they facilitate access to (collectively owned) capital and, by virtue 
of common group membership, social obligation between community members 
(Bourdieu, 1986). As social connections must provide access to other forms of capital 
(e.g. cultural capital) to be considered social capital, social capital is thus indivisible 
from other forms of capital (Bourdieu, 1986).  
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Developing on Bourdieu’s social capital, Putnam (2000) asserts two subtypes of social 
capital: bonding social capital and bridging social capital (2000:22). The former refers 
to ‘in-group’ ties which reassert group/community membership while the latter refers to 
ties to other groups/communities (Putnam, 2000). The significance of these subtypes of 
social capital is that those who only possess/make use of ties within communities 
usually have access to more limited resources (capital) than those who possess 
bridging ties to different groups/communities (Granovetter, 1973; 1983). As the 
(potential or actual) resources that an actor who does not possess bridging social ties 
can access tend to be the same as those that others in the same community can 
access, resources accessed through bonding ties are less likely to be scarce and so 
may provide little relative advantage (Granovetter, 1983). On the other hand, actors 
with bridging ties to other groups/communities are better placed to access resources 
which may be scarce in the communities in which they are immediately and more 
strongly embedded and thus may have greater advantage over peers. 
 
Cultural capital refers to all resources which are embodied within the (individual and 
collective) habitus largely as dispositions and which are appreciated by those within the 
community/field as valuable (Bourdieu, 1986). Finally, symbolic capital is the outcome 
of conversion of other forms of capital – the form that other types of capital (e.g. 
cultural capital) assume when they are recognised (valued) as legitimate resources so 
that they confer recognition, authority, respect, status, and/or prestige and thus power 
within the field and over others within it (Bourdieu, 1986; Bourdieu, 1989). As such it 
should not be thought of so much as a different type of capital but a form that other 
types of capital might assume. 
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Practical sense and practice 
For Bourdieu, the study of social phenomena from an ‘objective’ or external position 
means that social life is misrepresented (see Bourdieu, 1977:2; King, 2000:419). The 
social-scientist observer is ‘excluded from the real play of social activities by the fact 
that… [they have] no place in the system observed’ (Bourdieu, 1977:1). As an ‘outsider’ 
the social scientist reduces ‘social relations to commutative relations…and to decoding 
operations’ (Bourdieu, 1977:1) and thus construct rules, principles and ‘cultural maps 
[…] by which they orientate themselves around [the] strange cultural landscape’ (King, 
2000:419). These come to be treated as ‘evidence for the existence of an objective 
system of rules which imposes itself remorselessly on social interaction’ (King, 
2000:419). In other words, individuals are held to follow and act according to those 
rules and map, decoded by the outside observer, which served to orientate the 
observer and make sense of the social phenomena according to the observer’s own 
outside interpretation (see Bourdieu, 1977). 
 
For Bourdieu, agents do not act according to precise rules and principles. Instead the 
habitus functions to generate strategies, developed through experience and practice of 
the social world, which provide agents with a ‘practical sense of things’ or ‘feel for the 
game’ (Lamaison and Bourdieu, 1986:111). This practical sense operates as a ‘quasi-
bodily involvement’ in social circumstances which ‘presupposes no representation 
either of the body or of the world, still less of their relationship’ (Bourdieu, 1990:66). It, 
therefore, makes possible anticipation for the future – ‘feel for the game’, or ‘tactical 
intelligence’ (Bourdieu, 1990:103) – providing meaning for ‘the game’ as well as 
direction, orientation, and an impending outcome for those who take part (Bourdieu, 
1990:66). Guided by an embodied practical sense of things, actors respond to social 
conditions in a ‘reasonable’ way by providing a sense of which actions are appropriate 
(and which are not) in a given circumstance (Bourdieu, 1988:782,783; Thompson, 
1991:13). Taken for granted, this sense provides ‘an intimate understanding of the 
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object of the game and the kinds of situations it can throw up’ (King, 2000:419). As 
such the fit between the habitus and the ‘social world of which it is a product’ has been 
likened to a ‘fish in water’ in that the fish ‘does not feel the weight of the water’ 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992:127). The social world appears self-evident because 
the very ways of conceptualising it were produced by the habitus (see Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992:127). 
 
It is through practice (guided by practical sense) that it is possible for the habitus and 
objective structures to be (re)produced. The habitus has the capacity to generate and 
organise individual and collective practices (Bourdieu, 1990:53;54) because it was 
produced, in part and in the past, by practice itself. In this way the social world is able 
to continue in a regular and predictable way. While the habitus is the internalisation of 
the external structures through practice, external structures are the result of the 
practice enacted by the habitus. In other words, habitus, itself a product of history, is 
reproduced in though practice, creating more history (Bourdieu, 1990:54). While 
practices are generated, organised, and regulated by habitus, practices are not the 
product of ‘obedience to rules’ (Bourdieu, 1990:53). For Bourdieu, rules play a 
particularly small part in the determination of practices, instead practices are largely 
determined by the ‘automatism of the habitus’ (Bourdieu, 1990:145). By this, Bourdieu 
means that practices are produced as a matter of routine by the ‘thoughtlessness of 
habit or habituation, rather than consciously learned rules or principles’ (Jenkins, 
1992:76). This occurs without explicit reference to the schemas of the habitus, and it is 
for this reason that actors do not necessarily ‘know’ what they are doing and why, and 
so may not be able to discursively explain their actions. For Bourdieu then, agents do 
not follow precise rules but act according to their tacit knowledge of their cultural 
practices which they know ‘better than any set of rules could describe’ (King, 
2000:419).    
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Embodiment and habit 
The habitus is an embodied phenomenon (Adams, 2006:514). Bourdieu notes that the 
‘social reality’ objectivists speak of is also an object of perception and thus social 
analysis must focus on this reality as well as the perceptions, perspectives and points 
of view that agents have of this reality (1989:18). As Crossley points out, Bourdieu’s 
habitus ‘identifies a central interplay between [the physiological] body and society’ 
(2001b:95). As ‘structuring structures’ (Bourdieu, 1990:53) the habitus is shaped by the 
involvement of agents with their social conditions (field) through practice and equally 
generates the field through practice (see Crossley, 2001b:95). Sediment or residue of 
past experience, that habitus shapes perception, thought and action and thereby 
moulds social practice (Crossley, 2001b:83; Wainwright et al., 2006:537). In essence, 
and in part, the habitus involves the embodiment of social conditions: ‘The cognitive 
structures which social agents implement in their practical knowledge of the social 
world are internalised, ‘embodied’ social structures’ (Bourdieu, 1984:470). A central 
argument throughout Bourdieu (1984), for example, is that individuals unconsciously 
internalise their objective social conditions embodying dispositions, tastes and 
practices appropriate with those conditions. Embodying and acting according to these 
dispositions individuals demonstrate amor fati (a love of destiny) (Bourdieu, 1984:241) 
fulfilling the ‘appropriate’ role for their social position (King, 2004:41) and in doing so 
participating in practices that reproduce social conditions.  
 
Particularly relevant to the present thesis is the process through which individuals 
embody particular structures (e.g. addiction discourse) through experience and act 
according to those structures. To this end, it is fruitful to explicate habitus further by 
considering the phenomenological thinking of Merleau-Ponty upon which it is, in part, 
based (see Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Crossley, 2001b:98-99). Merleau-Ponty 
argued against explaining meaning and action by reference to conscious reflection 
asserting, instead, ‘the primacy of practical over reflective forms of being’ (Crossley, 
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2001b:100). As such agents do not, in the first instance, relate to the world and their 
own body’s in terms of reflective and conscious thought but through practical 
involvement and mastery (see Crossley, 2001b:100). Action is enacted not through 
reflection but through pre-reflection of both one’s own body and the environment and 
this, in essence, is the basis for Bourdieu’s notion of ‘practical sense’. Crossley (2001b) 
illustrates Merleau-Ponty’s practical sense with word processing where competent 
typists ‘know’ where particular keys are on the keyboard in that they can type without 
consciously locating each key but may be unable to discursively explain where the 
keys are in the absence of a keyboard (2001b:101-2). This pre-reflective knowledge 
represents a practical and embodied sense of the environment/space surrounding the 
individual. Moreover, just as in the example of proficient typing, action requires the 
coordination of the ‘embodied agent’ with the self and their world (Crossley, 
2001b:102). Particularly scathing of reductionist and mechanistic explanations of 
human behaviour/action that is most apparent in psychological behaviourism, Merleau-
Ponty argued that human behaviour is ‘purposive engagement with situations that 
renders them meaningful’ rather than a ‘mechanical reflex reaction to external physical 
stimuli’ (Crossley, 2001b:100). Thus habit is not a conditioned, mechanical, response 
but ‘embodied and practical understanding…that manifests itself as action…and that 
attaches to the world by way of meaning it forms at the interface with it’ (Crossley, 
2001b:106). 
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Critique of Bourdieu 
As will now be discussed Bourdieu’s theory has been greatly criticised and defended. 
Space constraints do not allow for an extensive critique so only those criticisms most 
persuasive and relevant to the present thesis are considered; in particular, accusations 
of determinism, appreciation of reflexivity, and empirical utility. It is reasoned that the 
somewhat peripheral inclusion of reflexivity and rational action in theory of practice 
gives it great flexibility, applicability and transferability. 
 
It has been argued that Bourdieu’s practical concepts are deterministic and inadequate 
to account for social change (Sewell, 1992:16; Jenkins, 1992; King, 2000:418). In 
general, claims of determinism are grounded in the interrelatedness of Bourdieu’s 
practical concepts: external objects (resources) are constructed and given shape by 
the application of schemas (habitus) through the medium of practices and external 
objects (resources) construct and give shape to schemas and their application 
(Bourdieu, 1977:91). Sewell (1992), for example, argues that as ‘habitus, schemas, 
and resources so powerfully reproduce one another [...] even the most cunning or 
improvisational actions undertaken by agents necessarily reproduce the structure’ 
making ‘significant social transformations seem impossible’ (Sewell, 1992:15; see also 
King, 2000:427) while King (2000) argues that the habitus is directly derived from ‘the 
socio-economic or structural position in which individuals find themselves’ (King, 
2000:423). These criticisms overstep the mark. As Wainwright et al. (2006) argue, the 
habitus is determining but it is not deterministic (2006:552). Bourdieu’s practical 
concepts acknowledge that significant social change is indeed relatively rare and 
appreciate the tendency for the reproduction of actions consistent with those conditions 
in which it was produced (Swartz, 1997:212) though the model still allows for some 
change (both at micro and macro levels) and the habitus is not a direct copy of the 
social context as some argue (e.g. King, 2000:425). The key to understanding how 
Bourdieu allows for change is in his relational thinking and specifically the ‘encounter’ 
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between habitus and the field (see Swartz, 1997:214). Where opportunities and 
constraints are similar to the situation in which the dispositions of the habitus were first 
formed, the ‘habitus will tend to produce practices that correspond to existing 
structures’ most likely resulting in stasis reproduction (Bourdieu, 1974:5) but where 
there is mismatch between habitus and structures/situations, change may occur and 
furthermore where opportunities and constraints of fields change gradually the habitus 
adapts but with a degree of mismatch between it and the new situation resulting in the 
deployment of traditional strategies in relation to novel phenomena (Swartz, 1997:213). 
Finally, where actors find themselves operating in a field of sharp, rapid change in 
opportunity structures ‘the expectations of the habitus are frustrated, creating the 
potential for social crisis’ (Swartz, 1997:213) 
 
Some commentators have read Bourdieu as suggesting that under ‘normal’ 
circumstances (i.e. where an agent’s habitus fits with the field), action is taken-for-
granted, pre-reflexive and entails ‘neither introspection nor calculation’ (Mouzelis, 
2007:§1.3) and this has lead to some to argue that Bourdieu’s actors, essentially, 
‘unwittingly go about their lives’ without any thought (Sweetman, 2003:529). In fact 
Bourdieu did not ignore the role of reflexivity and rational calculation but held these 
components to be much less central to social action arguing that it is only where there 
is a mismatch between habitus and field that crises ensue and agents engage in 
reflexivity and rational strategising (see Bourdieu, and Wacquant, 1992:131): 
‘consciousness and reflexivity are both cause and symptom of the failure of immediate 
adaption to the situation’ (Bourdieu, 1987a:11). It should be noted that Bourdieu was 
interested in the transferability of his theory of social action to other cultures (Bourdieu, 
1984) and that reflexivity and utilitarian rationality are cultural components of Western 
modernity (Alexander, 1995, 1996; Mestrovic 1998); Adams (2003:226) argues that the 
concepts of self-reflection and rationality (along with other ‘Enlightenment terms’) are 
normative ways of embedding actors in particular cultural frameworks (Adams, 
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2003:225). Research has suggested that even within Western contemporary societies 
actors engage in different levels of reflexivity and self-monitoring with some actors 
much more reflective than others (Adams, 2006; Goodman, 2000:161). Bourdieu’s 
theory of practice relies far less on reflexive self-monitoring and rational thinking and so 
can be used without assuming that research participants are highly reflexive actors 
who continually self-monitor and weigh up costs and benefits before acting. 
Nevertheless, the argument that Bourdieu’s theory, per se, fails to appreciate the 
influence of reflexivity, rational calculation and conscious on behaviour and everyday 
life may have some truth. For this reason some (Elder-Vass, 2007; Mouzelis, 2007; 
Sweetman, 2003 Crossley, 2001a:342) have developed aspects of Bourdieusian theory 
to address what they see as shortcomings. This means that while Bourdieu’s theory of 
practice appreciates that most action may not be the production of conscious 
decisionmaking it does not preclude the idea that actors are confronted with everyday 
choices that require conscious negotiation and reflexive thought and decision (Elder-
Vass, 2007). 
 
Bourdieu avoids ‘pure intellectualism’ by connecting the theoretical and the empirical 
(Ritzer, 2000:537; see also King, 2004:39). In fact it has been noted that ethnography 
is the ‘backbone’ of Bourdieu’s work (Bloomaert, 2005:224); throughout Outline of a 
Theory of Practice Bourdieu grounds his practical concepts with reference to his 
ethnography of the Kayble People and the English translation of Distinction is 
described as ‘a sort of ethnography of France’ (Bourdieu, 1986:xi. Cited in Bloomaert, 
2005:224). Some other social theorists (e.g. Giddens), on the other hand, make little 
connection theoretical and empirical concerns, focusing almost exclusively on the 
former and leaving the development and application of practical concepts to others 
(see Craib, 1992:72-74). Furthermore, theory of practice has been successfully applied 
in a number of ethnographies making it potentially applicable to present the thesis. 
Notable examples include ethnographies of homeless and drug addiction (Bourgois 
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and Schonberg, 2007; 2009), street crack dealing (Bourgois, 1995), and drug injecting 
(Parkin and Coomber, 2010; Parkin, 2013). 
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Part two: Foucauldian structure 
While Bourdieusian theory appreciates both structure and agency as duality, it appears 
– perhaps in part due to the intended transferability of the theory to other cultures – to 
be a little agentially orientated. A comprehensive framework of social action, however, 
needs to be located within wider structural elements, specific to the culture(s) in which 
agents are embedded, and which may influence behaviour and constitution human 
beings as social actors. To address this requirement discussion now turns to consider 
(post)Foucauldian theory which, as will become clear, has focused on the culturally 
specific historicities of contemporary Western culture. In this way Foucauldian thought 
is used to supplement Bourdieusian theory. The following discussion is structured 
around the concepts of discourse, knowledge and power, all of which are integral to 
Foucauldian understandings of how actors are socially constituted and their actions are 
governed. 
 
It is first worth emphasising that it is argued here that much Bourdieusian and 
Foucauldian theory – despite paucity of literature that has drawn on both theorists (cf. 
Schlosser, 2013; Threadgold, 2006; Binkley, 2009; Parkin, 2013; Hoy, 1999) – can be 
complimentary. To be clear, it is not argued that all Bourdieusian and Foucauldian 
thought is compatible but that some Foucauldian thought soon to be examined, is. 
Tasked with explaining social action and constitution, there are fundamental 
commonalities between both schools of thought; both emphasise the view that the 
social body, experiences and actions are largely influenced by the social context in 
which the individual lives and that through interaction between the human actor and 
social, cultural and historical subjectivity becomes constituted largely below the level of 
consciousness (Hoy, 1999:3). There are, of course, also many differences. In 
particular, while Bourdieu was concerned with explaining how the social and cultural 
becomes embodied (or ‘internalised’) within actors (habitus), is socially reproduced 
(through practice), and with producing a theory to could be applied transculturally 
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across different cultures (with cultural elements e.g. customs, traditions, ways of 
perceiving, thinking, acting, etc.), Foucault took a different approach. Rather than using 
ethnographic methods, Foucault drew on the genealogical method and was concerned 
with exposing the body as ‘imprinted by history’ (Foucault, 1984:83). Foucault was 
interested in the ‘historical and cultural dimensions of the body’s situatedness’ and how 
those dimensions shape the social constitution of actors (Hoy, 1999:6). 
 
Discourse, knowledge and power 
Key to understanding and applying Foucault’s approach to social action are the 
concepts of discourse, knowledge and power. According to Foucault it is through 
discourse that our social reality is constituted via knowledge and power (see Wetherell, 
2001:16). Discourse provides meaning and it is through the attachment of meaning that 
social objects/phenomena come into existence; meaning provided by discourse is a 
crucial precondition for the very existence of social objects (Wetherell, 2001). As such 
Foucault states that ‘nothing has any meaning outside of discourse’ (Foucault, 1972) 
which is not to say that there exists nothing outside of discourse but that all knowledge 
exists as part of our contemporary discourse (Hall, 1997:44). Crucially discourses are 
never singular so it makes no sense to talk of discourse in terms of a single statement, 
text or action but sense to refer to discourse(s) as regularities of action/knowledge 
which appear across statements, texts, actions and ways of being (Hall, 1997:44). 
Wherever social objects/events occur in the same style or pattern they are said to be of 
the same discourse (Hall, 1997:44). We might, for example, talk about the disease 
model of addiction as discourse that appears consistently across popular thought, 
scientific literature, diagnostic instruments and shapes the very conduct of members of 
society (see chapter two). Furthermore, discourses are not transcultural but are 
culturally/historically specific (Hall, 1997:47; King, 2004:42-44); Foucault (1989 [1961]; 
1977), for example, demonstrated that in particular epochs different discursive 
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formations led to differing constructions of phenomena such as mental illness and 
criminality and, crucially, to the ways in which the ‘mad’ and the ‘criminal’ are governed. 
 
Discourses are crucial to the construction of knowledge because discourses define 
ways of thinking about and acting in response to phenomena as well as acceptable, 
intelligible and even conceivable ways of communicating, acting and being (Hall, 
1997:44). For Foucault knowledge is instrumental and inseparable from power because 
it allows governance over an object/subject (Foucault 1977 [1975]; King, 2004:46). The 
human sciences, in particular, represent particular ‘discursive systems’ (Rabinow, 
1984:12) which, through the disciplinary techniques of those sciences, produce forms 
of knowledge which operate to regulate subjects (Foucault, 1977[1975]). According to 
Foucault (1977[1975]) the carceral system that arose in the West produced a ‘panoptic 
schema’ that spread throughout the social body resulting in a particular form and 
power-knowledge relationship which provided the appropriate conditions for the human 
sciences to emerge (Foucault, 1977 [1975]:93; Smart, 2002:105). The power-
knowledge of the panoptic schema ‘does the work of the naturalist […] It makes it 
possible to draw up differences: among [subjects], to observe the symptoms of each 
individual’ (Foucault, 1977 [1975]:203) and so functions ‘as a laboratory in so far as it 
constituted a site for the production of knowledge about those under observation’ 
(Smart, 2002:88). The disciplinary instruments through which power operates and 
which are used by the human sciences are: hierarchical observation, normalising 
judgement and a combination of these in the final instrument, the examination 
(Foucault, 1977 [1975]:170). Crucially these techniques are grounded in the search for 
difference and make use of the ‘norm’/average allowing actors to be ranked, classified, 
compared and differentiated from others (Foucault, 1977 [1975]:183). The norm 
becomes a reference point which makes it both intelligible and possible to judge 
subjects in terms of normality and abnormality. Aware of their permanent visibility 
actors become subject to a ‘normalizing gaze’ that operates to constrain the actions of 
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actors through a constant pressure to conform to particular expectations/standards 
(Foucault, 1977 [1975]:182). Thus, knowledge is produced by the human sciences 
through particular techniques centred on the norm which itself becomes ‘established as 
a constant principle of coercion’ (Foucault, 1977 [1975]:184). 
 
For Foucault knowledge does not ‘merely record a social reality which already exists’ 
but rather brings social reality into being (King, 2004:46). Applied in the real world 
knowledge ‘becomes true’ and with ‘truth’ comes authority to regulate or govern the 
conduct of others (Foucault, 1977[1975]:27); the possession of knowledge regarded as 
true legitimises power over others. Foucault rejected the notion of truth as 
‘correspondence to facts’ (Searle, 1995:199) that exist in reality and, rather, referred to 
‘regimes of truth’ or discourses upon which statements can be distinguished as true or 
false (Foucault, 1980a:131). Thus, truth defines which knowledge is acceptable and 
which is not. In this sense knowledge can be thought of in terms of ‘forms of truth’ 
(Dean, 2001:324), pluralistic, dynamic, provisionally accepted and dependent on the 
social context to which it is tied rather than truth as progressive development towards a 
single (and ‘accurate’) understanding of reality (Van de Ven, 2012:1). Truth(s) are not 
discovered/uncovered but (socially) produced/constructed from particular formations of 
power, knowledge and discourse (Van de Ven, 2012). Knowledge gathered, and truths 
produced, through the human sciences are normative in that (as the disciplinary 
techniques are centred on the norm) ideal expectations and standards of conduct are 
produced against which actors may be judged and to which they are encouraged to 
strive (Dean, 2010:17-18). Those who are ‘charged with saying what counts as true’ 
(Foucault, 1980a:133) are deemed experts who, as possessors of ‘truth’, are imbued 
with social authority over others. In Madness and Civilisation (1989 [1961]) Foucault 
argued that the physician came to assume authority over the mad not because of 
‘medical skill or power […] justified by a body of objective knowledge’ (Foucault, 1989 
[1961]:257) but rather that of a ‘bearer of reason’ (Smart, 2002:25) or a ‘wise man’ 
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(Foucault, 1989 [1961]:257). The ‘expert’ is essentially a bearer of truth who, as such, 
is afforded a social authority to advise the actions of actors in an effort to shape those 
actions. Consistent with Foucault, Dean (2010) argues that as expert/scientific advice 
is produced through the disciplinary techniques (technologies of normalisation) any 
attempt to shape conduct in conjunction with particular (normative) standards is a 
moral endeavour (Dean, 2010:19). 
 
Governmentality 
For Foucault it is through practices and ways of thinking that we are governed and 
govern ourselves (Dean, 2010:28). ‘Governmentality’ has been defined as ‘the conduct 
of conduct’ (Gordon, 1991:2; Foucault, 1982:220-1): a form of activity that affects, 
shapes, guides, modifies or ‘corrects’ the conduct of some person or persons (Gordon, 
1991:2; Burchell, 1996:19; Foucault, 1988). It concerns the actions, behaviour and 
comportment of the other as well as self-direction, self-guidance, and self-regulation 
(Dean, 2010:17) and constitutes ‘technologies of the self’ (Foucault, 1988). 
Governmentality takes many forms marked by interconnections and continuities across 
all aspects and levels of social life: governmentality can include government of the self, 
the government of a household, or the government of a state (Burchell, 1996:19; 
Foucault, 1991:87-104). 
 
Forms of governmentality are relatively coherent and rational ways of organising 
conduct (Burchell, 1996:19; Foucault, 1988; Rose, 1996:53): formulas, rationalities, or 
regimes of rule/government (Rose, 1996:39-40; Dean 2010:28). They constitute 
‘strategies of regulation’ (Rose, 1996:37) – particular complexes of various components 
including techniques for the production of truth/knowledge, practical technical and 
calculative procedures and modes of judgement and sanction (Dean, 2010:28; Rose, 
1996:37-9). These complexes may be analysed in terms of ‘idealized schemata’ for 
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representing reality – ‘a kind of intellectual machinery or apparatus for rendering reality 
thinkable in such a way that is amenable to political programming’ (Rose, 1996:42). As 
such governmentalities can also be thought of as ‘mentalities’ (Rose, 1996:43; Dean, 
2010:24): ‘modes of thought’ (Lemke, 2001:191) or ‘styles of thinking’ (Miller and Rose, 
2008:16). For Dean, governmental mentalities refer not to representations of the 
individual mind/consciousness but ‘bodies of knowledge, belief and opinion’ in which 
actors are immersed (Dean, 2010:24). It is a collective way of thinking, reasoning or 
calculating that may draw on formal bodies of (shared) knowledge (Dean, 2010:24): a 
discursive field in which power is rationalised (Lemke, 2001:191). The concept 
emphasises that the way we think and govern (act) draws upon various forms of 
knowledge such as philosophies, theories and ideas that are available to us (Dean, 
2010:25) and thus to analyse governmentality ‘is to analyse thought made practical’ 
(Dean, 2010:27). In other words, actors govern themselves and others according to the 
knowledge available to them. In liberal polities, Dean (2010:25) notes, our ways of 
thinking (and acting) ‘are often derived from the human sciences’ (e.g. psychology, 
economics and medicine) (Dean, 2010:25).  
 
It should be noted that there is no central locus from which the conduct of the other is 
directed nor is conduct directed ‘from above’. In contrast to the Marxist perspective, 
where power is centralised, institutionalised, viewed as a resource held by elites and 
ruling classes and imposed on subjects from above, Foucault argues that the power to 
govern is created and maintained in more subtle and diffuse ways (McNay, 1994:2). 
The power to direct conduct is not only exerted upon single subjects but by subjects, 
actors become both objects and subjects of governmental power (McNay, 1994:85). 
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Neoliberalism 
Foucault holds liberalism to be a particular rationality of government (Rose, 1996:39): a 
‘way of doing things that functions as the principle and method for the rationalization of 
governmental practices’ (Foucault, 1989. Cited in Burchell, 1996:21). Critical to 
Liberalism is laissez-faire (Burchell, 1991:127), the destatization of the central 
sovereign state and relinquishment of involvement in economic markets as required, 
according to the principles of liberalism, for optimal economic market function (Burchell, 
1996:24). Essential to laissez-faire is for individual interests to be pursued without 
(state) restriction: actors must be free to engage in rational self-conduct (Burchell, 
1996:24). Neoliberalism, like earlier liberalism, is concerned with limiting of state 
government in economic markets and encouraging the freedom (liberty) of citizens 
(Burchell, 1996:22) however, in contrast, it involves a shift away from laissez-faire to 
state government that constructs a political, legal and institutional framework for the 
facilitation of individual freedom as required for free economic exchange to take place 
(see Burchell, 1996:23). Implicit in this rationality is the premise that various 
components of society have ‘their own intrinsic mechanisms of self-regulation’ (Rose, 
1996:43). While the economic rationality of early liberalism was ‘devoted to exchange 
and barter’ (Foucault, 2003:27), neoliberalism is concerned with competition (Foucault, 
2008:12). Exchange was considered to be natural while competition is held to be 
artificial and in need of state protection ‘against the tendency for markets to form 
monopolies’ (Read, 2009:28). This protection involves intervention from the state not 
directly on the market but on the conditions of the market (Read, 2009:28; Foucault, 
2008:139). 
 
It should be emphasised that neoliberalism involves the generalisation of ways of 
approaching the market economy beyond the economic to all forms of conduct: ‘the 
promotion of an enterprise culture’ (Burchell, 1996:29). Not only does this 
generalisation extend beyond the economic but beyond the macro to include micro-
 53 
 
level interaction and the comportment of actors so that the ‘market form’ comes to 
‘serve as the organization principle for the state and society’ (Lemke, 2001:200). Rose 
(1996) refers to this generalisation as the ‘translation of political programmes’ in the 
form of ‘national efficiency, democracy, equality, enterprise’ ‘into ways of seeking to 
exercise authority over persons, places and activities in specific locales and practices’ 
(Rose, 1996:43). As such, Rose (1996) argues that the ‘goals of political, social and 
economic authorities’ come to be translated ‘into the choices and commitments of 
individuals’ (Rose, 1996:58). This generalisation is extremely broad and pervasive 
affecting ‘thought to the point where it has become incorporated into the common-
sense way many of us interpret, live in, and understand the word’ (Harvey, 2007:3). 
Rose (1996) notes that the generalisation of political regimes occurs via ‘a range of 
technologies that install and support the civilizing project by shaping and governing the 
capacities, competencies and wills of subjects, yet are outside the formal control of the 
‘public powers’ (Rose, 1996:58). 
 
New prudentialism, risk, and responsibilisation 
Neoliberalism, coupled with the emergence of risk technologies, results in the ‘new 
prudentialism’ (Dean, 2010:194) – a form of governance that encourages individuals to 
become responsible for managing risk (O’Malley, 1996:197). As a technology and in 
keeping with the strong constructionist principles of governmentality (Lupton, 2006:85) 
risk is not held to exist in the realist sense, ‘in reality’ (Dean, 2010:206; Ewald, 
1991:199) but as a rationality, a form of reasoning (Dean, 2010:213) that arose during 
the nineteenth century (Miller and Rose, 2008:98) and a way of viewing and dealing 
with (what come to be perceived of as) ‘problems’ (O’Malley, 2008:57). Dean (2010) 
argues that: 
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‘Risk is a way […] of ordering reality, or rendering it into calculable form […] It is 
a way of representing events in a certain form so they might be made 
governable in particular ways, with particular techniques and for particular 
goals’ 
(Dean, 2010:206) 
As such any phenomena/event has the potential to be a risk (and threat) depending on 
how it is analysed and considered (Ewald, 1991:199). The human sciences contribute 
to expert knowledge and discourse that form around phenomenon, making it thinkable 
in terms of risk and thus constituting that phenomenon as risk (Lupton, 2006:85; Dean, 
2010:206). Via the technologies/techniques of normalization and categorisation, 
knowledge allows particular social groupings to be identified as ‘at risk’ or ‘high risk’ of 
experiencing a particular problem (Lupton, 2006:87). Crucially, information gathered 
about risk is used to advise individuals on how they should conduct their lives (Lupton, 
2006:88). The rational and responsible neoliberal subject must adopt advice offered (by 
experts) and change their practices in order to avoid and mitigate risk (Lupton, 
2006:88) lest they be viewed as irresponsible, irrational and ultimately feckless. In this 
way risk (and management of) has become central to the shaping of social action 
(Miller and Rose, 2008:98). 
 
The move away from Keynesian welfarism toward neoliberalism and new prudentialism 
has resulted in shift in responsibility for risk management from the state and ‘society’ to 
the individual who must minimise and avoid risk (O’Malley, 1996). Risk management 
comes to be shared collectively; technologies such as social insurance, graduated 
income taxes, and unemployment relief are examples of collective risk management 
(see O’Malley, 1996:194). Rather than relying on ‘socialized securities’, neoliberal 
principles hold that it is prudent individuals who should manage risk, if necessary 
through provisions such as private insurance (O’Malley, 1996:196-7). Risk becomes 
privatized. As O’Malley (1996) notes prudentialism constitutes: 
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‘[...] a technology of governance that removes the key conception of regulating 
individuals by collective risk management, and throws back upon the individual 
the responsibility for managing risk’ 
(O’Malley, 1996:197) 
 
It is important to note that while this shift from collective risk management to privatized 
risk management is partial rather than absolute (O’Malley, 1996) there has, in recent 
decades, been a general devolution of responsibility for risk to the individual (O’Malley, 
1996:204). In healthcare while the UK government continues to provide state provision, 
provision has narrowed and private medical provision and insurance have increased 
(O’Malley, 1996:199). Paralleling these changes is the promotion of regimes and 
routines aimed at encouraging individual self-care by both state and private sector 
agencies (O’Malley, 1996:199) (e.g. ‘healthy’ eating and ‘responsible’ gambling). It is 
worth noting that self-care advice/guidance is both normative and grounded in moral 
presumptions/judgements about what is considered, to give examples, healthy or 
responsible (Dean, 2010). In this sense the recent proliferation of self-help 
literature/groups targeted at individual (rather than social/collective) change which may 
be seen to demonstrate the neoliberal shift towards individual responsibilisation and 
self-care. 
 
Consumerism 
Contemporary Western neoliberal societies have been termed ‘consumer societies’ 
(Miles et al., 2002) in which economies have come to be based on consumption and 
the provision of services (Reith, 2007b:39). There has been a shift from economies 
based on production to those based on consumption and provision of services which, 
in turn, has led social life to become more organised around consumption (Reith, 
2007b:39). A ‘consumption ethic’ has arisen characterized by ‘choice, pleasure and 
 56 
 
individual expression’ (Ritzer et al., 2001:411; Miles et al., 2002; Bauman, 1989; Reith, 
2007b). It is worth noting that consumption values (e.g. hedonism and instant 
gratification) have often been regarded as opposed, incompatible and even a threat to 
production values (e.g. rationality and control) (e.g. Weber, 1958[1904]; Veblen, 1994 
[1899]; Bell, 1976) while others (Reith, 2007b; Ritzer et al., 2001) have noted that 
‘production’ and ‘consumption’ values (e.g. rational and control) are actually 
compatible, even complementary. Ideal actors must consume in a rational and 
responsible way, self-regulating their consumption (Reith, 2007b). 
 
Genealogy/constitution of the contemporary subject 
Foucault was particularly interested in how human beings become subjects (Foucault, 
1982:777) and discussion now turns to how those structural changes in rationality and 
social thought (i.e. neoliberalism, new prudentialism and responsibilisation) have 
influenced the constitution of the contemporary subject. As noted, state political 
rationalities come to be translated in the form of a civilizing project in such a way as to 
shape subjectivity (Rose, 1996). Indeed for Foucault, particular regimes of power are 
inextricably linked to subjectivity: government serves as a ‘contact point’ between the 
‘technologies of domination’ and the ‘techniques of the self’ which interact to form 
‘structures of coercion’ (Foucault, 1980b. Cited in Burchell, 1996:20). As Foucault 
stated: 
‘I think that if one wants to analyze the genealogy of the subject in Western 
societies, one has to take into account not only techniques of domination but 
also techniques of the self. Let’s say one has to take into account the 
interaction of these two types of techniques’ (Foucault, 1980b) 
This means that the techniques/practices of the self and the state are neither 
independent nor reducible to one another (Dean, 2010:21; Burchell, 1996:20-1). While 
for Foucault the techniques of discipline represent the conditions that facilitate the 
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techniques of the self (e.g. self-governance/regulation) (Burchell, 1996:21), the 
(neo)liberal consumer is not merely an object or target of (state) power, determined to 
act according to the dominant political rationality, but is, at the same time, a partner or 
accomplice complicit in that rationality (Burchell, 1996:23). The actor is not a passive 
subject of determined conduct but active because (neo)liberalism and consumerism 
involve the coercion of actors in such a way so that citizens come ‘to align their 
particular wills with ends imposed on them’ (Burchell, 1996:119). 
 
‘(Ab)normality’: The ‘ideal’ and ‘deficient’ subject 
The ideal (and ‘normal’) contemporary subject acts in partnership with the rationalities 
of neoliberalism, new prudentialism and consumerism. While the principles of 
neoliberalism mean that the ideal actor must freely choose to act without state restraint 
and in line with their own self-interests (Burchell, 1996; Miller and Rose, 2008:18) that 
is not to say that actors act without restriction, that they are not governed by the 
political rationalities in which they are embedded. Rather, actors are governed through 
their freedom and through the choices they must make (Reith, 2007b; Miller and Rose, 
2008:18; Rose, 1996:53). The ‘free’ choices actors make are, somewhat paradoxically, 
shaped by the principals and expectations of governmental rationalities (i.e. 
neoliberalism, new prudentialism and consumerism). The translation of neoliberal 
politics/economics to the social domain leads to the economic subject (homo 
economicus) an actor who continually and rationally weighs up costs and benefits 
before acting (Lemke, 2001:200). The partial shift towards new prudentialism means 
that phenomena once seen as social/collective problems come to be recast as 
individual problems (Rose, 1996:47-50) which actors must approach in terms of 
problems of ‘self-care’ (Lemke, 2001:201). With guidelines and advice on how to act 
provided by expertise and offered by experts the rational and responsible subject must 
act accordingly in order to ‘take prudent risk-managing measures’ (O’Malley, 
1996:200), to take care of their self and fulfil a ‘duty to be well’ (Greco, 1993). In the 
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context of consumerism the ‘ideal’ ‘free’, rational and responsible actor must govern 
themselves through prudent and controlled consumption choices and habits (Reith, 
2007b:39) and as such ‘virtues such as self-control, self-discipline, self-denial and will 
power’ have become ‘qualifications considered important to being ‘normal’, ‘healthy’ 
human being’ (Peterson and Lupton, 1996:25). 
 
Those individuals who fail to fulfil the (socially constructed) expectations of the 
ideal/normal subject may be regarded as deficient, flawed, or abnormal. Reith (2007b) 
has argued that the addiction construct is articulated in oppositional terms to the 
‘ideal’/‘normal’ contemporary subject. Gambling that is regarded as problematic and out 
of control, for example, has been viewed in terms of ‘inappropriate consumption’ (Reith, 
2007b). Diagnostic screens differentiate problematic gambling (‘abnormal’ gambling) 
from social/recreational gambling (‘responsible’ or ‘normal’ gambling) through a 
checklist of symptoms that define problematic gambling in terms such as lack of control 
and of reason, loss of free-will, dependence on others, inability to manage risk 
sufficiently and failure to follow expert advice (see Reith, 2007b). 
 
Reformation of the subject: the ‘psy’ sciences 
From the Foucauldian perspective, the ‘psy’ sciences and forms of therapeutic 
treatment are concerned with ‘correcting’, ‘problems of abnormality, difference and 
divergence’ (Miller and Rose, 2008:9). These disciplines and forms of treatment are 
viewed as technologies which, through various disciplinary techniques (e.g. 
examination, normalisation and judgement), control behaviour indirectly – and for 
Foucault insidiously – through the non-physical restraints of moral responsibility and 
guilt (McNay, 1994:32). (Therapeutic) treatments of the asylum, for example, aimed to 
instil within subjects bourgeois morals, values, and norms in order to encourage self-
restraint with the subject through fostering feelings of guilt and social responsibility 
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(Foucault, 1989 [1961]). The ‘mad’ were cast as moral offenders in need of reformed 
attitudes and behaviours (Gutting, 2005:73). Similarly, Reith (2007b) has argued that 
therapeutic techniques aimed at the contemporary ‘problem’ gambler operate to 
manage and correct/reform the subject by instilling the principals of wider society (i.e. 
neoliberal-consumerism) (Reith, 2007b:47). Therapeutic interventions aimed at 
reforming the ‘problem’ gambler, for example, include forms of counselling directed at 
increasing self-control over time/money expenditure, at fostering techniques of 
budgeting and managing risk, and dispelling irrational beliefs/expectations (Reith, 
2007b:47). Therapeutic interventions represent forms of neoliberal governance aimed 
at coercing, shaping and managing subjectivity because they endeavour to facilitate 
self-control and self-policing so that subjects may be governed ‘at a distance’ (Latour, 
1986) through their own capabilities so that others do not have to (Cruickshank, 
1996:234). This reasoning has led Miller and Rose (2008:5) to describe various experts 
of the ‘psy’ sciences as ‘engineers of the human soul’. 
 
The body in Bourdieusian and Foucauldian theory 
As the chapter closes it is salient to engage with a general criticism of social theories of 
action that may be seen as having particular relevance in explaining addiction/recovery 
– the argument that the body/biology tends to be absent (Shilling, 2003; Weinberg 
2002). From my reading of Bourdieu and Foucault this criticism is misplaced. In 
contrast to much, particularly earlier, social theory criticised for ignoring the body, both 
Bourdieu and Foucault take seriously the embodiment of the social (Shilling, 2008; 
White, 2002; Hoy, 1999). The argument that biology/the physiological body is a 
necessary precondition of subjectivity and action is not at all inconsistent with the 
argument that the socio-cultural has massive influence over action (Bourdieu, 1984; 
Foucault, 1984). Hoy (1999) argues that Bourdieu does not deny the role of biology but 
sees it as ‘intertwined with the social’ (Hoy, 1999:13): according to Hoy’s (1999) 
reading, Bourdieu’s ‘habitus is precisely the ability to unify what is socially necessary 
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and what is biologically necessary’ (1999:13). Similarly, Foucault reveals his position 
when he states: 
“We [tend to] believe […] that the body obeys the exclusive laws of physiology 
and that it escapes the influence of history, but this too is false. The body is 
molded by a great many distinct regimes; it is broken down by the rhythms of 
work, rest, and holidays; it is poisoned by food or values, through eating habits 
or moral laws […]”. 
(Foucault, 1984:87) 
Accusations of biological absence in social theory seem, to me, to miss what social 
explanations of action aim to achieve. Of utmost importance in explaining human action 
is not uncovering all the preconditions of action, but explaining why it is that human 
action is enacted in a particular way rather than in another way. In chapter two it will be 
argued, on the basis of extensive evidence, that differences in behaviour and action – 
as exemplified in complex forms such as excessive and/or addictive consumption – are 
far more explainable in terms of socio-cultural difference and experience rather than 
biochemical difference.  
 
Conclusion 
Through careful consideration of the structure-agency problem this chapter has 
presented a Bourdieusian model of social action which appreciates that social actions 
are neither determined nor unconstrained and that this theory is useful for 
understanding behaviours of addiction. As Bourdieusian theory lacks well developed 
conceptualisation of the specific structural conditions in which social action, 
reproduction and change occurs, (post)Foucauldian theory was drawn on as a way to 
explain and explore the cultural conditions under which contemporary subjects are 
constituted and act – most notably the rationalities of neoliberalism and new 
prudentialism. It is this Bourdieusian/(post)Foucauldian synthesis that will be used as 
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the philosophical underpinning for the present research and to explain the actions and 
experiences of the present research participants. The proceeding chapter (chapter two) 
is framed heavily around Foucault’s notion of discourse while the following chapter 
(chapter three) draws extensively on Bourdieusian theory. In chapters six and seven, 
Bourdieusian and (post)Foucauldian theory is used to interpret findings. 
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Chapter two: Gambling addiction 
In order to investigate gambling addiction, it is first important to establish what 
gambling addiction is. In this chapter, the dominant contemporary view of addiction as 
a biomedical disorder is examined and problematised and, based on extensive 
evidence, it will be demonstrated that gambling addiction, though real, is a culture-
bound phenomenon. 
 
The chapter is split into two parts. Part one traces the intertwined histories of addiction, 
gambling addiction, and problematic gambling discourses. It will be suggested that 
addiction discourses are the product of particular social and cultural histories that have 
come to define and render intelligible contemporary (and culturally specific) 
understandings of addiction (Levine, 1978; Reinarman, 2005). It will be demonstrated 
that the medical model of addiction owes its existence far more to transformations in 
social thought rather than to scientific discovery (Reinarman, 2005; Levine, 1978). 
 
Part two demonstrates that the medical model fails to adequately explain loss of control 
over consumption. Inconsistencies of the medical model are highlighted through 
sociologically orientated research that focuses beyond the biological and physiological 
‘parts’ of the body. This literature suggests that the experience of addiction, 
problematic behaviour and the consequences of those behaviours are heavily 
influenced by (dynamic) social milieu, context and setting (Mead, 1934; Becker, 1967). 
The phenomenon of recovery will be explored in greater depth, further highlighting 
failures of the biomedical model to explain the experiences of problematic consumption 
and addiction, and demonstrating that it is possible for some who experience addiction 
to bring their consumption under control. In particular, natural recovery and maturing 
out are explored and discussed. Having discredited the dominant conception of 
addiction discussion then turns to explain the continuation of the bio-medical model 
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(now framed as an ‘addiction myth’). The chapter closes with a discussion of how 
addiction can be framed in terms consistent with both Bourdieusian and Foucauldian 
thought as discussed in chapter one. It will be demonstrated that a logical way to 
understand addiction is as the embodiment of discourse and of the social conditions in 
which actors are embedded.  
 
Part one: The discursive construction of problematic/abnormal gambling 
as an ‘addiction’ 
On the one hand, gambling is considered a mainstream recreational activity and 
legitimate use of time and money that is unproblematic and, often in the case of 
lotteries, even benefits society by supporting ‘good causes’ (McMillen, 1996:15; Reith, 
2007b:35-36). On the other hand, gambling can be viewed as an addiction: a 
(seemingly) ‘uncontrollable’ behaviour with harmful consequences for gamblers, their 
families, communities and society (Dickerson, 2003a:197; Dickerson et al., 1997; 
Blaszczynski and Nower, 2002:487). Contemporary understandings of the latter are 
diverse leading Wildman to remark on ‘a true scientific mess’ (1999:ii) and Reith to 
reflect on a ‘messy overlapping of discourses’ (2007b:38). Complexity aside, there has 
been a general move toward incorporating problematic gambling as a bona fide 
addiction along with substance addictions (e.g. Shaffer, 2004a; Orford, 2001b). The 
contemporary prevailing view takes the form of the biomedical model where particular 
(problematic) patterns of substance and non-substance based consumption are 
ascribed factors such as genetic abnormalities and neurotransmitter (dys)function as 
‘causes’ of addiction. There has, however, been resistance from those who maintain 
that substance use is a fundamental element of addiction (e.g. National Institute on 
Drug Abuse) and others who suggest that drug use per se is more ‘addictive’ than 
behaviours that do not involve drugs (see Robinson and Berridge, 2003:46). This 
resistance appears rooted in pharmacological determinism: the presupposition that 
particular pharmacological properties cause individuals to experience addiction. 
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Addiction and problematic gambling  
Rooted in positivism, materialism, and biochemical reductionism, human action has 
tended to be treated as consequential of biology and stimulus: ‘affectual and habitual 
bodily reactions to events’ (Shilling, 2008:2). In past explanations of addiction it was 
held that substance based stimuli have the power to cause addiction characterised by 
loss of control or compulsion. However, evidence that not all those who ingested 
particular substances experienced addiction shifted investigation from the substance to 
the body/mind (Weinberg, 2000). It is in this context that the dominant understanding of 
addiction has come to be an internal biochemical ‘disease’ or disorder (see Reinarman, 
2005:307) that can involve both substance and non-substance stimuli (e.g. Shaffer 
2004a; Orford. 2001b). As an internal disorder, cause has been conventionally located 
in the body, in the mind, in the soul, or in some combination of these (Room, 1985:134) 
and scientific explanations have wavered back and forth between physiology and 
psychology or a combination of the two (Room, 1985:134). Despite these shifts, the 
bedrock of the concept of ‘addiction’ remains loss of control over the object of 
addiction, behaviour, and a person’s life (see Room, 1985:135; Room, 2003:225). The 
dominant understanding of gambling addiction (and often problematic gambling) has 
come to be that which is caused by biochemical/physiological processes, abnormality 
or ‘pathology’ (disease) that can be illuminated through reductionist1 medical 
examination (see Bernhard, 2007:9; Castellani, 2000:59-66). In this vein, research has 
focused on biochemical factors such as neurophysiological pathways (e.g. Blanco et 
al., 2000; Blum et al., 1995) and genetic markers (e.g. Comings et al., 1996). To a 
lesser extent, some research has looked to the psychological to explore the influence 
of cognitive factors such as irrational thinking (e.g. Griffiths, 1994), impulsivity, and 
compulsivity (e.g. Blaszczynski, 1999). As such the aetiology of gambling addiction has 
                                                          
1
 Reductionism is the ‘assumption that complex problems are solvable are solvable by dividing 
them into smaller, simpler, and thus traceable units’ (Ahn et al., 2006:709). Reductionism has 
been the predominant paradigm in science and medicine over the past centuries (Ahn et al., 
2006:709). See Edwards (1994) for reflection on reductionism and addiction.  
 65 
 
come to be seen in terms of a biomedical or psychological disorder, or a combination of 
both (see e.g. Griffiths, 1991:347). 
 
The view that particular feelings and behaviours of addiction are determined by 
‘internal’ disorders (whether cognitive or biochemical) has been subjected to sustained 
and persuasive criticism. This chapter will engage with this criticism, problematising the 
prevailing view that addiction is determined by factors limited to the properties of the 
stimulus, physiology of the player, and/or structural characteristics of gambling 
activities. In this vein a social history of addiction and problematic gambling is provided 
in order to show that these constructs and the very idea of loss of control to which they 
refer are artefacts of social-context, prevailing rationalities/mentalities (Rose, 1996), 
and the prominent voices of particular individuals/institutions (see e.g. Levine, 1978; 
Reinarman, 2005; Bernhard, 2007; Castellani, 2000). As Bernhard (2007) points out, 
contemporary understandings of addiction are not autonomous creations (Mills, 
1959:151) that appeared on the discursive scene but are grounded in historical and 
social context (Bernhard, 2007:9). 
 
Constructivist account of addiction and problematic gambling 
In order to understand how problematic gambling came to be viewed as an addiction 
characterised by loss of control the genealogies of these constructs must be explored. 
‘Addiction’ as a biomedical construct has its roots in changing views of alcohol use 
(Levine, 1978; Room, 2003; Reinarman, 2005; Valverde, 1998) and has come to 
incorporate a range of substance and non-substance orientated behaviours 
(Reinarman, 2005). Prior to the latter half of 18th century, in the UK drinking and 
intoxication were part of everyday life ‘neither especially troublesome nor stigmatised’ 
partaken by clergymen and others (Levine, 1978:145-151. See also: Reinarman, 2005; 
Room, 2003). Views on gambling were not as permissive: throughout the Middle Ages 
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gambling had been prohibited on account that it diverted efforts away from state 
interests, though at the same time gambling was not seen as particularly sinful and 
even the Catholic Church allowed gambling at Christmas (Reith, 1999:5). 
 
The Protestant Reformation had significant implications for understandings of the self 
and ideas about how lives should be conducted. Actors became viewed as 
autonomous individuals, capable of navigating their own freedom and responsible for 
their own actions (see Cohen, 20002). The Protestant Ethic (Weber, 1958) meant that it 
became imperative for individuals to live ascetic lives characterised by the disciplined 
and rational pursuit of money (Weber, 1958:72). In order to succeed and survive 
individuals were required to self-regulate their own activities (Levine, 1978:164; Weber, 
1958). Activities such as drinking and gambling contravened ascetic lifestyles and thus 
were viewed in terms of vice and sin engaged in by individuals of their own free-will 
(see Levine, 1978). Gambling, in particular, contravenes protestant ideals of deferred 
gratification based on diligent labour, investment (Reith, 2007b:34), systematic saving, 
and ascetic consumption (Abt, 1996:184). Industrialisation further increased the 
problematic status of both alcohol and gambling. The need for an economically 
productive workforce meant that time became increasingly precious: a commodity to be 
spent ‘productively’ and not ‘squandered’ gambling or drinking (Room, 2003:226; Reith, 
1999:5). Moreover, the physiological effects of alcohol were increasingly seen as 
problematic for economic productivity (McMurran, 1994:6) and increased population 
mobility stretched and weakened social support networks so that the fortunes of 
families relied more heavily on the self-control of the husband/father than in pre-
industrial society (Room, 2003:222). In short moral opposition towards particular 
behaviours arose out of shifting understandings of the self and notions of self-control in 
response to changing world-views and industrialisation. 
                                                          
2
 Others have also noted the rise of the autonomous individual in one way or another, e.g.: 
Weber, 1958; Elias, 1994 [1939]; Foucault, 1984. 
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Substance addiction 
Prior to medicalisation a whole host of ‘vices’ (e.g. gambling, smoking, drinking, sexual 
excesses, and greediness for profit) were viewed in terms of sin, and little distinction 
was made between vices in terms of materiality (i.e. substance or non-substance) 
(Berridge and Edwards, 1981:142-143). However, the 19th century saw the 
transformation of alcohol use from sin engaged in by autonomous individuals with free-
will to disease characterised by loss of control. In his explanation of drunkenness, Dr. 
Benjamin Rush provided the foundations for the medical conception of addiction (see 
Levine, 1978:151). Rush identified alcohol as the causal agent of the ‘disease’ of 
alcoholism, characterised by loss of control over drinking, and proposed abstinence as 
the only cure for the condition (Levine, 1978:152). Alcohol was seen as inherently 
addictive and thus the ‘drunkard’ was seen as a victim of ubiquitous customary drinking 
(Levine, 1978:152). The disease model came to be incorporated into the ideology of 
the temperance movement (Levine, 1978:153) so that intemperance was seen both as 
sin and as disease kept at bay only by abstinence (Levine, 1978:157). Room (2003) 
notes that the temperance movement established as ‘fact’ the idea that drinking causes 
negative consequences and argued that the addiction construct (as loss of control) was 
used to explain why, despite ‘knowing’ the harm their drinking caused, not all drinkers 
stopped drinking (2003:224). 
 
Opium consumption, too, began to be increasingly seen as problematic and became 
incorporated with alcohol into the addiction construct. Tensions between Britain and 
China over the opium trade (culminating in the opium wars) as well as growing 
animosity toward Chinese immigrants (who usually ran the opium dens), and who in 
difficult economic times were perceived to work harder and for lower wages than non-
immigrants contributed to negative views of opium use (McMurran, 1994:8,12; Szasz, 
1976:76-77). In Britain, the medical profession became increasingly interested in, and 
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assumed greater authority over, substance use. The death of the Earl of Mar in 1828, 
whose life insurer failed to pay out after arguing that opium eating had shortened the 
Earl’s life (Berridge, 1979:71), along with cases of infant deaths that came to be 
attributed to the practice of calming/sedating babies with opium, prompted medical 
investigations into opium use and led to greater restrictions over opium distribution in 
1868 (see McMurran, 1994:8). In keeping with Rush’s disease model, particular 
substances came to be seen as inherently addictive with the power to remove self-
control. The understanding that alcohol was inherently addicting became particularly 
problematic as most knew from their own experience that relatively few drinkers 
become alcoholics (see Reinarman, 2005:308; Levine, 1978:162). A new paradigm that 
better explained alcoholism and ‘excessive’ consumption of other substances was 
needed. In the last quarter of the nineteenth-century medical science was providing 
greater understanding of physical conditions such as typhoid and cholera (Berridge, 
1999:150) – presumed ‘proof’ in the ability of medical science to understand and 
provide solutions (even cures) for individual ailments (see Berridge, 1999:150; 
McMurran, 1994:2). Consequently, all human behaviour was understood to have a 
biological cause explainable by material science and its associated principles (see 
McMurran, 1994:2). Those afflicted with addiction were held to have a physiological 
disorder or ‘disease’ that compelled them to behave as addicts (McMurran, 1994:2). 
This not only seemed to explain addiction as having a biological basis (and in doing so, 
asserted the authority of the medical profession) but also explained why it was that 
some could use alcohol and become addicted whilst others did not. Thus the source of 
addiction was no longer held to be a property of the drug per se but of the individual 
(Levine, 1978:162). Addiction came to be seen as a medical condition that afflicted 
some and not others. With the rise of medical science it seemed reasonable that 
aetiology of addiction was to be found within the biology of the individual and thus 
required medical investigation and that medical treatment could be developed 
(Weinberg, 2000:606).  
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Gambling addiction 
The construction of problematic gambling as an addiction followed a different but 
intertwined path to that of substance addictions. It was not until the early 20th century 
that psychoanalysts made attempts to explain excessive gambling as anything other 
than a moral or legal problem (Rosecrance, 1985:276). Freud (1928) analysed 
Dostoevsky’s semi-biographical novel The Gambler and concluded that gambling was 
a form of self-punishment provoked by oedipal guilt and other psychoanalysts extended 
the Freudian explanation to other gamblers (Rosecrance, 1985:276). Bergler (1943; 
1958) analysed several individuals who reported gambling problems and concluded 
that excessive gambling was not the conscious and rational choice of criminal deviants 
but irrational behaviour driven by unconscious desire to lose (Rosecrance, 1985:277) 
driven by illness, sickness, and neurosis (Castellani, 2000:24; see also Bergler, 
1958:vii). As such Bergler (1958) held that gamblers required medical treatment rather 
than moral condemnation (Rosecrance, 1985:277). In the same year as Bergler’s The 
Psychology of Gambling (1958) was published, Gamblers Anonymous (GA) was 
established modelled on Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) and embraced Bergler’s ideas 
with the doctrine: 
‘We, at Gamblers Anonymous, believe our gambling problem is an emotional 
illness, progressive in nature, which no amount of human will-power can stop or 
control’  
(Gamblers Anonymous, 1989:38. Cited in Castellani, 2000:25-26). 
 
In 1969 members of GA approached Robert Custer for help with members 
experiencing severe psychological problems which in turn led to the establishment of 
the first in-patient treatment centre for problematic gamblers in 1972 (Rosecrance, 
1985:278; Campbell and Smith, 2003:130; Taber et al., 1987; Bernhard, 2007:12). 
Building on experience treating individuals with alcohol problems, Custer based the 
treatment programme on one that had been used to treat alcoholics (Custer and Milt, 
1985:218). In the 1970’s proponents of the medical model rejected Bergler’s 
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‘unconscious desire to lose’ theory but retained the idea that problematic gamblers lost 
control of their gambling (Rosecrance, 1985:278) and as such Lesieur 
reconceptualised the problematic gambler in terms of the ‘compulsive gambler’ 
characterised by loss of control (Lesieur, 1977). The 1980s marked the legitimisation of 
problematic gambling as bona fide medical disorder when, in 1980, ‘pathological 
gambling’ became formally classified in the third edition of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III) as an impulse control disorder 
characterised as ‘a chronic and progressive failure to resist impulses to gamble, and 
gambling behavior that compromises, and disrupts, or damages personal, family, or 
vocational pursuits’ (APA, 1980:291). It is difficult to overestimate the significance of 
this inclusion. Described as ‘the bible of psychiatric assessment’ (Bernhard, 2007:12-
13) the DSM facilitated and legitimised a shift in responsibility from the individual to the 
illness over which the individual has no control (see Rosecrance, 1985:278). This 
allowed medical insurance pay-outs to be secured (Reith, 2007a:11), more treatment 
services to be made available funded by government (Castellani, 2000), and for 
‘pathological gambling’ to be used as defence in criminal justice proceedings 
(Castellani, 2000). It has been pointed out that, with very little research (clinical or 
otherwise) available, the diagnostic criteria were heavily based on Custer’s clinical 
observations rather than rigorous empirical research (Bernhard, 2007:12) and criteria 
were not tested before inclusion (National Research Council, 1999:25). 
 
The DSM-III criteria for pathological gambling (APA, 1980) were heavily criticised and 
focus on the similarities between the characteristics of pathological gambling and 
psychoactive substance dependence saw the reclassification and remodelling of 
diagnostic criteria in terms of the latter (Reith, 2007a:10; Lesieur and Rosenthal, 
1991:7). In fact the criteria for the DSM-III-R (3rd ed., revised) were, for the most part, 
literally copied from the criteria of substance dependence (National Research Council, 
1999:12) with the ‘use of a substance’ substituted with ‘gambling’ (National Research 
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Council, 1999:25). With the exception of ‘chasing losses’, all diagnostic criteria had 
‘counterpart in the diagnosis of alcohol, heroin, cocaine and other forms of drug 
dependence’ (Lesieur and Rosenthal, 1991:8). The DSM-III pathological gambling 
criteria were further criticised within the criminal justice literature for too often allowing 
the misuse of the insanity defence (see e.g. Cunnien, 1985; Rachlin et al., 1986; Rubin, 
1982; all cited in Castellani, 2000:54) with the phrase ‘unable to resist impulses to 
gamble’ (APA, 1980:291) being seen as particularly subject to misuse as criminal 
defence (Castellani, 2000:54). While the DSM-IV revision continued the trend toward 
understanding problematic gambling as similar to substance use (see Castellani, 
2000:55) and despite sharing many diagnostic criteria, pathological gambling remained 
characterised as an impulse control disorder classified apart from substance use 
(Abbott et al., 2004a:78; Petry, 2006) until the publication of the DSM-5 in 2013 where 
it was renamed ‘gambling disorder’ and classified in a category along with substance 
addictions (Petry et al., 2013). This reclassification is congruent with a continuing trend 
toward conceptualising a wide range of problematic behaviours as addictions 
regardless of the materiality of the object consumed. Other examples of this trend can 
be found in models of addiction as a ‘syndrome’ (Shaffer, 2004a) and as an ‘excessive 
appetite’ (Orford, 2001b). 
 
Addiction, neoliberalism, and self-control 
As has been discussed the core of the addiction construct is loss of control (Fraser et 
al., 2014:38). Room (1985) emphasises that the experience of addiction (as loss of 
control) is culturally specific because beliefs and norms regarding both the addiction 
construct and comportment/behaviour are historically and culturally specific. The 
definition, intelligibility, and experience of addiction is dependent on an organisation of 
society grounded in particular historical and cultural conditions where lack of self-
control is problematic and seen as a sign of weakness and where ‘morality, success 
and respectability’ come to be attributed ‘to the power of a disciplined will’ (i.e. self-
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control) (Lemert, 1951. Cited in Room, 1985:135). These are exactly the cultural 
conditions of neoliberalism and new prudentialism (see chapter one) where thought 
came to be structured in terms of particular beliefs, norms, and expectations about 
comportment and society centred on the individual and self-control. As has been 
pointed out, gambling had been viewed as problematic because it contravened the 
tenets of the protestant work ethic. In production-centred economies (such as emerged 
in the industrial revolution) ‘rational use of time and money through diligent labor, 
investment and self-discipline’ was paramount (Reith, 2007b:34) and so the ‘ideal’ and 
‘normal’ citizen embodied strict values of asceticism and control (Reith, 2004:285). 
Today gambling tends seen as both a legitimate leisure activity (‘normal’ gambling) and 
as a problem characterised by loss of control (‘abnormal’ gambling).  
 
Reith (2004; 2007b) argues that the shift toward viewing particular patterns of gambling 
as normal and other patterns as abnormal has been shaped by secularisation and the 
weakening of moral anti-gambling arguments as well as the move towards neoliberal 
consumer societies. In consumption-based economies the ideal (and ‘normal’) citizen 
comes to embody a different set of values to those of production; ‘instant gratification’ 
(Reith, 2004:285), ’self-fulfilment, hedonism, and desire’ (Reith, 2007b:39). The 
neoliberal subject, however, cannot act without self-control, far from it. As was 
discussed in chapter one, neoliberalism requires subjects to govern their own actions 
and actively engage in risk avoidance strategies. Those who fail in this endeavour are 
deemed deficient, deviant and ultimately ‘abnormal’. It has been argued that the 
tensions between neoliberal self-control and consumerism represent a ‘paradox’ 
represented by ‘contradictions of consumption’ where freedom and choice becomes an 
obligation through which individuals must govern themselves (Reith, 2004:285; Reith, 
2007b). On the one hand ‘citizenship is […] manifested through the free exercise of 
personal choice among a variety of marketed options’ (Rose, 1999:230) with 
individuals encouraged ‘to carve out a lifestyle and identity’ from those options (Reith, 
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2004:285) while on the other hand individuals must ‘subjugate aspects of themselves, 
to mould their subjective states and inner desires’ (Reith, 2004:285) in accordance with 
the values of ‘rational discipline’, (self)control, and restraint (Reith, 2007b:40). It is 
worth noting that neoliberal values such as autonomy, rationality, self-
control/governance and responsibility for one’s own life are completely opposed to the 
view of the ‘problem’ gambler as set out in the criteria of screening instruments which 
encompass ‘dependence, irrationality, lack of self-control, and an irresponsible attitude 
to money, family, and work relations’ (Reith, 2007b:41). 
 
 
Part one summary 
Discussion in this chapter so far has suggested that the constructs of addiction and 
problematic gambling emerged under particular social and historical conditions. The 
biomedical addiction construct, that is the idea that material interactions between 
substance/activities and biology could cause loss of control, arose at a particular time 
and in Western societies where Enlightenment thinking, the Protestant Reformation, 
and the industrial revolution created a social milieu in which individualism became the 
taken for granted frame of reference and the fate of people and society became 
increasingly dependent on self-control (Reinarman, 2004:311; Levine, 1978: Room, 
2003:222). In fact, Room (2003) goes further to point out that addiction as loss of self-
control only makes sense in cultural conditions where individualism is taken for granted 
and much less sense where individual aspirations and autonomy is subordinate to 
collective interests (2003:226). The search for a medical explanation for loss of control 
was not sparked by the identification of biological or psychological problem but by a 
moral one. Loss of control continues to be problematic in neoliberal consumer societies 
where reduction in external control (or governance) creates an impetus for individuals 
to self-regulate. Consistent with the constructivist account provided here, it has been 
argued that ‘addiction’ is more a social accomplishment – the convergence of particular 
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conditions, actors, and institutions – than the product of scientific discovery 
(Reinarman, 2005. see also e.g. Levine, 1978; Room, 2003; Cohen, 2000). The 
following discussion will support this view by highlighting the inconsistencies that arise 
when the biomedical model is used explain addiction. At this point, and as will be 
further explained later, it is prudent to stress that the use of constructionism to explain 
the experiences and consequences of addiction does not mean that addiction does not 
‘exist’, it is not an extremely compelling experience, that individuals do not feel 
addicted, or that addiction does not have extremely negative consequences for 
people’s lives and those in their social networks (see Reinarman, 2005:307).  
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Part two: Problematising the biomedical addiction model 
For many researchers, substance use is not central to the addictive state (Orford, 
2001b; Shaffer et al., 2004a; Fraser et al, 2014). In part two, I will problematise models 
of addiction grounded in pharmacological and biochemical determinism. The former 
refers to the argument that the pharmacological properties of substances ultimately 
cause loss of control over consumption of those substances (Reinarman and Levine, 
1997:8). In the past it was claimed that particular substances (e.g. alcohol and heroin) 
have the power to instantly addict anyone (Weinberg, 2000:2; Reinarman and Levine, 
1997:4; Levine, 1978) however anecdotal and empirical evidence from some who used 
without experiencing addiction discredited this view (Weinberg, 2000). As a result, a 
more complex but equally determinist claim came to be: repeated use of substances 
over a particular (invisible and person-specific) threshold causes biological change(s) 
resulting in addiction (see e.g. Washington, 1989:57). Again this claim has been 
discredited. Lindesmith (1938) observed that post-surgery hospital patients, while 
administered with sufficient doses of morphine to produce physiological withdrawal 
symptoms, did not experience addiction after leaving hospital (Lindesmith, 1938; 
Weinberg, 2002:3; Davies, 1997:47). Lindesmith (1938) argued that while these 
individuals experienced withdrawal symptoms, they did not attribute those symptoms to 
having been administered morphine and thus did not yearn for more of the drug 
(Lindesmith, 1938:3). Similarly, Alexander (2001) has pointed to evidence that it is very 
rare for those who use patient-controlled analgesia (PCA) machines (where hospital 
patients self-administer morphine for pain relief) to experience addiction (2001:2). 
Alexander (2001) also notes that while throughout much of the 20th Century British 
physicians widely prescribed heroin to medicate coughs, diarrhoea, and chronic pain, 
analysis of medical statistics concerning iatrogenic addiction found that there was ‘a 
virtual absence of addicts created by this singular medical practice’ (Trebach, 1982:83. 
Cited in Alexander, 2001) – quite simply, no evidence was found to support the idea 
that practice of prescribing heroin caused addiction. Zinberg (1984) showed the 
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existence of regular and controlled heroin users and found that of the 60% he was able 
to reinterview 12-24 months later: 49% were using heroin at the same level, 27% had 
reduced use to below the criteria for regular use, and 13% were using more (Zinberg, 
1984:71). Zinberg’s work showed that impaired control was not an inevitable outcome 
of substance use. Difficulty of control over objects that do not involve pharmacologically 
active substances further problematises pharmacological determinism and in this 
respect problematic gambling has been termed ‘the biggest challenge’ to 
pharmacological model of addiction (Orford, 2001b:3). 
 
Clearly, substance use does not cause addiction and if gambling is regarded as an 
addiction, substance use is not essential for addiction. The realisation that drug use per 
se does not determine addiction – that some people use without becoming addicted 
while others become addicted (Kalant, 2009:785) – shifted the search for addiction 
aetiology away from the pharmacological properties of substances to bodily factors 
(body/mind) (see Weinberg, 2000:2). Addiction came to be framed in terms of a 
vulnerability that affects some but not others (Alexander, 2001; Kalant, 2009:785). 
However, no biomedical research whether focused on genes or particular brain 
pathways has been able to explain why some individuals become addicted while others 
do not (see Reinarman, 2005:309). As will be indicated in the following discussion, the 
reductionist principles of medical investigation can never fully explain complex 
behaviours because they fail to consider the socio-cultural milieus, contexts, and 
settings, packed with social meaning, in which the lives of individuals are embedded. 
 
Socio-cultural milieu and meaning 
The consumption of substances may result in particular physiological effects 
determined by the actions between pharmacology and biology. Physiological effects 
such as heart and respiratory rates, chemicals in the blood and secretion of hormones 
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are observable and can be objectively measured (Becker, 1967:164). Conversely, 
subjective experiences, such as feelings of loss of control, are not determined by the 
stimulus-physiology relationship and can only be sought by asking the individual how 
they feel (see Becker, 1967:164). Subjective experience depends on meaning whereas 
physiological effects do not and as such there can never be a physiological medical 
test for addiction. As Mead (1934) points out, meaning is not a property of an object 
(whether substance, activity or the body) but is lodged with the object ‘as the person 
acquires a conception of the kind of action that can be taken with, toward, by and for it’ 
(Cited in Becker, 1967:166). To illustrate, in Becoming a Marihuana User Becker 
(1953) found that for his sample of cannabis users the cannabis ‘high’ was not 
determined by the pharmacological effects of the drug but was strongly influenced by 
the meaning the drug has for the user. Neophyte cannabis users learned from more 
experienced and knowledgeable users the ‘correct’ method of smoking, to attribute 
particular effects to drug use, and how to recognise and single out particular effects as 
pleasurable (1953:237-239). In his study of LSD use, Becker added that the experience 
of drug use depends greatly on how others define its effects (Becker, 1967:165). 
 
Despite having the same physiological effects ethnographic research indicates that the 
same drug (or non-substance activity e.g. gambling activity) can have different 
meaning for different people and, as a consequence, may be experienced differently by 
different people (Becker, 1967:165; MacAndrew and Edgerton, 1969). Evidence that 
not all cultures make a causal connection between particular behaviours (for example 
drinking) and loss of control or other consequences (Reinarman, 2005:311) has led 
some to argue that addiction is a ‘culture-bound’ phenomenon only experienced where 
specific cultural conditions and particular patterns of beliefs and norms exist (Room, 
1985:136; See also Room, 2003; Reinarman, 2005:311; Levine, 1978). MacAndrew 
and Edgerton (1969) examined ‘drunken comportment’ across different cultures and 
found wide variations in the experiences and behaviours of those who had used 
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alcohol (1969:84). They argued that people’s experiences and behaviours depended 
on… 
‘…what their society ‘knows’ about drunkenness; and, accepting and acting 
upon the understandings thus imparted on them, they become the living 
confirmation on their society’s teachings’  
(MacAndrew and Edgerton, 1969:88. Original emphasis) 
 
Social-setting and control 
Consistent with an interactionist perspective (Mead, 1934), Becker (1967) argued that 
meanings ‘lodged’ with the same physical object (in Becker’s case a ‘drug’) not only 
differ between people but between the same people in different social contexts and 
settings so that a given individual’s subjective experience of the same object (drug) 
may differ between different contexts and settings (Becker, 1967:165). As Reinarman 
and Levine (1997) point out, two drinks at a New Year’s Eve party tend to have very 
different effects to the same two drinks at a wake (1997:12). The path-breaking 
research of two scientists, Lee Robins and Norman Zinberg, problematised the 
biomedical addiction model and, in particular, highlighted the influence of social context 
and setting over patterns of consumption and addiction (Zinberg, 1984; Robins et al., 
1974a). These two researchers have had great impact on addictions research and as 
their work was seminal in the construction of the research proposal for the present 
thesis it is worth examining their work further and in some depth, beginning with 
Robins. 
 
Robins: Vietnam veterans’ recovery from addiction 
In 1971 there were rumours and reports of extensive heroin use among American 
soldiers serving in Vietnam and almost immediately thereafter the military screened the 
urine of returning servicemen for drug use prior to their scheduled departure from 
Vietnam (Robins et al., 1974a; Robins, 1993). The urines of 10.5% of soldiers 
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screened indicated drug use in the period immediately preceding the test (Robins et al., 
1974a:38; Robins and Slobodyan, 2003:1054). This appeared to indicate very high 
addiction rates and led to widespread concern about the impact of many ‘chronically’ 
addicted servicemen returning to the US (Robins et al., 1974a:38). Robins was 
commissioned to evaluate these concerns and to ascertain how many veterans would 
require treatment through a follow-up study of the veterans (Robins et al., 1974a:38). 
 
Empirical analyses were drawn from two waves of fieldwork (Robins and Slobodyan, 
2003) with participants drawn from two samples: (i) veterans whose urine had tested 
positive for narcotics before their departure from Vietnam (ii) and the wider population 
of Vietnam veterans. 8-12 months after their return from Vietnam those selected to 
participate were sought for interview and a urine sample (Robins et al., 1974a:39). Only 
19% of participants were still on active military service at the time of their follow-up 
interview with the remainder having been out of service for an average of seven 
months (Robins et al., 1974a:39); the vast majority of participant veterans had returned 
to their settings from which they had left 2-3 years before for military service (Robins et 
al., 1974a:39). The first wave of follow-up interviews suggested that: 34% of all army 
enlisted men had tried heroin whilst in Vietnam (any narcotic: 43%), 19% of all enlisted 
men reported heroin addiction whilst in Vietnam and 20% reported addiction to any 
narcotic whilst in Vietnam (Robins et al, 2010 [1977]:203; Robins et al., 1974b:241; 
Robins et al., 1994:240). Those interviews also suggested that since returning from 
Vietnam only 10% had used narcotics and, particularly noteworthy, those who reported 
heroin addiction dropped from 19% to 1% (the second and final wave of follow-up 
interviews at 3 years after the veterans returned suggested addiction to be at 2% of 
veterans; Robins et al., 2010[1977]:206). Urine screens supported participant reports 
about subsequent use in the US and there was practically no evidence of deception 
over use (Robins et al., 2010[1977]). 
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If, as this data seemed to indicate, addiction among the total sample of participants fell 
from 19% to 1% then, as Robins et al. point out, this suggests an unprecedented 
remission rate of over 90% (1974a:39): much higher than those reportedly achieved 
among treatment populations3 (Robins et al., 2010 [1977]). Moreover, interviews at 3 
years post departure from Vietnam indicated that half of all veterans who had 
previously reported heroin addiction while in Vietnam had used heroin within 2 years 
after departure from Vietnam but only one-eighth reported experiencing (re)addiction 
(Robins et al., 2010 [1977]:207). In fact, these final interviews suggested that, only 12% 
of those who had been addicted in Vietnam had experienced addiction post-Vietnam 
and their (re)addiction ‘had usually been very brief’ (Robins, 1993:1045). This 
suggested, Robins et al. (2010 [1977]) argued and in contrast to the biomedical model, 
that it is possible for individuals who have experienced heroin addiction to use heroin 
without experiencing (re)addiction (2010:207). Lastly, only one-quarter of those ex-
addicts reported that they had felt like taking narcotics and only 4% reported having 
experienced ‘a craving’ (Robins et al., 2010 [1977]:207). Craving, Robins et al. (2010 
[1977]) contend, was relatively rare among the veterans after they had returned to the 
US (2010 [1977]:207). It has been argued by many (Robins, 1993; e.g. Zinberg, 1984), 
that the veterans’ experience of addiction in Vietnam and subsequent recovery on their 
return to the US was largely the result in shifts in social-context and setting4.  
 
The data from Robins’ research was in many ways inconsistent with the biomedical 
addiction model, ‘common sense’ beliefs about addiction in general and, in particular, 
                                                          
3
 Remission and relapse rates vary but research has pointed to a ‘revolving door’ of treatment to 
describe the propensity of many who experience treatment to continually relapse and cycle in 
and out of treatment (McCarty et al., 2000). 
4
 Robins (1993) has argued that her data did not support the social-setting thesis, though her 
interpretation appears to have a lot to do with Robins’ simplistic conception of ‘setting’ situated 
within a behaviourist framework and psychological research about stimulus-response 
relationships. In Robins (1993), for example, it is argued that the approval/disapproval of 
friends/family probably had an influence over veterans drug use but is clear from her work that 
Robins did not view social-relationships as an aspect of setting. 
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beliefs about heroin use (Robins, 1993). As such there was widespread resistance to 
the acceptance of Robins’ findings; many of the press and research community, for 
example, were sceptical and resisted changing beliefs about heroin as a uniquely 
dangerous drug, which would quickly lead to addiction, that was virtually incurable 
(Robins, 1993:1047). The study attracted two main criticisms. Firstly that the veterans 
‘were never really addicted’ (Robins, 1993:1047) – many commentators clung so hard 
to the belief that addiction is life-long that they gave the tautological argument that if an 
‘addict’ goes on to recover then they were not really addicted in the first place 
(Heyman, 2013:32). Robins et al. (1974a) engaged directly with this criticism and 
argued convincingly that the veterans were indeed experiencing addiction with all those 
who self-reported addiction having used a narcotic more than five times, 80% of self-
reporters stating that they had used regularly for 6 months whilst in Vietnam and 97% 
of self-reporters stating that they had experienced withdrawal symptoms that lasted 
more than 2 days (1974a:42). Other criticisms argued that the data was simply wrong 
and ranged from academic fraud – including accusations that the research, data, 
and/or findings had been tailored or manipulated so as to exonerate the 
government/military from involvement in the addiction of many servicemen (Robins, 
1993:1047) – to the argument that there must have been much greater prevalence of 
addiction among veterans than Robins and collaborators had reported (Robins, 
1993:1047). There is no room for an in-depth discussion of Robins’ responses to these 
criticisms here but she provided extremely convincing rebuttals to her critics, those who 
rubbished her data and to accusations of fraud, which suggest high integrity of the data 
and findings (see Robins, 1993). In any case even if Robins’ data was overstated 
and/or exaggerated for any reason or if the data was, indeed, ‘a fluke’ (Robins, 1993) – 
and there is absolutely no evidence that this is the case – the rates of recovery 
suggested by her sample were so high and the rates of relapse back into addiction so 
low (even among non-abstaining ex-addicts) that even if those rates were two or three 
times ‘worse’ then the data would still indicate much greater outcomes than 
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comparable data reported in treatment populations (Robins, 1993; Hunt and Bespalec, 
1974). 
 
Zinberg: Drug, set, and setting 
Zinberg (1984) attributed the high levels of use and addiction among enlisted men to 
the Vietnam War setting, arguing that it was this that had led those who would not 
otherwise have used to heroin to use and become addicted (Zinberg, 1984:12). Zinberg 
argued that mutual hatred between the Vietnamese and American soldiers and the 
conditions of war meant that ‘American troops were easily attracted to any activity, 
including drug use, that blotted out the outside world’ (Zinberg, 1984:x). Heavily 
exposed to (cheap) heroin, 85% of Robin’s sample reported that they had been offered 
heroin whilst in Vietnam, often soon after arrival (Robins et al., 2010 [1977]:203). As 
the heroin that was available to soldiers tended to be far more potent and less 
expensive than in the US, smoking and snorting were effective methods of use and this 
probably made consumption far more attractive than if injection had been the primary 
mode of administration (Zinberg, 1984:13; Robins and Slobodyan, 2003:1054).  
 
Zinberg (1984) attributed the high incidence of veterans’ recovery to the shift in setting 
arguing that once users were removed from the ‘bad’ social-setting heroin use virtually 
ceased (Zinberg, 1984:xi). When war veterans returned to the US they moved back to 
a setting of less exposure and decreased availability (as heroin was more expensive) 
and decreased potency which made smoking impractical (Zinberg, 1984:13). But, 
crucially, Zinberg (1984) argued that addiction was not only influenced by market 
conditions (i.e. availability of cheaper, purer, heroin) but by socio-cultural conditions. 
While researching the ‘British system’ of heroin maintenance Zinberg noted differences 
between British and American heroin addicts (Zinberg, 1984:ix-x). American addicts, it 
seemed to Zinberg, were debilitated by their addiction and were regarded as a major 
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cause of social problems. British addicts, on the other hand, seemed to fit into two 
‘types’: firstly, those which managed to function adequately and even successfully, and 
secondly those which behaved in an uncontrolled way and did great harm to 
themselves but, unlike the stereotypical American ‘junkie’, neither of these types were 
seen as a source of social problems (Zinberg, 1984:ix-x). Zinberg attributed the 
differences he noted between American and British addicts to be product of the 
different social/cultural and legal attitudes toward heroin between the respective 
nations. In comparison to the US, heroin was legal in Britain and users were not 
regarded as particularly deviant and it was this context that, Zinberg argued, allowed 
some British users carry on with their lives as ‘normal’ while others viewed themselves 
as defective, adopting a ‘junkie’ lifestyle (Zinberg, 1984:x). Building on this experience 
and drawing on the work of Becker (1953; 1967) and Robins (1973), Zinberg (1984) 
provided strong evidence that control over object consumption is heavily influenced by 
social context and setting. As this project takes lead from Zinberg (1984), his model 
and findings are more fully discussed in chapter three as way of framing the conceptual 
framework for data collection, however suffice to say here that Zinberg’s research 
indicated that social-setting, and in particular informal sanctions (rules) and rituals, 
were instrumental in control over object consumption and that shifts of controlled and 
uncontrolled consumption were associated with shifts in and out of social-setting. 
 
Recovery 
The phenomenon of recovery problematises the view that experiences of addiction are 
always chronic and progressive. Robins (1973) not only found that many of those who 
had experienced addiction could abstain from the object of their addiction but, crucially, 
the vast majority abstained without ever desiring to use and only 4% ever experienced 
cravings (Robins et al., 2010 [1977]:207). Similarly, Zinberg (1984) found that many of 
those who had experienced substantial difficulty of control went on to consume in a 
controlled way. If it is accepted, as it is in this thesis, that central to addiction is loss of 
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control then it would be hard to deny that the majority of Robins’ (1973) and Zinberg’s 
(1984) participants recovered from addiction. More recent research has suggested the 
existence of ‘ex-addicts’ who maintain non-compulsive use of cocaine (e.g. Waldorf et 
al., 1991), alcohol (e.g. Heather and Robertson, 1983; Lloyd and Salzberg, 1975) and 
gambling respective of the object(s) of their previous addiction(s). With regard to ex-
gambling addicts who still gamble, two case studies are of notable interest (Dickerson 
and Weeks, 1979; Rankin, 1982) both of which reported positive outcomes for treating 
problematic gamblers with a controlled treatment goal. Empirical evidence for 
controlled gambling is presented by  Blaszczynski et al.’s (1991) follow-up study of 
individuals who had completed a behavioural treatment program between two and nine 
years earlier. Of the 63 participants followed up: 18 classified themselves as abstinent, 
25 classified themselves as controlled gamblers (i.e. still gambling but without reporting 
feeling unable to control and without experiencing negative financial consequences), 
and 20 reported uncontrolled gambling (1991:304). In another study, Dowling and 
Smith (2007) offered controlled gambling as a treatment option/goal (along with 
abstinence) to 85 women beginning cognitive and behavioural therapy for problematic 
gambling (Ladouceur et al., 2009:190): one-third (34%) chose controlled gambling as a 
treatment goal (Dowling and Smith, 2007:340). Those who chose controlled gambling 
gave reasons such as the belief that abstinence may be unrealistic or overwhelming, 
enjoying gambling, and a desire to be able to cope with situations involving gambling 
(Dowling and Smith, 2007:340. Cited in Ladouceur et al., 2009:190). 
 
There is good evidence to indicate that whether or not an individual can consume in a 
controlled way post-addiction depends on the extent to which individuals believe (or 
could be persuaded to believe that) it is possible (Decorte, 2001a:318; Orford and 
Keddie, 1986:72-3). A study by Dowling and Smith (2007) is particularly applicable 
because findings suggested that those who chose an abstinence treatment goal were 
significantly more likely to believe that problematic gambling is an uncontrollable 
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disease and feel they would never (again) be able to gamble in a controlled way 
(Dowling and Smith, 2007:340;343). Further credence comes from Decorte’s (2001a) 
controlled cocaine users who seemed to possess ‘a vocabulary of controlled drug use 
with which to conceive and articulate normative expectations of controlled use’ 
(2001a:318). As el-Guebaly (2005:267) notes, in general, research tends to support the 
hypothesis that treatment outcomes are influenced by the degree to which the 
individual believes in the necessity of the outcome (e.g. abstinence/controlled 
consumption). The idea that belief about addiction – and in particular if and how 
addiction can be overcome – influences recovery/treatment outcomes chimes 
particularly well with the previously discussed thesis that addiction is a social 
construction embodied by individuals and which impels agents 
perceptions/feelings/actions in ways consistent with the addiction construct. 
 
While the prevailing view among researchers, the public, and those ‘in recovery’ is that 
‘abstinence’ underpins recovery (see Laudet, 2007; Betty Ford Institute, 2007:221; 
Centre for Substance Abuse Treatment, 2009:1) it is apparent from the discussion 
above that recovery ‘in the absence of abstinence’ (Slutske et al., 2010) is possible, 
perhaps even likely (Zinberg, 1984). Regardless of whether or not abstinence or 
continued-but-controlled-use is a long-term recovery goal, recovery appears not a 
single event but an ongoing process (UK Drug Policy Commission Group, 2008; Best, 
2012b; Best and Lubman, 2012; DiClemente, 2003). Some research conducted with 
those in treatment has suggested that the process of bringing consumption under 
control often takes many years and is characterised by periods of loss of control (or 
‘relapse’) (Prochaska and DiClemente, 1983; DiClemente, 2003): Simpson and Sells 
(1990:243), for example, reported an average recovery time (defined as abstinence) of 
addiction to opiates of 9.9 years with a range of 1-35 years. It is interesting that such 
individuals do not experience rapid recovery akin to the Vietnam veterans and though 
there may be many differences between those veterans and those in treatment, the 
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latter are unlikely to have experienced such a monumental shift in socio-cultural 
context that those veterans did. 
 
While sustained controlled non-problematic consumption is possible many might argue 
that abstinence is more desirable. Some quantitative research has suggested, for 
example, that most of those seeking treatment tend to want abstinence (McKeganey et 
al., 2004) but qualitative research has found a much wider range of treatment 
aspirations including complete abstinence, abstinence from some drugs and not others, 
controlled consumption, abstinence for a certain period but not for good, as well as 
recovery goals that extend far beyond object consumption such as improving 
relationships, acquiring material possessions and achieving better health (Neale et al., 
2011:191-2). Consistent with these heterogeneous aspirations, recent years have seen 
a rise of the recovery advocacy movement which has looked beyond conceptualising 
recovery only in terms of control (mainly abstinence) over object consumption to 
include principles such as quality of life and wellbeing (Best, 2012b). The point being 
abstinence, or even sustained but controlled use, in itself does not constitute 
improvement in lived experience. Even where abstinence is the goal the recovery 
process may include a period of continued consumption: ‘warm turkey’ (see Miller and 
Page, 1991). Furthermore, recovery goals may change over time and after a period of 
controlled consumption the individual may (or may not) wish to seek abstinence. A 
great deal of research suggests that ‘one-size-fits-all’ treatment approaches are 
inappropriate (Ashton, 2011). 
 
Pathways to recovery 
Recovery is a uniquely personal experience with many different (and not necessarily 
exclusive) paths (Deegan, 1988). Broadly speaking pathways have been dichotomised 
into recovery with formal treatment and recovery without treatment (or ‘natural 
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recovery’). While a variety of formal treatment options have been developed to treat 
problematic gambling/gambling addiction access to this treatment is limited (see Reith, 
2006:73; Orford et al., 2003:227), the majority of those who experience gambling 
problems never seek treatment and for those that do most never complete (Reith, 
2006:71-2). Research has found natural recovery to both abstinence and sustained 
controlled use to be a common pathway away from substance addiction (Biernacki, 
1986; Waldorf et al., 1991; Toneatto et al., 1999; Stewart, 1999; Cunningham, 1999; 
Sobell et al., 2000; Vaillant, 2003; Robins, 2010; Mariezcurrena, 1994) and gambling 
addiction (Slutske, 2006; Hodgins and El-Guebaly, 2000; Slutske et al., 2010). 
(Quantitative) prevalence surveys have for some time noted the existence of 
individuals who fulfil particular criteria for lifetime problematic gambling but do not fulfil 
the criteria for past year problematic gambling (see e.g. Bland et al., 1993; Hodgins et 
al., 1999; Abbott et al., 2004b; Slutske, 2006). Slutske (2006), for example, analysed 
two US national prevalence surveys and found that an average of 36%-39% of 
individuals diagnosed with lifetime problematic gambling had not experienced 
gambling-related problems in the past year and that only 7%-12% of these individuals 
ever sought treatment or attended GA. Thus, Slutske (2006) suggests that 33%-36% of 
those identified as problematic (pathological) gamblers recovered ‘naturally’ (see 
Slutske, 2006:300). Adding to this evidence longitudinal research has suggested that 
problematic/addictive gambling behaviour may be episodic and fluid rather than chronic 
and static. LaPlante et al. (2008) reviewed five longitudinal studies of gambling 
behaviour and found that problematic gambling behaviour is extremely variable with 
individuals moving ‘in and out of more severe and less severe levels’ of problematic 
gambling (LaPlante et al., 2008:52). More recently a 5-year qualitative longitudinal 
study series (Reith and Dobbie, 2011; 2012; 2013) supported this finding, suggesting 
change be the norm in gambling behaviour with most moving in and out of periods of 
heavier and reduced gambling and in and out of periods of problematic gambling 
(2013:11-12). This research suggested variability in gambling behaviour to be 
influenced by the gambler’s social and cultural context (Reith and Dobbie, 2013:12). 
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‘Natural recovery’ and ‘maturing out’ of addiction 
It appears that most who experience addiction recovery do so without formal treatment, 
perhaps continuing to consume with greater control or ceasing consumption completely 
(Zinberg, 1984; Winick, 1962; Waldorf et al., 1991) which, as noted, is often referred to 
as ‘natural recovery’ (Waldorf et al., 1991). Noting that recovery without treatment 
happens in concert with aging, some literature has, synonymously, referred to natural 
recovery as ‘maturing out’ (e.g. Prins, 2008; Winick, 1962). Use of the latter to refer to 
all recovery in lieu of treatment has been criticised, however, as even though all 
recovery happens over time and thus with age, not all recovery may be shaped by 
aging and/or aptly described as supported by ‘maturation’ (Waldorf et al., 1991). 
Sociologically orientated research has asserted natural recovery to be strongly 
influenced or supported by change in actors’ lives such as transformations in social 
relationships, employment and living circumstances (Waldorf et al., 1991). The 
addiction/recovery experience of the Vietnam veterans (Robins, 1973) appeared 
supported by rapid shifts in context but these contextual shifts and, ultimately, in and 
out of addiction, did not appear to be shaped by the contextual processes suggested to 
occur over life-courses and thus with age (Quintero, 2000; Moore, 1993). Though 
influence of contextual change in and out of war settings on addiction/recovery is, 
arguably, quite unique, literature has asserted more common but still relatively rapid 
changes in socio-cultural milieu to influence addiction/recovery. Moving home from one 
geographical area to another, for example, has been suggested to lead to changes in 
social networks that might influence consumption, perhaps supporting greater or lesser 
control over object consumption (Waldorf et al., 1991; Zinberg, 1984) but such a shift in 
living circumstances may not be appositely described as ‘maturing out’ if moving home 
was not encouraged by social or cultural processes (Moore, 1993; Quintero, 2000) that 
exert influence on subjectivity in concert with aging. On the other hand, contextual 
changes that might occur with starting a family and that facilitate recovery, for example, 
might be well termed ‘maturing out’ if viewed as a culturally expected (and encouraged) 
happening in a given individuals life-course. To clarify, from a sociological perspective, 
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‘maturing out’ does not refer to behaviour change perceived as caused by the aging 
body in isolation from the socio-cultural context, but, to change that occurs between 
actor (subject) and their position within the socio-cultural milieu in which they are 
embedded that happen in concert with aging. Examples might include changes to 
culturally specific expectations about appropriate/inappropriate behaviour or about how 
one should live as they get older (see chapter seven). 
 
Indeed, consistent with a sociological interpretation of ‘maturing out’, addiction and 
recovery appears to tend to happen in young (or ‘emerging’) adulthood5 and some 
have explained this largely to be because it is during this time that individual’s lives are 
most changeable (Quintero, 2000; Verges et al., 2012). It appears that it is during 
emerging/young adulthood that there tends to be a dense (temporal) spacing of 
culturally established/expected life-events (e.g. marriage, parenthood, starting a career 
and so forth) which seems, in comparison to later life, to lead to greater changeability in 
lives and circumstance (Roberts et al. 2006; Glenn, 1980; Donovan et al., 1983; Luong 
et al., 2011; Hartup and Stevens, 1997:358). Moreover, psychological literature (Glenn, 
1980; Caspi and Roberts, 2001), noting that individual’s cultural expectations 
(values/norms), though relatively stable (Roberts et al., 2006), tend to be more variable 
in adolescence/young adulthood before becoming more stable into middle and older 
age6 (Roberts et al. 2006; Glenn, 1980; Donovan et al., 1983), has asserted 
changeability of expectations not to be product of aging, per se, but changes in living 
context .  
                                                          
5 Typically aged in 20’s or early 30’s (Quintero, 2000; Verges et al., 2012); that is not to say that 
addiction does not occur and persist among those older, but onset and recurrence is less usual 
(Verges et al., 2012). In fact, when those older do experience addiction there is good evidence 
that duration tends to persist longer than for those younger (Verges et al., 2012; Kerr et al., 
2002; Johnstone et al., 1996). 
6 Akin to dispositions of Bourdieu’s habitus, expectations may be durable but still subject to 
change (Bourdieu, 1992:133) – more malleable when younger and more reified with age. 
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In practice, though, it might be difficult to distinguish between natural recovery that is, 
or is not, supported by socio-cultural processes that occur alongside aging. As 
behaviour change (e.g. recovery) cannot be disentangled from time, all recovery (and 
change in general) happens alongside aging (and the socio-cultural processes that go 
along with aging). Moreover, situational change (e.g. moving home) may be both 
supported by circumstance and by changing cultural expectations that occur with age. 
Nonetheless, it may be useful to distinguish between ‘natural recovery’ and the 
‘maturing out’ as ‘abstract typifications’ – constructs that highlight particular aspects of 
actor’s lives that are of particular interest to the research (Ashley and Orenstein, 
1998:287-288). 
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Why does the biomedical addiction concept endure? 
Taking a constructivist approach it has been shown that the biomedical addiction 
construct arose out of particular historical and social circumstances and worldviews. 
Research that problematises this construct has been presented, suggesting that 
‘addiction’ as loss of control is not caused by the pharmacological effects of substances 
and/or physiological abnormalities. This paradox (where the dominant scientific model 
is not supported by evidence) has led some to consider why it is that the biomedical 
addiction construct endures (e.g. Hammersley and Reid, 2002; Davies, 1997; 
Alexander, 2001; Peele, 1985; Weinberg, 2000). Davies (1997) has argued that the 
biomedical addiction construct is a functional ‘myth’ – a way of making sense of the 
world (Davies, 1997) – which provides rationale and justification for particular feelings 
and actions so that reason and responsibility can be attributed to addiction rather than 
the rational choices of the individual (see Hammersley and Reid, 2002:15). In Davies’ 
(1997) view people use and continue to use drugs in a purposive way not because they 
are compelled to by pharmacological/physiological factors but because they want to 
and, given the choices available to them, they find no adequate reason for not doing so 
(1997:xi). Davies (1997) argues that ‘addiction’ provides individuals with explanation for 
continued consumption despite negative consequences and for actions that conflict 
with social norms (e.g. loss of control, theft).  As such it absolves the individual, 
transferring responsibility to a perceived internal condition over which they have no 
control. Similarly, the concept of addiction is functional for a wide range of other 
stakeholders. For friends/families of ‘addicts’, addiction provides an explanation for 
their behaviour (Davies, 1992). As Hammersley and Reid (2002:13) have argued, the 
biomedical notion of addiction seems to endure, in part, because of its continual 
functionality for a wide range of groups: the media gain good stories; politicians have 
safe campaign issues; those involved in producing and trafficking controlled drugs 
benefit from enhanced profits; and by targeting drug user-dealers law enforcement is 
tackling ‘crime’ and the perceived causes of acquisitive/violent crime. Similarly, 
Hammersley and Reid (2002:15) point out that the pharmaceutical and ‘biotechnology’ 
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industries gain from the biomedical addiction construct in that it creates an impetus to 
develop/market ‘less addictive’ drugs and justifies the (highly profitable) biomedical 
quest for an addiction ‘cure’ (Hammersley and Reid, 2002:15). Hammersley and Reid 
(2002) have extended the myth argument by arguing that it serves particular cultural 
functions: in Western cultures where self-control is championed, addiction serves as an 
illustration of how not to behave (2002:19-20). 
 
Other research has looked beyond functional accounts of addiction to argue that the 
biomedical model perpetuates and is reproduced as a result of institutionalisation, 
internalisation, and embodiment. Reinarman (2005), for example, points out that the 
process of identifying one’s self as addicted involves learning the language of addiction 
and recovery and retrospectively interpreting one’s behaviour and feelings in terms of 
the medical addiction model (2005:315). As such the addiction construct becomes a 
kind of lens through which individuals reinterpret their self and actions. Weinberg 
(2000) has argued that those seeking formal treatment services (and 12 step 
movements) are required to assume an addict identity characterised by loss of control, 
to argue anything else constitutes ‘denial’ (2000:611). Similarly, Rice (1992) has 
demonstrated how those in addiction self-help groups draw on addiction/recovery 
lexicon to (re)construct a narrative of their lives in terms of the bio-medical model of 
addiction. Furthermore, Reinarman (2005) notes that the addiction myth perpetuates 
through performative practice where ‘addicts’ and ‘ex-addicts’ tell and retell their ‘life 
stories according to the grammatical and syntactical rules of disease discourse that 
they have come to learn’ (Reinarman, 2005:315) continually reaffirming their 
(biomedically) addicted identity and in doing so discursively reproducing the addiction 
construct to others (Weinberg, 2000; Reinarman, 2005:315). This performative practice 
does not only occur among and between those ‘in treatment’ but also to the wider 
community when those who are ‘in recovery’ are asked to speak in schools and to the 
media as ‘experts’ on addiction because they have ‘been there’ (Reinarman 2005:315). 
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Addiction myths (and addict stereotypes) are also promulgated, reified and reproduced 
through mass media forms of storytelling and constitute flexible and functional narrative 
devices (Room, 2003). These myths and stereotypes communicate ideas held to 
represent phenomena that in reality are extremely complex in a generalised, 
(over)simplified and organised way (Lippmann, 1965; Dyer, 1979). Through the use of 
particular signifiers in media texts, audiences notice (addict stereotypical) traits and 
then ‘fill in the blanks” from their existing (and socially constructed) knowledge 
(Lippmann, 1965; Cape, 2003) which is heavily influenced by addiction myth. The 
overarching image of the addiction narrative is one of degradation and the addict 
character signifies that the individual will do terrible things for no reason other than they 
are addicted, have lost control and are willing to do anything to consume to object of 
their addiction: they will lie, cheat and will harm and kill others and often themselves 
(Room, 2003:229). In addition for the storyteller, addiction serves as ‘an extremely 
serviceable plot motivator’ that ‘allows the most outlandish and outrageous situation, 
episode, or action [to] be made believable by portraying one of the characters as an 
addict’ (Room, 2003:229). It can explain both failure and evildoing and ultimately can 
be used to explain the otherwise inexplicable (Room, 2003:229). Fictional film and 
television drama, in particular, have been noted for perpetuating and reproducing 
addiction myths (Cape, 2003). For instance, while withdrawal from opiate dependence 
may well be often by an extremely unpleasant and difficult experience it is often 
exaggerated in film (Cape, 2003:166). In the popular film Trainspotting, for example, a 
character undergoes withdrawal from opioids in such a way that is not seen in reality – 
from vivid hallucinations and tortured screaming (Cape, 2003:164-5). In Requiem for a 
Dream, described by its director as a ‘horror film’ in which ‘addiction’ is the monster 
(Gingold, 2000:57; Grist, 2007:124), drug use quickly descends into addiction and the 
tragic downfall of each of the main characters: one is forced into sex work to pay for 
heroin, another is incarcerated and has his sceptic arm amputated as a direct result of 
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injecting heroin, while another is involuntarily committed to a psychiatric ward, is given 
electroconvulsive therapy, and loses her mind. As Stevenson has noted, addiction 
themed movies ‘serve as incubators and conduits of myth for modern audiences’ 
(2000:11). 
 
The (re)telling of addiction myths, exaggerations and stereotypes are far from confined 
to ‘fictional’ mediums. Many have noted that the news media perpetuate and reproduce 
addiction myths and stereotypes (Taylor, 2008; Reinarman and Levine, 2004). The fact 
that, for example, most who experience heroin addiction are able to function normally 
in both personal and professional lives (Boland, 2008:179) and are actually employed 
is completely ‘alien’ to the news media and ‘goes against the simplified and 
stereotyped imagery presented by them’ (Taylor, 2008:376). Reinarman and Levine 
(2004), for example, have suggested that the American news media have continually 
propagated the myth that crack cocaine is instantly addictive. Recent news reports 
have widely reported that in the US illicit methamphetamine use results in instant 
addiction and causes a whole range of negative physiological deformities including 
what has been dubbed “meth mouth” (extreme tooth decay) and often presents ‘before 
and after’ photos (Hart et al., 2014). What the news does not report is that there is no 
evidence that reported deformities are caused by smoking methamphetamine and that 
the drug is regularly prescribed for attention-deficit hyperactive disorder (ADHD) (Hart 
et al., 2014). 
 
Another reason for the persistence of the biomedical addiction model may be found in 
the dominance of naturalistic science (including medicine) and its core principles of 
reductionism and materialism (see Edwards, 1994; Peele, 1981). From this position 
complex problems are held to be solvable through division into smaller and simpler 
(physical) units so that addiction is held to be caused by physiological parts explainable 
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by closer and deeper examination (Ahn et al., 2006:709. See also Edwards, 1994:9). 
Accordingly, if addiction as loss of control is ‘real’ then from this framework it must be 
linked to a measurable physiological change (see Hammersley and Reid, 2002:23). As 
Reith (2004) has noted medical and psychiatric approaches have attempted to locate 
cause within the physical body in cell biology, cortical functioning, and genes (see 
Reith, 2004:291). Reductionist materialism constitutes a mechanistic and deterministic 
worldview: human beings are held akin to clockwork mechanisms the functioning of 
which can be understood by understanding the functioning of constituent parts (see 
Mazzocchi, 2008:10). The idea that addiction exists only as part of shared 
understandings (See Cohen, 2000:590), rooted in subjective experience (see Edwards, 
1994:9), and that does not have a physical (material) cause makes no sense from a 
reductionist and materialist framework. As Peele (1985) has argued the persistence of 
the biomedical addiction construct results from ‘reluctance to formulate scientific 
concepts about behaviour that include subjective perceptions, cultural and individual 
values, and notions of self-control and other personality-based differences’ (1985:3).  
 
Social constructionism and materialism 
Evidence has been presented to suggest that addiction is a socially constructed, 
culture-bound, phenomenon. As this chapter closes it is important to highlight that 
constructionist accounts of addiction do not deny the influence of materialism/biology in 
the experience of addiction but do suggest that addiction cannot reside outside of 
subjectivity. From a realist perspective, constructionist accounts, in general, have been 
criticised for ignoring, even denying, materiality but this is not necessarily the case 
(Elder-Vass, 2012; Hacking, 2000). Fraser et al. (2014) contend that social constructs 
‘are distinct from the reality of biology […] which pre-exists and remains ontologically 
separate’ (2014:130). As Room (1984) argues, constructionists should not ‘discount 
objective realities’ as there is a ‘dialectic between social definitions and material 
circumstances’ (1984:10). Social action, however socially constructed, involves 
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objective, material, conditions, and consequences. Some, for example, have pointed to 
the production of dopamine – part of the brain’s so-called reward system (Kalant, 
2009:783) – as the source of addiction (e.g. Potenza, 2008) arguing that people will 
repeat anything that ‘turns on [...] dopamine neurons’ (Kolata, 2002. Cited in 
Reinarman, 2005:309). However, as Reinarman (2005) goes on to point out, 
neuroscience has found that dopamine is produced when individuals engage in a 
whole host of behaviours including looking at beautiful faces (Aharon et al., 2001), 
cooperation, trust, and generosity (Angier, 2002). Moreover, to argue that a particular 
object causes the production of dopamine which itself causes addiction neglects to 
appreciate the role of perception, interpretation, and meaning. While some research 
has found gambling wins and near misses to increase dopamine levels (e.g. Chase 
and Clark, 2010) this research fails to appreciate that wins and near misses are 
particular outcomes that have been ascribed with particular meanings: without meaning 
a win would not be a win, or a near-miss a near-miss. The presentation of addiction in 
terms of the discursive (i.e. as a social construction) emphasises the social 
constitutedness of behaviour which, in light of the evidence presented in this chapter, 
seems to better explain the phenomenon of addiction than theories based entirely on 
materialism and determinism while at the same time appreciating that (so-called) 
behaviours of addiction involve the biological (body) and the material. This is consistent 
with Bourdieusian and Foucauldian thought (see chapter one), which appreciates that 
while biology remains a pre-condition of human behaviour but it is far from the only 
condition. The chapter will now conclude with discussion that frames that chapter within 
Foucauldian and Bourdieusian thought.  
 
 
 
 
 97 
 
A Bourdieusian-Foucauldian framework: the embodiment of addiction 
discourse through practice 
As Fraser et al. (2014:5) note, much of the critical addictions literature rooted in the 
social constructionist tradition has been ‘deeply influenced’ by Foucauldian thought. 
The parallels between constructionist explanations of addiction (such as those 
presented in this chapter) and Foucauldian thought (chapter one) are clear. The 
constructionist accounts of addiction presented in this chapter, for example, emphasise 
the cultural histories of present-day understandings of addiction and this approach 
resonates strongly with Foucault’s historical and genealogical methodology. Some of 
the more nuanced constructionist accounts are more obviously aligned with 
(post)Foucauldian theory in that they explicitly locate contemporary understandings 
and discourses of addiction within more general ways of thinking, rationalities, or what 
Foucault called (govern)mentalities (Rose, 1996:43; see chapter one). The 
aforementioned works of Reith (2007b), Room (1985) and Levine (1978), to give 
examples, do not merely provide a historical account of addiction discourse but locate 
contemporary understandings within rationalities such as consumerism, neoliberalism, 
prudentialism and responsibilisation – all of which can be located within 
(post)Foucauldian governmentality – and even go as far to argue that it is only from 
within these rationalities that the contemporary addiction construct, as loss of control, 
comes to be intelligible (Room, 1985; Weinberg, 2011).  
 
Moreover, from a Foucauldian perspective addiction may be thought of as therapeutic 
(and so political) discourse which classifies, normalises and so disciplines subjects 
(Fraser et al., 2014:5). Addiction can be seen as a (socially constructed) disorder, a 
state of being, that promotes, even requires, action on the conduct of others through 
therapeutic/medical intervention in an effort to shape ‘subjectivity based on prudential 
consumption and responsible citizenship’ (Fraser et al., 2014:27). From this 
perspective, addiction discourse constitutes a technology of government; it comes to 
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be a rationale for intervention/reshaping subjectivity. This practical government can 
take various forms including work on the self which may be fostered by 12-step groups 
and forms of counselling – an aim often being for the subject to internalise particular 
codes of conduct and beliefs about the self concerning normality and ideal citizenship  
(Fraser et al., 2014:27). 
 
Fraser et al. (2014) emphasise that the need to appreciate addiction in both terms of 
embodied experience as well the discursive and argue that addiction exists as ‘a 
subjective reality, which is made and re-made in cultural practice’ (Fraser et al., 
2014:134). Accordingly, addiction comes to be seen not merely as a construct or field 
of knowledge but as something that is experienced through social action informed by 
multiple discourses that shape subjectivity (such as those of neoliberalism, new 
prudentialism, and consumerism discussed in chapter one). In this task Bourdieu’s 
theory of practice (Bourdieu, 1977) may be useful. In chapter one, it was discussed that 
the Bourdieusian habitus involves the embodiment (or internalisation) of social 
conditions or structures (Bourdieu, 1984:470) which may include (cultural) beliefs about 
addiction. The Foucauldian discussion of governmentality, neoliberalism and new 
prudentialism in chapter one and addiction discourse in this chapter is essentially a 
discussion of wider structural conditions in which, according to Bourdieu, the habitus of 
agents are formed and continually reshaped through ongoing interaction with structural 
conditions, which, in turn, reconstitute/shape the structural conditions which come to 
bear on future action. 
 
Consistent with Foucauldian and Bourdieusian thought is research suggesting that 
those who experience addiction tend to assume an ‘addict identity’ and (re)construct 
their biographies and (re)interpret/frame behaviour according to dominant 
(biochemical/disease) addiction discourse (Weinberg, 2000; Rice, 1992; Reinarman, 
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2005). Reinarman (2005), for example, argues that the addiction construct perpetuates 
through performative practice where ‘addicts’ and ‘ex-addicts’, having embodied 
addiction as disease discourse, continually tell their life stories according to the 
grammatical and syntactical rules of that discourse. By synthesising Bourdieusian and 
Foucauldian thought, the criticism that explanations of addiction which take an 
exclusively discursive/constructionist approach fail to adequately appreciate addiction 
as a (lived) experience (Weinberg, 2002) is allayed. As such, the present thesis holds 
that understandings of addiction must go beyond discourse to appreciate that addiction 
is both discursive and informs the experiences, perceptions and actions of individuals 
who are, simultaneously, objects of discourse and (re)creators of discourse. This 
allows an embodied approach to understanding addiction as experience situated 
within, and potentially influenced by, discourse/social structure. Moreover, the 
application of Bourdieu’s theory of practice to addiction as an embodied phenomenon 
allows it possible to treat the consumption, craving and addiction as precognitive, 
prereflexive and embodied rather than interpretive and disembodied but at the same 
time meaningful. As such, addiction can, on the one hand, be considered a social 
construction that is not caused by any intrinsic property of body or ‘stimuli’ but that, on 
the other, involves cravings that are ‘real’, experienced, not immediately under the 
agents control and extremely difficult to resist. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has established how gambling addiction is approached in this doctoral 
thesis. Taking a broadly Foucauldian approach, it has been demonstrated that 
addiction discourses (including those of gambling) are product of particular cultural 
histories that have come to define and render intelligible contemporary (and culturally 
specific) understandings of addiction (Levine, 1978; Reinarman, 2005). The sine qua 
non of addiction, loss of control (Fraser et al., 2014:38), has been discussed in the 
context of neoliberalism and new prudentialism (see chapter one) and it has been 
illustrated that this defining characteristic exists as a ‘problem’ largely because of 
cultural conditions where lack of self-control as well as failures to act ‘responsibly’ and 
of risk management are seen as abnormal and problematic.   
 
The dominant contemporary view of addiction as biomedical disorder has been 
examined and rejected because of numerous inconsistencies between the medical 
model and empirical evidence. Addiction recovery, in particular, was explored in depth 
thereby demonstrating that most who experience addiction eventually bring their 
consumption under control without formal treatment – a phenomenon often termed 
‘natural recovery’ and ‘maturing out’. Of particular focus was that some who experience 
addiction appear to recover by bringing their consumption under greater control in lieu 
of abstinence and that control as well as recovery is influenced by the social conditions 
of individuals’ lives. 
 
Having discredited the dominant conception of addiction discussion then turned to 
explain the continuation of that model. In particular, it was argued that addiction myths 
become embodied, internalised and reproduced through interactions between agent 
and the other. Individuals come to learn addiction/recovery language, ways of thinking 
and being from the cultural milieu so that ‘addicts’ come to (re)interpret their 
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biographies through the addiction lens and some then tell and retell their stories in the 
wider community further disseminating addiction myths (Reinarman, 2005; Weinberg, 
2000). In addition, it was argued that the endurance of the medical model might be 
explained by the dominance and authority of naturalistic science (including medicine) 
over the body (and behaviour), and its core principles of reductionism and materialism 
which preclude inclusion of theories bases on non-material irreducible phenomena 
such as subjective perceptions, experiences, meaning, and cultural values. The 
chapter closed with discussion of how addiction can logically be framed in terms 
consistent with both Bourdieusian and Foucauldian thought. The following chapter 
(chapter three) sets out the conceptual framework that will be drawn on for the 
empirical work and analyses. 
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Chapter three: Research approach and conceptual framework 
This chapter sets out the conceptual framework used to structure the empirical data 
collection, analysis, and the interpretation of findings. It is split into two parts. Part one 
provides a brief overview of gambling research and argues interpretivist approaches to 
be better suited to explanation of gambling behaviour than positivist approaches. It 
then turns to explore the nature of gambling-related harm before situating the thesis 
within the harm reduction paradigm. Harm reduction is asserted to have significant 
strengths over abstinence-focused approaches, in part, because it is often concerned 
with making environmental changes that support reductions in harm. Situated within 
that paradigm, the ‘risk environment’ approach is critically examined as an effective 
way of exploring gambling-related risk and harm in a way that also appreciates 
interplay between factors that may have influence but which might not be directly, or 
obviously, gambling related. Building on part one, in part two the conceptual framework 
is developed and presented. Strongly influenced by the works of Zinberg (1984) and 
Bourdieu (1989; chapter one), and supplemented with additional sociological and 
behaviour change literature, this framework is comprised of socio-cultural milieu, 
beliefs, practices, and life-structure.  
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Part one: Gambling research and harm reduction 
 
Existing gambling research: an overview of approaches 
A brief overview of existing gambling research and common themes is now provided. 
The aim is not to provide an in-depth literature review, but to examine current 
approaches and thereby provide justification for the interpretivist approach taken in this 
doctoral thesis (see chapter four). It is divided by epistemological position (i.e. 
interpretivism or positivism) and discipline for clarity, however, it is important to keep in 
mind that some research is interdisciplinary and may not be confined to one 
epistemology (e.g. mixed methods). 
 
Positivist gambling research 
Most gambling research (Reith, 2007a), consistent with addictions research in general 
(Edwards, 1994), is modelled on naturalistic science and thus takes a positivist 
approach in which the principles of objectivism, reductionism, determinism, and 
empiricism are core (Delanty, 1997; Wainwright and Forbes, 2000; Mazzocchi, 2008). 
Within this paradigm, behaviours and states of addiction are approached in terms of 
objective truth, distinct from subjectivity, explainable through division of phenomena 
which are, often, suggested to determine (cause) addiction (Edwards, 1994). In 
positivist science, only phenomena observable and measurable (quantifiable) can be 
investigated and, given the emphasis on reductionism, phenomena must be examined 
in isolation from context (Mazzocchi, 2008). 
 
Positivist disciplinary approaches: biomedical, psychological, and 
epidemiological 
Most positivist gambling research has taken a biomedical or psychological approach 
(Reith, 2007a; Binde, 2009). Biomedical approaches focusing on genes and other 
aspects of physiology or pharmacology have failed to provide empirical evidence to 
explain addiction (Reinarman, 2005; see chapter two). Most psychological gambling 
 104 
 
research can be broadly described as clinical or cognitive. Clinical work uses artificial 
experiments to identify ‘stimuli’ that elicit (subjective) feelings of compulsion, sensation, 
and arousal which, it is purported, encourage gambling behaviour, perhaps to the 
extent that it becomes problematic (Reith, 2007a; e.g. Parke and Griffiths, 2007). Of 
particular focus have been the design of gambling activities (e.g. speed of ‘play’ or 
sound effects of machines) and qualities of the immediate environment (e.g. lighting, 
music, or lack of windows) (e.g. Delfabbro and Winefield, 1999; Dickerson, 1993; 
Griffiths, 1993; Fisher, 1999; Dixon and Schreiber, 2004; Blaszczynski et al., 2005a). 
Cognitive work is focused on the relationship between gambling difficulties and the 
ways that those who experience these difficulties think (e.g. misunderstandings about 
probability and illusions of control; Reith, 2007a; Toneatto and Nguyen, 2007). Many 
approaches view problematic gambling (including gambling addiction) as caused by 
both psychological and biological factors: ‘psychobiological’ models (e.g. see 
Blaszczynski et al., 1986; Roy et al., 1988; Griffiths, 1991). 
 
Other research has looked beyond the biological and psychological to more ‘social’ 
factors. Often, taking the form of epidemiological survey research, population studies 
generally collect (quantitative) data about gambling patterns (e.g. frequency of 
gambling, gambling expenditure, and forms gambling activities participated in), 
incidence/prevalence rates of problematic gambling (via a screening instrument), and 
sociodemographic information (e.g. age, gender, and socioeconomic status) (Sproston 
et al., 2000; Wardle et al., 2011a; Johansson et al., 2009). With this information, 
relationships between factors are isolated and explored (Reith, 2007a) and such 
studies have suggested particular patterns of gambling and prevalence of problematic 
gambling to be associated with specific sociodemographic factors (e.g. Wardle et al., 
2011a). Building on explanations that hold biological and psychological factors to 
contribute to problematic gambling, literature suggesting patterning according to social 
factors has led to the development of ‘biopsychosocial’ theories such as the ‘syndrome’ 
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(Shaffer et al., 2004a), ‘excessive appetites’ (Orford, 2001b), and ‘pathways’ models 
(Blaszczynski and Nower, 2002). Though there appears to be increasing appreciation 
of the social patterning of gambling behaviours, there is a sense that primacy continues 
to be afforded to the biological and/or psychological while social factors are treated as 
having (only) a mediatory influence over what, in effect, is seen as a psychological 
and/or biological disorder. 
 
 
Interpretivist approaches 
In contrast, relatively little gambling research has taken an interpretivist approach using 
qualitative, ethnographic, methods (Reith, 2007a; Reith and Dobbie, 2011; McGowen, 
2004; McGowan et al., 2000). Though data is usually collected from research 
participants, the ultimate subject of interpretivist gambling work tends to be the 
immediate settings in which gambling takes place and/or the wider (socio-cultural) 
context (including features such as class and gender) which are held to shape 
gambling behaviour and experience (Reith, 2007a). 
 
Interpretivism is far better suited to the investigation of complex human behaviours and 
subjective experiences (e.g. gambling addiction) than positivism (Hanes and Case, 
2008:7-8; Pitts, 2003:82-83). In particular, only that which can be quantified can be 
explored from within positivist epistemology but it appears that many influences on 
human behaviour do not lend themselves to quantification (Webster et al., 2006; 
France and Utting, 2005). Dynamic and interactive processes come to be (poorly) 
represented as static and unitary factors while social phenomena such as culture, 
meaning, experience, and biography that shape action are ignored because of 
difficulties (or impossibilities) in representing these statistically (Haines and Case, 
2008). Moreover, positivistic approaches usually assume (statistical) associations 
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between a factor (or sets of factors) and a particular outcome (e.g. problematic 
gambling) to be causal when any relationship may be far more nuanced, complex, and 
subject to interplay in ways that cannot be accounted for by quantitative methods 
(Kemshall et al., 2006). In order to understand human behaviour, interpretivist 
approaches examine the very phenomena that positivism cannot such as meaning, 
culture, and context along with the particular cultural and historical conditions that have 
shaped those aspects (Crotty, 1998) which, as illustrated in chapters one and two, 
shape behaviour. 
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Gambling harm and harm reduction 
As will be discussed shortly, this study takes a harm reduction approach but before this 
it is worth considering the nature of gambling harms. 
 
Gambling-related harm 
Gambling harms refer to outcomes associated with gambling regarded as negative or 
undesirable (Lenton and Single, 1998:214,218; Dickson et al., 2004:236) and research 
has identified and listed a large number of harms across a variety of levels (e.g. 
individual, family, community). Harms tend to be treated as objective and caused solely 
by gambling behaviour with examples including: psychological problems such as 
anxiety, depression and suicidal thoughts; interpersonal problems such as arguments 
and relationship breakdown; employment problems such as job loss or poor 
productivity; financial harms such as debt; and legal problems such as criminal 
behaviour (Productivity Commission, 1999:18). In such cases gambling behaviour may 
well be a significant factor contributing to harm and in some (perhaps even many) 
cases if an individual controls, reduces or even abstains from gambling then harm may 
well be reduced or alleviated and quality of life improved. The experience of harm, 
however, is far more complex than most addictions and (problem) gambling research 
suggests and it is important to realise gambling behaviour per se cannot be the sole 
cause of harm. It is clear from the examples listed above that harm cannot be 
understood in isolation from cultural and contextual factors or from non-gambling 
related aspects of lives. 
‘Harm’ is open to subjective interpretation, judgements, and moral assessments 
(Keane, 2003:228) which are influenced by wider cultural norms, beliefs, and values 
(Ball, 2007:686) and so what constitutes harm may be different in different contexts 
(Collins et al., 2012:8). Take, for example, a fictitious individual who reports difficulty in 
controlling her gambling, spends much of the day gambling, loses her job, is unable to 
pay her mortgage and gets into debt, argues with her spouse about gambling and 
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experiences marital breakdown, becomes stigmatised by friends, family and others and 
attempts suicide. In this example (similar experiences of which may be extremely rare 
and atypical of those who experience difficulty controlling their gambling) gambling may 
be seen as, directly or indirectly ‘causing’ a whole host of harms but none of these 
harms are solely caused by gambling behaviour. As Neal et al. (2005:39) point out, 
while marital breakdown may often be ostensibly attributed to financial and time 
pressures which may, in turn, be attributed to gambling, such pressures and 
breakdown may arise in spite of gambling. Accordingly, it seems that experience of 
harm is strongly dependent on the nature of the gambler’s life and circumstances as 
well as their gambling behaviour: greater time spent gambling may be more 
problematic for someone with a job that requires greater time commitment; equal 
financial gambling losses may be more problematic for someone with less 
income/greater financial commitments; marital breakdown attributed to gambling not 
only requires a spouse but a relationship which is in some way affected by gambling. In 
short, the same patterns of gambling may not contribute to harm for one person but 
may do so for another and, as will become clearer in chapters four and five, this makes 
the objective identification of harm impossible. Nonetheless, even though the 
experience of harm is dependent on many other influences (e.g. socio-cultural and 
economic conditions), there is widespread consensus that, in particular, spending 
‘more’ money and ‘greater’ time gambling are significant contributors to gambling-
related harm (Neal et al., 2005).  
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Harm reduction approaches 
Harm reduction perspectives hold that reduction (and/or prevention) of harm is more 
important than a reduction in consumption per se (Riley and O’Hare, 2000). That is not 
to say harm reduction strategies may not involve, even encourage, reductions in 
consumption but that this is only appropriate if it minimises harm (see Lenton and 
Single, 1998). In contrast to those abstinence-orientated, harm reduction approaches 
emphasise that significant improvements in quality of life and reductions in harm may 
be achieved in the absence of abstinence (Blaszczynski, 1998; Ladouceur et al., 
2009:189). That said, reductions in harm and such improvements might stem from 
efforts to reduce consumption (Grund et al., 2013) and so may also be considered 
harm reduction strategies (so long as they do not increase harm). Departing from 
approaches rooted in moral attitudes toward gambling (see chapter two), harm 
reduction strives for a non-judgmental approach (Erickson et al., 1997; Mugford, 1993) 
so that consumption is neither seen as intrinsically ‘bad’ or ‘good’ (Strang, 1993:4) and 
moral judgements are avoided with regard to use, level of use, or mode of use (Riley 
and O’Hare, 2000:6). In fact some consumption at a societal level (whether substance 
use or gambling) is held to be inevitable (Riley and O’Hare, 2000:6) and so rather than 
striving for absolute and unachievable abstinence-orientated ideals, pragmatic and 
evidence-based solutions to achieving reductions in harm are sought (Keane, 
2003:228; Tammi and Hurme, 2007:86; Collins et al., 2012). 
 
While harm reduction is a relatively new formal approach, attempts to reduce harm 
without abstinence have been practiced for centuries (Ball, 2007:685): traditional use of 
opium in Asia as well as hallucinogen and coca use in Latin America has been guided 
by ceremonies, rituals and taboos that protect individual and community health (WHO, 
1999); in the 18th and 19th centuries registered ‘addicts’ in European colonies in Asia 
were provided with opium (Spear, 1994); following the ‘British System’ in the early 20th 
century doctors provided opiates to those experiencing dependency (Spear, 1994); and 
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in the 1960’s magazines published in North America and Europe advised on less 
hazardous drug use (Stimson, 1994). 
 
Risk environment framework 
Grounded in the harm reduction paradigm, this thesis draws on a risk environment 
approach which holds that risks and harms are shaped by the social context in which 
individuals live (Rhodes, 2009:193; Rhodes, 2002:91). As risks and harms are held to 
result from interactions between individuals and their environments, environments 
come to be conceptualised as ‘risk environments’: spaces made up of various factors 
exogenous to the individual that interplay to increase or reduce risk and chance of 
harm (see Rhodes, 2002; Rhodes, 2009; Rhodes et al., 2005; Rhodes and Simic, 
2005). The approach aims to reveal how aspects of space/place influence risk and 
harm so that (better) environmental interventions can be designed and implemented to 
create ‘enabling environments’ for harm reduction (Rhodes, 2002:91). Unlike 
‘traditional’ public health/harm reduction approaches, consideration is not only given to 
factors directly related to the risky and potentially harmful activity in question (e.g. 
gambling) but also to factors that do not directly relate to the activity (see Rhodes, 
2002:88). For example, the influence of housing policy on drug harms (Pearson, 1987. 
Cited in Rhodes, 2002:88).  
 
Reading of the academic gambling literature, to date, indicates a lack of appreciation 
given to the notion that factors not directly related to gambling may influence patterns 
of gambling behaviour and/or experience of gambling-related harm. Of exception, is 
recent qualitative longitudinal research investigating patterns of stability and change in 
gambling behaviour (Reith and Dobbie, 2013) which indicated that shifts in and out of 
problematic periods of gambling may be associated with changes in the material and 
social context in which day-to-day lives are played out. This includes significant life 
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events (e.g. bereavement, caring for the sick, losing/changing job, birth of a child, 
starting/ending a relationship, moving home); financial circumstances; employment; 
interpersonal relationships; and availability of recreational activities. While that 
research did not seek to explore how these factors interplay, findings suggested that in 
some cases a combination of factors might come together to influence shifts in and out 
of problematic gambling (see Reith and Dobbie, 2013:5;10-11). 
 
Harm reduction: agency and promotion of control 
Harm reduction approaches have been criticised for tendency to marginalise the 
agential capacities of those who consume potentially harmful objects and for failing to 
appreciate that implementation of strategies which make use of such capacities may be 
effective in reducing harm (Grund et al., 2013; Zuffa and Ronconi, 2015). Indeed, 
continued belief in (or, at best, agnosticism about) addiction as a biomedical disorder 
(see chapter two) often means that harm reduction approaches (policies/interventions) 
frame those who experience addiction as, for all intents and purposes, completely 
powerless to regulate their consumption and incapable of coming to control their 
consumption (Zuffa and Ronconi, 2015; Grund et al., 2013). 
 
As was discussed in chapter two, however, most of those who consume drugs or 
gamble do not experience addiction and even those who do so do not suffer complete 
loss of control (Grund, 1993). Those who experience addiction still retain some agency 
over how they consume the object of question, albeit agency heavily constrained and 
impaired by the embodiment of addiction (Davies, 1997; see chapter two). Moreover, 
most who experience addiction usually regain control/recover eventually and a 
significant proportion appear do so in lieu abstinence (see chapter two). These points, 
however, tend not to be reflected in harm reduction approaches (Zuffa and Ronconi, 
2015) – controlled consumption, for example, tends not to be offered as a treatment 
goal in formal services and, where it is, this is usually only as stepping stone toward 
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abstinence (Dowling and Smith, 2007) – and Grund et al. (2013) purport that, as a 
consequence, policies, interventions, and treatments have tended to marginalise efforts 
to garner or support greater (self)control. 
 
Drawing on the risk environment approach, interventions might be developed to 
facilitate enabling environments which not only reduce harm through risk reduction but, 
also, through promotion of ‘skills, cultures and strategies’ of control (Grund et al., 
2013:4). Indeed, Cohen (1999), for example, has argued against prohibitive drug laws 
for inhibiting self-regulation as well as increasing harm, and called for legal frameworks 
that facilitate the emergence of conditions which allow individuals to ‘maximise his or 
her considerable powers of control’ over consumption (Cohen, 1999:231). 
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Part two: conceptual framework 
Research suggests that aspects of the immediate setting and wider socio-cultural 
milieu influence control over consumption as well as outcomes (e.g. harms) (Zinberg, 
1984; Harding and Zinberg, 1977; Moore, 1993; Decorte, 2001a; Grund, 1993; Waldorf 
et al., 1991). According to Zinberg’s thesis, control over drug consumption is ‘chiefly’ 
supported by ‘social-setting’, comprised of two components: ‘rituals’ and ‘social-
sanctions’ (collectively ‘informal social controls’) (Harding and Zinberg, 1977:111; 
Zinberg, 1984:5). Zinberg argued that the rituals of controlled users buttress, reinforce 
and symbolise controlling beliefs (i.e. beliefs were found to be consistent with rituals) 
and while the rituals of ‘compulsive’ users (those who found control more difficult) were 
often found to be the same as those of controlled users, ‘compulsive’ users tended to 
subscribe to different beliefs (Harding and Zinberg, 1977:12). Zinberg interpreted this 
finding as suggesting that beliefs are better at ‘predicting’ control over use than rituals 
(1977:12). Some who have developed on Zinberg’s initial framework have also added 
‘life-structure’ (Moore, 1993; Grund, 1993), noting that the way an actor’s life is 
organised might also influence control over consumption and/or related harm. The task 
in the remainder of the chapter is to develop on Zinberg’s model (including additions by 
other researchers) with Bourdieusian and other sociological theory as well as other 
academic literature to create the conceptual framework for this thesis. This task 
involves deconstructing the existing concepts of others (including Zinberg), twisting and 
shaping them to form the new framework. 
 
Analytical constructs: socio-cultural milieu, beliefs, practices, and life-structure 
It is important to keep in mind that Zinberg’s concepts of ‘social-setting’, ‘social-
sanctions’ and ‘rituals’ as well as those of ‘socio-cultural milieu’, ‘beliefs’, ‘practices’ and 
‘life-structure’, as form the framework in this study, are (discursive) constructs. They 
exist as ‘ideas’ and analytical tools used to explore, investigate and explain 
phenomena. Through the following discussion it will become clear that these constructs 
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have been defined and operationalised in many disparate ways. Rather than seeking 
‘correct’ definitions, discussion will explore how constructs have been operationalised 
so that the new framework may be produced and constructs operationalised in a logical 
and effective way that fruitfully facilitates investigation of gambling related control and 
harm. That being said, while the analytical constructs are flexible allowing for some 
conceptual (re)shaping and (re)defining it would make little sense to deviate 
significantly from the commonly understood principles of the respective concepts. 
 
 
Practices: rituals and patterns of action 
Zinberg and colleagues (Zinberg, 1984; Harding and Zinberg, 1977) argued that drug 
users adhere to ‘stylized, prescribed behavior[al] patterns surrounding the use of a 
drug’ including ‘methods of procuring, and administering the drug, the selection of 
physical and social settings for use, the activities after the drug has been administered, 
and the ways of preventing untoward drug effects’ (Zinberg, 1984:5). These 
behavioural patterns are referred to by Zinberg as ‘rituals’ and using this language it is 
the ‘ritualisation’ of drug use that Zinberg suggested to influence control over 
consumption. As will be discussed and justified shortly, the concept of ‘practice’ is used 
in this thesis over ‘rituals’. Firstly, however, it is important to emphasise that both 
Zinberg’s ‘rituals’ and Bourdieusian ‘practices’ as used in the present thesis go beyond 
that of ‘habit’, whether conceptualised as a mechanical response to objective 
conditions in the Pavlovian sense or as minute sequences of actions preformed 
repeatedly (Swidler, 1986). Instead, Zinberg’s ‘ritual’, as with Bourdieu’s ‘practice’, 
does not refer to ‘one-off’ actions but to patterns, regularities, and sequences of action 
(Zinberg, 1984; Swidler, 1986; Bourdieu, 1977).  
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The key problem with use of ‘ritual’ instead of ‘practice’ concerns issues surrounding 
subjective meaning. Generally speaking, rituals are considered practices with greater 
symbolic and affective meaning for those who engaged in them and can be contrasted 
with more routinised practices which tend to be regarded more instrumental and 
subconscious7 (Fiese et al., 2002:382; Denham, 2003:307; Corbin, 1999. Cited in 
Clark, 2000:128S). Distinction between ritualistic and non-ritualistic practices based on 
the presence or absence of (symbolic) meaning is, however, problematic in a number 
of ways. One issue to be considered is for whom must action be meaningful for it to be 
considered meaningful? Implicit in much classical anthropological/sociological 
literature, for example, is a view that ‘subjects’ are unable to interpret their ritualistic 
action ‘correctly’ (e.g. Malinowski, 1948; Radcliffe-Brown, 1952. Cited in Grund, 
1993:10) and, instead, it is the role of the observer-analyst to interpret whether action is 
‘meaningful’ and thus ritualistic. From this perspective, rituals come to be repeated 
actions upon which meaning is imposed by ‘outside’ observer-analysts. However, as 
Bourdieu argues, in order to explain the actions of an actor there must be 
understanding of the meaning those actions have for the actor and from their 
perspective (Bourdieu, 1977:1-2). Indeed, there is some contemporary consensus that 
meaning is to be found in the individual’s subjective experience rather than in that 
imposed by the observer-analyst (Fiese et al., 2002). 
 
Another difficulty in separating ritual from non-ritual practices in terms of meaning is 
that all practices involve meaning to some extent. For Bourdieu (1990) all action is 
meaningful because actors bring to the present situation past experience, knowledge, 
and meaning developed through past interaction. If practical action is always 
meaningful interaction then practices are never meaningless, hence (complete) 
absence/presence of meaning cannot be relied on to delineate between ritual and non-
ritual practices. Of course, it might be argued that rituals are practices with greater 
                                                          
7
 In this thesis ‘subconscious’ is used to mean that which the actor may not have a high level of 
awareness; meaning can exist outside of the actor’s awareness (Goffman, 1967).  
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meaning for the actor. This, however, is also problematic in two key ways. Firstly, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to measure meaning because meaning does not lend itself to 
quantification (Bryman, 2008:16) and even if possible at what ‘level’ of 
‘meaningfulness’ would a practice be considered a ritual? Secondly, social theorists 
have argued that meaning often exists outside of the actor’s awareness (Bourdieu, 
1990; Goffman, 1967) and so subjects may be unable to explain that meaning to others 
(e.g. a researcher). Indeed, integral to Bourdieu’s notion of ‘practice sense’ is the idea 
that actors are rarely aware of, or reflect on, the meaning they bring to the present 
situation (see Bourdieu, and Wacquant, 1992:131). Given all this, in the present thesis, 
‘practices’ refer to repeated patterns of action.  
Relationships often exist between practices and harm. With regard to physiological 
health, for example, some practices might protect against illness (e.g. teeth cleaning 
and exercise; Gillman et al., 2000) while others might facilitate better management of 
existing health conditions (e.g. weekly vacuuming for asthma; Fiese et al., 2005:171), 
and some practices may damage health (e.g. smoking tobacco). With regard to 
gambling, some practices such as holding back and not (re)gambling high-value casino 
chip and setting spending limits have been suggested to reduce financial losses and so 
harm (Dzik, 2006).  
 
Beliefs: cultural expectations, rules, and conscious beliefs 
In addition to patterns of action, Zinberg’s thesis holds control over consumption to be 
influenced by informal ‘social-sanctions’: norms regarding use, largely unspoken values 
or rules of conduct and (conscious) beliefs all of which shared by a group (Harding and 
Zinberg, 1977; Zinberg, 1984). This doctoral thesis, however, rejects use of ‘social-
sanctions’ to refer to these cultural phenomena preferring, instead, to refer to them as 
(shared/cultural) ‘beliefs’. This will be justified before turning to examine each of these 
(often overlapping) cultural phenomena in turn and to set out how they are used in this 
study. 
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Rejection of ‘social-sanctions’ 
The ‘social sanctions’ concept is avoided in this doctoral thesis because it is 
inconsistent with the primarily Bourdieusian approach to social action used to frame 
this study. The term implies a standpoint where individuals rationally (and thus 
reflexively) weigh up the costs and benefits of particular courses of action before 
deciding how to act and, accordingly, choose to act in ways which avoid 
unwanted/negative social reactions (i.e. costs e.g. disapproval/disdain) and/or solicit 
positive social reactions (i.e. benefits e.g. approval, status, or respect) (Coleman, 
1987). Essentially, this is a form of rational choice theory (RCT) (see Scott, 2000; 
Coleman, 1987) whereby the subject is viewed in terms of homo economicus (see 
chapter one; Lemke, 2001). Bourdieu, however, was explicit in the main purpose of his 
habitus concept to break with the philosophy of homo economicus as explanation of 
human action and argued very little action to be governed by purposive and rational 
calculation (Bourdieu, 1992). Instead, behaviour tends to be precognitive, pre-reflexive, 
and encouraged by a ‘practical sense’ – a tacit and informal awareness of how one 
should act in conjunction with the present situation (Lamaison and Bourdieu, 1986:111; 
Bourdieu, 1992:120-121; see chapter one). This does not preclude, however, the idea 
that some action may be instrumental, purposive, and calculative (see Wacquant, 
1989:45). Actors may come to possess what could be termed a ‘rational habitus’ so 
that more of their behaviour is product of rational, reflexive, decisionmaking: 
‘the art of estimating and taking chances, the ability to anticipate through a kind 
of practical induction, [and] the capacity to bet on the possible against the 
probable for a measured risk […are constituted] under definite social and 
economic conditions’  
(Bourdieu, 1992:124) 
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Cultural expectations (values and norms) 
Parsons (1966) distinguished between norms and values (for Parsons, collectively 
‘normative agreements’) arguing that these constructs exist as shared ‘cultural objects’ 
which, through socialisation, function to determine and maintain social order, structure 
and social life (Spates, 1983:30; Parsons and Shils, 1951:165). For Parsons (1966), 
norms are tied to particular situations and circumstances, determining specific ways of 
acting (and thinking) in given situations, while values are held to operate at a higher 
level of abstraction providing general reference for thought and action (Spates, 
1983:32). According to Parsons, values are objects appealed to for the ‘ultimate 
rationales of action’ (Spates, 1983:28), that act to govern social order (see Spates, 
1983:30) and are embodied in specific ways of acting through norms (Parsons, 
1951[1991]:170). 
 
Parsons’ concepts of values that exist at a higher level of abstraction, making them 
trans-situational, and norms which are tied to particular situations and circumstances 
are generally agreed today (Hitlin and Piliavin, 2004:361; Spates, 1983:32). Moreover, 
there is some consensus that norms and values reflect the desirability of actions (see 
Parsons, 1937:75; Roccas et al., 2002:790) – which actions are considered good/bad 
or appropriate/inappropriate (Fine, 2001). Values, in particular, have come to be 
conceived in terms of ‘moral compass’ (see Hitlin and Piliavin, 2004:362) and have 
been termed ‘societal standards’ (Fine, 2001:139). Combining desirability with level of 
abstraction informs the general contemporary view that norms refer to the means of 
action tied to situation and what ‘ought’ to be done while values refer to desirable ends 
as based on personal/cultural ideals that transcend present situation (see Hitlin and 
Pilavin 2004:361). Notions of desirability are, of course, relative to the social and 
cultural setting in which they are embedded and the context in which they are talked 
about; norms and values are neither inherently ‘good’ nor ‘bad’ other than how others 
define them (Fine, 2001:142). While norms, then, are about the acceptability of action, 
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or obligation to act, or not act, in particular ways (Marini, 2000; Parsons, 1937:35), 
values refer more to feelings of attraction or repulsion to particular courses of action or 
choices (Marini, 2000). 
 
While, theoretically, making distinction between values and norms may seem a 
valuable way to develop the concepts from Zinberg’s framework so that they might be 
used to explore influence over (gambling) behaviour and experience, practically, 
distinction may be difficult and add little to the argument of this thesis. Given the high 
abstractness of values, actors may be unaware of them (Hitlin and Piliavin, 2004; 
Marini, 2000:2828; Opp, 2001:102) and unable to express them other than through 
norms. Pragmatically, it was decided that values and norms would be referred to in the 
present thesis collectively as ‘cultural expectations’. 
 
 
Rules 
Values and norms are sometimes regarded as forms of cultural rules (Gibbs, 1965; 
Interis, 2011). For this study, however, rules are used to refer to explicit, self-imposed 
(though often culturally derived), regulations directed at governing conduct. More so 
than cultural expectations, agents are likely to be aware of the rules they hold and so 
may be better to report them discursively. Existing substance use focused literature 
has revealed that drug users often hold rules about their drug use such as the amount 
of substance used, frequency of use, and circumstances in which they will or will not 
use (e.g. not at work) and has argued such rules to support greater control and/or 
reduce harm (Zinberg, 1984; Decorte 2001a; Warburton  et al., 2005). Given this, it is 
likely that those who gamble also hold rules related to their gambling such as 
circumstances in which they will or will not gamble, how much money they will gamble, 
and who they will gamble with. 
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Conscious beliefs
8
 
In addition to cultural expectations, ‘belief’, particularly in popular thought, is often used 
to refer to (conscious) propositions or ideas endorsed by an actor (e.g. Devine, 1989; 
Preston and Epley, 2005). The concept is, of course, very similar to, and overlaps with, 
cultural expectations; it would be reasonable to refer to beliefs about how one should 
act, for example, as cultural expectations. (Indeed, the encompassing nature of ‘beliefs’ 
is the rationale for collectively referring to values/norms, rules, and conscious beliefs as 
‘beliefs’). However, in this study conscious beliefs are used to refer to ideas that might 
be considered, in common usage, to be ‘fact’ (but which may or may not be). Examples 
relevant to this doctoral thesis may include understandings about the nature of 
probability, superstition and belief in ‘luck’, how gambling machines work, the 
successfulness of particular gambling strategies, ideas about whether or not control 
can be exerted over games of pure chance, or whether or not one is ‘addicted’. Indeed, 
much cognitive gambling research has suggested relationships between the holding of 
‘erroneous’ beliefs and problematic gambling (see Orford et al., 2003:126-133). 
 
Relationship between ‘practices’ and ‘beliefs’ 
At this point, it is worth clarifying how the relationship between ‘practices’ (i.e. as 
patterns of action and behaviour) and ‘beliefs’ (i.e. cultural expectations, conscious 
beliefs, and rules) is approached in this study. In keeping with Bourdieusian theory, 
such beliefs, even when ‘held’ or embodied, are not viewed as determining practices 
(behaviour) (see chapter one). Instead, they provide agents with a repertoire that they 
draw on, almost always pre-reflexively and with little thought, to construct strategies of 
action (i.e. patterned practices or behaviour) (Swidler, 1986). From Bourdieu’s 
viewpoint such beliefs (and according to Bourdieu, values/norms far more so than 
consciously held rules) shape the capacities for action rather than determine action by 
providing individuals with a practical sense that guides and encourages particular 
                                                          
8
 In this thesis ‘conscious’ is used to mean aware. 
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actions (Swidler, 1986; Bourdieu, 1987). As a consequence, while individuals may, 
most often, act in accordance with their ‘beliefs’ (e.g. cultural expectations) they may 
not always do so. 
 
Life-structure 
Drug users do not engage only in drug use but participate in a whole host of activities 
such as eating, preparing meals, and paying bills as well, the totality of which Cohen 
refers to as an actor’s ‘field of engagements’ (1999:230). Building on Zinberg’s (1984) 
framework, Grund (1993) adds life-structure – the regularly occurring patterns of 
activities that shape and constrain daily lives such as social relationships, 
commitments, responsibilities and obligations and argues that the organisation of daily 
life around such engagements constrains drug use and supports greater control. 
Indeed, other research has also concluded that life-structure can influence control over 
drug use. Based on a comparative study between cocaine users with greater and 
lesser control, Waldorf et al. (1991), for example, suggested that those with greater 
control had lives structured around non-drug related activities, particularly those related 
to ‘meaningful’ roles and ‘positive’ identities. On the other hand, having lives which lack 
non-drug related engagements and which are organised around drug related activities 
appears associated with lesser control. Nettleton et al. (2011) interviewed individuals 
seeking recovery from heroin addiction and found that although their daily lives were 
very structured, that structuring was around heroin consumption, avoidance of 
withdrawal symptoms, and strategies aimed at acquiring heroin. Given all this, it stands 
to reason that shifts in life-structures away from those organised around more 
problematic activities may support greater control. 
 
Socio-cultural milieu 
Research suggests that control over consumption is influenced by the socio-cultural 
conditions in which the actor is embedded and acts (Zinberg, 1984; Moore, 1993; 
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Maloff et al., 1980). According to Zinberg (1984) the social-setting influences drug use 
behaviour by facilitating the development of practices (for Zinberg, rituals) and various 
cultural beliefs (for Zinberg, social sanctions) which are themselves embedded in the 
social-setting and act as specific mechanisms to influence control over consumption 
(Zinberg, 1984:5). Zinberg’s (1984) conception of social-setting refers to the immediate 
social-situation, friendship patterns, peer groups, actual episode of consumption and 
the wider beliefs, values, norms, and rules brought by particular social groups. 
 
Based on longitudinal ethnographic research concerning drug using careers, Moore 
(1993) has argued that Zinberg’s ‘social-setting’ construct is narrow and treats social 
contexts as static scenes that actors move in and out of. An analytical construct with 
better explanatory power over behaviour, Moore (1993) proposes, is the ‘social and 
cultural milieu’ in which consumption takes place and in which the individual and their 
life is embedded (Moore, 1993:413). By ‘milieu’ Moore (1993) emphasises that socio-
cultural contexts are characterised by fluidity, dynamism and change so that individuals 
are not merely moving through static ‘social-settings’ but in and out of ever-changing 
milieus which not only influence behaviour but are, at the same time, constitutive of 
behaviour. This fluidity, Moore (1993) suggests, arises from two interplaying processes: 
social processes and cultural processes. Social processes relate to the dynamic nature 
of social relationships which tend to be short-lived and characterised by change as 
social ties constantly form, reform, and lapse with changes to employment, sexual 
partners, residence, and leisure styles resulting in groups with constantly changing 
structures (Moore, 1993). Cultural processes refer to the continual creation and 
transmission of cultural resources (e.g. ideas and meanings) within and between 
groups that allow behaviours to become socially meaningful (Moore, 1993). 
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Essentially, then, socio-cultural milieu can be thought of as spaces comprised of 
dynamic social relationships and cultural understandings and, thus resonates strongly 
with Bourdieu’s notion of ‘fields’ – dynamic spaces comprised of social relationships 
through which those who participate within those spaces access cultural resources 
(capital) provided therein (e.g. worldviews and cultural expectations; see chapter one). 
Indeed, Moore’s (1993) idea that behaviour is influenced by socio-cultural processes is 
supported by more recent work suggesting that behaviours and values/norms spread 
through social networks via ‘social contagion’ so that the behaviours and values/norms 
of an individual are affected by those they are connected to (Christakis and Fowler, 
2013). Indeed, research has suggested that cessation from tobacco smoking, for 
example, spreads through social networks and that this may be, in part, due to 
transmission of values/norms about smoking through social ties (Christakis and Fowler, 
2008). 
 
Use of the conceptual framework 
As the chapter closes it is worth clarifying how the conceptual framework will be used. 
It has been developed to aid data collection and analysis and, as such, aspects relating 
to those components are of particular focus throughout the empirical work. It is 
important, however, that this study is not overly constrained by the framework. If, for 
example, data collection and analysis suggest other aspects, not included in the 
framework, to support control, recovery, and/or harm reduction then these will also be 
presented and discussed. Moreover, it might be that some constituents of the 
framework are implicated to have greater influence than others or that aspects 
appreciated little in extant literature have influence, and in such events, it makes sense 
that greater attention is given to those phenomena in this thesis. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of existing approaches to gambling research 
and argued that the overwhelmingly positivistic nature of most of this work has 
limitations for the investigation of complex social behaviours (e.g. gambling). In 
particular, positivist approaches marginalise the nuances and complexities of lived 
experience, process, and context, examinations of which are necessary to make sense 
of social action and so an interpretivist approach which can account for such 
phenomena is more appropriate for understanding behaviour. The nature of gambling-
related harm has then been examined and it was argued that whether or not gambling 
contributes to harm depends largely on the particular circumstances of the gambler’s 
life and circumstances. A harm reduction approach which appreciates that reductions 
in gambling patterns and promotion of greater control may reduce harm is presented as 
a pragmatic way of supporting control and facilitating recovery. Finally, drawing on the 
work of Zinberg (1984) and Bourdieu (1990), an analytical framework has been 
developed and presented in order to frame the empirical work and analysis: socio-
cultural milieu, beliefs, practices, and life-structure. The next chapter (chapter four) 
develops and presents the methodology and practical methods. 
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Chapter four: Methodology and methods 
This chapter provides expositions of the research design, approach, the methods used, 
and details how the data is analysed and presented in following chapters. After setting 
out the research questions and aims, discussion turns to the ‘philosophical’ 
(ontological, epistemological, and methodological) positions from which they will be 
addressed. This establishes the foundations for the data collection methods which 
begins with presentation of the tripartite participant typology used for recruitment and 
analysis: (i) experiencing addiction; (ii) regained control; (iii) never experienced 
addiction. The recruitment strategies are then critically discussed. Keeping in mind that 
as a result of both the stigmatisation of gambling (particularly gambling deemed 
addictive or problematic) and the lack of a sampling frame gamblers constitute a 
hidden and hard-to-reach population, strategies that were used to ensure the 
recruitment of participants who fulfil the criteria for the participant typologies are set out 
and evaluated. Recruitment strategies include an online survey advertised through 
social media platforms and in newspapers as well as chain referral techniques. Next, 
the primary method of data collection, semi-structured interviewing, is presented with 
specific discussion of the interview schedule and how it was developed from existing 
addictions and gambling research. There is then an examination of how the research 
adheres to ethical guidelines and as well as other measures used to safeguard 
participant welfare. The chapter closes by detailing and justifying how the data is 
analysed and presented in following chapters in ways which champion the holistic 
approach taken in his thesis.  
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Research questions and aims 
Zinberg (1984) sought to understand how and why some drug users experience 
difficulties of control and harm by exploring how and why others maintain control 
without such difficulties as well as how and why yet others regain control and/or 
mitigate harm. Drawing on this approach, this thesis seeks to explore two fundamental 
research questions:  
1. How and why do most of those who gamble never experience gambling 
addiction or significant harm? 
2. How and why do most of those who do experience gambling addiction regain 
control and ameliorate or come to avoid harm? 
Such knowledge would be valuable in various ways (see introduction to thesis) but, 
briefly, it might be used to design policies and interventions to facilitate and support 
greater control as well as reduction of harm among both those who have never 
experienced addiction (particularly neophyte gamblers) and those seeking to better 
regulate their gambling (including among those experiencing addiction). 
As existing literature has suggested those aspects of gamblers’ lives presented in the 
conceptual framework (chapter three) – social relationships and cultural expectations 
(socio-cultural milieu), life-structure, beliefs, and practices – likely to be influential, 
these are of main focus along with any other influences implicated in data 
collection/analysis. Also of focus is how aspects of the more immediate setting (i.e. 
gambling spaces/places) influence control over gambling and harm. Given the 
theoretical position developed in chapter one, particular attention is paid to exploring 
influences on agency and ‘better’ decisionmaking.  
The principal aim of the research is to: 
 Explore how the wider circumstances/aspects of gambler’s lives (particularly 
social relationships, cultural expectations, life-structure, beliefs, and practices) 
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and qualities of immediate gambling setting (space/place) influence control over 
gambling and experience of harm. 
 
This is deconstructed into these sub-aims: 
 Explore how those with greater control over their gambling and who avoid harm 
manage to regulate their gambling in this way with particular focus on the 
influence of their social relationships, cultural expectations, life-structure, 
beliefs, and practices. 
 
 Explore how those who experience significant difficulty of control over their 
gambling (i.e. addiction) come to regain control and ameliorate harm with 
particular focus on the influence of their social relationships, cultural 
expectations, life-structure, beliefs, and practices. 
 
 
Philosophical positioning 
In chapter two it was argued that addiction does not exist as a material condition, as 
the outcome of mechanistic material processes, or independently of subjectivity, 
perception, conception, and experience. Instead, a constructionist account presented 
addiction as a culturally and historically specific phenomenon which comes to be 
embodied within actors. In keeping with this constructionist approach the ontological 
and epistemological assumptions of the present research design are now introduced.  
 
Ontology relates to the nature/reality of the (social) world (Hay, 2007:83; Furlong and 
Marsh, 2010:185). The ontological position taken in this thesis could be broadly 
described as a moderate form of idealism. While there are many idealist positions, all 
hold that an understanding of the world is dependent on the mind and on interpretation 
(see Williams and May, 1996:59-60). Although extreme forms of monistic idealism (e.g. 
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‘absolute idealism’ or ‘subjective idealism’) are associated with immaterialism, that is 
the denial of material existence independent of the human mind (see Grayling, 
2005:166), more moderate idealism does not preclude the realist supposition that 
‘things’ exist outside of human consciousness (see Callahan, 2010:868) that have real 
effects, not directly perceivable (see Callahan, 2010:870) but is at the same time 
consistent with the premise that we cannot ‘truly’ know anything separate from our 
perception of it (Williams and May, 1996:60). This ontological position, like any other, 
cannot be ‘proven’ and is highly contested (see Furlong and Marsh, 2010:186) but it 
makes sense in the context of literature presented in earlier chapters. According to 
idealism the mind is instrumental in shaping what we ‘know’ and what it is possible to 
know and our knowledge of the world cannot be divorced from our perception and 
understanding of it. As such idealist doctrine stands in stark contrast to the objectivist 
claim that reality exists independently of (perceiving) subjects and that it is possible to 
achieve (true) knowledge of that reality ‘when a subject correctly mirrors or represents 
objective reality’ (Bernstein, 1983:9. Emphasis added). 
 
Given this ontological position, what can be known about the ‘nature’ of particular of 
behaviours and how can such behaviours be explored? This thesis draws on social 
constructionist epistemology. Constructionism, in keeping with idealism, holds that 
‘what we take to be objective knowledge and truth is the result of perspective’ 
(Schwandt, 1994:125). Rather than being ‘discovered’, knowledge, truth, and meaning 
are constructed and come into existence through social interaction (Schwandt, 
1994:125; Crotty, 1998:43; Lincoln and Guba, 1985:80). Though radical 
constructionism may claim that no real world exists independently of ‘human mental 
activity’ (Bruner, 1986:95), more moderate forms argue that an independent reality 
exists but that the ‘knowing’ of this reality cannot be divorced from the human mind 
(see Elder-Vass, 2012; Schwandt, 1994:126). Accordingly, constructionists question 
the application of a methodological framework grounded in ‘objectivism, empirical 
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realism, objective truth, and essentialism’ to human inquiry and emphasise ‘the world of 
experience as it is lived, felt, [and] undergone by social actors’ (see Schwandt, 
1994:125). 
 
The central constructionist argument is that the ways in which we ‘collectively think and 
communicate about the world affect the way that the world is’ (Elder-Vass, 2012:4). 
Something is socially constructed if thinking about the phenomena differently changes 
the very nature of the construction (Hacking, 2000:6-7) as indicated by the culturally 
specific nature of addiction (see chapter two). Shared cultural practices and 
understandings have the power to influence human action and behaviour (see Elder-
Vass, 2012:38-9) and thus constructionism, like interpretivism, is concerned with 
understanding ‘lived experience from the point of view of those who live it’ (Schwandt, 
1994:118). By taking an idealistic ontology the immaterial reality of (gambling) addiction 
is emphasised without denying that feelings and behaviours involve material objects 
(such as the body). As such, priority is given to the idea that gambling addiction cannot 
exist without meaning, interpretation, and understanding and is ultimately experiential. 
By taking a constructionist epistemology the influence of history and cultural 
norms/values on ways of being and acting is highlighted.  
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Methodology 
Qualitative social research often takes an interpretive approach to inquiry (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 1994:2). As emphasised by Schütz’s social phenomenology, qualitative 
research is often consistent with the idea that it is subjective interpretation and 
meaning that impels action and thus in order to understand behaviour there needs to 
be understanding from the perspective of those people under study (Schütz, 1962:59): 
‘[i]n-depth understanding of the phenomena in question’ requires making sense of, or 
interpreting, ‘phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them’ in natural 
social settings (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994:2). Accordingly, qualitative research often 
emphasises the socially constructed nature of reality and as interpretivist research 
involves the researcher’s interpretation of the interpretation of those under study, the 
relationship between the researcher and what is being studied is often highlighted as 
well as the value-laden nature of inquiry (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994:4).  
 
Kelle (1997:4.2) notes the common misconception that qualitative research is merely 
an ‘inductive endeavour’ where ‘qualitative researchers approach their empirical field 
without any theoretical concepts whatsoever’ (Kelle, 1997:4.2). In their influential 
methodological text The Discovery of Grounded Theory (1967), Kelle (1997) notes that 
Glaser and Strauss encourage researchers ‘literally to ignore the literature of theory 
and fact on the area under study, in order to assure that the emergence of categories 
will not be contaminated...’ (1967:37. Cited in Kelle, 1997:4.2), the idea being that new 
theories emerge from the data without influence from existing theory (see Seale, 
1999:23). Frankly, this is not possible as the observer’s mind, formed though 
experience, is always instrumental in structuring observation and perception (Seale, 
1999:23). A common philosophical critique of inductivism, particularly consistent with 
constructionism as outlined above, is that previous knowledge and preconceptions are 
integral to (scientific) observation (Kelle, 1997:4.2). As Seale notes, ‘all observation is 
driven by pre-existing theories or values which determine both how objects are 
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constituted in sense experience and why some objects are selected rather than others’ 
(Seale, 1999:23). In keeping with deductive logic (Lincoln et al., 2011:105) the 
conceptual framework presented in chapter three is grounded in existing theory 
concerning social action as well as more practical work concerning behaviour change 
and addiction. Breaking from conventional deductivism, existing knowledge is not used 
in this thesis to produce testable hypotheses (Lincoln et al., 2011:105) but to provide a 
conceptual/analytical framework through which to orientate and ‘guide’ enquiry (see 
chapter three). 
 
 
Ensuring quality 
There is little consensus about how to assess the quality of qualitative research (Seale, 
1999:32-50; Hammersley, 2007). A significant issue is that qualitative research actually 
refers to ‘a plurality of approaches’ which ‘are often regarded as incommensurable 
paradigms’ with ‘divergent theoretical, methodological and value assumptions’ 
(Hammersley, 2007:292). The theoretical assumptions of the present thesis in 
particular (ontological idealism and epistemological constructionism) have significant 
implications with regard to quality assessment in that, as Seale (1999:32) highlights, 
with ‘no possibility of direct knowledge of the world’ and the existence of ‘multiple 
realities…constructed by different minds, the imposition of criteria is no more than an 
attempt to gain an artificial consensus’ (Seale, 1999:32). Internal validity, for example, 
is particularly problematic when the notion of a single absolute truth is rejected (i.e. 
relativism) (Seale, 1999). 
 
Nevertheless, Lincoln and Guba (1985; 1994) propose a number of principles that can 
be adhered to in an effort to provide reliable and valid research outputs: credibility, 
transferability, dependability, and confirmability. Lincoln and Guba (1985) recommend 
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that checking data with participants (‘member checks’) increases the likelihood of 
achieving ‘credible’ findings (1985:314-316). In this thesis interview questions often 
served to check responses given by participants in preceding questions. Transferability 
relates to the applicability of findings in other contexts and requires that a detailed 
description of the setting studied is provided so that readers have sufficient information 
to judge the applicability of findings to other settings (Seale, 1999:45; Lincoln and 
Guba, 1985:316). Participants were sought because of their relevance to the research 
questions rather than any form of, or desire for, representativeness. Dependability 
involves providing an ‘audit trail’: documenting data, methods, and decisions made 
during the project (Seale, 1999:45; Lincoln and Guba, 1985:316-318). Essentially this 
is about transparency: by clearly documenting vital aspects of the research process, as 
in this study, readers can act as ‘auditors’ examining the process and assessing 
whether findings/conclusions are justified (see Lincoln and Guba, 1985:317-318). In the 
present research the nature of doctoral supervision by experienced social researchers 
along with Plymouth University’s research ethical review process helped ensure that 
‘proper’ research procedures were followed. The presentation of an audit trail also goes 
some way to establishing ‘confirmability’ of the data (Lincoln and Guba, 1985:318). The 
keeping of a reflexive record whereby the researcher records information about self 
and research method is a way of ensuring credibility, transferability, dependability, and 
confirmability (Lincoln and Guba, 1985:327). The key point being that reflexivity 
provides information about the ‘human instrument’ (researcher) that is integral to entire 
research process (Lincoln and Guba, 1985:327). To this end brief reflexive annotations 
were noted on interview scripts which comprised of the researcher’s written reflections 
on the interview and any ideas or interesting themes that the researcher felt relevant. 
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Methods 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Data collection methods at a glance 
 
Participant typology 
 
Identifying control over gambling and significant gambling-related harm 
The present research was primarily concerned with comparative analysis between 
members of the three ideal-types: (i) never experienced addiction; (ii) regained control; 
and (iii) experiencing addiction. The framing of the research within the harm-reduction 
paradigm, with the intention of exploring contextual influences on gambling-related 
harm, also means that there was a need to explore experience of harm. Thus 
identification of valuable participants for further analysis relied on two dimensions: first 
and foremost, control so that experience of gambling addiction (or lack thereof) could 
be ascertained and, secondly, harm so that experience of significant negative 
consequences contributed to by gambling (or lack thereof) could be ascertained. 
 
Members of the never experienced addiction group were of particular interest as 
literature suggests that constituents of the conceptual framework developed in chapter 
Survey 
Recruitment and screening of potentially valuable participants 
 
Interviewing 
Semi-structured in-depth interviews with twenty-five interviewees: nineteen were 
recruited from survey respondents and six were recruited through chain referral 
and/or from the researcher’s social-networks. 
 
Never experienced addiction n=13 
Regained control (and still gamble) n=9 
Experiencing addiction n=3 
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three (i.e. socio-cultural milieu, beliefs, life-structure, and practices) characteristic of 
their lives encourage greater control and constraint as well as prevent or impede harm 
(see chapters two and three). Similarly, members of the regained control group were of 
interest because (re)instatement of control and shifts away from harm may be 
supported by changes in aspects of the conceptual framework towards those which 
encourage greater control. Finally, interviewees identified as members of the 
experiencing addiction group were sought in order to compare those aspects of their 
lives with those characteristic of the other ideal-types who appear more effective in 
controlling/constraining gambling and mitigating/preventing harm. 
 
 
Problematic gambling and gambling addiction: related but not interchangeable 
constructs 
Crucial for the creation of a meaningful typology in the present research was to avoid 
the near ubiquitous conflation of control (e.g. gambling addiction) with harm (e.g. 
problematic gambling). While much existing literature treats these concepts as 
synonymous and interchangeable, some commentators have cautioned that they might 
be better understood and operationalised as analytically distinct (Griffiths, 2014a; 
Wakefield, 1997). Conflation is pervasive with numerous news articles (Morrison, 2014; 
BBC, 2012; Ramesh, 2013) and much peer-reviewed academic research (Becoña, 
1993; Orford et al., 1996) supporting claims about ‘gambling addiction’ on data 
produced using screening instruments developed to identify presence/absence of 
problematic gambling (i.e. as an ‘objective’ measure of harm). In news media this 
conflation is clear and tends to manifest itself through the presentation of figures 
collected using a ‘problem gambling’ screen which are then used to base claims about 
gambling addiction. In academic publications conflation tends to be more subtle and 
implicit. Some peer-reviewed academic research, for instance, purports to focus on 
gambling ‘addiction’ but then presents data collected using problem gambling screens 
alongside so that either (a) claims about gambling addiction are explicitly informed by 
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data collected using ‘problem gambling’ screens or (b) it is implied that this data is 
evidence of addiction (e.g. Laansoo and Niit, 2009). The latter is more subtle whereby 
the interchangeability of ‘problem gambling’ and ‘gambling addiction’ lays in the 
authorial/editorial decision to include ‘problem gambling’ data in a discussion about 
gambling addiction. The choice of dissemination platform may also further encourage 
conflation as research concerning problematic gambling, which in many instances does 
not even mention ‘gambling addiction’ nor explicitly claim to concern addiction/loss of 
self-control, tend to be published in addiction focused journals such as ‘Addiction, 
Research and Theory’ and ‘Addiction’ (e.g. Liu et al., 2013; Toneatto, 2008). 
 
The treatment and recovery sector propagates conflation through a tendency to use 
problematic gambling screens as part of their admissions procedures (Griffiths et al., 
2001:164). To be clear, it is not argued here that the dimensions of control and harm 
may not practically often, even usually, be intimately related. After all, difficulty of 
control may often lead to harm, and harm may often be the result of difficulty in 
controlling gambling. It is, of course, unlikely that someone would seek and participate 
in treatment unless they perceived their gambling to contribute to significant harm (i.e. 
was problematic) and experienced significant difficulty of self-control. Part of the reason 
for the interchangeable use of these terms is, perhaps, grounded in the logic that, given 
free-will, individuals will act in a rational way so that any behaviour that has greater 
cost than benefit is avoided (see chapter three). Nevertheless, as existing literature 
(Griffiths, 2014a; Wakefield, 1997) indicates that the experiences of loss of self-control 
and harm do not always go together, it was important to develop a typology for 
comparative analysis that avoided conflate the two dimensions.  
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Rejection of reliance on established diagnostic criteria to identify addiction 
Though literature suggests that experience of harm may not always be evidence of 
difficulty of control (Wakefield, 1997:640; Griffiths, 2014), when the methods were 
conceptualised and the recruitment survey and interview script developed it was 
(naïvely, though reasonably) assumed, consistent with nearly all existing gambling 
research, that gambling which contributes to significant harm for the gambler is 
(always) the result of significant difficulty of self-control (i.e. gambling addiction). 
Following this logic it was reasoned that widely used classification instruments (or 
‘screens’) designed to identify and categorise those who gamble problematically 
through asking about ‘objectively’ defined ‘harms’ could be confidently relied on for 
case selection. That is, to identify: those experiencing gambling addiction at time of 
interview (experiencing addiction); those who had previously experienced significant 
difficulty of control but who had since regained control (regained control), and gamblers 
who had never experienced significant difficulty of control (never experienced 
addiction).  
Based on the reasoning just described, a gambling screen widely used in research and 
assessment, The National Opinion Research Center (NORC) Diagnostic Screen for 
Gambling Disorders (NODS) and two brief derivatives, the NODS-CLiP and NODS 
PERC9, were included in the recruitment survey as well as the interview schedule. To 
check reliability participants were also asked, separately and more directly, if they felt 
that their gambling had been problematic (as indication of harm) and whether or not 
they had found it difficult to control their gambling (as indication of addiction). As 
interviews commenced it became clear that while the screens did tend to identify those 
who reported significant difficulty controlling their gambling (and did not capture those 
who did not report as such), screen responses were not always consistent with 
subjective responses about experience of harm and difficulty of control (or addiction) 
                                                          
9
 ‘Control, Lying, and Preoccupation’ (CLiP); ‘Preoccupation and Escape as well as Chasing and Risked 
Relationships’ (PERC)  
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(see chapter five). As such, it was felt that the NODS could not be solely relied upon as 
evidence of addiction and/or harm. 
At this point, it is important to emphasise that the decision not to rely on gambling 
screens for the case selection and classification of participants does not mean that 
screening instruments such as those just described are useless. In interviews, for 
example, the NODS questions often prompted participants into revealing further 
insights into their gambling patterns and experiences of control and harm. In addition, 
screening tools can be valuable aids in the clinical assessment of behaviour and can 
help allocate limited resources more effectively to those in greatest need (Taxman et 
al., 2007). With regard to epidemiological research, problem gambling screens may be 
helpful in providing rough estimates of the experience of problematic gambling in 
populations and can be used to explore changes in rates of harm over time (e.g. 
Wardle et al. 2011a). This information, for example, might then be used to justify and 
target public health interventions aimed at ameliorating gambling-related harm. 
 
Analytical constructs for control: the ideal tripartite typology 
Weber’s ‘ideal-type’ concept (Weber, 1949 [1904]) was used to classify participants. 
The rationale behind using an ideal typology is based on research which has 
highlighted the shortcomings of nosology to treat diagnostic criteria as discrete and 
concrete (Wiggins and Schwartz, 1994; Schwartz et al., 1989) as well as those who 
caution against the propensity of addictions research to think only in dichotomous 
terms (e.g. addicted/not-addicted and problematic/non-problematic) and who suggest 
that it makes better sense to think of control and harm as continuums (Weinberg, 2013; 
Grund et al., 2013; Peele, 2001) with theoretical extremes that do not exist in reality 
(e.g. complete control at one end and absolutely no control at the other). This allows 
the threefold typology of never experienced addiction, regained control, and 
experiencing addiction to be treated as ‘mental’ constructs that have ‘conceptual purity’ 
but ‘[may not] be found empirically anywhere in reality’ (Weber, 1949[1904]:90). As 
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such, types of gambler are considered ‘abstract typifications’, constructs that highlight 
particular aspects of actor’s lives that are of particular interest to the research (Ashley 
and Orenstein, 1998:287-288). These classifications are heuristic rather than 
descriptive (Philips, 2002:94) and aid in the identification of valuable gamblers as to aid 
recruitment, further investigation and for comparison. Based on evidence that addiction 
is first and foremost a subjective experience (see chapter two), it was decided that the 
best way to ascertain whether or not a participant had experienced addiction was to 
discuss at interview whether or not they felt they had experienced difficulty in 
controlling their gambling. Similarly, consistent with this, and keeping in mind that 
which is harmful seems dependent on the qualities of a given actor’s life (see 
Wakefield, 1997), it was also decided that the best way to identify experience of harm 
was to discuss at interview whether or not they felt that their gambling had resulted in 
harm. 
 
Although lived experience cannot be reduced to analytical constructs (Schütz, 1982), 
that is not to say that the ideal-types developed to aid the empirical work have no basis 
in reality. Rather, the ideal-types broadly relate to the experiences of particular 
participants so that those classified as experiencing addiction, for example, will have 
experienced significant difficulty in controlling their gambling in order to be classified as 
such. Moreover, it is worth noting that constructs such as ‘addiction’ and 
‘problem’/‘pathological’ gambling are also, simultaneously, general concepts (without 
strict criteria) that have meaning for participants. In other words, not only are the 
constructs meaningful in terms of the research but also for the participant in their own 
perceptions/worldview. Participants may use concepts such as problem or pathological 
gambling as a frame of reference through which to view/interpret their selves and their 
actions while bringing to that interpretation discourse as socially/culturally constructed. 
In keeping with Bourdieu’s (1987) discussion of social-class classifications, 
classifications of addiction and harm do not exist as readymade categories ‘out there’, 
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the product of scientific discovery, but at the same time are more than subjective 
constructs of the observer or just ‘theoretical artefacts [...] obtained by arbitrarily cutting 
up the otherwise undifferentiated continuum of the social world’ (Bourdieu, 1987:4). 
 
The operationalisation of each ideal-type is provided in table 4.1. When 
operationalising experiencing addiction it was decided that this should involve difficulty 
controlling gambling between gambling sessions rather than merely within sessions. 
This is consistent with existing research which has argued that chasing losses10 
between sessions is much more likely to be associated with addiction and to lead to 
harm (O’Connor and Dickerson, 2003; Dickerson, 2003; Lesieur, 1984). In fact 
O’Connor and Dickerson (2003) have argued that chasing losses within sessions is 
quite common and seldom problematic while Lesieur (1984) stated that it was the long-
term chase that distinguished ‘compulsive’ from non-compulsive gamblers11. Dickerson 
(2003) has even argued that difficulty of control within sessions may be a ‘common’ 
experience for non-addicted regular players and may be ‘an integral part of the 
pleasurable experience of gambling’ (Dickerson, 2003). This is not to say that chasing 
losses within sessions is conducive to constraint or may not lead to harm (e.g. financial 
loss) but distinct instances of excessive, less constrained, gambling appears not 
necessarily indicative of addiction. 
 
                                                          
10
 Chasing losses (colloquially, ‘chasing’) is where gamblers continue gambling in an attempt to 
recover past gambling losses (O’Connor and Dickerson, 2003:360; Lesieur, 1984:360). 
 
11
 The distinction is also built into the DSM criteria (item 6 in DSM-5) which asks whether or not 
having lost money gambling, the gambler ‘often returns another day to get even’ – an affirmative 
response contributing to a diagnosis of a ‘gambling disorder’ (APA, 2013) (or ‘pathological 
gambling’ in previous DSM iterations  [NCRG, 2013]). 
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Table 4.1 Typologies defined: never experienced addiction;  regained control;  experiencing addiction 
 
Ideal-type Ideal-type criteria for inclusion How well the characteristics of those interviewed met or 
departed from the ideal-type criteria (see chapter five) 
Never experienced 
addiction 
(n=13) 
Reports having never experienced loss of control between 
gambling sessions. 
 
All thirteen interviewees reported never having had difficulty 
controlling gambling between sessions. 
Gamblers who exhibit a range of gambling frequencies per 
week 
 
Reported frequencies ranged between once a week and 
10+per week (see table 5.4, chapter five) 
Reports typically gambling at least weekly 
 
One interviewee reported typically gambling less than once a 
week 
Regained control 
(n=9) 
Reports being in control of gambling for 3 months prior to 
interview but has experienced periods where they found it 
difficult to control gambling between sessions. 
All 9 interviewees reported being in control for 3 months prior 
to interview but before this had experienced periods where 
they found it difficult to control gambling between sessions. 
Reports typically gambling at least weekly  
 
Two interviewees reported gambling less than weekly  
Gamblers who exhibit a range of gambling frequencies per 
week 
In addition to the two interviewees who reported gambling 
less than weekly, other frequencies per week ranged from 3 
times a week to over 10 times per week 
Experiencing 
addiction 
(n=3) 
Reports gambling in the past 3 months. 2 interviewees reported gambling in the three months prior to 
interview. The other indicated having been abstinent for many 
months (but did not specify how many) 
Reports difficulty controlling gambling between sessions 
during 3 months prior to interview. 
All interviewees indicated difficulty controlling gambling 
between sessions. 
Gambles at least weekly but as the gambling of those 
experiencing addiction may be particularly chaotic/irregular 
and some may be trying (and often succeeding for long time 
periods) to gamble less often (or not at all), this may be a 
difficult criterion to fulfil.  
One interviewee reported gambling less than once a week; 
one reported twice a week; and the other 10+ per week 
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Recruitment 
Hidden and hard-to-reach participants 
Those who engage in stigmatised activities, such as recreational drug use or gambling, 
are normatively regarded by researchers as hidden and hard-to-reach meaning that 
they are difficult to identify and recruit as research participants (Duncan et al., 2003). 
Numerous factors contribute to this with those not involved in formal treatment, in 
particular, being less visible and harder to reach. While gambling, in general, seems to 
be becoming increasingly normalised (Reith, 2007a) and British attitudes appear to be 
becoming more positive, research suggests that the general public view of gambling is 
more negative than it is positive (Wardle et al., 2011a:132) and gambling that is 
perceived to be excessive/problematic is particularly stigmatised (Hing et al., 2014). As 
the stigmatisation of gambling difficulties often results in embarrassment, shame and 
deters treatment seeking/participation (Hing et al., 2013; Holdsworth et al., 2013) it is 
reasonable to suggest that gamblers may have been discouraged from taking part in 
the present research. Despite assurances of anonymity and confidentiality some 
gamblers, like members of other stigmatised populations, may have felt threatened by 
the prospect of research participation (Heckathorn, 1997:174), perceiving risk that their 
gambling practices might be revealed with detrimental consequence (e.g. 
embarrassment or shame) and so chose not to participate in the research. Moreover, 
those who did participate may have a vested interest to present their gambling in ways 
that maintain a ‘positive’ image; e.g. they may downplay their gambling spend if they 
feel that this could be perceived by others as unfavourable. 
Alongside (potential for) stigmatisation and the desire of some to keep their gambling 
behaviour hidden there are various other factors that contribute to difficulties in 
identifying and recruiting gambling participants for research. In particular, gambling 
participation is more visible for some activities (e.g. offline casino activities) than for 
others (e.g. online gambling in private homes). Many providers do not maintain 
customer records (e.g. slot-machines, off-line National Lottery) and those providers that 
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do (e.g. casinos, online bookmakers) are unlikely to disclose the identities/contact 
details of customers to external agencies/researchers. While some researchers have 
negotiated access to commercial gambling spaces/places and players within them (e.g. 
Cassidy, 2012a; Moodie and Reith, 2009; Reith and Dobbie, 2011), permission from 
providers may be difficult to obtain and an increasing amount of gambling takes place 
‘remotely’ away from physical gambling-specific sites/venues (Griffiths et al., 2006; 
Wardle et al, 2011a). Furthermore, any recruitment from gambling places is likely to 
lead to recruitment bias towards those who frequent those places more often and for 
greater durations. Much existing ‘addictions’ research, as well as (problem) gambling 
research, has relied on participants recruited from captive populations such as students 
and those in treatment (Waldorf et al., 1991:284-285). However, it is likely that such 
individuals represent a very small proportion of those who gamble and experience 
gambling problems. In particular, as the vast majority of those who experience 
gambling difficulties never seek or engage with formal treatment (Reith, 2006:71-2) it is 
reasonable to suggest that the experiences, gambling patterns and problem severity of 
individuals in treatment might be qualitatively different from the vast majority of less-
visible problematic and non-problematic non-treatment populations of gamblers. As will 
be discussed while recruitment is not designed to yield ‘generalisable’ data, the data 
should be as ‘transferable’ as possible and with this in mind, recruitment techniques 
aim to seek participants beyond student and treatment populations – though the 
participation of these groups is not excluded. A significant recruitment challenge, then, 
is to reach ‘non-captive’ gamblers whose activities may not only be hidden due to their 
gambling patterns (e.g. gambling only in private spaces) but may also have vested 
interest in keeping their gambling hidden and thus purposefully hide their gambling 
from public view. As will be discussed this challenge was addressed through 
recruitment via an online survey and chain referral techniques. 
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Recruitment procedures: survey and chain referral 
In line with recommendations from Duncan et al. (2003), a bricolage of recruitment 
strategies were used in an effort to achieve a good number and variability of 
respondents. Most research participants were recruited for interview through an online 
survey the main objective of which was to identify and screen for gamblers who fulfil 
criteria for any of the ideal-types (see table 4.1) so that they may be recruited for 
interview. A series of adverts on local news media and social media sought to make 
gamblers aware of the research/survey and provided details of how to take part. All 
adverts included a web-link direct to the online survey and adverts placed in offline 
printed news media also included a phone number so that the survey could also be 
completed offline (no respondents chose this option). On following the web-link 
potential respondents were made aware that to take part they need to be actively 
participating in gambling and be aged 18 years and older. These eligibility criteria were 
purposively broad to avoid excluding/discouraging potentially valuable participants. In 
addition, the survey link provided assurances of confidentiality, anonymity and made 
explicit the right to withdraw from the research at any time. Respondents were informed 
that if they were invited to interview and participated they would be offered a £10 
reciprocity payment. They were also told that if they wished they could have this paid to 
a third-party as research suggests that some people may give their money to others for 
safe keeping if they feel they are unable to control spending (Reith and Dobbie, 2013). 
The survey form is briefly deconstructed below and can be found in Appendix A though 
suffice to say here that it was designed to fulfil two main aims: (i) to identify potentially 
valuable participants for interview and (ii) to gather contact information so that survey 
respondents could be invited to interview. The former aim was met through the 
following objectives, to: (a) gather information on frequency of gambling so that 
participants with a range of gambling patterns could be identified/recruited; (b) 
establish whether or not individual respondents felt that they had been in control of 
their gambling in their lifetime and in the past 3-months allowing those who have 
regained control but who still gamble to be identified. 
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Survey targeting 
In line with existing research (Zinberg, 1984; Alvarez et al., 2003), advertisements were 
used to reach participants, provide them with an overview of the research, and inform 
them of the opportunity to participate. Adverts were designed to reduce barriers to 
participation by clearly explaining participation requirements and allaying privacy 
concerns by asserting anonymity and confidentiality. Initially, all interviews were to be 
conducted face-to-face, however, as will be discussed shortly, this proved logistically 
problematic and most interviews were conducted over the phone and one via online 
video conference. Nevertheless, as interviews were initially to be conducted face-to-
face it was pragmatic to target gamblers residing in and around Plymouth. In the first 
instance, the research and survey were advertised in three feature articles published in 
the local press – both print and online. Print versions had a UK total estimated 
circulation of 81,000 and covered Devon, Cornwall and parts of Somerset and Dorset 
(Western Morning News/Plymouth Herald). While a number of studies have 
successfully advertised for hidden populations of research participants in newspapers 
and magazines (e.g. Zinberg, 1984; Powell, 1973), this method stimulated very few 
survey responses in the present research (11 responses). The research and survey 
were also advertised in an announcement on the staff intranet at Plymouth University. 
The ubiquity of the internet and, in particular, the rise of online surveys have provided 
further ways to reach hidden populations (e.g. illicit drug users; OCD sufferers; men 
who have sex with men) (Coomber, 1997; Elford et al., 2004; Williams et al., 2012). A 
common approach has been to advertise web-hosted surveys in online spaces (e.g. 
newsgroups, forums, websites thought to be frequented by the target population [see 
Miller et al., 2007; Parrott, et al., 2002]). The recent rise in social media has provided 
further online spaces in which to advertise research and recruit survey respondents 
(e.g. Ramo et al., 2010; Williams et al., 2012), though very little research has examined 
social networking websites as a recruitment tool (Brickman-Bhutta, 2012:58). The 
research and survey was advertised using two popular social networking platforms in 
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the UK, Facebook and Twitter (Kapp, 2013). There were 266 survey respondents (see 
chapter five). For the most part it was not possible to disaggregate responses 
stimulated by the different recruitment strategies as the survey did not ask how 
respondents found out about the research and advertising through the mediums was 
largely conducted simultaneously. Methods of recruitment via social networking 
platforms are now discussed. 
 
Recruitment via Facebook 
Advertising through the Facebook platform has shown utility in recruiting participants 
for health research (Fenner, 2012). In order to use Facebook, users must provide 
various demographic data (e.g. age, gender, location) along with information about 
their interests and activities (Fenner, 2012). Using this information, Facebook allows 
advertisers to target adverts to those who fulfil particular demographic and interest 
target criteria (Fenner, 2012). A Facebook advert was created (see figure 4.1 below) 
and targeted toward Facebook users who presented as (i) living in and within a 10 mile 
radius of Plymouth, (ii) aged 18 years or older, along with (iii) each of the following 
criteria in turn: (a) reports interest in gambling (any); (b) reports interest in sport (any); 
(c) reports interest in gaming (social/online). The third set of criteria was included 
because of a limited research budget. Every time a Facebook user clicked the survey 
link the project was billed. Over the course of the Facebook advertising campaign the 
advert was clicked on 326 times at a cost of £75: thus each Facebook advert click had 
cost an average of £0.23. It was felt that without restricting targeting to those 
demographics thought to be most likely to be gamblers and who may be more likely to 
gamble regularly, a greater proportion of less valuable respondents may have clicked 
the link (perhaps just out of curiosity rather than to take part) thereby using up the 
research budget. As those who completed the survey may have been directed through 
advertising on various platforms including Twitter and as it cannot be known how each 
survey respondent followed the survey link, it cannot be known how many of the 326 
Facebook users who clicked on the advert completed the survey.  
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Figure 4.2: Facebook advert for recruitment 
 
 
 
 
Recruitment via Twitter 
The Twitter platform allows a user to create a ‘profile’ and subscribe to information 
published by other users (termed ‘following’). Default Twitter settings are such that 
when one user subscribes to another user’s updates (i.e. ‘follows’ another user) the 
latter user is notified of the subscription and the existence of the subscriber’s profile. A 
Twitter profile was created for the research project (see figure 4.2) that contained a link 
to further information about the research and to the survey. In order to make potentially 
valuable survey respondents and interview participants aware of the Twitter profile (and 
thus the research) Twitter users who subscribe to updates from two major local casinos 
in the South West were subscribed to. The aim was to alert Twitter using gamblers in 
the South West to the research encouraging them to complete the survey. 
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Figure 4.3: Twitter Profile for recruitment 
 
Chain referral recruitment 
While adverts were targeted towards gamblers in Plymouth and the South West, a few 
survey respondents and subsequently interview participants were located elsewhere. 
One survey respondent and interviewee, for example, was a British expatriate located 
in Warsaw while another respondent and interviewee was located in Worcestershire, 
UK. One reason for the geographical spread of participants is that survey web-link was 
easily shared online (Best and Krueger, 2008:221) to those outside of the South West. 
Six interviewees were recruited through ‘chain referral’ (Fricker, 2008:200). At interview 
all participants were asked if they knew of any other regular gamblers and if so to pass 
on contact details of the researcher and ask them to get in contact. These ‘referred 
gamblers’ were then assessed to see if they fulfilled the relevant inclusion criteria and 
then invited to interview; two participants were recruited in this way (Waldorf et al., 
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1991). While some have criticised chain referral techniques for producing socially 
connected and often homogeneous participants (Faugier and Sargeant, 1997), the 
method has been successfully and extensively used to research sensitive issues and 
hidden populations (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981:141). 
 
Survey design and screening 
The chief function of the survey was to identify (screen for) and recruit valuable 
participants for interview. The full survey script is included in Appendix A. Questions 1 
and 2 identified active gamblers as required for the project. It was decided that 
individuals who gamble only on the National Lottery would be excluded as these tend 
not to find lottery play difficult to control or problematic (Griffiths, 2012b). Questions 3, 4 
and 5 were designed to collect information about gambling patterns so that 
respondents with a range of gambling patterns could be invited to interview. Question 6 
was designed to establish whether or not respondents felt in control of their gambling. 
Question 7 was designed to gather some initial information about the ways in which 
gamblers manage their gambling so that this information could be used to inform 
construction of the interview schedule. Questions 8-13, inclusive, are a combination of 
the two existing brief versions of the full NODS (‘NODS CLiP’ and ‘NODS PERC’) and 
were included in an effort to establish ‘lifetime’ and current problematic gambling status 
(past-3-months) which, at the time when data collection instruments were developed, 
were not only held to correspond to subjective experience of significant harm but also 
the absence/presence of addiction. As discussed earlier in this chapter and in 
illustrated in Chapter five, it became apparent that screening instruments cannot be 
solely relied upon in this way. As such while NODS scores were considered, and while 
the full NODS served at interview to encourage discussion of the experience of 
gambling-related harm, greater reliance was placed on subjective self-reports of 
experience of harm and substantial difficult of control. Question 14 was crucial to the 
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identification of potential interviewees that might fulfil the ‘ideal-type’ groups (see table 
4.1). It explored whether respondents had: 
a) Experienced difficulty controlling their gambling within the three months prior to 
survey (indicating ‘experiencing addiction’ classification);  
b) Experienced difficulty controlling their gambling at some point in their lives but 
not within three months prior to survey (indicating ‘regained control’ 
classification); and  
c) Never experienced periods of difficulty controlling their gambling (indicating 
‘never experienced addiction’ classification). 
Question 15 was designed to indicate whether or not respondents felt they had 
experienced gambling-related harm and was relied on instead of the NODS. Finally, 
questions 16 and 17 were designed to gather the contact details of valuable and 
potential participants who express interest in taking part in an interview. 
 
Critique of the screening survey 
In order to reduce the proportion of respondents abandoning the survey mid-
completion it was purposefully short (Lumsden, 2007:44; Best and Krueger, 2008:222) 
and most respondents took between 3-4 minutes to complete it. The survey did not aim 
to collect in-depth qualitative data but, instead, surface data which was used to identify 
and gather the contact details of potentially valuable participants. This functional brevity 
excluded demographic questions as, at the time of survey construction and survey data 
collection, demographic attributes were not considered important by the researcher for 
recruiting gamblers. Valuable participants were to be identified according to those 
aforementioned typologies which required information about gambling 
behaviours/patterns and experiences rather than demographic attributes. This omission 
meant that when it came to invite a selection of survey respondents to interview it was 
not possible to purposefully invite individuals with a variety of demographic 
characteristics (e.g. age and ethnicity). Where respondents left contact details it was 
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generally possible to establish whether they were male or female (giving indication of 
gender) and this suggested that very few females/women left contact details and fewer 
still might fit the ideal-type criteria. While it cannot be known for sure, there is no 
reason to suggest that those who left their contact details and were invited to interview 
differed, demographically, from those who filled out the survey, did not leave their 
contact details, and/or declined to be interviewed.  
 
Recruitment and data collection through online self-completed surveys has numerous 
strengths. While stigmatisation may reduce the willingness of some to disclose their 
gambling and/or report it in ways they perceive to be more socially acceptable, there is 
some evidence to suggest that online survey respondents are less likely to respond 
with socially desirable answers (Joinson, 1999:437; Rhodes et al., 2003:68). One 
explanation for greater disclosure online may be that respondents perceive a 
heightened level of anonymity compared with participants of offline research (Hewson 
and Laurent, 2008:60). Greater anonymity may contribute to a more balanced 
researcher-participant power relationship which tends to be skewed toward the 
researcher (Hewson and Laurent, 2008:60). This may help marginalised groups feel 
more empowered making them more forthcoming with responses, open, and honest, 
particularly where sensitive topics are discussed (Hewson and Laurent, 2008:60; 
Vehovar and Manfreda, 2008:179). Further strengths relate to the self-administration of 
the online survey. As no researcher needed to be present to administer the survey, 
respondents were likely able to complete it at a time convenient for them, at their own 
pace, and with an increased sense of privacy (Vehovar and Manfreda, 2008:179; 
Hewson and Laurent, 2008:60). These points are compounded by the placement of 
survey advertising on social media and news media – i.e. spaces that the individual is 
relatively likely to occupy when they have time to complete the survey. 
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The incorporation of automated skip patterns reduced the need for respondent 
instructions thus reducing reliance on the respondent (see Rhodes et al., 2003:69), 
ameliorating respondent fatigue, and potentially improving numbers of complete 
responses (Vehovar and Manfreda, 2008:178-9). The survey design further aimed to 
reduce missing data by (i) preventing respondents from progressing to a new page of 
survey questions without having answered questions on the current page and (ii) 
submitting and saving data each time the respondent moved between pages so that 
even where respondent terminated the survey early at least some data was collected 
(Best and Krueger, 2008:225). These measures were important as the identification of 
valuable respondents required as much data as possible and no questions were felt to 
be superfluous. Moreover, in comparison to paper self-completion surveys, 
respondents were unable to answer ‘incorrectly’ by, for example, ticking more than one 
option when only one was required (Rhodes et al., 2003:69). A particular strength was 
that responses were automatically exported into digital spreadsheet formats for 
analysis, reducing possibility of human data entry error (Rhodes et al., 2003:69; 
Schillewaert et al., 1998; Schmidt, 1997:279), and aiding the identification of potentially 
valuable participants.  
 
Critique of recruitment strategies: transferability and applicability 
The recruitment strategy was necessarily purposive meaning that only those individuals 
most relevant to the research aims/questions were sought (Bryman, 2008:415). An oft-
rehearsed criticism of purposive sampling is that it leads to research findings that not 
generalisable (Bryman, 2008:415), however the present research aims do not require 
generalisability but, rather, applicability as met by the transferability of data/findings 
(Krefting, 1991:216). Research meets the criterion of transferability where there is a 
good degree of similarity or ‘goodness of fit’ between the research contexts and 
contexts that research findings are applied to (Krefting, 1991:216). In order for others to 
assess transferability this thesis clearly and transparently describes the research 
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process including methods, findings, and conclusions so that those wishing to transfer 
elements of the present research to similar settings/contexts can do so (Lincoln and 
Guba, 1985; Krefting, 1991). Alongside deep, transparent and clear description of the 
research process, potential of transferability to a greater variety of contexts can be 
heightened through recruiting participants whose lives are embedded in different 
contexts and who have different experiences (Krefting, 1991) and, as such, it is worth 
briefly examining the constraints on the heterogeneity of participants that may have 
resulted from the recruitment strategy. 
 
 
Many potential participants (i.e. those who fulfil the criteria in table 4.1) will not have 
been made aware of the research such as those who do not use Facebook/Twitter or 
read local newspapers and this raises the question: are those gamblers who became 
aware of the research and then took part qualitatively different from other gamblers? As 
awareness of the present research was heavily garnered through online advertising 
(e.g. Facebook/Twitter/University Intranet) and as existing research has suggested 
recruitment through online research has often led to participants that tend to be male 
and better educated than those recruited through offline methods (Miller et al., 
2007:170; Duncan et al., 2003; Coomber; 1997), it is quite possible that the 
experiences (and lives/milieus) of those individuals who became aware of the research, 
completed the survey and were subsequently recruited to interview tended to be quite 
different from gamblers who do not use online platforms, use them less often, or were 
otherwise were not made aware of the research. Having said this, research concerning 
drug-use in the US indicates that drug-users recruited using the internet tend to be 
more representative of the general population than clinical samples (Nicholson et al., 
1999). This suggests that while gamblers recruited through the internet may not be 
representative of the wider gambling population, they may still be more representative 
than clinical populations on which most addictions research is based. Focusing on the 
use of Twitter as a recruitment strategy, only those who ‘follow’ the two gambling 
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providers in the South West may have been made aware of the research and on 
Facebook only those who fulfilled the Facebook advertising target criteria. Moreover, 
only a very small proportion of those who fulfilled the Facebook target criteria were 
actually shown the advert due to budget restrictions. It should also be noted that only a 
proportion of those who became aware of the research took part; participants were 
self-selecting. This raises another question: are those who were aware but chose not to 
take part qualitatively different from those who were made aware and took part? This 
cannot be known as nothing is known about those who became aware but did not take 
part. Finally, just less than half (48%) of all survey respondents who completed the 
survey provided contact details and agreed to be contacted for interview. This raises a 
further relevant question: did those who did not provide contact details differ from those 
who did? As noted in chapter five, there was no evidence that they were but with very 
limited information this question is difficult to address. In terms of typical gambling 
frequencies as well as experience of addiction or harm there was no indication of 
significant difference (see chapter five). 
 
 
Interviewing 
Through semi-structured interviewing information was gathered concerning each 
gambler’s (dynamic) socio-cultural milieu, life-structure, practices, and beliefs. The 
main rationale for using this method is that, consistent with constructivist ontology, it 
has shown utility and value in previous addictions research in exploring these elements 
(Zinberg, 1984; Waldorf et al., 1991). As little is known about how gamblers control 
their gambling or how those who experience gambling addiction regain control, an 
overly structured interview was deemed too constraining. While questions were 
preformulated based on existing addictions/behaviour change literature (chapter two), 
in conjunction with the conceptual framework (chapter three), questions were designed 
to elicit ‘open’ responses encouraging interviewees to respond on their own terms and 
allowed freedom to deviate from the schedule required so that potentially fruitful lines of 
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enquiry could be explored as they arose (May, 2001:122-3). Nevertheless, as each 
interviewee was asked more or less for the same information comparisons could be 
made between accounts (May, 2001:123).  
 
Survey respondents whose responses suggested that they fulfil the criteria for valuable 
participants (table 4.1), had left contact details, and who had agreed to be interviewed 
were invited to interview. Twenty-five semi-structured interviews were conducted: 13 
‘never experienced addiction’; 9 ‘regained control’; and 3 ‘experiencing addiction’. 
Interviews lasted between 30-120 minutes (most lasted approximately 60 minutes) and 
were audio recorded and transcribed by the researcher. Participants were offered £10 
compensation for their time and knowledge (which could be paid to a third-party where 
the participant wished). Seven interviews were conducted face-to-face, one by video 
link over the internet and most, 17, were conducted over the telephone. 
 
 
The interview schedule 
In line with best practice (Lumsden, 2007), the interview schedule was piloted on 
research colleagues in order to identify any poorly worded questions or potential 
sources of misunderstanding and with this feedback some questions were reworded 
but no significant alterations were made. The full interview schedule is included in 
Appendix C. Separated into seven parts, part one began with a brief set of questions 
regarding demographics and life structure/living situation to build an initial picture of the 
participant and their life. Part two encouraged gamblers to tell their ‘gambling story’ – a 
retrospective account of their gambling experiences including how they started 
gambling regularly and how they learned to gamble – an approach that has proved 
valuable in previous gambling research (e.g. Reith and Dobbie, 2011; 2012; 2013). 
Part three gathered information about past and present gambling practices and sought 
to investigate how these were embedded in immediate social-spaces and physical-
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places as well as wider social relationships. In particular discussion focused on the 
dynamism of social relationships as consistent with a processural conception of milieu 
(Moore, 1993) and whether these changes were associated with changes in gambling 
patterns, control and/or harm. Part four gathered information about the structure and 
routines of interviewees’ lives and how these facets compare when gambling and not 
gambling thereby building on research suggesting that routines influence behavioural 
change/habitual action (e.g. Nettleton et al., 2011). For those who have experienced 
periods in which they found it difficult to control their gambling and/or experienced 
gambling-related harm, participants were asked about how daily routines differed 
between these periods. Discussion in part five focused on issues of control such as 
regulation of gambling as well as loss of control. Questions were directed towards 
sources of support and routines as well as strategies aimed at ‘winning’, controlling 
time/money spent gambling and reducing gambling-related harm. Part six focused on 
uncovering gambling beliefs (conscious beliefs, rules, values, and norms) through 
directing discussion toward: advice for gambling ‘safely’/non-problematically; signs that 
someone cannot control their gambling or has a gambling problem; and explicitly 
asking about personal gambling rules. Finally, part seven included the full NODS 
gambling screen and served to facilitate discussion about the experiences of control 
over gambling and gambling-related harm. It should be noted that the final schedule 
(Appendix C) was only used as loose guide to direct discussion; often later questions 
were answered when interviewees provided an account of their gambling story and so 
these were not asked again or were asked only to elicit clarification. Also, questions 
that did not apply to the interviewee were not asked. 
 
Practical issues 
Initially, interviews were planned to be conducted face-to-face however it became clear 
that many participants were unable or unwilling to engage in discussion in-person and 
that face-to-face interviewing would be unpractical due to budget and time constraints. 
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Many potential interviewees suggested that they did not have the time to participate in 
an interview in person while a few initially agreed only to cancel later. Instead, the 
majority of interviews were undertaken by telephone and this had some advantages 
over face-to-face interviewing. Pragmatically, telephone interviewing seemed more 
convenient for participants and may have increased participant 
engagement/compliance in interviewing – few cancelled or rearranged the telephone 
interviews. Research has indicated that telephone interviewing may produce data that 
is just as rich as that produced through face-to-face interviewing (Elwood and Martin, 
2000). It has been argued, for example, that in face-to-face interviewing power is 
skewed toward the interviewer often leading the interviewee to feel less 
knowledgeable, hold back discussion, and ultimately provide less in-depth responses 
(Elwood and Martin, 2000). To disrupt such power inequality research has suggested 
that participants be interviewed in their own homes (Oberhauser, 1997; Falconer-Al 
Hindi, 1997) as was often the case when interviewees in the present project were 
interviewed over the phone. There is also some evidence to suggest that when 
compared to face-to-face interviewing interviewees are more ‘honest’ and reveal more 
in telephone interviews, particularly for stigmatised behaviours and sensitive topics 
(see Trier-Bieniek, 2012). Of those interviews that were undertaken face-to-face, three 
were undertaken in participant’s homes, three in a private room in the university library 
and one in a coffee shop. 
 
Ethical considerations 
Ethical approval for the research was granted by the Human Health Research Ethics 
Committee at Plymouth University in November 2012 and the research adhered to the 
ethical guidelines as published by the British Sociological Association (BSA, 2002). The 
following discussion demonstrates how the research adhered to examples of BSA 
ethical principles. Potential participants were given clear information about the purpose 
of the research and how the data was to be used. This provided participants with the 
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information required to provide informed consent to take part in the research (BSA 
principle 17). Survey respondents were provided with this information via a web-link 
and those taking part in interviews were given this information verbally or by email 
when interviews were arranged. It was made explicit that participants had the right to 
withdraw from the research at any time, did not have to answer any questions they did 
not want to, and did not have to provide any reasons for these decisions (BSA Principle 
17). All interviewees were asked if they were comfortable for the interview to be audio 
recorded and were informed that recordings would be deleted on completion of the 
research (BSA Principle 18). Researchers have responsibility to ensure that participant 
wellbeing is not adversely affected by the research and to protect sensitivity and 
privacy (BSA Principle 13) – a principle closely linked to respect for confidentiality and 
anonymity (BSA Principle 34). All participants and the data provided/collected were 
protected by appropriate anonymising; participants were given pseudonyms and 
descriptions were general enough so that neither was identifiable from research 
outputs. All confidential information (survey responses, interview audio recordings and 
identifiers, interview transcripts) were stored in a password protected computer (BSA 
Principle 36; Kraut et al., 2004; Nosek et al., 2002); only the researcher knew the 
identities of survey respondents and those interviewed except where participants were 
recruited via chain referral but in these instances all discussion was kept confidential. 
In addition, all interview participants were given an information sheet in person or by 
email that detailed support services for problematic gambling should they wish to seek 
advice or support for their gambling. In order to reduce risk to researcher safety (BSA 
Principle 8) interviews conducted face-to-face were undertaken in public/semi-public 
places. The researcher informed a fellow colleague of the fieldwork, where it was to 
take place as well as start and estimated finish time. The researcher also carried a 
mobile phone and ‘checked in’ with this colleague at predetermined times to notify of 
fieldwork progress and when the fieldwork session concluded. 
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While research conducted online can draw on general ethical guidelines largely 
developed for offline use (Vehovar and Manfreda, 2008; Ess, 2002), the nature of 
online research requires some special consideration (Eynon et al., 2008). One example 
is informed consent. Where data collection involves direct, real-time, dialogue with a 
researcher it is relatively easy to check whether or not participants are fully informed 
(Eynon et al., 2008); in face-to-face interviews, for instance, participants can ask the 
researcher questions about the goals of the research, what is required of participation, 
how participant data will be stored and so forth and the researcher can check that the 
participant is fully informed on these and other relevant issues (Eynon et al., 2008:29; 
Anderson, 1998). In contrast, it may be more difficult for online survey respondents to 
clarify any questions and the researcher to check respondents are fully informed 
(Eynon et al., 2008). In an effort to minimise any misunderstanding and safeguard 
informed consent as much as possible, clear and concise information about the 
research was included on the survey webpage along with the researchers contact 
details should any respondents which to ask any questions/clarify any information. 
 
Analysis and presentation of data 
Discussion will shortly turn to how the data was analysed but the subject of analysis is 
first clarified. As no research techniques allow people, their biographies, and 
behaviours, to be ‘totally known’, analysis must draw instead on a collection of 
research artefacts constructed during the research process which represent each 
participant: the ‘case’ or ‘whole’ (Hollway and Jefferson, 2000:69). For this thesis each 
‘whole’ included all those sources relating to that particular participant: survey 
responses; interview artefacts including audio recordings and derived written sources 
(e.g. transcripts/quotes) as well as the interviews of others who mentioned that 
participant (applicable in cases where an interviewee knew another interviewee) in 
addition to the reflexive notes and memories of the interviewer. These data are not the 
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participant but are representative of the participant, their dynamic milieus, experiences, 
life-structure, beliefs and practices (Hollway and Jefferson, 2000). 
 
Data should be organised and managed in a logical way to aid interpretation and 
analysis (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996:26). While there are many approaches to 
qualitative data management and analysis the process usually involves assigning 
codes to particular segments/chunks of data according to categories that are 
predefined (deductive coding) and/or generated from the researcher’s engagement 
with the data (inductive coding) (see Coffey and Atkinson, 1996). The present research 
uses both deductive coding as based on the conceptual framework set out in chapter 
three as well as inductive coding to identify ‘themes’ and patterns that emerged from 
the data. Both approaches require the analyst to impose codes upon the data which 
represent conceptual and discursive links between the data and the researcher’s 
theoretical concepts (Seidel and Kelle, 1995:52). Data management in the present 
thesis drew less on ‘code and retrieve’ techniques and more on ‘referential’ coding, the 
former characterised by reductionism, fragmentation, and usually decontextualisation 
while the latter directs the analyst to data in situ, is grounded in holism, and 
emphasises context making it more in keeping with the methodological principles of 
qualitative research (see Coffey and Atkinson, 1996:27-30; Coffey et al., 1996; Kelle, 
2004). The analytical challenge is in focusing on aspects of individual cases that 
influence behaviour, control, and harm while appreciating that these aspects are better 
understood with relation to other aspects of the whole including the wider context in 
which the lives of individuals and their actions are embedded. 
 
The coding of data segments is a common starting point for analysis (Coffey and 
Atkinson, 1996:22-23). The researcher applies ‘factual’ codes (Kelle, 2004:455) to 
fragments of data (often passages of text) which are then assumed (or grouped) under 
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particular categories (see Coffey and Atkinson, 2000). This coding-by-fragmentation 
represents a bottom-up approach and is primarily focused on small parts of the text 
which become grouped together under categories or themes (Coffey and Atkinson, 
1996; Hollway and Jefferson, 2000). Analysis in this thesis took a more holistic, top 
down, approach beginning with the ‘whole’ in an effort to facilitate better understanding 
of aspects of the ‘whole’ fit together (Hollway and Jefferson, 2000). For each 
interviewee, a collection of documents were produced that included all materials 
related to them: survey data, interview transcript, and reflexive notes made by the 
interviewer. Codes, themes and notes were then annotated onto documents rather 
than being removed from documents and categorised. This approach was felt to be 
more consistent with the principles of this thesis which emphasise that behaviour is 
best understood in context. 
 
Data presentation: vignettes and contextual descriptions 
In the following chapter, a selection of vignettes (short case studies) are used to 
describe interviewee experiences and prelude later discussion (chapters six and 
seven) about how aspects of interviewees’ lives (including those of the conceptual 
framework; chapter three) influence their gambling behaviour and shifts thereof. The 
gives some context by providing background information about their lives, how aspects 
of their lives fit together, experiences, and, in particular, the sequentiality of happenings 
within biographies (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2014; Brewer, 2003). The presentation of 
narrative as the starting point for further written findings and discussion is not only 
consistent with the general principles of this thesis but with the approach to analysis 
starting with the ‘whole’ before examining features of the whole. 
 
In chapters six and seven, there is greater focus on how different aspects of 
interviewees lives influence their gambling behaviour and (greater/lesser) control. 
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However, though this doctoral thesis champions a holistic approach to inquiry, clear 
written, scientific communication of findings, necessary for transferability, requires that 
aspects be analysed and presented separately. As such there is tension between 
avoiding decontextualisation and with reporting findings in a useful and valuable way. 
Although this paradox cannot be completely resolved, it is ameliorated in chapters six 
and seven through signposting between findings and by presenting influential aspects 
with background descriptions from interviewees’ lives thereby providing context and 
reference to notable associations between aspects. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined and critiqued the research design and approach. The 
research questions and aims used to guide the thesis were presented and the 
underlying philosophical positions from which these are addressed explicated. In 
particular, a qualitative methodology and use of semi-structured interviewing have been 
justified as appropriate. Participants who fulfil one of three sets criteria were identified 
as potentially valuable sources of data that could be used to address the research 
questions and aims. These criteria form the ideal-typology which is used to guide 
recruitment and to frame data analyses: (i) experiencing addiction; (ii) regained control; 
(ii) never experienced addiction (see table 4.1). It was argued that though significant 
harm may, by in large, go with addiction this may not necessarily be the case and so 
experience of gambling-related harm, often captured through use of gambling screens, 
cannot be relied on to categorise participants into those ideal type groups. Instead, it 
was argued that asking individuals whether or not they have experienced significant 
difficulty of control and if their gambling has been problematic is a better strategy for 
uncovering experience of addiction and/or harm (at least for the purposes of this 
thesis). Strategies used to recruit interviewees who fit those ideal types were discussed 
and critiqued. The primary recruitment method was discussed; an online survey that 
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gathered (self-reported) information about gambling patterns and experiences as well 
as contact details so that those who indicated fit with the ideal-type criteria could be 
identified and invited to interview. Some interviewees were also recruited via chain 
referral. After discussion of adherence to ethical principles, the chapter concluded by 
setting out how the data is analysed and presented in the following chapters. With 
chapter five, the presentation of the findings commences. 
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Chapter five: introducing the interviewees, gambling patterns, 
and trajectories 
This chapter begins the presentation of findings and introduces the interviewees. It is 
split into two parts. Leading on from arguments in chapter four, part one begins by 
using interview data to illustrate that experience of harm is better identified (at least 
among the present interviewees) through simply asking whether or not interviewees 
feel their gambling has been problematic and/or contributed to harm rather than via a 
screening instrument. Then, again building on chapter four and illustrated using 
interview data, it is argued that the experiences of addiction and harm are best 
considered distinct and should not be used as proxy for one another because, despite 
addiction, the circumstances of some interviewee’s lives may impede harm. These 
discussions justify the decision, presented in chapter four, not to rely on gambling 
screens to identify experience of harm or addiction. Following this, part one closes with 
presentation of the demographic characteristics and gambling patterns of interviewees 
at time of interview. This serves to introduce the interviewees and provide a sense of 
who they are. 
 
Part two sets the scene for more detailed qualitative analyses presented in chapters six 
and seven. It examines how the gambling behaviours of interviewees changed over 
their lives and uses vignettes constructed from interviews to illustrate trajectories of 
gambling careers. These vignettes emphasise changes in gambling behaviour (or lack 
thereof) to be influenced by changes (or lack thereof) in the wider circumstances of 
interviewees lives. As will become clear, most interviewees suggested their gambling 
patterns to be variable and there was a trend toward reduced and increasingly 
constrained gambling over gambling careers (even among those who had never 
experienced addiction). 
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Part one: Introducing the interviewees 
This chapter introduces the 25 interviewees before the main analyses are presented in 
chapters six and seven. There were 206 survey respondents who completed the 
survey and fulfilled the survey eligibility criteria (see chapter four). This produced 99 
respondents who agreed to be contacted for interview and, of these, 19 were 
interviewed. The remaining six interviewees were recruited through chain referral, five 
through the researcher’s social network and the other through that of another survey-
recruited interviewee. Individuals were invited to interview on the basis that they 
indicated ‘fit’ with the ideal-type criteria (table 4.1) – respondents on the basis that their 
survey data and chain referrals on the basis of an informal discussion with the 
researcher.  
 
Use of survey data and rationale for including survey analysis as an appendix 
Analysis of the survey data is included in an appendix (Appendix D) rather than in the 
main thesis body. There are two main rationales for this. First and foremost, the 
research questions and aims of the thesis are best addressed through qualitative 
analysis of interview data rather than analysis of the quantitative data produced from 
survey responses (see chapter four). As such, if the survey analysis presented in 
Appendix D was included in the main body then it would have distracted from the ‘flow’ 
of the thesis with little benefit because that data did not address the research 
aims/questions. Secondly and more practically, there is a strict word limit imposed on 
the main body of thesis and had the survey analysis text presented in Appendix D been 
incorporated into the main text then this limit would have been exceeded. It would, 
perhaps, have been possible to edit-down the survey analysis but then it would have 
been less thorough (and poorer for it) or it would, on the other hand, have been 
possible to edit-down other parts of the thesis to make space for the survey analysis 
but this would have reduced text arguably more relevant to the research questions and 
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aims in order to include discussion less germane. It must be re-emphasised that the 
inclusion of the survey analysis in an appendix does not mean that the survey data was 
not valuable or not used to support the research. As noted in chapter four, survey data 
was used to recruit interviewees – it was not ignored. After the thesis has been 
completed it may be possible (given funding and other constraints) to publish the 
survey recruitment method and data, perhaps as a journal article, and/or to include the 
(anonymised) data in an open repository for others to analyse/make use of. 
 
Ethically, it was important that the survey data was made available alongside the thesis 
submission (rather than left out completely). The research methods and procedures of 
studies should be presented clearly and transparently not only so that reviewers and 
critics (as well as PhD examiners!) have information required to evaluate the research 
processes but as a matter of record and so that others taking lead from the research 
are able to develop on the recruitment methods in future work (Van den Eynden et al., 
2011). Moreover, the survey recruitment method consumed a reasonable amount of 
time and money –  alongside a great deal of the researcher’s (funded) time, there were 
other costs met by a research grant including survey hosting and advertising (all 
funded by a stipend and a research expenses budget; see ‘acknowledgements’). Given 
that the research has been ‘paid for’ and used valuable resources, it makes sense, 
particularly from a ‘return on investment’ viewpoint to enhance the research by 
presenting/sharing the survey data with the thesis (albeit as an appendix because it 
has a supporting function in this thesis) (Van den Eynden et al., 2011). A further point 
is that the survey analysis is produced from the responses of survey respondents who 
have offered their time/data without compensation – indeed it is possible (probable, 
even) that some respondents were motivated to complete the survey because they 
wanted to contribute directly to a study advertised as having potential to better 
understand gambling behaviour and support recovery for others. It is reasonable to 
argue, then, that as these respondents have provided their data, the researcher has an 
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obligation to make use of and share that data (as has been done in this study). 
Ethically, the present author is satisfied with the decision to include the survey analysis 
as an appendix. 
 
 
Addiction and harm: avoiding conflation 
Prior to introducing the interviewees, however, it is worth returning to the problem of 
measuring gambling-related harm objectively and of using harm as proxy for addiction 
(see chapter four). Though gambling screens are de rigueur for identifying experiences 
of gambling addiction and harm (McGowan et al., 2000; see chapter four), as will be 
illustrated, the screen used in the survey and at interview was suggested to be 
insufficient for the identification of addiction and harm among the present interviewees. 
As discussed in chapter four, when the methods and research instruments were 
designed it was assumed that (a) experience of harm is objectively identifiable as well 
as measurable and (b) that experience of significant gambling-related harm and 
gambling addiction (always) co-occur. Based on these assumptions, and consistent 
with existing gambling literature, the NORC DSM-IV Screen for Gambling Problems 
(NODS) was incorporated into both the survey script and interview schedule in an effort 
to classify individuals according to addiction status alongside more general questions 
about control and harm designed, specifically, for this study to check reliability (chapter 
four). Interviewees, however, suggested the situation to be far more complex. As will 
be demonstrated, not only did interviews indicate that the NODS could not, in itself, be 
relied upon to identify (subjective) experience of significant harm (or lack thereof), but 
that significant harm (whether subjectively reported by the interviewee or ‘objectively’ 
classified via NODS) could not be relied on to evidence addiction. 
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Consistency between self-reported experience of harm and ‘objectively’ 
identified harm 
Interviews suggested that identification of problem gambling (i.e. harm) through the 
NODS was not always consistent with self-reported experience of significant harm. 
Comparison between self-reported problem gambling and NODS-identified problem 
gambling is presented in table 5.1 and this shows that although those who reported 
their gambling to have been problematic tended to be captured by the NODS, the 
NODS failed to identify two additional interviewees who also reported their gambling to 
have been problematic. 
 
Table 5.1: NODS identification of problem gambling against whether or not 
interviewees felt their gambling to have been problematic 
NODS classification Self-reported problem gambling Total 
Experienced 
problem gambling 
Never experienced 
problem gambling 
Experienced 
problem gambling 
10 0 10 
Never experienced 
problem gambling 
2 13 15 
Total 12 13 25 
 
Had there been interviewees identified by the NODS as ‘problem gamblers’ who did not 
self-report problematic gambling then an obvious assumption may have been that 
these interviewees were being deceptive or ‘in denial’ about their gambling. The 
reverse, however, is a little harder to explain away. Further examination of these two 
cases indicated that their gambling behaviour was a significant contributor to their 
experience of harm, thereby problematising reliance on the NODS (and perhaps other 
quantitative diagnostic instruments) to identify experience of harm. Keith’s case, now 
discussed, exemplifies the issue well. 
Keith (regained control) scored two on the lifetime NODS (less than half the score 
needed to reach the NODS problem gambling threshold of five; see chapter four). 
However, he indicated that he felt his gambling to have been excessive and, although 
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reportedly not financially harmful, to have led to arguments with his wife, who 
disapproved of the time he was spending gambling, resulting in “sort of a shit 
relationship”. Some might argue that Keith’s gambling was not really problematic – 
perhaps, for example, his wife was overly scathing of his gambling patterns – but this 
would fail to appreciate that perception is fundamental to experience and that many 
harms are dependent on social context (see chapter two). His wife’s opinion of his 
gambling was certainly integral to Keith’s view of his gambling as problematic but in 
every conceivable scenario the experience of gambling-related harm involves that 
which is beyond gambling patterns to include cultural expectations such as the 
opinions of others (Wakefield, 1997; see chapter three). As such, this doctoral study 
draws on self-reported subjective experience of harm rather than the NODS thereby 
including all those who fulfilled the NODS criteria as well as the additional two 
interviewees who also reported experiencing gambling-related harm. This approach is 
consistent with the philosophical underpinnings of the present research which are 
grounded in experience and subjectivity (see chapters one-four). 
 
Addiction and experience of harm 
Although usually the case, interviews indicated that subjective reports of harm (problem 
gambling) did not always co-occur with significant difficulty of control (addiction). 
Though lifetime reports of addiction and problem gambling did co-occur (see table 5.2), 
when the ‘past three months’ timeframe was used there was disparity (see table 5.3). 
    
Table 5.2: Reports of addiction compared against reports of problem gambling 
(harm). Lifetime version.  
Reports of 
gambling problem 
(i.e. harm) 
Experience of addiction Total 
Experienced Never experienced 
Experienced 
problem  
12 0 12 
Never felt problem 0 13 13 
Total 12 13 25 
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Table 5.3: Reports addiction compared against reports of problem gambling 
(harm). Past three months version. 
Reports of 
gambling 
problem (i.e. 
harm) 
Experience of addiction Total 
Experiencing 
addiction 
Regained 
control 
Never experienced 
addiction 
Problem 
gambler 
1 0 0 1 
Ex-problem 
gambler 
2 9 0 11 
Never 
experienced 
problem 
0 0 13 13 
Total 3 9 13 25 
 
All interviewees who did not self-report having experienced problem gambling (harm) 
also did not report having experienced addiction. Most (n=9; 81.82%) of those who 
self-reported experience of problem gambling in their lives but not in the past three 
months, also reported having experienced addiction in their lives but not in the past 
three months. The two interviewees12  who bucked this trend suggested that while they 
were experiencing gambling addiction at time of interview their gambling had not 
contributed to harm within the past three months prior to interview. Though, at first, this 
seems contradictory – how can someone experience significant difficulty controlling 
their gambling and not experience significant harm alongside? – on closer inspection it 
seems that this inconsistency is resultant of particular life circumstances which impede 
(or protect against) experience of harm, even where that participant has significant 
difficulty controlling their gambling. Rosie (experiencing addiction), for example, 
indicated that life-structure and circumstance could protect against harm even when 
experiencing significant difficulty controlling her gambling. At the time of interview, 
Rosie lived with her mother and her only ‘essential’ living expense was rent for which 
she had implemented strategies for preventing harm such as paying rent by direct debit 
on payday before she could spend the money elsewhere (e.g. gambling). 
 
                                                          
12
 ‘Carl’ and ‘Rosie’ 
 172 
 
Interviewees 
Demographics 
Most interviewees were male: 21 (84%) compared with 4 (16%) female. All 
interviewees were classified as ‘White British’. Ages ranged from 20 to 54 years (range: 
34) with a median age of 28. The mean age was 31 (SD=9.52 years). In terms of 
employment status three interviewees were unemployed, one for many years, one for a 
matter of weeks, and one was on long-term sick leave. One interviewee was a full-time 
undergraduate student and 21 were employed full-time. Reported employment 
included: an account manager, a government officer, a paralegal, an administrator, a 
teaching assistant, a carpenter, engineers, retail and sales staff, bar work and a 
personal trainer. Two interviewees were serving in the Royal Navy and another 
previously in the army. There was wide variation in employed interviewees reported 
incomes: from £9,600 to £70,000 (range= £60,400), a median of £28,500 a mean of 
£29,600 (SD=£17,800). The hours typically worked per week ranged from 25 to 90 
(range=65) with a median of 41 and a mean of 46 (SD=14). Interviewees had a wide 
range of highest formal educational attainments: seven reported having GCSEs, six 
reported having undergraduate degrees one of whom began but did not finish PhD 
study, one had a postgraduate teaching qualification, six reported having A-levels, four 
reported having various vocational industry qualifications. Only one reported no formal 
qualifications. 
Over half (56%, n=14) of the 25 interviewees lived in Plymouth (UK) and the 
surrounding area at the time of interview and many of these had lived in the area for 
over a decade, some for their entire lives. Additionally, five interviewees lived in South 
Buckinghamshire where the researcher has links and were recruited there through the 
researcher’s network(s). One interviewee was a UK expatriate who had been living in 
Warsaw for 21 years, another lived elsewhere in South Devon, two interviewees lived 
in rural Cornwall, and the remaining two interviewees were based in Worcestershire 
and Bristol. Interviewees displayed a wide variety of living situations. Two lived alone, 
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five lived in shared accommodation (e.g. shared house/flat with friends), eight lived with 
partners and/or children, six reported having children, and seven reported living with 
parent(s), for the most part reflecting cultural expectations about age. 
 
Comparisons between ideal types 
Concern now turns to description of the demographic/social characteristics of 
interviewees by ideal-type (experiencing addiction, having regained control and never 
experienced addiction) is now provided. Given the limitations of the research design 
and of qualitative data (see chapter four), representativeness or generalisability is 
neither sought nor claimed; discussion only serves to introduce the interviewees.  
 
Age and gender 
Three participants were identified as experiencing addiction: Rosie, Sampson and Carl 
aged 20, 21 and 36 respectively (median=21 years). Of the nine who indicated having 
regained control all were male and the median age was higher at 31; the youngest was 
aged 20 and the oldest 40 aged (range=20 years). Of the 13 identified as having never 
experienced addiction three were female and 10 were male. The median age was 28, 
higher than those experiencing addiction but lower than the regained control group; the 
youngest was aged 23 and the oldest was aged 54 (range=31 years). 
 
Geography and living circumstances  
Two of those experiencing addiction, Rosie and Sampson, had lived in Plymouth for 
their whole lives while the other, Carl, lived in a rural coastal Devon town after growing 
up in Coventry. At the time of interview all lived with parent(s). Rosie had never lived 
away from her mother and Sampson never away from his parents/family home. Carl 
had lived with his then wife but since their divorce had moved back and forth between 
his parents and other accommodation. 
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Of the nine who had regained control, seven lived in Plymouth with one of these, 
Richard, an undergraduate student, returning to his family home in Wales outside of 
term-time. One lived in rural Cornwall and the other lived in a mid-sized town in south 
Buckinghamshire. Three had been domiciled for their entire lives in the area where 
they lived at the time of interview and some of the others had relocated hundreds of 
miles (but still within the UK) from where they had grown up. 
Of the 13 who indicated never having experienced addiction, five were living in 
Plymouth, four in south Buckinghamshire, one was a British ex-patriate living in Poland 
and the other three were living elsewhere in England.  
Among both those who had regained control and who had never experienced 
addiction, a wide range of living situations were reported including: house shares with 
friends as well as living with a partner and/or with children. While all those experiencing 
addiction were living with a parent at the time of interview, none of those who had 
regained control were doing so at the time of interview and four of those who had never 
experienced addiction were living with their parents. None of those experiencing 
addiction lived alone, only one of the regained control group was living alone and two 
of those who had never experienced addiction lived alone. 
 
Employment and income 
All those experiencing addiction were employed: Rosie had two part-time jobs, one as 
bar staff in a local pub and the other as a primary school teaching assistant; Sampson 
was undertaking a nautical electrical engineering apprenticeship; and Carl worked as a 
project manager in social care. Sampson reported an annual income of £9,600 working 
40 hours a week. Rosie did not report her income but worked a total of 58 hours a 
week. Carl reported an annual income of £37,500 working 37.5 hours a week. 
With regard to those who had regained control, all were employed or in full-time 
education with the exception of Jacob, who was unemployed, and Scott, who was on 
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long-term sick leave from secondary school teaching. The median number of hours 
worked was 45 and the median yearly income was £22,000.  
For those who had never experienced addiction, with the exception of Wallace who had 
been made redundant shortly before interview, all were employed. The median number 
of hours worked was 40 per week and the median yearly income was £28,500. 
 
Gambling frequency 
Interviewees exhibited a range of gambling patterns. Table 5.4 presents the gambling 
frequencies that were reported for each ideal-type. 
Table 5.4: Gambling frequency by ideal type 
 Ideal-type Total 
Gambling times per 
week 
Experiencing 
addiction 
Regained 
control 
Never 
experienced 
addiction 
<1* 1 2 1 4 
1   1 1 
2 1   1 
3  1 2 3 
4   1 1 
5   1 1 
6  1 1 2 
7  2 2 4 
8   1 1 
9     
10 or more 1 3 3 7 
Total 3 9 13 25 
*Of those who reported typically gambling less than once per week: one reported 
gambling once a month; another reported gambling once every three months; another 
reported long-term abstinence; and the other reported trying to be abstinent but 
typically only managing to do so for a few months at a time. 
 
 
Gambling activities and experience of control 
Members of all groups reported engaging in various gambling activities, both online 
and offline/over-the-counter, using various platforms (e.g. mobile/smartphone, tablet, 
PC/laptop, in person) and various types of bet. Activities included: betting on sports 
such as horseracing, football, and tennis; casinos activities such as roulette, blackjack 
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and poker; video roulette on FOBTs in betting shops; scratch-cards and National 
Lottery; and fruit-machines/slot machines. Types of bets regularly placed included: 
accumulator/parlay bets, ‘straight’ bets on single outcomes, and in-play betting. At the 
ideal-type group level it was not possible to identify particular gambling activities, 
mediums for placing bets, or types of wagering that differed between the three groups. 
Among those who had experienced addiction, none were found to have ever 
experienced difficulty controlling all of the gambling activities they engaged in but, 
rather, typically reported having experienced difficulties with one activity in particular. 
Moreover, the activities over which some had difficulty controlling their gambling and 
the activities over which the same individuals had control differed between participants 
– it was not possible to identify gambling activities that were particularly associated with 
difficulty of control. This can be exemplified through examination of members of the 
experiencing addiction group. Carl, for example, reported that he had gambled on 
many activities including the National Lottery draws, scratch cards, horseracing and 
“online any form of gambling you can think of” including poker and roulette but that he 
only found it difficult to control fruit-machine play. Similarly, Sampson reported placing 
football bets online numerous times a week without any difficulty of control but found it 
very difficult to control his roulette play, both offline in the casino and video roulette in 
the betting shop. Finally, Rosie reported buying occasional scratch-cards, and regularly 
playing roulette, blackjack and poker all in the casino and the latter in the pub too, as 
well as fruit-machines, however, she reported that she only found blackjack and fruit-
machine play difficult to control, the latter particularly so. Similar experiences were 
noted among those who had regained control: Richard, for example, had greater 
control over fruit-machine gambling but less so over online sports betting while Andy, in 
direct opposition, had little control over fruit machine gambling but experienced no 
difficulties with football betting. This suggests that, for the present sample, the activity 
per se has little influence of the extent to which it is controlled.  
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Part two: gambling careers and wider biographies 
Discussion now turns to introduce the gambling careers and trajectories of interviewees 
as situated within their wider biographies, thereby prefacing more thorough qualitative 
investigation in later chapters (chapters six and seven). Consistent with existing 
research (Reith and Dobbie, 2013), most interviewees suggested variable gambling 
patterns that were subject to change. It will become clear that, among the present 
sample (most of whom were recruited because they had regained control or had never 
experienced addiction despite periods of regular gambling), there was a trend for 
gambling behaviour to become increasing constrained over their gambling careers. 
 
The main task is to elucidate gambling pathways, characteristic of gambling careers 
(particularly those towards more constrained and better controlled gambling), and 
demonstrate that these are associated with (and supported by) wider shifts (or lack 
thereof) in the lives of participants. Within each ideal-type, subtypes of gambling 
trajectories are identified according to similarities/differences of gambling experience. 
Each subtype is illustrated with a single interview constructed vignette, used to 
demonstrate that shifts in gambling patterns (or lack thereof) concerted with wider 
changes in the lives of interviewees (or lack thereof). At this point in the thesis, the aim 
is not to provide in-depth analysis or discussion of how shifts in circumstances relate to 
shifts in gambling behaviour and greater/lesser control but merely to indicate that there 
appears to be association that is more closely examined in later chapters. 
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Trajectories: ideal-types and subtypes 
 
‘Regained control’ ideal-type 
Most (n=6) of those categorised as having regained control indicated their recoveries to 
involve abstinence from the particular gambling activity with which they had 
experienced addiction, while others (n=3) reported that they still continued to gamble 
on those activities but with reduced frequency, duration, financial expenditure, and, by 
definition, with greater control. Most of the regained control group suggested having 
sustained control in the long-term; of the nine members, six indicated having not 
experienced difficulty of control for over a year (including two who indicated not having 
experienced difficulty for at least 10 years despite continuing to gamble). The other 
three indicated having experienced addiction within 12 months prior to interview but, by 
condition of ideal-type criteria (table 4.1), not within three months prior. The stability of 
the recoveries of these three interviewees is less certain and there was indication that 
the recovery of least one of these was quite precarious (Jacob). 
As will be indicated in this section and discussed in greater depth in proceeding 
chapters, recovery was implicated to be (best) supported by wider, non-gambling 
related, changes in interviewees’ lives (e.g. shifting cultural expectations, social 
relationships, life-structure, and engagements; see chapter seven). For the most part, 
changes to gambling patterns did not appear to result from the individual purposefully 
and directly implementing changes to their gambling but, rather, were result of 
unintended consequences of non-gambling change in their wider lives. 
 
Regained control subtypes  
All members of the regained control group recovered without formal intervention. Two 
broad natural recovery pathways were identified: (1) more rapid recovery supported by 
more drastic life changes evocative of the recoveries of the Vietnam veterans (see 
chapter two; Robins, 1973; Zinberg, 1984); and (2) more gradual recovery that seemed 
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to be supported by slower, subtle and more incremental life changes in keeping with 
‘maturing out’ (Winick, 1962; 1964; see chapter two). Literature has suggested it 
possible for some to experience multiple recoveries from gambling difficulties (Reith 
and Dobbie, 2013) and, consistent with this, one interviewee (Tom) indicated 
experiencing recovery best characterised by the former (subtype one recovery), 
sustaining control for a few years, experiencing another period of addiction, and then 
recovery better characterised by the latter (subtype two recovery). 
 
Subtype one: Rapid recovery supported by drastic life changes   
Four recoveries were suggested to be strongly supported by drastic changes in social 
circumstances such as: the death of a parent (Jacob); changing employment, moving 
home, and break up of a romantic relationship (Roger); moving to a new home 
hundreds of miles away to start a new life (Tom); and leaving university to return home 
for the summer before returning to new living circumstances (Richard). In these cases, 
circumstantial change disrupted and led to changes in social relationships, routines, 
life-structures engagements which appeared to impact on gambling patterns in 
constraining ways. Figure 5.1 illustrates how drastic life changes encouraged recovery. 
Interestingly, it appeared that although many had struggled to constrain their gambling 
before those drastic changes in their lives, with these life-changes positive shifts in 
gambling behaviour were almost consequential and tended to occur without the 
individual putting much effort into trying to modify their gambling.   
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Figure 5.1 Vignette: drastic life changes and rapid recovery (regained control 
subtype one) 
 
 
 
 
‘Roger’ 
15 years prior to interview, Roger decided to split from his girlfriend. He moved out of the 
house they both shared and owned (subject to mortgage) and resigned from employment 
as a computer engineer at a company his (ex) girlfriend’s father owned. Roger quickly 
found new employment and met his wife with whom he established a family. At time of 
interview he was living with his wife and their two teenage children. 
Experience of gambling addiction 
Further back, when Roger joined his (then) girlfriend’s father’s company as a computer 
engineer, he began socialising with colleagues after work at a casino. Soon into the 2-3 
year period during which he worked at the company, it became routine for Roger to 
gamble with work colleagues every day after work. With work colleagues, he would often 
eat in the casino restaurant before they spent the evening playing roulette and blackjack. 
Over the course of “around 2 years” his casino gambling led to considerable debt. With 
both money borrowed for gambling – including cashing bad cheques in the casino, 
running up an authorised overdraft, and taking out loans to cover these debts – as well as 
substantial interest incurred on that credit, Roger amassed a total debt of “around 
£30,000”*. At the time of interview, roughly 15 years later, Roger reported that he was still 
paying off this debt to his mother as his parents had paid his creditors after he stopped 
gambling. Over the 2 year period in which he amassed this debt, his interview suggested 
that he had tried, on numerous occasions, to constrain his gambling but was 
unsuccessful.   
Recovery 
Roger’s interview suggested that resignation from work discouraged him from visiting the 
casino and he stopped gambling. Roger reported that he “didn’t step foot in the casino […] 
for easily ten years” and, at the time of interview, visits the casino around 3 times a year 
with his wife mainly to watch entertainment provided by the casino. On these occasions 
he reports that he and his wife often gamble but it is very controlled and “he’d be lucky” if 
on such occasions his wife allows him “£20 to play with”. At the time of interview, Roger 
reported that his gambling was not problematic and he has not felt compulsion to gamble 
since he met his wife. 
*Interview suggested that although his debt was around £30,000, Roger borrowed £4,000 
– thus most of his debt was financial interest. 
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Subtype two: gradual recoveries supported by slower and more incremental life 
changes 
The recoveries of most interviewees, however, did not appear to have resulted from 
drastic life changes but, rather, appeared encouraged by more subtle and incremental 
non-gambling related life changes often consistent with the social and cultural 
processes that underlie ‘maturing out’ (see chapters two and seven). These included 
shifts in cultural expectations about self-comportment and a propensity for social 
relationships to become less gambling orientated, both of which went with alterations in 
self-identity that occurred over the life-course, and all of which tended to have 
constraining influence over gambling. The vignette in figure 5.2 illustrates the case of 
Tom who experienced a drastic recovery (subtype one) followed by a more gradual 
recovery (subtype two). It is the latter which is emphasised.  
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‘Tom’* 
Background 
Tom, aged 39 at the time of interview, is employed as an engineer and has lived in 
Plymouth for over 10 years after growing up near Liverpool. For the 10 years preceding 
interview Tom has lived with his wife, stepdaughter, and occasionally his daughter when 
she comes to stay. 
Gambling experience 
At the time of interview, Tom estimated routinely gambling £20-£30 a week and tending to 
confine his gambling to the weekend. This gambling tended to take the form of one or two 
parlay/accumulator football bets totalling £5 or £10 each and placed once or twice a week 
in the betting shop; the occasional £1 on a greyhound race if there happens to be one on 
when he is in the shop when placing his football bets; some online roulette play (usually 
totalling £10) if he works overtime on a Friday and he is not very busy at work; and typically 
once every couple of months visiting the casino, with friends, playing roulette and/or 
blackjack. Tom’s interview indicated that he has not found these patterns of gambling 
problematic or difficult to control. He has, however, experienced addiction with fruit-
machine gambling but not at the time of interview. 
Tom reported experiencing gambling from an early age, recalling playing ‘pitch and toss’ at 
school and later, aged 15 or 16, gambling in arcades regularly. Some of his school friends’ 
parents owned greyhounds and he reported that he often attended greyhound races a 
couple of days a week after school, betting 50ps on races. Aged around 18 he reported 
starting to bet regularly in betting shops with friends. 
Soon after, he “really got into” fruit-machines and, after experiencing a period of what he 
perceives to have been problematic and addictive patterns of fruit-machine gambling, Tom 
moved to Plymouth where his fruit-machine gambling “just fizzled out”. Tom indicated that 
despite having experienced difficulty controlling fruit-machine gambling, after moving to 
Plymouth he abstained from gambling for “maybe a year or two” without putting effort into 
constraining his gambling: “I just didn’t bother [gambling]”. Tom indicated that his 
geographical move “changed a lot of things, gambling being one of them”. There was a 
sense that Tom’s geographical move disrupted many aspects of his life, not just that 
gambling related, and that he experienced a drastic change in his life which supported a 
recovery from fruit-machine addiction.  
Addiction and recovery via ‘maturing out’ 
Tom’s interview suggested that he later experienced another period of problematic 
gambling, addiction. and subsequent recovery. Tom noted that while the move from 
Liverpool to Plymouth “got me out of the stupid fruit-machine” gambling for at least 2 years 
he later returned to fruit-machine gambling for a short period and indicated that he, again, 
found this difficult to control. Tom’s experience of recovery from fruit-machine gambling 
after he had moved to Plymouth provided a strong sense that changes in his life, as he has 
aged, have constrained his fruit-machine gambling. In terms of accessibility, his interview 
suggested that he has come to visit places/spaces with fruit-machines (e.g. pubs) much 
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Figure 5.2 Vignette: slower recovery supported by subtle and slower life 
changes (regained control subtype two) 
 
  
less as he has aged and if he does it tends more to be with his family who, he reported, 
he would not gamble on the fruit-machine in front of:  
“If I’m in the pub or whatever with the family I wouldn’t go and play on the fruit-
machine not because I wouldn’t want them to see me gambling but because I 
wouldn’t want them sitting there in the corner on their own. I’m there with them 
and I’m not going to walk away from them just to put money in the machine”.   
Moreover, Tom reasoned that he had “totally slowed down and reduced” his gambling 
in general because “I’ve got more responsibilities now” including “family, mortgage 
[and] work commitments”. He contrasted these circumstances to those which 
characterised his life when his gambling was more excessive, reporting that then he 
was a “young single lad”, “had no responsibilities, lived at home with my parents […] 
and there was nothing to hold me back […] I could do what I want, I wasn’t too fussed 
about work because jobs were ‘two-a-penny’ back then. Just did what you wanted”. 
*Tom experienced two recoveries from gambling addiction. His first fitted the drastic 
change and rapid recovery subtype while his second recovery seemed to be much 
slower and fitted with the processes of maturing out. Though both recoveries are 
discussed in the vignette, it is primarily used to illustrate the subtype of more subtle and 
slower change consistent with ‘maturing out’. 
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‘Never experienced addiction’ ideal-type 
Interviewees who had never experienced addiction also indicated regulation of their 
gambling behaviour to be supported by non-gambling aspects of their lives. In keeping 
with regained control members, influential aspects included cultural expectations, 
social relationships, and life-structures (see chapter seven). 
 
‘Never experienced addiction’ subtypes 
Two broad experiential subtypes were identified: (1) long-term reductions of gambling 
indicated to be supported by wider, non-gambling, related changes in individuals’ lives 
and which seemed to constrain/suppress gambling behaviour; and (2) long-term 
consistency of gambling patterns which were indicated to be supported by stability (i.e. 
relative lack of change) in individuals’ wider lives. 
 
Subtype one: gradual reductions in gambling patterns 
Some interviewees who reported never experiencing addiction suggested that in the 
years prior to interview their gambling patterns had, in general, declined and that these 
reductions were supported by gradual, non-gambling changes in their lives. Though 
some suggested that they had purposefully sought to reduce their gambling because of 
changes to their lives (e.g. meeting a new partner or buying a house), others indicated 
that reductions in gambling were not product of decisions to change their gambling 
behaviour but that wider changes in their lives/milieu had an indirect and often 
unintended consequence of constraining gambling-related practices. An example of 
this subtype is provided by the account constructed from Steven’s interview (figure 
5.3). 
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‘Steven’ 
Background 
Steven, aged 27 at interview, was an engineer in the Royal Navy who had lived in 
Plymouth for his whole life. He reported dividing his time between ‘off-shore’ (at sea) with 
work (sometimes for months at a time), ‘shore-side’ in Plymouth where he would 
sometimes stay in navy accommodation, and in the home he owns with his fiancée. 
Gambling experience 
Steven reported being introduced to various card games by family members and played 
from a young age. Aged 16, he regularly played Euchre for a local pub league. His parents 
taught him to play poker and for much of his teens up until the time of interview he 
reported poker gambling regularly, both with friends at private ‘poker nights’ at home and 
in more formal casino tournaments. While Steven reported some experience with other 
gambling forms including fruit-machines, scratch cards, and casino blackjack, it was 
(offline) poker that had been the most constant and regular activity he had engaged in. 
Aged 18 onwards, he and friends visited casinos on evenings out to socialise and play 
blackjack. However, Steven reported such visits to have become increasingly rare in 
recent years. Steven reported that while there have, in the past, been occasions when, on 
reflection, he had spent more gambling on nights out than he would have liked to, he 
believes that he has never experienced periods of gambling that have been addictive, 
problematic, or harmful. 
Reduction in gambling  
At interview, Steven indicated a general trend towards more reduced gambling in recent 
years. He suggested this decline to have been supported by the reducing casino 
attendance of his friends and because his social network has become increasingly 
characterised by a greater proportion of people who do not gamble regularly. Steven also 
reported that since meeting his fiancée, a few years prior to interview, his gambling has 
reduced substantially. In particular, over the prior 12 months he reported that his poker 
gambling had “really curtailed off” – he had “played about 4 times in the 6 months prior” 
which contrasted greatly to when he used to play “3 or 4 times a month” further in the past.  
When asked about why he feels that his gambling patterns have reduced recently, Steven 
reported: 
“I think it’s since buying the house for me, I think buying the house I know that I 
can’t afford to piss it all up. We’re getting married in February, […] and that means 
more to me than gambling ever would. So perhaps it’s just a case of I know that I’d 
be letting my other half down, and myself, if I blew it all up the shit due to going to 
the casino she’d have my nuts on the chopping board” 
Steven went on: 
“I work away every other night and I couldn’t justify in my head saying to the missus 
‘right I’m going to disappear tonight’. You know, I’m home tonight and I won’t be 
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Figure 5.3 Vignette: gradual reduction in gambling patterns (never experienced 
addiction subtype one) 
 
Subtype two: long-term stability of gambling patterns 
Others indicated relative stability of gambling over the long-term but that over the short-
term their gambling fluctuated depending on non-gambling practices, commitments, 
and accessibility of gambling events (e.g. some reported placing sports bets regularly 
only during the English football/soccer season during which the fieldwork was 
undertaken). Interviews suggested that both these short-term fluctuations and long-
term stability of gambling patterns were supported by short-term variability and long-
term consistency of living circumstances. An example of this subtype is provided by the 
account constructed from Kate’s interview (figure 5.4). 
home tomorrow night so if I was to nip out the casino tonight and play poker and 
not come back till 2 am when she is already in bed so perhaps that’s another 
reason why I’ve slowed down a little bit. Socially I don’t think that’s acceptable to 
me and my other half. I know she wouldn’t mind if I did it every now and again but 
at the same time I don’t really want to test that water too hard” 
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Figure 5.4 Vignette: long-term stability of gambling patterns (never experienced 
addiction subtype two) 
 
‘Experiencing addiction’ ideal-type 
With only three interviewees indicating experience of addiction at time of interview, 
identification of defining themes and patterns was challenging. Nonetheless, the 
experiences of one interviewee, in particular, Carl, appeared distinctive. In contrast with 
other members of the group, Carl had participated in formal treatment, reported a far 
‘Kate’ 
Background  
Kate, aged 54 at interview, has lived in Plymouth for over 30 years. She has two sons, one 
of whom she lives with, is divorced and was single at the time of interview. Kate is 
employed full-time as an events planner for a large business. She plays online poker 
regularly. 
Gambling experience 
Kate reported growing up around some gambling; her father used to place weekly small 
stake horse racing bets such as “10p each-way” bets on a Saturday and she reported 
attending Epsom Derby once a year with her family. Other than online poker, Kate 
reported little gambling participation; she used to play the National Lottery regularly but 
stopped and had on a few occasions attended bingo with friends.  
Discovering online poker through interactive television 4 years prior to interview, Kate 
reported poker gambling quite regularly ever since. While growing up she reported having 
regularly played card games with her family and suggested that this knowledge allowed 
her to learn poker with ease. While Kate’s interview indicated her patterns of poker 
gambling to have been relatively stable over the few years prior to interview, she also 
indicated that the regularity of her poker gambling was heavily influenced by other 
happenings in her life. In the summer, for example, Kate reported tending to play much 
less poker because she then enjoys being outside in the garden and going walking. With 
the interview conducted in summer she reported that she had not gambled for 4 days, 
however, in winter, Kate reported tending to play poker every evening. There was a strong 
sense that Kate’s patterns of play were restricted by everyday living practices such as 
spending time with her sons and household chores:  
“My children will come first before gambling, even now when they’re 27 and 24. 
Bills have to be paid and it’s not a question of ‘oh I’m not going to pay that bill this 
month’ because I want to gamble more; It’s never even come up. […] It’s just how 
I’ve played for 4 years – all my bills are paid, there’s food in the cupboard. I go to 
work, I come home and nothing changes. It’s just instead of sitting in front of the 
telly, I’ll have a game of poker – That’s how I see it” 
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longer gambling career (the entirety of which he indicated difficulty of control), and 
exhibited a strong sense of embarrassment and stigma conspicuously absent from 
others in the group. A vignette constructed from Carl’s interview is presented in figure 
5.5. 
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‘Carl’ 
Background 
Carl, aged 36 at time of interview, worked full-time and lived in a coastal town in South-
West England. At the time of interview, he had been lodging with his parents for 
approximately 2 years and, prior to this, had lived with his (now) ex-wife and their baby 
daughter. Carl was the only interviewee to have participated in formal treatment and 
considered himself a fruit-machine “addict” despite having been abstinent for an 
unspecified number of months (possibly years) prior to interview. 
Gambling patterns and experience of addiction 
Until his teens, Carl reported little experience of gambling. No other family members of his 
have regularly gambled or had experienced difficulties. While Carl stated having 
participated in numerous non-fruit machine gambling activities, he had never done so 
regularly and never found any activity other than fruit machines to be problematic. 
When Carl began working full-time aged 18, he reported that he started gambling on fruit-
machines and that this quickly became “every spare minute of every day, every time I had 
a bit of money, and I did that until when I was 30”. Whilst it is unlikely that Carl was 
attempting to deceive, it is important not to take that statement literally. Carl was able to 
move out of home aged 18, almost certainly paying various living costs alongside his 
gambling and he was able to maintain a relationship with his girlfriend who later became 
his wife. So while it does appear that during periods of gambling difficulties Carl spent a lot 
of time and money gambling, it is very unlikely to have been “every spare minute” or all his 
money. 
Carl indicated that his patterns of fruit-machine gambling had fluctuated over the years 
and that he had often achieved periods of abstinence followed by returns to heavier and 
less controlled patterns of gambling. He reported having spent more money gambling than 
he could afford, often gambling with credit, and so had incurred significant debt. At 
interview, Carl reported that he had recently organised debt repayments incurred through 
gambling and was paying over £1000 a month towards this. He revealed that there had 
been times, about ten years prior to interview, when he felt that he “didn’t have anything to 
live for” and had come very close to committing suicide on a couple of occasions. He 
reasoned that his gambling difficulties had contributed to this way of thinking. 
At the time of interview he reported that he was abstinent from fruit-machines and 
suggested that he had been so for many months prior to interview. Nonetheless, Carl was 
adamant that, despite abstinence, he was still “an addict”, constantly finding it difficult to 
control compulsions to gamble: 
“[…] I may not be physically gambling but it certainly consumes my brain […] It’s 
still a problem for me. That’s the one thing I need to make clear, it’s still a massive 
problem for me” 
  Contextual influences 
Carl suggested that his patterns of fruit-machine gambling had not been stable or constant 
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Figure 5.5 Vignette: experiencing addiction and engagement in formal 
treatment (subtype one) 
but highly variable over his gambling career. There was a strong sense that this 
variability had been influenced by changes to non-gambling aspects of his life such as 
changes to employment and living circumstances (e.g. when he moved out of his 
parents’ home, got married, became a father, got divorced, and moved back in with his 
parents). 
An example of the influence of context on his gambling life is provided by his work life. 
Carl indicated that depending on his weekday work duties, his employment practices 
and routines had, at times, discouraged, and at other times facilitated compulsive 
gambling thoughts and gambling practices. In the past, for example, he reported having 
worked shift patterns that meant having time off during ‘normal’ work hours when most 
others are working. With little to occupy him during his time off as well as knowing that 
he would be relatively unlikely to be seen gambling, he reported feeling greater 
temptation to gamble and less discouraged. More recently he began to follow more 
‘normal’ working hours and indicated that this discouraged gambling because he was 
less able to gamble without being seen by those that know him. However, at the time of 
interview, Carl reported that he had recently been promoted to a management position 
and this had reduced various gambling constraints by increasing the flexibility of his 
working hours and involving travel away from home which, he felt, had increased 
temptation to gamble. 
Experience of treatment 
Carl was the only interviewee to have participated in formal treatment for gambling 
addiction, including: hypnosis, various forms of counselling, gamblers anonymous as 
well as a 6-month residential treatment programme. Consistent with existing research 
(Reith and Dobbie, 2012:518), there was a strong sense that this may have led Carl to 
(re)frame his self and experiences in terms of addiction-as-disease and 12-step 
philosophy, continuing to perceive himself as an addict despite abstinence. 
Stigma and embarrassment 
Also unique among interviewees was the extent to which Carl reported experience of 
stigma and embarrassment related to gambling practices and to his self as a perceived 
gambling addict. Carl reported relying quite heavily on others – friends, family, and the 
pub landlord – to prevent him from fruit-machine gambling and stated that others 
knowing about his addiction led to embarrassment:  
“It’s embarrassing because virtually everyone in my life knows about my 
gambling. And as soon as they seem me going anywhere or doing anything – or 
whatever it could be anything, they start questioning me […] and I find that very 
difficult when people start questioning me and start looking at me and it’s quite 
soul destroying”.  
Similarly, when Carl revealed that his parent’s managed his finances to help constrain 
his gambling he remarked that it was “child’s stuff, embarrassing really, but it keeps me 
safe”. 
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Despite abstinence, Carl continued to perceive himself as “addicted” because, he 
reasoned, he regularly continued to feel compulsion to gamble. As noted in Carl’s 
vignette, there was some sense that participation in formal treatment may have led him 
to embody addiction-as-disease philosophy, contributing to his self-perception as an 
abstinent addict. Also noted in Carl’s vignette was a strong sense that control over his 
gambling was supported by his circumstances and life-structure – sometimes in the 
direction of constraint and sometimes not. In contrast, Sampson’s experience of 
gambling addiction resonated strongly with the other member of the group, Rosie. 
Aged 21 and 20, respectively, both indicated having had a relatively short regular 
gambling career, beginning at aged 18, but for most of which they had indicated 
experiencing significant difficulty of control. The living costs of both were heavily 
subsidised by their parent(s) and although Rosie worked a total of 50 hours a week in 
two part-time jobs, she reported paying her mother quite a small proportion of her 
income as rent. Sampson reported that while he had paid some rent to his parents in 
the past, by agreement he no longer did so. Both indicated similar experiences 
whereby they had begun gambling regularly with friends, but had quite quickly come to 
experience difficulty of control. The fact that gambling was a central activity in their 
friendships and socialising routines, in particular, seemed to encourage gambling and 
discourage constraint. 
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Figure 5.6 Vignette: experiencing addiction and no engagement in formal treatment 
(subtype two) 
‘Sampson’ 
Sampson was aged 21 at interview and employed as an apprentice engineer. He had 
always lived in Plymouth with his mother, father, and sister. He did not know of anyone 
else in his family who has ever gambled regularly or experienced difficulties. 
Gambling experience 
At the time of interview, Sampson reported regularly placing football bets (both online and 
in betting shop) and frequently gambling on offline casino roulette as well as video roulette 
in the betting shop. He stated buying an occasional scratch card but asserted that it was 
only roulette (both video and casino/offline) that he had found difficult to control. The 
interview was conducted on a Friday afternoon and Sampson reported that he had lost 
£90 on video roulette earlier that day. While Sampson stated regularly gambling on online 
soccer, estimating that he placed between three and eight parlay/accumulator £2 bets per 
week, tending to spend around £10 per week, he reported this to be “quite well controlled” 
and not problematic.  
Sampson first started visiting the casino aged 18 with friends and quickly began playing 
roulette regularly. At the time of interview, he reported when in the casino tending not to 
play any non-roulette activities and that although he feels that his roulette gambling has 
been problematic and difficult to control for some time prior to interview, it has been 
particularly so within the past year. 
Context/circumstances 
Sampson reported that all of his close friends regularly gamble in the casino, online and at 
the betting shop. His girlfriend, however, does not gamble and would prefer him not to do 
so either; while in the past she had accompanied him to the casino and betting shop, she 
has come to do so less often. Sampson reported that he frequently gambles behind his 
girlfriend’s back and sometimes lies to her about his gambling. 
When Sampson first started gambling he indicated that he would always visit the casino 
and betting shop with others rather than alone. However, at the time of interview, though 
he reported still tending to visit the casino and betting shop with others, sometimes he 
does visit alone (he estimated 25% of the time alone). With regard to casino, gambling he 
also reported that there are times when he continues to gamble after his friends have left 
the casino but on many occasions others will stay with him until early hours after entering 
the casino in the early evening. 
Sampson stated having three friends who also partake in regular visits to the casino and 
betting shop, indicating that gambling (and related practices) had, at the time of interview, 
become “quite a sociable thing”. He felt that one of these friends also finds it difficult to 
control their gambling (not interviewed). Sampson described much of his roulette gambling 
as quite spontaneous and reported that if visiting town he will often pop into the betting 
shop and play video roulette. On work days he asserted his gambling to be far more 
constrained, not gambling during work hours, but, after work, sometimes meeting friends 
at the betting shop.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of the interviewees, their demographic 
characteristics, and gambling patterns. Vignettes have been presented to illustrate 
trajectories of gambling careers and indicate that gambling behaviour is strongly 
concomitant with (and as will be argued in chapter seven, supported by) wider aspects 
and circumstances of their lives. Shifts in these aspects/circumstances have been 
implicated to concert with changes in gambling behaviour while, on the other hand, 
consistency of these aspects/circumstances has been suggested to go with stability of 
gambling behaviour. More specifically, among the present interviewees (most of who 
were recruited because they exhibited greater control over gambling behaviour), such 
shifts were indicated to encourage positive changes in gambling behaviour. Closer 
examination of the influence of the wider, non-gambling, aspects and circumstances in 
which interviewees are embedded is the focus of chapter seven. First, chapter six, 
consistent with Zinberg (1984), focuses on the aspects of lives/milieu which are more 
directly related to gambling, the immediate (gambling) context and short-term 
behaviour. 
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Chapter six: Gambling-related influences on gambling 
behaviour 
The thesis now turns to more in-depth qualitative analyses of interview data. The focus 
of this chapter is on aspects of lives directly related to gambling while the focus of 
chapter seven is on wider, non-gambling, related aspects of lives which were 
suggested to influence gambling behaviour, control, and harm. Consistent with the 
structure-agency theoretical underpinnings of the thesis (including rejection of 
structural determinism; see chapter one), particular consideration is given to how 
aspects influence decisionmaking via impact on the conditions in which gambling-
related decisions are made. Drawing on the conceptual framework (see chapter three), 
the chapter begins with discussion of gambling-related practices and strategies 
suggested to influence gambling behaviour. The chief focus is on practices more 
conducive to constraint and ameliorating of harm but there is also discussion of 
practices which were revealed to be less constraining and riskier in terms of harm. The 
chapter then moves to examine the influence of aspects related to mindset and 
subjectivity/disposition on gambling behaviour. Drawing on the conceptual framework, 
again, there are sections devoted to gambling-related rules and conscious beliefs (i.e. 
understandings about luck and probability). References to cultural expectations and 
some conscious beliefs are made throughout the chapter because it often made for 
better clarity and readability to discuss these alongside other aspects (particularly 
practices) with which they resonate. As the chapter closes, discussion turns to consider 
how interviewees approached gambling and risk and, accordingly, two forms of habitus 
are deduced: a prudential habitus defined by a more cautious, more constrained and 
less risky approach to gambling and a prodigal habitus defined by a less constrained 
and more excessive approach. 
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Part one: practices 
 
Constraining practices 
Interviewees indicated enacting various practices to constrain their gambling and 
mitigate related harm. Consistent with existing research (Moore et al., 2012; Thomas et 
al., 2010), very common were practices aimed at better managing and reducing 
spending during gambling sessions. 
 
Holding back and not (re)gambling winnings 
Several interviewees reported that when gambling they would refrain from (re)gambling 
winnings. Some who reported gambling with casino chips offline (most commonly 
blackjack or roulette) stated that if they won and received higher value casino chips 
they would hold these back before cashing them in at the end of the gambling session 
– a strategy that seemed to constrain losses (Dzik, 2006). Tom (regained control) 
reported that on rare visits to the casino (typically once every two months at time of 
interview) he puts any chips won to one side, out of sight. 
“I give it to the wife so she’ll put it in her pocket or whatever. Or I’ll put it in my 
pocket myself or give it to a mate to put away. [...] I’m not aware of how much 
they’re holding just ‘that it’s a £25 chip, put it away’. Once I’ve lost the other 
chips on the table I’ll go and cash the black chips in” 
Tom, regained control 
 
In Tom’s case there was suggestion that the practice coincided with the bringing of his 
gambling under control as he reported not having practiced it when he was 
experiencing addiction. Roger (regained control) also reported holding back higher 
value casino chips, and although he explained that he tended to do so at the time he 
had significant difficulty controlling his gambling, there was a sense that the practice 
constrained his gambling and spending, reducing financial harm. 
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“If I was having a particularly good run and I won a stack of chips [...] [the 
croupier] may have given me one £25 token. That £25 or £10 token, whatever it 
was, would always go in my pocket and it would never get put back on the 
table. Even if I had £100 cash in my pocket, the cash would get spent and the 
tokens would stay in my pocket until the end of the night and then they would 
get changed up” 
Roger, regained control 
 
So although Roger followed the practice when experiencing difficulties, it did appear to 
support gambling less problematic than it might have otherwise been. Nonetheless, 
Roger disclosed that having since regained control and reduced his gambling 
significantly he no longer engages in the practice. Having decreased the sizes of his 
wagers he reported that he is “very unlikely to win […] anything significant”, preventing 
the winning of higher-value chips. The interviews of Tom and Roger suggest that the 
holding back high value chips as a harm-reduction strategy might be double-edged. 
The practice may, on the one hand, constrain financial losses but at the same time it 
requires the gambling of higher value wagers and/or on riskier odds. As such it is 
unlikely to be a valuable strategy for those who engage in more modest, less risky 
gambling and, in fact, might actually increase harm for such individuals as they would 
need to engage in financially riskier patterns of gambling to make use of it. 
 
Bankroll management strategies 
Common among poker gambling participants were bankroll management strategies – 
the setting aside of an amount of money, the ‘bankroll’, exclusively for gambling and 
the limiting of wager sizes to a maximum proportion of that bankroll (Nazarewicz, 2012; 
Recher and Griffiths, 2012). In the event of a win, the value of that win tends to be 
added to the bankroll so that the actual maximum amount of money that can be 
wagered increases but, on the other hand, in the event of a loss the actual maximum 
wager is decreased (Nazarewicz, 2012; Recher and Griffiths, 2012). The maximum 
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proportion of the bankroll that may be wagered remains constant (Nazarewicz, 2012; 
Recher and Griffiths, 2012). Although the proportion of the bankroll that may be 
wagered may differ depending on the specifics of the particular strategy and, 
sometimes, the type of poker tournament played, one participant, Scott (regained 
control), recommended that a poker gambler should always have 100 maximum ‘buy-
ins’ (or ‘stakes’ depending on the type of poker game) in their bankroll: 
“So say you’re paying $5 tournaments you should have $500 in your account 
and then if it goes below that then you drop down to $3 and so on”  
Scott, regained control 
 
Some poker gambling interviewees suggested that their poker skills and adherence to 
bankroll management strategies had led their poker to become self-financing and 
allowed them to continue poker gambling, long-term, without having to add additional 
funds to their online poker accounts. As Scott (regained control) continued:  
“I deposited just over two years ago and made a couple of small withdrawals 
from it and never had to redeposit and I’ve got probably 5 or 6 times what I put 
on in the first place still available to me on the [web]site so it’s not making me a 
huge amount of money but it’s a hobby that finances itself”. 
Scott, regained control, emphasis added 
 
Some literature has suggested that poker gamblers who experience financial harms 
are less likely to use a bankroll management strategy (Griffiths et al., 2010). Avoidance 
of financial loss, even profitability, however, does not necessarily preclude experience 
of harm. Gambling-related harm can also stem from (excessive) time spent gambling 
and, as such, existing research has suggested that some experience of poker-related 
harm despite profitability (Griffiths et al., 2010; Wood et al., 2007). In preventing the 
poker gambler from ‘going bust’ (Recher and Griffiths, 2012:17), bankroll management 
strategies may actually increase harms stemming from time spent gambling because 
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the individual can keep poker gambling for much longer than would be the case if they 
no longer had money needed to gamble. Exemplifying this argument is the case of 
Scott (regained control) who suggested that even when he was experiencing difficulty 
controlling his gambling he continued to follow a bankroll management strategy. Scott 
reported that his gambling had not been problematic because of poker losses (indeed 
he stated his poker to be financially profitable) but because of the time he spent 
gambling which, he suggested, negatively affected his health, eating, and sleeping as 
well as his relationships with others, in particular with his girlfriend. Of course, it could 
be argued that financial losses might be more harmful than excessive time spent 
gambling and if, for a given individual, this is the case then bankroll management 
strategies may reduce overall harm. 
 
‘Grinding’ 
Like some other poker gamblers, Josh (never experienced addiction), who reported 
poker as his only gambling activity, stated following a bankroll management strategy 
and that his poker had become self-financing. He referred to his “style” of poker 
gambling as “grinding” – a strategy of wagering small stakes in an effort to slowly 
amass or ‘grind out’ profit through repetitive, low-risk play as per ‘the daily grind’ 
(Radburn and Horsley, 2011). Any wins and losses are likely to be smaller than those 
who play more ‘aggressive’, higher stakes and riskier poker (Radburn and Horsley, 
2011). Although grinding may not, necessarily, involve bankroll management – 
individuals, perhaps, choosing only to gamble what they consider to be small wagers 
regardless of a bankroll – Josh reported that the maximum stake he was prepared to 
place in a poker game was 5% of his $500 bankroll ($25) but that it was sometimes 
less and he tended to wager 1-2¢ or 5-10¢ per poker hand. Scott’s (regained control) 
poker strategy also reflected the grinding ethos: 
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“I try and take the less risk and take small pots, regular small pots, instead of 
flipping bigger pots. I’d rather accumulate chips over a long period of time rather 
than take big risks and win a big pot or bust” 
Scott, regained control 
 
Wagering small stakes is likely to impede financial harm, particularly when used in 
conjunction with bankroll management, but, as with bankroll strategies, grinding is 
unlikely to mitigate harms that may arise from time spent gambling. In fact, it is quite 
possible that grinding could increase time-related harm because of its reliance on slow, 
repetitive and drawn out patterns of gambling. 
 
Limiting money spent gambling by limiting (online) deposits 
Most gambling, even among poker players, is, of course, not self-financing and over 
time individuals almost always ‘lose’ financially (i.e. it costs them money) (Walker, 
1992). Gambling literature reports that some gamblers set a maximum budget that can 
be spent gambling over a specified timeframe (Hing et al., 2015c). Kate (never 
experienced addiction), for example, stated limiting the money she deposited into her 
online poker account to £25 a month thereby not only limiting financial cost but 
reducing the time she spent gambling. Kate reported that if she had “dropped” (lost) 
£25 in the present month poker gambling then she will cease playing until the following 
month. 
 
It is commonplace for online gambling providers to provide their customers with options 
to set deposit limits on their gambling accounts (Nelson et al., 2008). Keith (regained 
control), for example, reported that when he was finding it difficult to control his 
gambling he prearranged limits with various gambling providers with whom he had a 
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gambling account13. However, he reported that having multiple accounts allowed him 
frequently to chase losses and spend more gambling than he would have preferred. 
Although in Keith’s case, prearranged limits seemed to fail because he would 
frequently reach those limits and gamble elsewhere, such limits may have had some 
usefulness for him, impeding further gambling and/or prompting reflection that might 
have discouraged decisions to gamble further. Further research is needed to evaluate 
the effectiveness of prearranged gambling limits in reducing harm. 
 
Bankroll management style practices among non-poker players 
While reports of bankroll management style strategies were uncommon among non-
poker gamblers, there were some who indicated practices loosely evocative of the 
ethos. Martin, who reported predominantly betting shop horse race gambling, stated 
that he: 
“[...] might increase my bets slightly say if I’m having a good day to fivers a race 
and that but if I have a few losers I’ll go back to £2” 
Martin, never experienced addiction 
 
Although reminiscent of bankroll management, Martin’s practice was much less 
sophisticated, less exacting and in all likelihood less effective at constraining spending 
than stricter poker bankroll management strategies as with no set bankroll figure, for 
example, there can be no proportional maximum wager. That is not to say it is 
ineffective in constraining losses. Following such a strategy does provide rough 
spending limits and contrasts with ‘chasing’ practices that will be discussed later (e.g. 
the ‘martingale’ strategy). 
 
Restricting access to money: constructing obstacles to future gambling 
Many participants reported enacting strategies aimed at restricting access to their own 
money in order to reduce money spent gambling. 
                                                          
13
 At time of interview Keith had closed down all but one of his online gambling accounts. 
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Carrying limited money 
A relatively common strategy, particularly among those who reported having 
experienced difficulty constraining their gambling, was to carry a limited amount of 
cash. Andy (regained control), for example, disclosed that in an effort to manage his 
spending on fruit-machines in pubs having reduced the amount of money he carries on 
evenings out. Andy indicated that the lack of an ATM (automated teller machine) in or 
near the pub that he frequents impedes access to additional money and so constrains 
his gambling. Indeed, scant research indicates that greater access to ATMs in 
gambling venues leads to increased gambling expenditure, particularly for those who 
gamble problematically (McMillen et al., 2004), and that removal of ATMs leads to 
reduced gambling expenditure both among those experiencing difficulties and those 
who are not (Thomas et al., 2013). 
 
Leaving bankcards at home or elsewhere 
As well as carrying limited money, some interviewees, particularly those who had 
experienced difficulty of control, reported leaving bankcards at home (Reith and 
Dobbie, 2013) or in their car.  Stuart (regained control), for example, revealed that at 
the time when he was finding control difficult: 
“I would never take my bankcard out with me. That was just to reduce the risk 
and the temptation” 
Though this practice was not always as effective as Stuart wished because: 
“[...] there was always so many times when I would spend the whole lot, I’d run 
home to get my card and go back chasing my money”. 
Stuart, regained control 
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Giving funds to others to look after or manage 
Some interviewees, and again particularly those who reported some difficulty of control 
over their gambling, asserted temporarily giving money or bankcards to others for 
safekeeping to help constrain gambling. When asked if there was anything he did to 
limit his gambling, Sampson stated: 
“Yeah before we go out I say to my friends don’t give [lend] me any money […] 
If I’ve got my bankcard I give it to them and [say] ‘don’t give me my bankcard’ 
[...] so that I can’t spend any more money […]” 
However, Sampson went on to indicate that this practice was not always particularly 
effective: 
“[…] but most of the time they give it [bankcard] back to me anyway” 
 Sampson, experiencing addiction 
 
Some interviewees relied on practical support from family to manage their money and 
thus impede their gambling as well as reduce harm. Carl (experiencing addiction), for 
example, reported that at the time of interview he had given his parents responsibility 
for managing his money and that they would give him a weekly allowance from this 
(Anderson et al., 2009). Similarly, Jacob (regained control) reported that, in the past 
when he had found it difficult to control his gambling, his mother had taken control of 
his money and would then feed him money as required. Jacob reported that he was 
happy with this arrangement as it kept his gambling “sensible” but that after his mother 
died he found it extremely difficult to manage his money and constrain his gambling. As 
such, while it is reasonable to suggest that relying on others to constrain money spent 
gambling may be useful for those experiencing addiction, such constraints may 
eventually be removed leaving those who find control difficult at greater risk of 
gambling-related harm. 
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Effectiveness of constructing obstacles to future gambling 
At first, it may seem that those strategies, just described, aimed at constructing 
obstacles to future gambling (i.e. carrying limited money; leaving bankcards elsewhere; 
and temporarily giving money to others to look after) were ineffective because they 
were often surmounted. However, though these strategies were often less effective 
than the interviewee wished, interviews suggested that they still reduced gambling and, 
often, encouraged more positive decisionmaking.  Although Rosie, for example, 
reported “normally” going back to her car to get her bankcard before returning to the 
casino to continue gambling, she did not always do so. Similarly, though Sampson 
revealed leaving his bankcard(s) in his car and that he would often leave the casino to 
get these cards with the intention of going back to continue gambling, he disclosed that 
the process of returning to his car provided time for reflection and that, sometimes, he 
would change his mind: “[...] half the time when you’re coming back [with the bankcard] 
you think ‘no, I better not’” before reporting that he then may not gamble further. 
Sampson also indicated that while on other occasions he might give his bankcard to a 
friend, also at the casino, who would tend to give it back if he asked for it, the practice 
may provide an extra barrier to further gambling as Sampson reported not always 
asking for his bankcard back, describing it as a “hassle” to do so. 
 
The effectiveness of such strategies is undoubtedly influenced by the qualities of the 
social/physical setting. Had it been more difficult for Stuart to return home, he may 
have been even less likely to return to the casino with additional money; had 
Sampson’s friends refused to return his bankcard he may have been unable to gamble 
further; and had Rosie parked further away from the casino, she may have been less 
likely to leave and return to the casino with more money. Though interviews indicated 
those with greater difficulty often relied quite heavily on strategies aimed at hindering 
gambling (and reducing financial harm), such practices did not entirely replace but 
supported control. All of the strategies just mentioned require interviewees to use their 
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agency to restructure their (future) gambling environments (e.g. restricting immediate 
access to funds) in an effort to hinder future gambling. 
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Taking breaks 
Interviewees suggested taking breaks from gambling to constrain gambling behaviour. 
Though it may appear commonsense that breaking constrains gambling – after all, by 
definition, during breaks the individual is not gambling – closer examination of data 
uncovers further detail about why breaks are undertaken and how it supports more 
positive decisionmaking about gambling behaviour. 
 
Taking breaks within gambling sessions 
Some interviewees reported taking breaks within gambling sessions, slowing down the 
pace of their gambling. Scott (regained control), for example, reported that when he 
used to smoke tobacco and was at a casino he would go outside for a cigarette or if he 
was at home playing poker he would get up and go to the window or outside to smoke. 
In these cases, smoking provided a break from gambling. After having given up 
smoking, he reported that when taking a break from online poker gambling he would 
watch television or do some household chores. Scott emphasised a belief that the 
taking of breaks is important when gambling, particularly during poker: 
 “[…] there’s always something you can do to take some time out and I think 
that’s important – especially with poker where if you get knocked out sometimes 
you need to take a break and sort your mind-set out whether its 5 minutes or 
sometimes it’s better just to turn it off for the night. [...] You need to do that to 
reset your Brain otherwise it’s a slippery slope from [pause] your mind-set goes 
the wrong way and then that doesn’t help” 
Scott, regained control 
The taking of breaks was suggested to be directly influenced by the immediate physical 
and social conditions of the gambling environment. Depending on casino policy, 
drinking was implicated to encourage gambling breaks. For example, at time of data 
collection there were two main casinos in Plymouth; in ‘Casino A’ drinks were not 
permitted at gaming tables and gamblers who wanted to drink must do so at the bar or 
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in other designated areas, while in the other casino, ‘Casino B’, drinks were permitted 
at gaming tables as long as gamblers use trolley tables and do not place drinks on the 
gaming tables. Furthermore, Casino B allowed gamblers to order drinks via waiting 
staff who then serve drinks at the gaming tables while Casino A did not provide this 
service. It is likely that Casino A’s policy of not allowing drinks at gambling tables slows 
down gambling as gamblers who want a drink must leave the gaming area to do so. 
Ross (never experienced addiction) reported that because he regularly frequented 
Casino B, rather than A, where “drinks are brought to you at the table […] the majority 
of the time [he will be] sat at the tables” and indicated that this led to fewer breaks. 
 
Taking breaks between gambling sessions 
Some interviewees, all of who were either members of the never experienced addiction 
or regained control groups, talked about a need to take time off between gambling 
sessions. This was particularly the case among poker playing interviewees who tended 
to suggest that taking days off from gambling could be beneficial to improving their 
poker gambling/strategy by helping them to make better, soberer, decisions. The 
purposeful taking of breaks between sessions was not, however, uncommon among 
non-poker gamblers. Maya (never experienced addiction), for example, reported that if 
she “loses a lot” then she “will take a break from betting for a few days” while, Evan 
(never experienced addiction) recommended that: 
“[…] as soon as you feel you’re on a losing streak maybe it is time to give it a 
break for a couple of days and come back on the weekend” 
Evan, never experienced addiction 
 
Though the excerpts above suggest breaks to be performed with intent to support more 
positive gambling decisions, interviews indicated breaks far more often to be non-
purposive and consequence of engagement in other commitments (though this was not 
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stated explicitly). As will be discussed further in chapter seven, data suggested that 
having life-structures which included non-gambling obligations appeared to constrain 
gambling. In meeting commitments to non-gambling-related obligations, resources (e.g. 
time/money) are directed away from gambling, constraining and breaking up gambling 
sessions. This results in time away from gambling and, for some, may provide space to 
reflect on gambling practices leading to more ‘positive’ decisionmaking. The chapter 
now turns to explore practices less conducive to constraint. 
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Practices less constraining 
Interviews also revealed some gambling practices to be less conducive to constraint 
and riskier in terms of harm. Although, as will become clear, members of the never 
experienced addiction and regained control groups indicated that such actions were not 
confined to periods of lesser control, the interviews of participants experiencing 
addiction at time of interview and the reports of those who had regained control 
concerning past experiences suggested that practices less conducive to control were, 
unsurprisingly, more common and enacted to a far greater magnitude during such 
periods. 
 
Chasing losses 
Chasing losses (or ‘chasing’) refers to attempts to recover past gambling losses 
through further gambling and often involves placing progressively larger bets and/or 
choosing to gamble with riskier odds so that any win yields larger return(s) needed to 
quickly recover losses (Dickerson, 1984:133; Walker, 1992:86; O’Connor and 
Dickerson, 2003:360; Lesieur, 1977:360). Literature has, however, noted distinction 
between the chasing of losses between gambling sessions (e.g. returning another day 
to recoup losses) and chasing losses within sessions (O’Connor and Dickerson, 
2003:360) and while both types of chasing may not be conducive to constraint and may 
increase risk of harm, it has been argued that it is chasing losses between sessions 
that is much more likely to be associated with addiction and harm (O’Connor and 
Dickerson, 2003). In fact, Lesieur (1977) purported that it was the ‘long-term chase’ 
that distinguished ‘compulsive’ from non-compulsive gamblers while O’Connor and 
Dickerson (2003) argued that chasing within sessions to be quite common and usually 
unproblematic. In short, it has been argued that, while not indicative of constraint (e.g. 
financial losses), discrete and infrequent instances of excessive and less constrained 
gambling are not necessarily indicative of addiction. 
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It was common for interviewees to indicate chasing losses both within and between 
sessions during periods of addiction. Sampson (experiencing addiction) described his 
gambling as: 
“[…] just endless. Just plugging money in places trying to like to seep back 
[recover] money that I’ve lost […] when you are losing a lot of money to draw 
more money out to try and get back and then when you are so far down you just 
keep going trying to get your money back” 
Sampson, experiencing addiction 
 
Chasing losses: increasing size of bets and gambling on riskier odds 
In contrast to strategies of bankroll management (i.e. where wagers are reduced in 
response to losses), some interviewees reported increasing the size of their wagers 
and/or, less commonly, wagering on riskier odds in an attempt to quickly recoup or 
‘chase’ losses within sessions. Members of the regained control and experiencing 
addiction groups suggested such practices to be particularly prevalent during periods of 
lesser control. Tom (regained control) illustrated these forms of chasing with reference 
to another gambler known to him: 
“I know one lad who, he’s quite ‘wedged up’ [has/carries a lot of money], he 
might [bet] £100 on a football game and if he loses it he might look at the next 
football game and go ‘well if those odds mean that I put £200 on and I win then 
I win that £100 back’. So he’ll end up £300 in debt or level” 
 Tom, regained control 
 
Some interviewees reported ‘doubling-up’ wagers in order to recover losses – a 
strategy that one participant, Felix (never experienced addiction) who was scathing of 
the practice, referred to as the ‘martingale strategy’ whereby if a player losses a wager 
they will continually double their wager on each subsequent bet so that any win 
recoups previous losses in addition to that wager (see Walker, 1992:86; O’Connor and 
Dickerson, 2003:361). Felix explained that following this strategy with an initial £10 
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wager would mean that 8 or 9 losses in succession would result in having to stake, and 
potentially lose, thousands of pounds. While, theoretically, losses may eventually be 
recouped, the strategy soon becomes unsustainable because the gambler very quickly 
runs out of money to gamble with or is forced to wager money that they do not have 
(i.e. credit) and so may incur debt. Performing ‘doubling-up’ strategies, then, is likely to 
increase risk of harm resulting from financial loss. Most participants who reported 
‘doubling-up’ did so while playing roulette on odds that were close to even (e.g. 
red/black; odds/evens) but, as usually the case, with odds in favour of the gambling 
provider (house edge; Dzik, 2006). While doubling up strategies were asserted to be 
most common during periods of lesser control, some (though relatively few) of those 
who had not experienced difficulties also reported doubling up in the pursuit of past 
losses. Maya (never experienced addiction), for example, reported occasionally 
‘doubling-up’ wagers after a loss on roulette, however, she would only do so up to the 
value of £10 and cautioned against “getting sucked into the idea that you can win your 
money back”. There were no reports of the martingale strategy being deployed over 
numerous gambling sessions (i.e. chasing between sessions) and this may well be 
because, as noted, the strategy becomes unsustainable very quickly.    
 
Chasing losses: ‘in-running’ betting 
Some interviewees indicated chasing losses through ‘in-running’ gambling. Also known 
and marketed as ‘in-play’ or ‘live’ betting, in-running bets are most often placed on 
sporting events and are almost always placed over the internet (Gambling 
Commission, 2009; Parke and Griffiths, 2007; Griffiths and Auer, 2013). The hallmark 
of in-running betting is wagering after that event has started and as it progresses, 
allowing the gambler to place numerous and, possibly, contradictory bets as the event 
unfolds (Parke and Griffiths, 2007; Gambling Commission, 2009). In spite of very little 
existing research, commentators have expressed concern that in-running gambling 
circumvents various structural constraints inherent in more ‘traditional’ sports betting 
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(e.g. inability to chase losses within an event) that act to constrain gambling 
opportunities and so may lead to heavier and more problematic gambling (Parke and 
Griffiths, 2007; Griffiths and Auer, 2013). It is not claimed here that in-running gambling 
necessarily encourages heavier gambling, problematic gambling, or gambling addiction 
(although Griffiths and Auer (2013) do go as far as to purport that it does) but it is fair to 
say that in-running gambling removes structural constraints that might otherwise 
constrain gambling. 
 
Two interviewees reported engaging in in-running gambling, Maya (never experienced 
addiction) and Keith (regained control). Each reported only doing so on football/soccer 
matches, indicated that they had done so when chasing losses, and stated that they 
tended, in addition, to bet on the event before it started. Maya reported that after 
placing soccer bets she may place some in-running bets while following the match: 
“[…] depending on how those are going, I’ll do the in-play bets. If they [original 
bet(s), placed before the event begins] don’t look like they are going to win then 
I’ll do in-play bets to try to win more. If I’m going to lose I’ll place in play bets to 
counter the fact that I’m going to lose” 
 Maya, never experienced addiction 
 
Similarly, Keith reported that he had engaged in a comparable practice when his 
gambling was more excessive, problematic and when he was experiencing difficulty of 
control.  
“[…] say now for example, if I lost a bet […] let’s say last night, the ‘Man United’ 
game; say I had van Persie [football player] to score the first [goal]. I used to go 
onto one of my other accounts and put it on again [van Persie to score next] 
and if he didn’t I’d go on another account and do the exact same thing again” 
Keith, regained control 
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Chasing losses, reflection, and promotion of poor decisionmaking 
Although engaging in chasing practices are fundamentally practices of lesser 
constraint, a common theme in interviewees with those who had experienced lesser 
control was that losing money led to circumstances which impaired ‘better’ 
decisionmaking and encouraged decisions to gamble further thereby leading to an 
escalation of financial harm. Reflecting on past experiences, Andy (regained control), 
for example, asserted: 
“I put a tenner in [to the fruit-machine] and just think ‘oh that’ll do, it’s a tenner’ 
but the thing is as soon as you lose it you think [pause] the next thing I’m about 
£40 or £50 down and I’m chasing now big time and all I’m trying to do then is 
get my money back […] It’s called the red mist” 
Andy, regained control, emphasis added 
 
Similarly reflecting back on past experience, Brian (regained control) revealed how 
making incremental decisions can lead to a situation which discourages desistance:  
“With gambling if you walk in there and say you’re going to come out twenty 
pounds worse off, well you think that I can’t afford to lose twenty quid. But you 
are never losing twenty-quid in a single decision. Each decision is a quid, 
maybe. So being £13 down makes no difference at all but that extra quid – I 
might win back a tenner and that does make a difference. Being £14 instead of 
£15 is fine, virtually the same thing. And you keep doing that in small 
increments and suddenly you’ve lost money that you can’t afford” 
Brain, regained control 
 
Implicit in the excerpts above is the negative influence that reflection on previous 
losses can have for some gamblers. Indeed, as will now be discussed, the practice of 
recording gambling expenditure can promote chasing practices and thus increase risk 
of harm for some. 
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Keeping track of expenditure and promotion of loss chasing 
Although problematic gamblers are often advised to keep records of their gambling 
expenditure and patterns to discourage gambling and reduce harm (e.g. Aquarius, 
2014), some interviewees who had experienced difficulty controlling their gambling 
indicated that this could contribute to poorer decisionmaking.  
 
Richard (regained control), for example, reported that at the time of addiction he would 
keep a short-term record of his wins/losses (covering a few days) but, rather than 
reflecting on losses and constraining his gambling, he treated gambling losses as a 
“score” – a target figure to recoup through gambling. Richard reported that the more 
money he lost gambling, the more he increased his wagers because, he reasoned, he 
needed any potential wins to be larger to recoup increasing losses. Similarly, Sampson 
(experiencing addiction) reported that he kept a rough figure in mind of how much he 
had lost gambling and treated this as a figure to recoup through further gambling. As 
Sampson reported:  
“[…] it’s only a figure of the last time [...] because all the little wins in between I 
don’t really count because I know I’ve done nothing useful with that money [...] 
this week I’ve won more than I lost but I’ve just taken no notice of that cos I’m 
not feeling the benefit of any extra money at all [...] the only way it’s going to fix 
it is if I win a few hundred pounds so [that] I have got a big chunk of money to 
go put somewhere like, pay something off if you know what I mean rather than 
just having the odd [pause] like even having £100 I wouldn’t go and put that 
£100 away [in bank]” 
Sampson, experiencing addiction 
These excerpts suggest that, at least for some, keeping track of losses may not 
support decisions to constrain gambling as might be assumed.  Indeed, quite surprising 
was that those with greater control tended not to report reflecting on losses (though, of 
course, this may not mean that they did not). 
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Cultural expectations about chasing losses 
Along with reporting whether or not they engaged in loss chasing, some interviewees 
revealed beliefs and opinions about those practices. In general, there was widespread 
disdain for chasing losses between sessions. Kate (never experienced addiction), for 
example, reported: 
“I often wonder at how these people become embroiled in gambling to the 
extent that they don’t care – they’d spend money to try to win money back that 
they’ve lost and I think ‘you’re on the road to nowhere’“ 
 
Kate, never experienced addiction 
 
Indeed, even interviewees who indicated experience of addiction and engaged in 
between-session chasing were scathing of it. Sampson (experiencing addiction), for 
example, revealed that while he did not think that gamblers should chase losses 
between sessions, he frequently did so. When questioned further, Sampson reasoned 
that because he had lost money gambling, wanted to recoup it, and perceived little 
other way of doing so quickly, further gambling was a sort of ‘necessary evil’ required 
to regain losses. With regard to chasing losses within sessions, cultural expectations 
were more mixed.  Some reported chasing practices to be unacceptable. Tom 
(regained control), for example, asserted such practices were indicative of problematic 
gambling:  
“I think you’ve got an issue once you start chasing things” 
Tom, regained control 
 
Others, however, indicated that chasing within sessions was permissible within limits. 
Maya (never experienced addiction), for example, reported occasionally ‘doubling-up’ 
wagers after roulette losses but stipulated that only being prepared to do so up to the 
value of £10 and cautioned against “getting sucked into the idea that you can win your 
money back”. 
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Gambling practices reflection 
Before this chapter turns to examine the gambling-related mindset, subjectivities, and 
dispositions of interviewees, it is worth discussing further some notable points relating 
to gambling practices.  
Although some practices were identified as intrinsically riskier or less risky in terms 
harm (e.g. the placing of smaller wagers is less risky in terms of financial harm than 
placing larger ones), interviews also emphasised that practices could influence 
gambling behaviour by contributing to future circumstances in ways which encourage 
decisions to engage in gambling practices which are less/more risky in terms or harm. 
The practice of leaving bankcards outside of the gambling setting, for example, was 
suggested by interviewees to help support later decisions not to engage in loss chasing 
while, on the other hand, some indicated that that keeping track of losses could 
encourage decisions to chase losses thereby increasing risk of harm.  
Secondly, although data indicated numerous gambling practices that, when enacted, 
often constrained gambling and supported control, it appeared that those with greater 
control relied little on these to regulate their gambling. As will now be explained, this 
suggests that while such practices may still be useful, better managed gambling may 
be little attributable to the enactment of such practices. Indeed, such strategies were 
least often reported by interviewees who had never experienced addiction indicating 
that many regulate their gambling without recourse gambling practices. Whilst, on the 
one hand, this might be unsurprising as without experience of difficulties, gamblers 
may have little need or motivation to impose constraints, on the other hand, this seems 
to conflict with existing substance-focused research which has suggested the nature of 
consumption-related practices to be a prime factor in degree of control over drug use 
(Zinberg, 1984; Decorte, 2001). Reports of those constraining practices described 
earlier were far more common among members of the regained control group. 
Nevertheless, (re)instatement of control for these interviewees, however, seemed little 
attributable to such practices because these interviewees tended to assert that they 
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had engaged in the same constraining strategies during periods of addiction and that 
they continued to do so after achieving greater lasting control. This, too, conflicts with 
the existing literature (Zinberg, 1984; Decorte, 2001) in the way just mentioned. Indeed, 
as will become clearer in chapter seven, greater/lesser control as well as shifts thereof 
(e.g. recovery) appeared to be far more influenced by qualities of subjectivities and the 
wider circumstances of interviewees lives than by the nature of gambling practices. 
To be clear, while in terms of addiction and recovery those practices identified as 
constraining appeared to have little impact, this is not to say that those strategies were 
not valuable in limiting gambling within sessions and so reducing harm. Indeed, 
constraining practices were implicated to have value both during periods of addiction 
and during periods of greater control. Though interviewees suggested regularly 
spending far more money than they wished during periods of addiction, it was not 
uncommon for members of both the never experienced addiction and regained control 
groups to assert often spending more money gambling than they later wished they had 
at time of interview14 (albeit, perhaps, to a lesser extent) and to indicate that 
constraining practices helped safeguard against this.  
 
  
                                                          
14 Spending more money in a gambling session than, on reflection, someone wished they had is 
not necessary indicative of significant loss of control (i.e. addiction). This is comparable to 
someone who does not drink addictively but might, on occasion, consume more alcohol on an 
evening than they come to wish they had when they wake up the next day. 
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Part two: Gambling-related mindset, subjectivities, and dispositions 
The chapter now turns explore aspects related to mind-set and subjectivity including 
rules about gambling, (conscious) beliefs and (mis)understandings about probability 
and luck, before turning to consider how interviewees approached risk and the 
gambling wager. As will become clear, some interviewees appeared to possess a more 
‘prodigal’ habitus more associated with difficulties and others a more ‘prudential’ 
habitus which seemed less so. 
 
Rules about gambling 
Interviewees revealed numerous rules about gambling. Constraints on this doctoral 
thesis do not allow for discussion of all these rules and so what follows, instead, is a 
general discussion with focus on which ideal-types reported them and whether or not 
any association between greater or lesser control was suggested. Nonetheless, rules 
are paraphrased and presented in Appendix E for the interested reader. 
 
Members of the never experienced addiction group tended to report relatively few and 
quite uniform rules. Particularly common was the oft-repeated maxim ‘don’t gamble [or 
spend] more than you can afford to lose’15 along with other rules about spending limits. 
Members of the regained control group, in contrast, tended to report a greater diversity 
of rules which were more nuanced and framed within their past personal experiences 
of difficulties. This is likely because, having experienced difficulties in the past, 
members of the regained control group developed rules based on those difficulties. 
Roger (regained control), for example, ruled to never gamble with credit because he 
had done so in the past and incurred significant debt. To give another example, Scott, 
who suggested that excessive time spent poker gambling had, in the past, negatively 
                                                          
15
 Though widely reported, there was a sense that this phrase had little meaning for 
interviewees or that they had ever really considered the sentiment. 
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affected his health and led to arguments and conflict with loved ones, stated, “it’s 
[gambling/poker] not your life, it’s a little part of it” alluding to the importance he later 
came to place on non-gambling aspects of his life. 
 
Interviews with members of the experiencing addiction and regained control groups 
indicated that, during periods of addiction, interviewees often tried to implement 
prohibitive rules that were routinely violated. When asked what advice he might give to 
others who were experiencing difficulty of control, for example, Sampson (experiencing 
addiction) retorted “don’t do it! [gamble]”, a sentiment echoed by the other two 
experiencing addiction at time of interview. With regard to spending limits, to give 
further examples, while most of those with greater control tended to report that they 
occasionally spent more gambling than they had originally planned, those who found it 
difficult to control their gambling tended to report regularly spending far more than they 
had planned (if they had planned to gamble at all). Rosie (experiencing addiction), for 
example, indicated that at the time of interview she had a rule to spend £3 each 
session on a pub fruit-machine but that she usually spent much more. Brian (regained 
control) reported that he tried to implement many gambling rules when he was 
experiencing addiction, but that he frequently contravened them: 
“Back in the past [when gambling problematically] there would have been lots of 
rules and all of them broken. You set the rules to protect yourself but if you’ve 
got a problem then you’ll always break the rules, I think” 
Brian (regained control) 
 
Rules reportedly held by members of the regained control group at time of interview 
tended not to be prohibitive but still constraining. This is unsurprising as there was an 
emphasis on recruiting those who were actively/regularly gambling – if individuals who 
had regained control through abstinence were recruited then more prohibitive rules 
may have been reported.  
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There was little indication that rules were particularly effective in governing gambling 
behaviour. The finding that members of the never experienced addiction group 
reported few rules yet managed their gambling well and that those experiencing 
difficulty of control routinely contravened their rules suggests that gambling behaviour 
tends not to be regulated through obedience to rules. Indeed, the repeated failures of 
those experiencing difficulties to regulate their gambling by recourse of rules suggest 
rules to be relatively poor at managing behaviour (at least among those with difficulty of 
control). These findings resonate strongly with Bourdieu (1987b) who argued that 
behaviour is not product of regulation to rules but develops through an integrated 
model whereby, outside of agents’ awareness and reflection, past experiences come to 
shape their ways of thinking (habitus) thereby motivating particular courses of future 
behaviour (see chapter one). 
 
Moreover, failure to report a rule does not mean that an interviewee contravened the 
sentiment as exemplified by the rule, reported by Roger (regained control), not to 
gamble with credit. Though members of the never experienced addiction group did not 
report this rule, there was no indication that any of that group had acted on the 
contrary. Rather than (consciously) holding and reflecting on a rule to prevent 
interviewees from doing so, gambling with credit was, it is reasonable to suggest, just 
something that they would not do (or, perhaps, even think to do). Interpreted through 
Bourdieu (1987b), such a course of action may lay outside of a given individual’s 
expectations for self-conduct – outside their habitus and their practice sense (see 
chapter one) – so that it is not even considered as a potential course of action. Brian 
(regained control) who, as recently discussed, reporting contravening many previously 
held rules about gambling when he was experiencing difficulties gives credence to 
these ideas, indicating that his more controlled gambling was not regulated by recourse 
of rules at time of interview: 
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“I don’t think I have any rules really [...] There’s not a cast-iron rule. There’s no 
set rule about going to the bookies, I just don’t” 
Brian, regained control (emphasis added) 
 
Beliefs: (mis)understandings about probability and ‘luck’ 
Some existing gambling research (Joukhador, 2004; Ohtsuka and Chan, 2010) has 
focused on the influence of erroneous beliefs about probability and ‘luck’ on 
problematic gambling, discussion now turns to explore how the reports of interviewees 
resonate with that literature. Members of all ideal-types indicated erroneous 
understandings about probability and gambling. Interviewees who referred to ‘luck’ did 
so to mean the experience of favourable outcomes which may not easily have 
occurred, and/or were unlikely to happen, and where the gambler has little or no control 
over those outcomes (Pritchard and Smith, 2004; Levy, 2012; Gunther, 2009). Beyond 
this, participants referred to ‘luck’ with reference to superstition and/or probability. 
 
Superstitious luck (belief in the existence of a supernatural/mystical force that 
somehow determines favourable outcomes; Vyse, 1997) is, of course, fallacious, and 
existing research has suggested a link between the holding such beliefs and 
problematic gambling (Joukhador, 2004; Ohtsuka and Chan, 2010). Among the present 
interviewees, however, there was scant indication that during periods of lesser control 
there was a greater tendency to hold such beliefs. Indeed, some indicted that 
superstition influenced their gambling behaviour during periods of greater control. 
Jacob (regained control), for example, recommended that if someone feels “lucky”, 
then they should “do it” [gamble] but if someone does not feel lucky then “don’t do it 
[…] sometimes a gut instinct always works but sometimes we don’t listen to it”. Some 
interviewees reported carrying out particular actions and rationalising that they were 
lucky. Victoria (never experienced addiction), for example, reported that when playing 
roulette she always puts at least one chip on her “lucky number which is 22” while 
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Maya (never experienced addiction) reported that she only uses one online gambling 
provider because “I think it’s lucky to use the same one”. Given that existing literature 
suggests association between erroneous/superstitious beliefs and problematic 
gambling, it is quite surprising that members of all ideal-types indicated such beliefs. It 
is worth noting, however, that interviewees were not asked explicitly about any 
superstitious beliefs and as those who mentioned them were not pressed on such 
beliefs, it is quite unclear how strongly these were held or if they ‘really’ believed in 
them. Most interviewees, however, did not indicate superstitious beliefs and some 
explicitly rejected them. When Felix (never experienced addiction), for example, was 
asked about any gambling rules he holds he berated superstition among gamblers by 
sarcastically replying: “If I haven’t got my lucky red sock on?!”. Most interviewees who 
mentioned luck did so when referring to statistical probability – favourable outcomes, 
the result of chance (Pritchard and Smith, 2004) and, in general, there was little 
evidence to indicate misunderstandings about probability among interviewees (though 
interviewees were specifically asked or pressed about their understandings). 
 
Approach to risk 
Some interviewees suggested that they were, or had been, encouraged to gamble by 
desire to engage in risky practices. While these participants may, in part, have been 
motivated by the potential of financial reward, some indicated desire to put at risk what 
they already have. For some of these, it appeared that the more valuable the wager 
and the riskier the bet, the greater the thrill and attraction to the activity. This resonates 
strongly with edgework theory (Lyng, 2005), concerned with voluntary risk taking for 
pleasure. According to Lyng (2005) for some it is ‘the intensively seductive character of 
the experience itself’ that encourages engagement in risky edgework activities. Brian 
(regained control), for example, reflecting on his past experience of addiction, 
appreciated that for some:  
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“Part of the excitement comes where you’re risking money that you can’t quite 
afford because the rewards are obviously bigger and it’s kind of exciting and 
dangerous” 
Brian, regained control, emphasised added 
 
This was echoed by Rosie (experiencing addiction) who stated that “there’s something 
quite exciting about risking a sum of money”. Brian reported that since he had brought 
his gambling under control he had become more “risk-averse”: 
“[...] something changed where [...] I’m [now] very risk averse. For example, 
even when paying for the parking [to attend the interview] I paid for 2 hours 
even though you [the interviewer] said it would be less than 1 hour but it’s a risk 
and gamble [...]”  
Brian, regained control 
 
Though the very fact that Brian continued to participate in poker gambling suggests 
that he may not be as risk averse as he implies, he suggested that his gambling style, 
at time of interview, was far less risky in terms of odds and money wagered than at the 
time he was experiencing difficulty managing his betting shop gambling.  
 
Preference for riskier (higher) odds 
Some interviewees reported rejecting lower, less risky odds, and choosing to gamble 
on events where higher, riskier odds were offered by the bookmaker. Victoria (never 
experienced addiction), for example, stated that when playing blackjack often betting 
on the “top 3 box” (a side bet) – an option where if the cards dealt combine to make 
certain poker hands a larger return on the wager is paid. Victoria appreciated that such 
an outcome is very unlikely and in doing so her wager is at much greater risk than if 
she was playing common blackjack but nevertheless reported: “I’ll just play it anyway 
because it makes it a bit more exciting”. Some gamblers tended only to gamble on 
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instances where the bookmaker offers relatively high (risky) odds. Maya (never 
experienced addiction), for example, reported that “If there’s good [high] odds I might 
put something on, if not I won’t bother”. A commonly reported form of betting among 
interviewees of all ideal-types involved combining two or more individual wagers into a 
single bet known as a ‘parlay’ or an accumulator bet (Grant, 2013). Combining 
numerous single bets in this way increases the amount of money that might be won 
but, as the success of the bet depends on the correct prediction of all outcomes, it also 
increases risk of failure and financial loss (Grant, 2013). Some, however, rejected 
riskier odds thereby, ceteris paribus, reducing (but not mitigating) risk of losses. Martin 
(never experienced addiction), for example, reported:   
“It’s not often I do ‘accers’ [accumulator bets] either because that is putting all 
your eggs in one basket. You only have to have one loser on that and then 
that’s it, you’re done. Then you’ve lost the lot! it’s not a wise bet; I don’t think so 
anyway” 
Martin, never experienced addiction (original emphasis) 
 
Preference for smaller wagers 
A preference for riskier odds, per se, however, was necessarily harmful. Indeed, those 
with greater control often reported balancing riskier odds with lower value wagers in 
ways which offset (financial) harm. Scott (regained control), for example, asserted 
himself to be, at time of interview, “very much a small bet, long odds type of [sports] 
gambler”. Some other interviewees, and particularly those with better regulated 
gambling, adhered to styles of gambling that involved both smaller wagers and less 
risky odds. Steven (never experienced addiction), for example, reported preferring 
small wager gambling and avoided roulette because “the odds are too high”. 
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Approaching the wager: financial investment or leisure fee 
Interviewees indicated thinking about the wager in two broad ways: in terms of 
investment and, on the other hand, as a fee for engaging in gambling as a leisure 
activity (similar to paying to visit the cinema or go bowling) (Dzik, 2006). These two 
ways of viewing wagers were not necessarily mutually exclusive as, in general, 
interviews indicated that participants tended to regard the wager as simultaneously 
investment and fee. Nonetheless, as will become clear, the approaching of the wager 
more in terms of the latter appeared more conducive to control than more in terms of 
the former. 
 
The wager as a leisure fee 
Some interviewees, particularly those who indicated greater control, tended to regard 
wagers more as a fee but with an added potential that they may win some money. 
Though they often reported the possibility of winning money to be exciting, emphasis 
was placed on gambling as an ‘end in itself’ rather than on the potential for monetary 
return. Such an approach resonates with existing research suggesting that while the 
potential to win money can, for some, increase the excitement of gambling (Gilovich 
and Douglas, 1986), some gamblers are willing to pay financially for that excitement 
regardless of winning or losing (Bruce and Johnson, 1995). Victoria (never experienced 
addiction), for example, reported: 
“I see it [poker] as a game. More like I would pay £10 to go bowling, I would pay 
£10 to play poker. You don’t win anything when you go bowling but you enjoy it 
and you have fun. I wouldn’t go bowling and then if I didn’t win go ‘I’ve got to 
play again, I’ve got to play again’ because you just don’t think of it like that do 
you?” 
Victoria, never experienced addiction 
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The wager as a financial investment 
There was a sense that more controlled gamblers tended not to believe that gambling 
was an effective way of making money in the long-term or that it was extremely 
unlikely, if not impossible, to do so. Wallace (never experienced addiction) expressed 
surprise at the notion of regular gamblers winning more than they were spending: 
“[…] of course, I’d say yeah, I’m spending more than I’m winning but I’d like to find 
any gambler who makes more money then I need their [phone] number!” 
Wallace, never experienced addiction  
Interviews with members of the experiencing addiction and regained control groups 
indicated tendency for wagers to be approached in terms of investment during periods 
of lesser control. It has already been noted that interviewees reported it commonplace 
to chase losses during periods of gambling-related difficulties and those doing so, it is 
reasonable to suggest, are essentially treating each wager as an investment. In 
addition, it was also quite common for interviewees with lesser control to indicate 
having viewed gambling as a way to make discernible profit and so wagers as 
investments in this sense.  
Such indications were not necessarily explicit in interviewee’s reports but often gleaned 
from a tendency for the interviewee to discuss, often at length and in detail, the 
potential financial rewards of gambling to a far greater extent than those who indicated 
greater control and less experience of harm. Sampson (experiencing addiction) 
reasoned that, at time of interview, he was attracted by the prospect of financial returns 
and to win back losses: 
“Any time you think about it and you’re a bit skint you think ‘oh might be able to 
get a bit of extra money here’ [by gambling] and then when you’ve lost it’s like, 
‘shit, I need that money back now!’ […] when you are losing a lot of money you 
draw more money out to try and get back and the when you are so far down 
you just keep going trying to get your money back”. 
Sampson, experiencing addiction 
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Among members of the regained control group there were reports of having believed, 
during times of difficulty of control, gambling to be a way of making discernible profit. 
Brian (regained control), for example, asserted that when “hooked” he thought he could 
“beat the system” and, declaring an aptitude for mathematics, had approached 
gambling as “a mathematical problem to solve” in an effort to “beat the system”. Brian 
reported: 
“My brother said that 1 in 2000 gamblers in the bookies are making money so the 
idea of becoming that 1 in 2000 – it seems a status thing and kudos to yourself that 
you can be that special person” 
Brian, regained control 
 
Although in the past Brian reported having believed that his brother was profiting from 
gambling, at the time of interview he no longer believed that this had been the case. 
Brian also stated no longer believing that there was a ‘system’ to ‘beat’ and that it was 
not feasible to make discernible profit gambling. A similar experience was reported by 
Stuart (regained control) who indicated that during his difficulty of control he also 
believed that he could make money gambling. Stuart rationalised that in the past he 
gambled, in part, to try to make money: 
“There were times when I had less money, which sounds silly, where I’d gamble 
more because I wanted to get more. I wanted to have the spare money. I 
thought that gambling was the answer to not being able to have the things I 
wanted. So, before, when I didn’t have a lot of money, when I was in between 
jobs, that was a time – and I’ve spoken to quite a few people who agree the 
same as well – it’s when you’re down in your luck in life that seems to be the 
time that you’re looking for a lucky break and that’s the reason they’re 
gambling” 
Stuart, regained control 
 
 228 
 
Gambling subjectivities: prudential and prodigal habitus 
Synthesising findings about how interviewees approached gambling approached 
gambling with Bourdieusian theory (see chapter one), distinction can be made between 
two pure forms of habitus: 
Prudential habitus – characterised by a more cautious approach to gambling 
where the gambler prefers smaller sized wagers, lower odds and views the 
wager less as an investment and more as a leisure fee. 
Prodigal habitus – characterised by a riskier approach to gambling where the 
gambler prefers larger sized wagers, higher odds and approaches the wager 
more as a way to make money. Those with a more prodigal habitus appeared 
particularly attracted by a desire to put at risk what they already possessed. 
Unsurprisingly, a propensity towards more cautious gambling (i.e. embodiment of a 
prudential habitus) tended to be associated with gambling that was greater controlled 
while propensity towards riskier gambling (i.e. embodiment of a prodigal habitus) 
appeared more associated with gambling that was lesser controlled.  
 
Prudential habitus 
According to Bourdieusian theory, an individual’s habitus is the embodiment of 
particular dispositions arising from their past experience, providing the ‘practical sense’ 
necessary to negotiate new situations (see chapter one; Bourdieu, 1977). Kate (never 
experienced addiction) indicated a prudential gambling habitus throughout her 
interview. Kate reported: 
“Even if I’ve got a massive bankroll I won’t go into the big [poker] tournaments 
[...] I still will not pay $12 or $20 to enter a tournament. It’s not in my nature. […] 
to me that’s a waste of money, I can get just as much pleasure playing the $2 or 
the $4 as I can at $20” 
 Kate, never experienced addiction 
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Even when a child, Kate indicated that she embodied a more prudential approach to 
gambling, stating that though on family holidays to seaside she would play penny 
arcade games, she would always keep and “never” re-gamble any winnings. 
Interviewees appeared to indicate consistency with their wider (non-gambling related) 
expectations and practices (e.g. how they approached managed other finances). After 
expressing perplexity that some gamblers chase losses, she reported:  
“[…] money has always been tight […] I always wanted to take my kids on 
holiday and I had to work very hard at being able to afford that. So money to me 
is something that I can’t just throw away” 
Kate, never experienced addiction 
 
Again consistent with Bourdieusian theory, Kate’s statement above emphasises that 
her prudential disposition was influenced by her situation and experience of living with 
little money which, it appears, encouraged her to embody expectations (value/norms) 
against more profligate spending. Echoing Kate’s disclosure that it was not in her 
‘nature’ to gamble in what could be described as a more profligate way, when Ross 
(never experienced addiction) was asked about how he managed to control his 
gambling while (in his view) some of his friends had great difficulty, he reported “[...] I’m 
a bit more restrained and a bit stingy with my money, to put in bluntly”. 
A similarly cautious approach to gambling was also exemplified by Scott (regained 
control). Although Scott had experienced addiction and harm stemming from excessive 
time gambling, adherence to strict bankroll management meant that he mitigated 
financial gambling-related harm. Scott indicated disposition toward prioritising non-
gambling spending over gambling, reporting that: 
“Some people might think ‘If I gamble the last £10 on this and I win then I can 
pay that’ whereas I would think ‘well that the last £10 can at least be used 
towards it’” 
Scott, regained control 
 230 
 
 
Scott’s more prudential dispositions and gambling practices (strict bankroll 
management) also appeared consistent with, and perhaps influenced by, experience in 
the ‘field’.  Scott had not worked for three years at the time of interview due to illness 
and reported that this meant he had to be “frugal” whereas, reflecting back to when he 
was working, he stated: 
“I had a decent enough disposable income so I did play higher stakes before 
and I probably took more risks [...] I would be prepared to put larger bets on” 
Scott, regained control 
 
Prodigal habitus 
Similarly, there was a sense that many of those who engaged in more prodigal 
gambling, associated with lesser control, indicated more profligate non-gambling 
spending. It must be noted, however, that as recruitment focused on individuals with 
greater control there is far less data on which to base this assertion. Nonetheless, 
Rosie (experiencing addiction) suggested embodiment of a prodigal habitus. Rosie 
reported employment of over 50 hours per week and indicated paying relatively little 
rent to her mother (£200 as her only necessary monthly outgoing). However, she 
reported that “as soon as I have money it tends to go in the first couple of days” and 
that while some of her money does get spent gambling, the rest gets spent on what 
she perceived to be “everyday items”. Similarly, Sampson (experiencing addiction) 
reported that if even when he has lost money gambling he will still continue to spend 
money on other activities: 
“[…] if I get annoyed that I’ve lost money during the week and then I’ll be like 
‘Nah, I still want to do this’ [...] I think I’m still going to do the stuff I want to do 
because I’m not going to hold back now”  
 Sampson, experiencing addiction 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has been concerned with how gambling-related aspects of interviewees’ 
lives and subjectivities influence regulation of gambling behaviour and/or harm. 
Practices indicated by interviewees to constrain gambling and, to a lesser extent, other 
practices indicated to be less constraining have been presented and discussed. 
Although many of the practices, themselves, constitute less/more constrained gambling 
behaviours, other strategies have been discussed whereby individuals purposefully 
restructure their gambling environments in ways to impede future decisions to engage 
in excessive gambling (e.g. not bringing bankcards into gambling settings). 
Examination of such practices has been neglected in existing gambling literature and, 
as will become clearer in chapter eight, knowledge of these strategies may be used to 
reduce harm and support greater control among gamblers. However, findings also 
suggested that greater control may be little attributable to such practices because 
those who had never experienced addiction tended not to engage in practices aimed at 
constraining gambling and those who experienced recovery reported enacting 
constraining practices when they were experiencing addiction. Indeed, as will be 
discussed in chapter seven, data suggested greater/lesser control and addiction 
recovery to be far more influenced by wider, non-gambling, aspects of interviewees 
lives and changes thereof than influenced by the particulars of gambling practices. 
 
The second half of the chapter focused on aspects of mindset including rules, 
superstitious beliefs, and understandings about probability as well as approaches to 
gambling and disposition toward risk. Though rules may have some value for helping to 
constrain gambling, data suggested that those with greater control tended to rely little 
on rules to regulate their gambling. It was reasoned that gambling-related rules have 
limited power for governing gambling behaviour. Drawing on Bourdieu, it was argued 
that data indicated two forms of habitus. Firstly, a more prudential habitus 
characterised by a more cautious approach to gambling and which appeared to support 
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greater constraint and more controlled gambling and, secondly, a more prodigal 
habitus characterised by riskier patterns of gambling and which appeared to 
discourage constraint and support less well-controlled gambling. In the penultimate 
chapter (chapter seven), there is a greater focus on shifts in gambling behaviour and 
on how wider, non-gambling related, aspects of interviewee’s lives influence control. 
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Chapter seven: wider influences on gambling behaviour 
Chapter seven continues presentation of the qualitative findings. While chapter six 
focused on aspects directly related to gambling, this chapter is largely concerned with 
wider aspects of lives and milieus not directly (or obviously) gambling-related. More 
specifically, the focus is on how those wider aspects, particularly those included in the 
conceptual framework (see chapter three), influence gambling behaviour and how 
changes in those aspects encourage shifts in behaviour (including recovery). As such 
there is far greater emphasis on behaviour change in this chapter than in the preceding 
one. In addition to the conceptual framework, Bourdieusian theory is used to frame and 
aid discussion and, where appropriate, reference is made to (post)Foucauldian theory 
(particularly governmentality literature). 
 
Initially the chapter was to be structured according to the conceptual framework 
(chapter three; i.e. socio-cultural milieu, beliefs, practices, and life-structure), however, 
analysis indicated these features to be so greatly intertwined that it made little sense to 
discuss them separately. After a brief recap of the gambling-related behavioural 
trajectories of interviewees (see chapter five), discussion, drawing on Bourdieu, is 
focused on the influence of ‘field’ participation on gambling behaviour. As will become 
clear, interviewees indicated coming to participate in different fields over their lives and, 
in doing so, came to access ‘new’ socio-cultural resources from which they (re)shaped 
their subjectivities and behaviours in ways more supportive of control and constraint. 
 
Discussion then turns to life-structure as interviewees indicated the organisation of their 
lives, their routines, obligations, and practices to have particular influence over the 
gambling behaviour and greater/lesser control. This discussion is situated after that of 
fields because life-structures appeared heavily dependent on field participation; it is 
through social participation that individuals arrange their lives.  
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Next, the nature and influence of subjectivities (including habitus) on greater/lesser 
control over gambling is explored. This is situated after discussion of fields because 
although, consistent with Bourdieusian theory, interviewees indicated interplaying 
influence between their socio-cultural spaces of participation (fields), subjectivity 
(habitus), and behaviour (practices), it was shifts into new fields which prompted shifts 
in habitus and practices (including gambling behaviour). Nonetheless, interplay 
between field, habitus, and behaviour is appreciated throughout discussion with 
signposting where appropriate. As the chapter closes, discussion turns to the social 
and cultural processes (constituents of the socio-cultural milieu) suggested to underlie 
shifts in field participation, subjectivity (habitus), and ultimately, reductions in gambling 
behaviour among those who experienced addiction and others who had not. 
 
Gambling trajectories: change and stability 
As first discussed in chapter five, interviewees with greater control (i.e. members of the 
regained control and never experienced addiction groups) revealed their gambling 
careers to have followed various trajectories: 
Regained control: 
1. Rapid recovery associated with drastic change in their lives/milieus. 
2. Gradual recovery associated with slower and more incremental change in their 
lives/milieus. 
Never experienced addiction: 
1. Gradual reduction in gambling patterns associated with slower and more 
incremental change in their lives/milieus. 
2. Stability of gambling patterns associated with lack of change in their 
lives/milieus. 
With the exception of some of the never experienced addiction group whose gambling 
patterns were relatively stable, interviewees with greater control indicated tendency for 
 235 
 
their gambling behaviour to decrease over the long-term. This is consistent with 
literature which has noted over the adult life-courses of those who consume objects of 
addiction tendency towards reduced and more constrained consumption among those 
who experience addiction and/or who consume problematically as well as those who 
consume with greater control and avoid experience of problems (Quintero, 2000). 
Although there appears to be increasing academic appreciation that those who 
experience addiction tend, eventually, to achieve better control over their consumption, 
usually without formal intervention (e.g. natural recovery; see chapter two), less 
appreciated and discussed is the tendency toward greater constraint among those who 
consume addiction objects without ever experiencing significant difficulties. As will 
become clear, regardless of whether or not an interviewee had experienced addiction, 
shifts in gambling behaviour went in concert with wider changes in the qualities of 
individuals’ lives (consistent with Moore, 1993; Zinberg, 1984; Quintero, 2000; see 
chapter two). These included changes in social relationships (social capital) and 
cultural expectations (cultural capital) – constituents of socio-cultural milieu (Moore, 
1993) – as well as changes in self-identities, and life-structures. As will also become 
clear, those whose gambling changed more gradually suggested such shifts to be 
supported by incremental changes in these aspects while those whose gambling 
changed more rapidly were suggested to be supported by swifter shifts in those 
aspects (e.g. as facilitated by migration). 
 
While long-term shifts in gambling behaviour appeared supported by change in the 
wider qualities of individuals’ lives, (relative) stability of gambling behaviour was 
indicated to be influenced by lack of such change. For some of these interviewees, 
particularly those younger, stability of lives/milieu over gambling careers was, in large 
part, reflective of relatively short gambling careers. Other interviewees, particularly 
those older, indicated their lives to be characterised by relative stability in which 
gambling was a regular engagement among many other engagements. 
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Field participation 
Society is comprised of innumerable fields (communities or socio-cultural spaces) each 
structured according to particular regulatory principles, including forms of capital, which 
differ and have different value in disparate fields (chapter one; Wacquant, 1992; 
Swartz, 2002; Thompson, 1991). These regulatory principles represent external 
structures that, through an actor’s participation (practices) within pertaining fields, 
become embodied as mental dispositions within their habitus, thereby encouraging 
particular future behaviours (Swartz, 1997; Bourdieu, 1984). The habitus, though 
durable, is plastic so that with new experience and participation in these different fields 
the habitus is continually (though usually gradually) restructured (Bourdieu, 1984) thus 
encouraging shifts in subjectivity as well as behaviour change. In short, this means that 
the particular qualities of fields in which actors have participated (e.g. cultural capital) 
influence the subjectivity and behaviour of members (i.e. who they are and what they 
do) and that participation in new fields can influence shifts in subjectivity and 
behaviour. 
 
As will be illustrated with interview excerpts, interviewees indicated propensity for 
reductions in, and increasing constraint over, gambling behaviour often to be supported 
by transitions into fields with cultural expectations for comportment and subjectivity 
(regulatory principles) which marginalise and problematise more excessive time spent 
gambling. Examples of such fields included those pertaining to parenthood, being a 
spouse/partner, and forms of employment/professions all of which involved 
engagements and cultural expectations which constrain gambling. Interviewees often 
referred to engagements pertaining to these fields in terms of ‘responsibilities’, 
‘commitments’ and ‘obligations’. 
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Participation in gambling fields 
Interviewees indicated membership of different gambling fields including sports betting 
communities – encompassing soccer betting communities and horserace betting 
communities – and poker gambling communities16. Consistent with existing literature 
(Reith and Dobbie, 2011; Gordon et al., 2015), participation in these communities was 
suggested to involve various forms of gambling-related cultural capital (e.g. sports 
knowledge, understanding of betting types, and knowledge of poker strategies). As 
addictions/recovery literature indicates possession of capital to constitute investment in 
pertaining fields which encourages deeper participation, greater consumption of central 
objects, and discourages constraint as well as recovery (Reith and Dobbie, 2011; 
Bourgois, 1995; Waldorf et al., 1991), it would be reasonable to posit that possession 
of gambling-related capital among the present interviewees – and in particular capital 
highly valued (i.e. ‘symbolic’ capital; see chapter one) in gambling fields – would 
encourage more excessive gambling and be less supportive of control thereby 
encouraging addiction, harm, and impeding recovery. 
 
Perhaps surprisingly, however, interviewees gave little indication that lesser (or 
greater) control was associated with greater possession of gambling-related capital. In 
terms of technical gambling knowledge (a form of cultural capital), for example, it was 
common for interviewees of all ideal-types to express quite in-depth knowledge as 
exemplified through use of the following terminology17. Horse-racing gamblers referred 
                                                          
16
 Though membership did not always appear mutually exclusive, interviewees tended to 
indicate greater participation in one particular community. While gambling community 
membership could be subcategorised further, this is not necessary for the present thesis (or 
possible, given space restrictions). Sports bettors, for example, could be categorised according 
to mode of placing bets, over the internet or in the betting shop, while poker gamblers could be 
categorised according to whether or not they tended to engage in poker online, in pubs, or in 
casinos. 
17 It is neither necessary to define these terms here nor explore the nuances and differences 
between the capital pertaining to different gambling communities, but rather salient to 
appreciate that membership of, and position within, gambling communities involves cultural (and 
symbolic) capital. 
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to placing various types of bets including “placepots”, “lucky 15s”, and “yankees" as 
well as betting at “the tote” on “the rails” while some poker gambling interviewees 
referred to “grinding”, “buy-ins”, “rebuys”, “freezeout”, being “on tilt”, experiencing “bad 
beats”, and various poker “hands” (e.g. “royal flush”). Moreover, it was common for 
interviewees to indicate that they regarded gambling knowledge and competencies as 
valuable. Martin (never experienced addiction), for example, indicated his knowledge 
and skill pertaining to horse-racing ‘form’18 to be well regarded and commanding of 
respect among others in the betting shop: 
“And I taught myself; how to read form and things like that and it’s just come 
with experience and now I can look at papers and where I get some people 
asking in the betting shop, ‘what does that mean?’ or whatever. There is 
nothing I don’t know and I mean nothing I don’t know about reading form but 
that’s taken years and years of practice and reading and things like that” 
Martin, never experienced addiction (interviewee’s emphasis) 
Nevertheless, there was some sense that placing high value on gambling-related 
resources encourages gambling. Members of the regained control group often 
suggested that at the time of their difficulties they had placed much greater value on 
gambling and related capital (e.g. technical knowledge and/or skill) than they did at 
time of interview. Brian (regained control), for example, indicated at the time of his 
difficulties believing that a minority of “special” gamblers were able to make consistent 
profit through betting shop gambling and that this conferred respect and “kudos”. 
However, by time of interview, Brian had not only dispensed with the idea that it was 
possible to make consistent profit betting shop gambling but that even individuals who 
might be making money gambling would command greater respect by engaging in 
more ‘legitimate’ employment: 
“[...] if you can make money from poker you can probably make even more 
money elsewhere [...] If you’ve got a brain that can beat that and make lots of 
                                                          
18
 In horseracing ‘form’ refers to a various information about a horse, the jockey, and record of 
performance in past races, often published in newspapers in print form and online, and usually 
in the form of racecards (Racing Post, 2013). 
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money then you can probably make more money somewhere else. [...] In 
something that’s a lot more respected anyway [...] you could do better 
elsewhere in something where you do not have to hide it from your friends” 
Brian, regained control (emphasis added) 
 
Participation in non-gambling and more ‘conventional’ fields 
Among the present interviewees, it was not so much possession and valuing of 
gambling-related capital or participation in gambling fields that influenced and 
explained differences in control, but participation (or lack thereof) in non-gambling, 
often more ‘conventional’, fields as well as inequalities of conventional (or non-
gambling) forms of capital. 
 
As will be illustrated, those with greater control over their gambling were more deeply 
embedded in non-gambling life (fields), possessed a great deal of conventional capital, 
and appeared to more greatly value those resources (and aspects of their lives) over 
those related to gambling despite possession of gambling capital and continued 
(though usually lessening) participation in gambling communities. This resonates with 
substance literature which has suggested that possession of resources valued in fields 
where consumption of objects of addiction is not central, or even where such 
consumption is criticised, as well as greater participation in such fields can constrain 
consumption, discourage consumption difficulties (e.g. addiction and harm) and 
encourage recovery despite possession of resources valued in fields pertaining to 
objects of addiction (Waldorf et al., 1991; Cloud and Granfield, 2008; Gibson et al., 
2004; Hughes, 2007; Biernacki, 1986). 
 
In terms of behaviour change, the propensity of members of both the regained control 
and never experienced addiction groups towards increasing constraint (see chapter 
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five) was indicated to be supported by greater participation in a variation of non-
gambling life/fields (e.g. parenthood or employment), attendant accumulation of non-
gambling capital and, simultaneously, placing increasing value on that capital. With 
these changes, interviewees appeared to participate less in gambling life/fields and, 
though they still possessed much gambling related capital (e.g. technical knowledge), 
this capital became devalued relative to non-gambling capital. There were, however, 
general differences between members of the never experienced addiction and 
regained control groups in these terms. Firstly, those who had never experienced 
addiction tended to indicate that they had always placed greater value on non-gambling 
aspects of their lives over gambling while those who had regained control tended to 
indicate that recovery involved coming to value non-gambling aspects over gambling. 
Secondly, interviewees who indicated addiction recovery (i.e. members of the regained 
control group) often indicated having experienced greater detachment from non-
gambling life than members of the never experienced addiction group and that this 
isolation had occurred alongside their gambling difficulties. That said, their detachment 
often appeared to have been mild19 and, throughout their difficulties, they seemed to 
have maintained some participation in non-gambling life that might have eased their 
recovery (by providing access to resources that helped them to regain control). 
 
Brian (regained control), for example, indicated that at the time of his gambling 
difficulties he possessed little conventional capital and spent much of his time 
gambling. During periods when he was experiencing difficulty of control, Brian was 
either unemployed or worked in low skilled, poorly paid, employment and lodged with 
his sister who provided him with one meal a day. Brian engaged in very few activities 
beyond gambling and tended to place very little value on those he did engage in 
compared to gambling activities. For example, he marginalised eating: 
                                                          
19
 In comparison to the isolation that some problematic substance users may experience (cf. 
Neale et al., 2011; McIntosh and McKeganey, 2001). 
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“I could feed myself on a fiver for two weeks. When I was getting that meal a 
day I didn’t ever buy food” 
Brian, regained control 
Much of Brian’s time was spent in the betting shop with other gamblers. His recovery 
involved various changes in non-gambling aspects of his life that resulted in a life less 
characterised by, and orientated around, gambling. He met and married his wife, 
became a homeowner, started a business, and became a parent to three children. 
Thus he came to participate in a multiplicity of non-gambling fields such as marriage, 
parenthood, and employment, where gambling has little place. His interview suggests 
that he came to value participation in these fields over gambling and so prioritised 
these non-gambling aspects of his life. 
 
Steven (never experienced addiction), aged 27 at interview, indicated long having 
participated in card games and other forms of gambling. During childhood he recalled 
playing Newmarket and Rummy with family, learning to play poker with his parents, 
and throughout his teens and up until interview playing poker with friends/family. Aged 
16 he played Euchre for a local pub league and aged 18 up until interview, regularly, 
though increasingly less so, participated in casino poker tournaments. Despite frequent 
participation in gambling fields (particularly poker), Steven indicated gambling to have 
always been only one aspect of his life among many others including employment, 
spending time with family, and various interests/hobbies including rugby (which he later 
replaced with golf because he felt injury would jeopardise his naval career) and 
mountain biking (which he reported being “quite big into”). At the time of interview, he 
had been employed as an aircraft engineer for an unspecified number of years in the 
Royal Navy, who were sponsoring his study for an engineering degree, was planning a 
wedding with his fiancée with whom he had been in a relationship for nine years and 
had recently become a homeowner. 
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Steven’s gambling, just like most other members of the never experienced addiction 
group, was in decline and has become increasingly marginalised and subordinate to 
other aspects of his life. Reductions in his gambling appeared to concert with greater 
participation in various non-gambling engagements and resources (e.g. employment, 
social relationships less orientated around gambling, and engineering qualification) on 
which he placed greater value and prioritised over gambling. 
 
Forms of employment: examples of conventional fields 
Interviewees referred to participation in numerous non-gambling fields that impacted on 
their gambling behaviour (e.g. parenthood, spousehood, and being a university 
student). Due to the space constraints of this thesis, rather than discussing 
participation in numerous non-gambling fields, employment was chosen as an example 
because it was widely discussed during interviews and was indicated to have strong 
influence over gambling. Literature has suggested that employment tends to constrain, 
or discourage, risky or deviant practices often in subtle, indirect and usually 
unintended, ways and usually encourages addiction recovery (Nasir et al., 2011; 2014; 
Waldorf et al., 1991). Although, consistent with this, interviewees mostly suggested 
their employment to support greater control over gambling, some also indicated 
employment to encourage gambling. As will be illustrated, the influence of employment 
seemed quite dependent on the cultural expectations to which specific employment 
facilitated access (e.g. whether or not there was a gambling culture at work). 
  
Cultural expectations attached to employment supportive of control 
Most interviewees, of all ideal-types, reported not gambling while working or alongside 
employment practices and, for the few who had done so, this tended to have been 
infrequent. Even those employed at time of their gambling difficulties tended not to 
indicate having gambled while working but, rather, structuring their gambling around 
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employment-related practices. It could be assumed that, particularly for those 
experiencing difficulties, employment constrains gambling because, when ‘at work’, 
actors are physically unable to gamble. Employment, however, does not remove an 
individual’s capability to gamble. With the exception of the few interviewees employed 
in the armed forces20, it is reasonable to suggest that interviewees were not physically 
incapable of leaving their workplace/space to gamble or, for those with the resources 
required to place bets using mobile devices, placing bets without leaving work. A more 
reasonable explanation is that cultural expectations, lodged with employment, tend to 
constrain and discourage gambling, supporting greater control. 
 
Belief that it is inappropriate to gambling while working 
Supporting greater control, interviewees appeared to hold cultural expectations that 
rejected gambling practices while working. Kate (never experienced addiction), for 
instance, expressed it inappropriate to gamble during the working day and suggested 
that this might be a sign of gambling difficulties while, Evan (never experienced 
addiction), similarly, reported that he did not think it was very ‘professional’ to gamble 
or discuss gambling at work and refrained from doing either. 
 
Belief that employment should take precedence over gambling 
Interviews with members of all ideal-type groups indicated greater control (even during 
periods of lesser control) to be supported by holding expectations that employment 
should take precedence over gambling. Not only did this seem to discourage gambling 
while working but also to constrain time available for gambling while not at work. Scott 
(regained control), who worked as a teacher but was on long-term sick leave at time of 
interview, for example, reported: 
                                                          
20
 For some interviewees, particularly those who were in the Army or Navy, it seemed 
practically, almost impossible, to gamble while working. Keith (regained control), for example, 
reported that being offshore in a submarine precluded gambling opportunities, especially, he 
emphasised, with no internet connectivity. 
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“I just didn’t have the time to be putting in the hours playing poker because I was at 
work and then I was marking and planning at home in the evenings [...] I couldn’t 
stay up in to 2 or 3 in the morning if a tournament was on that late because [I] had 
to be in work [later that morning]” 
Scott, regained control 
 
Similarly, Greg (never experienced addiction) asserted that leaving university and 
entering full-time employment discouraged his poker gambling: 
“[...] working full time I also played less and less and poker to the point now where I 
don’t really do [gamble] anything apart from the very occasional flutter” 
Greg, never experienced addiction 
 
Employment communities and brokering access to capital 
Employment was suggested often to facilitate formation of relationships which brokered 
access to capital, the particular qualities of which influenced gambling behaviour (even 
outside of time spent working). Though there is some academic consensus that 
employment tends to discourage addiction, encourage control, support recovery, and 
impede experience of harm by facilitating access to social networks which broker 
access to more ‘conventional’ (i.e. non-deviant) capital (Nasir et al., 2014; Cloud and 
Granfield, 2008), less appreciated appears to be that, as indicated by present 
interviewees, some employment can also broker capital which encourages deviant 
behaviour (e.g. gambling) and/or discourage constraint. 
 
Indeed, some interviewees indicated that their employment had facilitated access to 
social networks where gambling was quite central, which provided access to cultural 
resources and encouraged practices as well as routines (constituents of life-structure) 
which seemed to encourage gambling, particularly where there seemed a strong 
gambling culture in the workplace. Roger (regained control), for example, reported that 
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he started a new job where colleagues would routinely visit a casino after work and that 
this introduced him to casino gambling which became problematic for him. Roger 
indicated that through gambling and socialising with work colleagues he met other 
regular casinogoers and there “ended up about 10 or 15 of us” for who it was “the 
norm” to regularly attend the casino after work. Through gambling with others in this 
“little world”, Roger reported learning how to gamble. 
 
Moreover, two interviewees, both serving in the Royal Navy, suggested there to be a 
strong gambling culture at work and that commercial gambling was a regular social 
activity during free time. Keith (regained control), a submariner, reported: 
“Being in the Navy definitely has an effect [on encouraging gambling] because 
it’s more accepted and part of the community […] everybody sort of gambles” 
Keith, regained control 
To give a final example, Rosie (experiencing addiction) indicated that it was through 
watching others gambling on fruit-machines while she was working in a pub that she 
become interested in fruit-machine gambling which became problematic for her.  
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Life-structure 
It is reasonable to suggest that community membership and the socio-cultural 
resources facilitated by field participation has influence over the organisation of the 
lives of individuals. Employment, parenthood, being a student, to give examples, come 
with engagements that must be integrated into the organisation of daily lives if they are 
to be met. 
 
Lives structured around non-gambling engagements support greater control 
As noted in chapter three, some addictions/recovery research has suggested that a 
given actor’s life-structure may influence control over consumption and/or experience 
of related harm (Moore, 1993; Grund, 1993; Cohen, 1999). As will be illustrated, 
interviewees with greater regular engagement in more numerous non-gambling 
activities indicated greater control and constraint over their gambling. Where such 
engagements were related to an aspect of their life perceived to be particularly 
meaningful (or, more precisely, that was more valued than gambling) these activities 
were more supportive of controlled gambling. These included engagements relating to 
friends/family, employment, housing, as well as other leisure activities and were, often, 
quite mundane such as paying bills, buying food and preparing meals. This parallels 
existing literature which has suggested that involvement in more prosaic and everyday 
activities, often marginalised during the experience of addiction (Nettleton et al., 2011), 
buttresses constraint and control (Cohen, 1999). Interviewees with greater control often 
talked about such aspects of their lives in terms of priorities, responsibilities and/or 
commitments, although, they tended not to do so in terms of burden. 
 
Felix (never experienced addiction) reported numerous non-gambling engagements: 
regularly spending time with his son, socialising weekly with friends, playing football 
weekly, going running four times weekly, and membership of a running club. At the 
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time of interview, Felix had been a British expatriate in Warsaw for over 20 years and 
reported regularly attending social events with other expatriates. Similarly, Kate (never 
experienced addiction) reported prioritising non-gambling commitments and, in 
particular, emphasised that these took financial precedence over gambling: 
“My children come first before gambling, even now when they’re 27 and 24. 
Bills have to be paid and it’s not a question of ‘oh I’m not going to pay that bill 
this month’ because I want to gamble more; It’s never even come up. […] It’s 
just how I’ve played for 4 years – all my bills are paid, there’s food in the 
cupboard” 
Kate, never experienced addiction 
 
Interviewees with greater control indicated that the prioritisation of non-gambling 
engagements prompted those individuals to direct time and money more towards 
(those) related non-gambling aspects and less towards gambling. Though these 
interviewees tended not to structure their time and money purposefully in order to 
better manage their gambling, the non-gambling prioritisation of time and money had 
unintended and latent consequence of doing so. The financial priorities of more 
controlled gamblers included those which might reasonably be considered more 
‘essential’ living costs (e.g. utility bills, rent/mortgage, and food), social relationships 
(e.g. friends/family), as well as other leisure activities. The prioritisation of various non-
gambling financial costs appeared supported by beliefs that meeting those costs were 
more essential or important than gambling. Some interviewees (all indicating control of 
their gambling at time of interview), for example, indicated that they felt it inappropriate 
to gamble if money was ‘tight’ (i.e. the individual had little discretionary income), was in 
debt, and/or was struggling to meet financial obligations. Andy (regained control) 
reported that he believed a friend “clearly” has “a [gambling] problem” indicated by 
difficulty to meet financial obligations and frequent borrowing of money from others 
(which his friend often fails to repay) despite continued heavy spending on fruit-
machines. 
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Life-structures which lacked or marginalised non-gambling engagements were 
associated with lesser control 
Lesser control appeared often supported by a relative lack of non-gambling related 
engagements. Sampson (experiencing addiction), for example, lived with, and was 
supported by, his parents and so had few of the more mundane commitments (e.g. 
paying bills) that some other interviewees had. Sampson rationalised: 
“It’s just I haven’t really got a hobby so I enjoy doing that [gambling] so that’s 
something for me to do. I’ve got a lot of spare time around work and on the 
weekend” 
Sampson, experiencing addiction 
 
Some interviewees framed lack of engagements as lack of ‘responsibilities’. Quite 
common among the interviews of those who had regained control were reports of 
having had (or at least having perceived) few responsibilities at the time of addiction. 
Tom (regained control), for example, reported: 
“I was a young single lad. Errrm used to just knock around with me mates, had 
no responsibilities, lived at home with my parents, yer’know, and there was 
nothing to hold me back, yer’know. I could do what I want. I wasn’t too fussed 
about work [...] just did what [I] wanted” 
Tom, regained control 
 
It often appeared not necessarily lack of non-gambling engagements that characterised 
the life-structures of those with lesser control, but marginalisation of existing 
engagements, some of which might reasonably be considered more ‘essential’ 
obligations and ‘living’ costs, so that these became viewed with less (immediate) 
priority than gambling. Carl (experiencing addiction), for example, reported that during 
times when he found constraint most difficult he prioritised gambling over eating:  
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“I wouldn’t eat regularly, I’d go two or three days without eating really; maybe a 
packet of crisps or go to Tesco and try to find the cheapest food you can, a 
packet of biscuits or whatever [...]” 
Carl, experiencing addiction 
 
Changing life-structures and shifts toward greater control 
As discussed, interviewees’ life-structures were not static but dynamic, changing over 
life-courses. Reductions in gambling among those who had never experienced 
addiction and others who had regained control (as well as recovery for the latter), 
appeared associated with a restructuring of individual’s lives to include greater non-
gambling engagements. This appeared most effective where these engagements were 
perceived by the interviewee as important and regarded in terms of responsibilities, 
commitments and priorities. 
 
Brian (regained control), for example, suggested that at the time when he was 
experiencing addiction he had few non-gambling interests and engaged in few non-
gambling activities. During this time, Brian was either unemployed or in low skilled work 
and was lodging with his sister who provided him with food and accommodation in 
return for babysitting her daughter whilst she worked nights. In the proceeding period 
up until time of interview, Brian brought his gambling under control alongside drastic 
changes in his life-structure. At the time of interview, Brian was married, had three 
children, “lots of pets”, and had started his own business. He asserted that starting the 
business, in particular, had supported reductions in his gambling: 
“Since I started the business it’s probably less than half, maybe even a quarter, 
of what it used to be. Much less, some days go by where I don’t play. Before 
the business started I was unemployed for a long time and I played poker every 
day”. 
Brian, regained control 
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Likewise, Stuart (regained control) indicated that his shift towards more constrained 
gambling was supported by greater engagement in more conventional activities. As 
well as time spent working, Stuart explained:  
“I spend a lot of time with the family nowadays and partner’s family [pause]. We 
go [to the] gym five times a week now as well so that’s something to stop me 
gambling a lot; going to the gym straight from work till about 7 or 8 O’clock so it 
[gambling] doesn’t even come into my head now” 
Stuart, regained control 
Congruent with the finding that shifts toward a life-structure more characterised by non-
gambling activities was supportive of greater control, Scott (regained control), reflecting 
on his own past gambling difficulties, urged gamblers to: “find ways of not letting it 
[gambling] take over your life. It’s not your life, it’s a little part of it”. 
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Habitus restructuring through shifts in field participation 
As previously stated, through participation in different fields, the regulatory principles of 
those fields come to (re)structure the individual’s habitus thereby influencing future 
behaviour (practice) (see chapter one; Bourdieu, 1989). Though scant, and tending not 
to employ Bourdieusian theory21, some addictions and deviancy literatures have 
argued that the qualities of socio-cultural spaces in which the individual is embedded 
have strong influence over subjectivity (often framed as ‘identity’ rather than ‘habitus’ 
e.g. Hughes, 2007; Neale et al., 2011; Waldorf et al., 1991) and thereby influence 
behaviour in general and consumption of addiction objects in particular (Sampson and 
Laub, 1992; Cloud and Granfield, 2008). 
 
At this point it is worth mentioning that though existing research has far more often 
referred to ‘identity’ than ‘habitus’, the two concepts are very similar. Indeed, in 
Bourdieusian orientated research those two concepts are often treated synonymous 
(e.g. Abrahams and Ingram, 2013; Hughes, 2007). Both are constructed through social 
participation, shaped by qualities of socio-cultural context, influence behaviour 
(practice), and have a durable plasticity influenced by changes in the socio-cultural 
conditions of the actor’s life (Lawler, 2014; Shilling, 2008). Just as individuals 
continually (re)construct their habitus from the capital accessible within their fields of 
participation (Bourdieu, 1984), actors continually (re)construct their self-identity(ies) 
from the (valued) resources available within their context/milieus (Koski-Jannes, 2002; 
Hughes, 2007; Neale et al., 2011; Waldorf et al., 1991). Given these parallels, as 
existing addictions/deviancy literature explicitly refers to ‘(self)identity’ rather than 
‘habitus’, and because interviews emphasised association between gambling 
behaviour and identity/roles, ‘self-identity’ is drawn on in the present discussion to help 
better understand and explain the gambling related behaviour of interviewees. 
                                                          
21
 Some addictions/recovery research has drawn on Bourdieu’s practical concepts, most notably 
species of capital (e.g. Cloud and Granfield, 2008), but very little work has employed Bourdieu’s 
theoretical model and/or practical concepts beyond capital (cf. Hughes, 2007). 
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Shifts in identity and alterations in embodied cultural expectations 
Unsurprisingly, given the recruitment focus on active gamblers (see chapter four), 
interviewees of all ideal-types tended to hold gambling as part of their self-identity. 
Nevertheless, consistent with existing addictions/recovery literature (Waldorf et al., 
1991; Grund, 1993; Decorte, 2011), interviews suggested greater control to be 
supported by possession of multiple non-gambling self-identities, encouraged by 
attendant participation in associated non-gambling fields, so that gambling was a 
smaller part of who they perceived themselves to be. 
 
Lesser control, on the other hand, appeared to be supported by having fewer non-
gambling identities so that gambling was a comparatively greater part of their sense of 
self. Indeed, interviewees indicated the tendency for increasing constraint among both 
those who have never experienced addiction and others who regained control 
(including recovery for the latter) to involve accumulation of non-gambling self-identities 
over time so that gambling became increasingly less central to sense of self. It is 
salient to point out that though there appears to be association between identity and 
behaviour (Hughes, 2007), literature suggests it not to be self-identity, per se, that 
supports regulation of addiction objects but, largely, the concomitant embodied 
expectations for behaviour and subjectivity, both for the self and for others (Sampson 
and Laub, 1992; Quintero, 2000). Indeed, that literature indicates shifts in deviant 
behaviour (e.g. addiction recovery) to be strongly influenced by shifts in embodied 
expectations (values/norms) which concert with identity change (Sampson and Laub, 
1992; Quintero, 2000). 
 
Indeed, as will be illustrated with interview excerpts, interviews indicated changes in 
identities and embodied cultural expectations to be associated with changes in 
gambling behaviour including, in particular, propensity towards greater 
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control/constraint as well as reductions among members of the never experienced 
addiction and regained control groups (including recovery for the latter). Steven (never 
experienced addiction), for example, suggested that becoming a homeowner and a 
partner encouraged him to constrain and reduce his gambling: 
“I think it’s since buying the house for me, I think buying the house I know that I 
can’t afford to piss it all up [lose a lot of money gambling]” 
“Perhaps it’s just a case of I know that I’d be letting my other half down, and myself, 
if I blew it all up the shit due to going to the casino” 
Steven, never experienced addiction 
 
Another interviewee emphasised that changes in self-identity and social roles went with 
shifts in self-expectations about the appropriateness of gambling behaviour. Reflecting 
on a period of less constrained gambling, Tom (regained control) reported that having 
“no responsibilities [...] there was nothing to hold me back”, however in more recent 
years: 
“I’ve totally slowed down and reduced [my gambling]. Just because I’ve got 
more responsibilities now [...] [such as] family, mortgage, [and] work 
commitments [...] I know I’ve got commitments that I can’t just drop” 
Tom, regained control 
 
Absence of identity(ies) damaged through gambling 
Literature suggests addiction and stigmatisation to usually go together, and that 
through experience of stigmatisation those who experience addiction come to embody 
an identity marked (or ‘spoiled’; Goffman, 1963) (McIntosh and McKeganey, 2001). 
Stigmatisation is particularly problematic for those experiencing addiction because 
concomitant marginalisation often constricts social networks (Dinos et al., 2004; 
Markowitz, 1998), hindering access to the sorts of socio-cultural resources that 
facilitate participation in ‘conventional’ (e.g. non-gambling) fields/life which might 
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support control, addiction recovery, and discourage harm (Waldorf et al., 1991; Cloud 
and Granfield, 2008). Given all this, it is unsurprising that members of the never 
experienced addiction group did not indicate having felt stigmatised because of their 
gambling or ever having held an identity marked by it. 
 
More surprisingly, interviewees who experienced addiction recovery (i.e. members of 
the regained control group), many of whom, in the past, appeared to have participated 
relatively little in non-gambling life/fields, also tended not to indicate experience of 
stigmatisation or embodiment of an identity marked by gambling. Although lack of such 
reports among those who have recovered from addiction is a little hard to explain 
(given that addiction, stigma, and a marked identity are usually held to co-occur; 
McIntosh and McKeganey, 2001), two reasonable explanations are now proposed, 
both of which may have supported control and recovery22. 
Firstly, despite addiction and relative lack of participation in non-gambling life, some 
may simply have not have experienced stigmatisation at all or only mildly so. In 
comparison to others who experience addiction and greater marginalisation, members 
of the regained control group may, as a consequence, have been better able to 
maintain non-gambling relationships and at least some participation in conventional 
life/fields thereby providing access to more conventional capital which eased their 
recovery (Waldorf et al., 1991; Cloud and Granfield, 2008). Echoing Warburton et al. 
(2005:53), lack of stigmatisation may, for some interviewees, have been due to 
success in keeping their difficulties hidden as indicated by Stuart (regained control): “I 
never let anyone know about it [gambling difficulties]”. 
Secondly, as literature suggests addiction recovery to involve a shift from a ‘negative’ 
(discredited) self-identity to a ‘positive’ (or ‘unspoiled’) self-identity (Waldorf and 
Biernacki, 1981; Biernacki, 1986; McIntosh and McKeganey, 2001), some members of 
                                                          
22
 It is worth noting, however, that as interviewees were not pressed on experience of 
marginalisation or on self-identity, it is difficult to explore these speculations with high certainty. 
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the regained control group may, by time of interview, have transcended a self-identity 
damaged through gambling and so did not express having experienced such a self-
identity when interviewed. In this case it might be that by relinquishing a previously held 
negative identity recovery may have been eased. 
 
Social distancing: rejection of stigmatised self-identity and marginalising others  
Although, for those subject, social disapproval (e.g. in the form stigmatisation) is 
harmful because it impedes and discourages constraint over addiction objects (Cloud 
and Granfield, 2008; Hing et al., 2015a), some of the present interviewees, consistent 
with other literature (Decorte, 2001a), indicated that disapproval of ‘the other’ may 
actually support control for the disapprovers. For context, some research suggests that 
controlled drug users often compare their present selves and behaviours with those of 
other users and/or their past selves (Decorte, 2001a; Neale et al., 2011). These 
others/past selves, perceived to consume inappropriately, become viewed as ‘counter 
examples’23 which, in illustrating how not to be(have), help the disapprover to define 
appropriate consumption and so avoid consuming inappropriately (Decorte, 2001a). 
Interviewees with greater control reported tendency to reflect on counter examples – 
which included the gambling of others, past selves, and stereotypes of problematic 
gamblers – to support their own control. Steven (never experienced addiction), for 
example, seemingly reflecting on nobody in particular, asserted: 
“Nobody wants to be ‘that guy’, who has his house repossessed because of 
gambling” 
Steven, never experienced addiction 
 
                                                          
23
Neale et al. (2011) point out that the process of separating one’s self, actions, and ultimately 
life from ‘the other’ perceived as negative has been variously referred to as ‘othering’ (Rødner, 
2005), ‘distancing’ (Gibson et al., 2004; McIntosh and McKeganey, 2000), and ‘downward 
comparison’ (Simmonds and Coomber, 2009). 
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Similarly, when talking about frequenters of his local betting shop, Herbert (never 
experienced addiction) referred to “nutters” while Brian (regained control) referred to 
regulars in a betting shop he used to frequent as “idiots”. To give a final example, Andy 
(regained control), comparing his gambling behaviour at time of interview with that of 
his past as well as current behaviour of a friend, indicated that distancing helped to 
maintain his constraint:   
“I’ve got one friend who I’d say is problematic [...] [it] was just like, ‘well that 
used to be me’. He was one of the people that made me realise I was just 
putting far too much [money] in [to the fruit-machines] – it just wasn’t good [...] 
Every time I see him it does sort of help me. I just know that I don’t want to be 
that person again”. 
Andy, regained control 
 
With regard to gambling-related control, stigmatisation, then, appears to be double-
edged. While subjection to denigration appears to be deleterious and unconducive to 
control, access to ‘counter examples’ may help set boundaries of appropriate 
(gambling) behaviour thereby supporting control, at least for those who are not the 
example.  
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Absence of enduring ‘addict’ identities 
In chapter two, addiction was presented as a culture-bound phenomenon, the 
intelligibility and experience of which relies on specific cultural expectations and beliefs 
(including theories/‘truths’) (Room, 1985; Reinarman, 2005; Levine, 1978; MacAndrew 
and Edgerton, 1969). Synthesising Bourdieusian and Foucauldian thought, addiction 
was argued to be a discursive construction that comes to be experienced by some 
through the embodiment of addiction discourse whereby the principles of addiction 
become instilled within their habitus. Literature suggests a tendency for the 
embodiment of addiction to involve a (re)interpretation of self and biography so that the 
actor comes to possess an addiction-related identity and act in accordance with the 
expectations of addiction embodied within them (Weinberg, 2000; Reinarman, 2005). 
 
Unsurprisingly, members of the never experienced addiction group did not indicate 
having ever embodied an ‘addict’ identity. Perception of having experienced addiction 
and/or having embodied an ‘addict’ identity, on the other hand, was more mixed among 
members of the regained control group. More surprising was that though members of 
the regained control group suggested, by definition (see chapter four), significant 
difficulty of control between gambling sessions in the past but at time of interview no 
longer, relatively few talked of having been ‘addicted’ or that they had been an ‘addict’. 
Indeed, mention of addiction and use of addiction/recovery lexicon was notably absent 
from interviews (cf. Reinarman, 2005). 
 
Two reasonable explanations as to why those who had regained control tended not to 
report having experienced addiction and/or having held an ‘addict’ self-identity are 
proposed. Firstly, it might be that some, although having experienced significant 
difficulties limiting time/money spent gambling, never perceived such difficulties as 
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associated with personal experience of addiction or an ‘addict’ self-identity24. If so, 
absence of an addict identity may have supported control (Warburton et al., 2005) 
and/or eased shifts towards greater control (Reith and Dobbie, 2012). Secondly, it 
might be that some did perceive, at some point, perhaps during the time when they had 
difficulty controlling their gambling, that they were experiencing addiction and/or 
thought of themselves as an ‘addict’ but had dispensed with such beliefs by time of 
interview. This is consistent with existing literature suggesting natural recovery to occur 
more readily when those who once experienced addiction relinquish past addiction-
related identities, whether through recovery of past, non-addict, identities and/or the 
creation of new, non-addict, identities (Hughes, 2007; Reith and Dobbie, 2012). Indeed, 
this is illustrated with the case of Keith (regained control) who, although indicated once 
believing he was addicted, came to be less sure after achieving greater control: 
“If you’d asked me 4 or 5 years ago if I was addicted to gambling, I would have 
said yes. When I was spending £200 or £300 on it and watching it [football] all 
night [...] I’ve lied to my wife if she asked me if I’d got a bet on I’d say no. I’d be 
sitting there checking my bets on my phone so I spose yeah I was addicted” 
But you don’t think you’re addicted now? (interviewer) 
“No. I’m not sure if I was addicted because when she [his wife] told me to stop I 
just closed my account the same day and didn’t do it for about a year or 
something and then I eventually got back into it” 
Keith, regained control  
 
With only three interviewees who, at time of interview, indicated experiencing addiction, 
it is difficult to draw conclusions and make comparisons with other groups (see chapter 
                                                          
24
 There may be numerous explanations for this. One is that, while difficulty of control may be 
considered the distinguishing mark of addiction (see chapter two; Fraser et al., 2014:38), the 
stereotypical ‘addict’ connotes many other negative characteristics such as willingness to do 
anything whatsoever in order to consume to object in question – to cheat, harm and, perhaps, 
kill others (Room, 2003:229) – while the stereotypical problematic gambler may, more 
specifically, be regarded as dishonest, irresponsible, greedy and aggressive (Horch and 
Hodgins, 2013) all of which may not be consistent with the self-identities of interviewees. 
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five for discussion) in terms of embodying an ‘addict’ identity (or lack thereof). 
However, the only interviewee to have reported participation in formal treatment, ‘Carl’ 
(experiencing addiction), was, also, the only interviewee to, emphatically, refer to 
himself as an “addict”. While another, Sampson (experiencing addiction), mentioned 
addiction only once in his 45+ minute interview – “I must be addicted to it or something 
because I keep going back and losing money” – Carl referred to his “addiction” 
throughout and was adamant that he was still “an addict” despite having maintained 
abstinence for many months prior to interview. This is consistent with the assertion of 
existing literature that the adoption of an addict identity appears particularly apparent 
among those who engage in formal treatment in which the addiction-as-disease model 
is part (e.g. Gamblers Anonymous) (Reith and Dobbie, 2012).  
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Socio-cultural processes and shifts in habitus  
Throughout this chapter, particularly during discussion of transitions between fields and 
of habitus reformation, it has been noted that shifts in interviewees’ social relationships 
and cultural expectations concerted with changes in gambling behaviour. Interviewees 
whose gambling had become increasing reduced and constrained indicated their social 
networks to have developed in ways to become less gambling related and that they 
had come to embody cultural expectations more constraining of gambling, particularly 
as they participated more in non-gambling fields. Discussion now examines more 
closely the social and cultural processes that participants indicated to influence greater 
or lesser control over their gambling across their gambling careers. 
 
Social processes 
Interviewees indicated that various social processes led to gambling networks 
becoming less characterised by gambling. Many reported, over their gambling careers, 
lessening engagement with others who gamble while, simultaneously, forming new 
relationships less characterised by gambling. This resonates with literature suggesting 
that, over life-courses, relationships orientated around deviant practices and/or objects 
of potential addiction often decay and more conventionally orientated relationships tend 
to form (Moore, 1993; Laub and Sampson, 1993; Quintero, 2000). Keith (regained 
control), for example, reported: 
“I don’t go out as much with the Navy boys now. Before my wife moved to 
Plymouth [when interviewee was living with others in Navy accommodation] we 
used to go to the casino every single day after work [...] I probably gambled a 
lot more then than I ever did” 
Keith, regained control 
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The forming of new, valued, romantic relationships seemed to have particular influence 
in constraining gambling: 
Do you think that changes in your circles of friends have had any 
influence over your gambling? (Interviewer) 
“Meeting the missus is probably the big one. She knew I went to the casino, she 
knew I played a lot of poker and stuff but if you lose big then it really is hard on 
the relationship […] so I started doing perhaps a little bit less or at least bring 
the stakes down or be a little more controlled and disciplined in what I was 
doing from month to month” 
Steven, never experienced addiction 
 
Steven went on to assert that though his fiancée did not particularly approve of his 
gambling, she tolerated it within limits. Given that the relationship “means more to [him] 
than gambling ever would”, Steven reported that he would not gamble more heavily. In 
line with existing literature (Laub and Sampson, 1993; Waldorf et al., 1991), Steven 
indicated that the risk of losing a valued, non-gambling orientated, relationship 
encouraged greater constraint. 
 
In addition, there were indications that reductions in gambling were supported by a 
propensity for existing relationships to be become less gambling-related over time. 
Steven (never experienced addiction), for example, reported: 
“The lads that I used to go the casino with a lot are probably going to the casino 
less [...] your social groups do change and I’ve probably got more friends now 
that don’t gamble as much” 
Steven, never experienced addiction 
 
Literature suggests that a common strategy for controlling/quitting substance use 
among those experiencing addiction is to avoid ‘using’ friends and to (re)form ‘non-
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using’ (i.e. non-drug related) ties (Waldorf et al., 1991:205-6). Although interviewees 
did not report purposefully avoiding gamblers in an effort to control their gambling, the 
social processes just described led interviewees to socialise less with others who 
gamble and less in gambling spaces/places. 
 
Rapid changes in social relationships 
Though many interviewees indicated that incremental changes in their relationships 
had supported gradual shifts in gambling behaviour (e.g. decay of gambling-orientated 
relationships), some suggested that more drastic shifts in their social networks 
influenced more rapid changes in gambling behaviour. Migration, for example, was 
indicated to encourage a breaking of old relationships and the formation of new ones. 
Tom (regained control), for example, experienced significant difficulty controlling his 
gambling while living in Liverpool, but when he moved to Plymouth, leaving behind old 
friendships and forming new ones, his gambling “kind of just fizzled out a bit”. His 
geographical move appeared to involve a restructuring of his social network from one 
where gambling was a relatively central practice to one where it was not. Of course, 
changes to social networks resulting from geographical moves might lead to social 
relationships which encourage rather than discourage gambling depending on the 
nature of new relationships. Scott (regained control) who had experienced difficulty 
controlling his poker gambling, for example, reported that he only started poker 
gambling after he moved to Cornwall, formed relationships with others who happened 
to be poker gamblers, and became part of poker communities both online and with 
others in a local pub league. 
 
Cultural processes and shifts in habitus 
In keeping with Bourdieu’s premise that social relationships facilitate access to cultural 
capital which become embodied in the habitus and thereby influence behaviour 
(Bourdieu, 1984), reductions in gambling and shifts towards greater control among 
 263 
 
interviewees were found to be supported by a propensity for social relationships to 
change in ways which facilitated access to particular cultural expectations and 
rationalities/mentalities (ways of thinking) which marginalised/discouraged (heavier) 
gambling. In other words, over life-courses there was a tendency for interviewees to 
increase participation in fields (socio-cultural spaces) which problematised (more 
excessive) gambling and encouraged non-gambling behaviour. 
 
Consistent with Bourdieu (1984), data suggested that through becoming embedded in 
such fields interviewees came to align their own, embodied, cultural expectations and 
ways of thinking with those of their fields thereby motivating courses of action which 
precluded heavier and more excessive gambling. As has been alluded to throughout 
this chapter, the fields in which interviewees came to participate in (e.g. parenthood, 
employment, and marriage) tended to be those characterised by the governing 
rationalities/mentalities of wider contemporary society (e.g. responsibility, acting 
‘rationally’, and risk management; Foucault 1984; Dean, 2010). Reductions in gambling  
were suggested to concert with bringing their personal cultural expectations more in 
line with those rationalities; that is, towards greater self-control/discipline, adversity to 
risk, dependability, and responsibility25. Reflecting back on discussion of habitus in 
chapter six, there was a tendency for reductions in gambling and shifts towards greater 
control to involve a shift towards a more ‘prudential’ habitus more constraining of 
gambling as exemplified by Brian (regained control) who reported becoming more “risk 
averse” and Tom (regained control) who asserted becoming more “responsible” as he 
came to participate more in non-gambling life and organised his life more around non-
gambling related engagements. 
 
                                                          
25
 This is consistent with psychological literature that suggests tendency for personalities to 
change in this way with age (Littlefield et al., 2009:361; Johnson et al., 2007; Roberts et al., 
2001). 
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These findings are consistent with Cloud and Granfield’s (2008) assertion that 
addiction recovery involves embodiment of new systems of meaning (e.g. new 
values/norms and worldviews) that discourage deviancy, but adds that such shifts in 
embodied meaning also encourage greater constraint for those who consume in lieu of 
addiction and indicates that the construction of new meaning may be a ‘typical’ part of 
the life-course. 
 
Resonance of findings with the ‘life-course’ perspective 
Members of the regained control and never experienced addiction groups indicated a 
tendency for their gambling behaviour to reduce in the long-term, over their adult 
gambling careers and thus over their life-courses. Data indicated these shifts in 
gambling behaviour to be concomitant with wider changes in these gamblers’ lives and, 
in particular, changes in the socio-cultural milieus (or fields) in which their lives were 
embedded. At the same time, a few members of the never experienced addiction group 
indicated that their gambling patterns had remained relatively stable over their adult 
gambling careers (and thus over their life-courses) and data indicated this behavioural 
consistency to be supported by stability of socio-cultural milieu. 
These findings complement and take credence from the life-course perspective 
developed from longitudinal research on criminal deviancy (Glueck and Glueck, 1950; 
Glueck and Glueck, 1968; Laub and Sampson, 2003; Sampson and Laub, 2005). 
Based on longitudinal data pertaining to a group of offenders aged between ten and 
seventeen in 1940 and following these individuals up until aged 70, Laub and Sampson 
(2003) found that not only did the offending of these juvenile offenders tend to reduce 
with age (the vast majority coming to desist in middle adulthood) but that criminal 
desistence was associated with various life-events (e.g. marriage, participation in 
military service, shifts in employment, and residential change) which were interpreted 
as ‘turning points’ (Sampson and Laub, 2005). Laub and Sampson (2003) concluded 
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that such life-events motivated desistence by supporting shifts in lives/circumstances, 
identity, and held values/norms in ways which discourage recidivist behaviour. 
Essentially, this is what data collected from the interviewees of this study about their 
gambling careers also illustrated. Consistent with Quintero’s (2000) research 
examining ‘aging out’ of problem drinking, the present thesis suggests that the 
processes conceptualised by the life-course perspective resonate well with those which 
encourage reductions in gambling behaviour as well as natural recovery from gambling 
addiction. 
 
Social Identity Theory (SIT) and the Social Identity Model of Recovery 
(SIMOR)26 
Although the findings have been interpreted according to the sociologically orientated 
theoretical framework developed in chapter one, it is worth noting that what has been 
presented in this chapter largely complements a recently developed model of addiction 
recovery, the Social Identity Model of Recovery (SIMOR) (Best et al., 2016). Rooted in 
social psychology, the SIMOR is strongly influenced by Social Identity Theory (SIT) 
which holds that a given agent’s identity is largely shaped by their membership of the 
social groups/communities in which they participate/interact (Tajfel, 1982; Turner, 
1991; Pearce, 2013). According to SIT, individuals construct their self-identities not 
only through their perception of group membership but rejection of membership of 
other groups/communities – in part, individuals define who they are by who they 
perceive/believe themselves not to be (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). More specifically, 
according to SIT it is not self-identity, per se, that influences behaviour but the 
values/norms that go with embodiment of self-identities derived from group/community 
membership. Although the terms and language used differ, it is clear to see the 
similarities between SIT and the theoretical framework (particularly Bourdieusian 
                                                          
26
 The text in this section was added post-viva as an amendment recommended by PhD 
examiners. 
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aspects; see chapter one). According to both frameworks, subjectivity/self-identity is 
held to be constructed from socio-cultural resources (e.g. cultural capital; value/norms; 
ways of thinking/rationalities) made accessible through group/community (or ‘field’) 
membership and these resources are held, though embodiment, to influence future 
behaviour/practices. 
 
Developed from SIT and existing addictions/recovery research (in particular literature 
which has emphasised recovery to involve identity change), the SIMOR explains 
addiction recovery as largely resulting from changes in group membership/participation 
which bring forth resources supportive of recovery (e.g. practical/emotional support, 
valuable information, and ‘recovery’ values) and involves transition away from 
addiction-related identities towards identities supportive of recovery (Best et al., 2016). 
The formation of new relationships with other individuals who are not experiencing 
addiction and/or consuming/using problematically is viewed as key to recovery as it is 
these which facilitate connection to recovery communities and access to recovery 
capital (Best et al., 2016). 
 
Essentially, then, the SIMOR appreciates the processes of recovery to be very similar 
to those which have been presented in this chapter (and which will be recapped 
shortly; conclusion and summary of key findings). One difference, however, is that data 
analysed for this thesis emphasises that such processes do not only support addiction 
recovery but shifts towards less and more constrained gambling among those who 
never gamble problematically as well. Given the parallels between SIT and SIMOR, on 
the one hand, and the present thesis, on the other, the reader may question why it is 
that those models have not been drawn upon more heavily to guide the research and 
interpret the findings. Firstly, the SIMOR model was first published towards the end of 
the production of this doctoral thesis, after the theoretical and conceptual frameworks 
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had been developed, the data had been collected and analysed, and most of the thesis 
had been written. In fact, the present author only became aware of the model during 
the PhD viva. Nevertheless, it is comforting that the processes of recovery identified in 
the present thesis complement so well other work produced independently. 
 
Secondly, although the principles of SIT were familiar to the present author as they 
strongly resonate with Bourdieusian and much sociological theory in general, SIT as a 
formal theory was unfamiliar (despite having studied sociology for over 10 years). This 
is, perhaps, unsurprising given Jenkins’ (2014) remark that one of the most ‘striking 
things’ about the social identity approach is its ‘isolation from scholarship outside of 
social psychology’ particularly from anthropology and sociology where others (e.g. 
Goffman) had developed very similar ideas long before SIT (Jenkins, 2014:118). 
Despite the similarities between Bourdieu’s work, on the one hand, and the developers 
of SIT (Tajef and Turner, 1979; Turner, 1991) on the other, and the fact that both were 
writing for much of the same period, a reading of the literature suggests that neither 
cited the other. Though a social psychologist familiar with SIT may, quite reasonably, 
question why this chapter has not drawn more heavily on SIT (or why mention of it was 
absent in earlier drafts of this thesis), a sociologist familiar with Bourdieusian theory 
may, similarly and just as reasonably, question why much existing SIT-orientated 
literature does not draw on Bourdieu’s or other sociological theory despite strong 
resonance. Nevertheless, the application of SIT and SIMOR models may be a fruitful 
focus of future research/publications. For example, the SIT premise that agents 
construct their identities by rejection of group membership fits well with the suggestion 
that greater control over gambling may be supported by social distancing – that is, 
reflection on, and rejection of, ‘counter examples’ as indicated by interviewees and in 
existing addictions/recovery literature (Decorte, 2001a; Neale et al., 2011). Moreover, 
the findings of this thesis may be used to develop the SIMOR further. For example, the 
finding that shifts in group membership bring forth new engagements which encourage 
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life-structures to change in ways which influence control and/or harm would be an 
addition worth considering in the SIMOR. 
 
Agency and structure 
It has been stressed throughout this thesis that although behaviour is strongly 
influenced by the circumstances in which actors are embedded and in which they act, 
behaviour/actions also, simultaneously, contribute to, and (re)shape circumstances. 
Moreover, it has also been emphasised that this behaviour-structure relationship is not 
that of deterministic reciprocity because actors have capacity to make decisions (i.e. 
agency), albeit decisions that might be heavily constrained by structural conditions (see 
chapter one). Indeed, discussion in chapter six illustrated how some made use of their 
agential capacities by (purposefully) deploying strategies in order to restructure their 
(immediate) circumstances in ways more supportive of future control (often by making 
future gambling more difficult e.g. restricting short-term access to money) thereby 
constraining gambling and reducing harm. 
 
Chapter seven has also emphasised that the wider circumstances of the lives of 
interviewees influenced their gambling behaviour but as of yet there has been little 
discussion of the role that agency/decisionmaking play in shaping such conditions. 
Interviews suggested that such wider, non-gambling related, changes in their lives 
tended not to be product of purposeful decisions aimed at supporting control or 
changing gambling behaviour but, instead, often latent and unintended consequences 
of decisions to make other changes in their lives such as to move home, to start a new 
romantic relationship, or, perhaps (if planned!), to become a parent. In other instances 
such ‘structural’ changes were implicated to be less product of decisionmaking and 
more consequence of imposition – Jacob (regained control), for example, experienced 
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a period of gambling difficulties after his mother, who had been managing his finances, 
died. 
 
Furthermore, although behaviour is shaped by both structure and agency (Bourdieu, 
1984), data indicated that, with regard to gambling behaviour, structure may well have 
primacy. Shifts in the wider circumstances of interviewees’ lives appeared so influential 
over control that though members of the regained control group often reported that they 
had experienced periods when they had struggled greatly and failed to bring their 
gambling under control, with changes in wider aspects of their lives, shifts in gambling 
behaviour followed often with little effort directed at making behaviour changes. 
 
Conclusion and summary of key findings 
This chapter has illustrated gambling behaviour and control to be strongly influenced by 
the wider, non-gambling related, qualities of interviewees’ lives and their 
subjectivities/dispositions. Given the breadth of findings presented in this chapter it is 
worth summarising those most salient before moving on. 
 
Chiefly influential over gambling were found to be the qualities of the socio-cultural 
milieus (or fields) in which lives were embedded. Those with greater control were 
generally found to participate more in non-gambling and often more ‘conventional’ 
fields, where rationalities (collective ways of thinking) and cultural expectations 
marginalised gambling and problematised heavier gambling, and were found to have 
social networks where gambling featured less. Alongside these more ‘structural’ 
aspects, those with greater control tended to express mentalities (embodied ways of 
thinking) and cultural expectations more consistent with the cultural milieus in which 
they were embedded. Drawing on Bourdieusian theory, it was argued that it was 
through day-to-day participation in such fields that interviewees with greater control had 
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come embody those cultural expectations/rationalities so that those principles became 
integral to their subjectivity thereby constituting a more ‘prudential’ habitus (see chapter 
six). As a result, their ways of thinking and acting (including gambling behaviour) were 
broadly consistent with the fields in which they participate and so they were 
discouraged from engaging in heavier, and so riskier and more problematic, gambling. 
 
As first noted in chapter five, there was propensity for reductions in gambling over the 
gambling careers of both interviewees who had regained control and others who had 
never experienced addiction. Explaining these behavioural changes was of particular 
focus in this chapter. It was deduced that the same socio-cultural processes were 
largely responsible for long-term reductions in gambling among members of both these 
groups and this implies that the processes of natural recovery may be the same as 
those processes which bring about reductions in gambling for those who never 
experience difficulties. Interviewees revealed, over their life-courses, tendency toward 
increased participation in more ‘conventional’ fields characterised by the ways of 
thinking and cultural expectations just described. With these more ‘structural’ changes, 
interviewees came to more greatly (re)align their ways of thinking and expectations 
with those of these more conventional fields thereby motivating shifts toward more 
constrained gambling behaviour and greater control (particularly for those who had 
experienced addiction). Particularly supportive of reductions in gambling behaviour, as 
well as shifts towards greater control (including recovery), appeared to be tendency for 
gambling to feature less and less in social networks over life-courses as older, more 
gambling focused, relationships decayed or changed and new relationships where 
gambling had little place formed. 
Having lives structured more around non-gambling engagements was found to support 
more constrained and controlled gambling. Often engagements appeared quite 
mundane such as paying bills, going to work, and preparing meals in addition to 
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hobbies, exercise, and spending time with friends/family. Particularly constraining 
appeared to be having engagements which interviewees viewed with importance (or, 
more precisely, with greater importance than gambling engagements) and which they 
framed in terms of ‘responsibility’ or ‘commitment’. Moreover, data suggested that life-
structures such as these were dependent on participation in more conventional life as 
this was suggested to bring with it engagements that interviewees incorporated into 
their lives. Reductions in gambling as well as recovery were suggested to involve 
accumulation of non-gambling engagements and/or coming to view engagements as 
just described. Those who had experienced addiction recovery often reported having 
marginalised activities such as eating, paying bills and socialising with others during 
difficulties but no longer doing so after regaining control. There was a sense that 
through greater participation in more conventional life not only did interviewees 
accumulate non-gambling engagements but they came to view those engagements 
with greater importance (i.e. in terms of responsibility and commitment).  
 
More constrained and better regulated gambling was suggested to be supported by 
possession of multiple, non-gambling related, self-identities so that ‘gambling’ was a 
relatively small part of sense of self. As was argued earlier, possession of more 
conventional self-identities involves embodiment of mentalities and cultural 
expectations about how one should (be)have which act to dissuade from (heavier) 
gambling. Drawing on Bourdieu (1984), it was discussed that the formation of non-
gambling identities involves taking on social roles garnered through participation in 
non-gambling life. Interviewees who experienced addiction recovery often indicated 
that through increasing participation in non-gambling areas of life they came to embody 
greater multiplicities of non-gambling identities and that gambling had become 
decreasingly central to their sense of self. 
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Interviewees tended not to indicate having experienced stigmatisation or 
marginalisation as a result of their gambling. While this was expected among those 
who had never experienced addiction, it was unexpected among those who had 
experienced addiction because literature suggests addiction and stigmatisation often to 
go together resulting in marginalisation (McIntosh and McKeganey, 2001). Whatever 
the reasons for non-reporting of stigmatisation/marginalisation (see earlier discussion), 
it was posited that lack of stigmatisation may have eased recovery for those who 
experienced difficulties because marginalisation would likely have impeded 
participation in more conventional life and access to the very resources which support 
greater control. Surprisingly, interviewees who indicated periods of significant 
difficulties controlling their gambling and were thus identified in this study as having 
experienced addiction tended not to report, explicitly, having been “addicted”. It was 
argued that this was because interviewees tended not to ever have think of themselves 
as addicted and so did not embody the principles of addiction (see chapter two). As 
such they did not ever consider themselves as afflicted with a chronic condition or that 
they were completely powerless to regulate their consumption and this may have 
supported their recovery. Moreover, some who had thought of themselves as addicted 
appeared to have relinquished their once-held ‘addict’ identity and, in doing so, may 
have been better able to regain control. In the next chapter the thesis is concluded. 
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Chapter eight: Conclusions and implications 
This final chapter examines the significance and value of the thesis. The key findings 
are examined and there is discussion of how these might be used to develop 
interventions/policies which promote better controlled gambling, recovery from 
gambling addiction and reductions in gambling-related harm. Afterwards, the 
theoretical and conceptual frameworks (see chapters one and three) that were 
developed to guide data collection, analysis and interpretation are re-examined. 
Improvements to the conceptual framework are suggested to aid future research. 
Discussion then turns to critique the study. The limitations of the research are 
examined and reflection is provided about what might have been done differently with 
hindsight, greater resources, and with the knowledge now possessed by the author. 
The chapter closes with ideas for future research which could follow the thesis. 
 
Key findings and implications 
This thesis has investigated (a) how and why most of those who gamble never 
experience gambling addiction and significant harm and (b) how and why most of those 
who do experience gambling addiction come to regain control and ameliorate or avoid 
harm. Drawing on sociological theory (see chapter one) and drug-use literature (see 
chapter two), the focus has been on how greater/lesser control and harm is influenced 
by aspects of social-setting and socio-cultural milieu and, taking lead from others 
(Zinberg, 1984; Moore, 1993), how shifts in those aspects encourage recovery from 
gambling addiction. Discussion now turns to highlight the key findings of the thesis and 
discuss how these may be used to support greater control and reduce gambling-related 
harm. 
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Findings, implications and recommendations to reduce harm among both 
those who are, and are not, experiencing addiction 
The immediate gambling setting was found to influence gambling behaviour and had 
potential to encourage more constrained gambling as well as impede harm (see 
chapter six). Indeed, interviewees (both those who were experiencing addiction and 
those who were not) revealed exploiting the structure(s) of gambling environments in 
ways to better manage their gambling, often by incorporating qualities of setting into 
strategies aimed at supporting greater constraint and ameliorating/mitigating harm. 
Some of these strategies were found to be effective while others were found to be 
more detrimental. Practices effective at supporting control and mitigating harm 
included: not (re)gambling winnings; various ‘bankroll management’ style strategies; 
‘grinding’; and limiting the amount of money that may be gambled over a specified 
timeframe. Some other strategies, though often aimed at reducing harm, actually 
increased harm. These included ‘chasing’ strategies aimed at recouping losses as well 
as gambling ‘systems’ (e.g. the ‘neighbours’ roulette system or ‘martingale’ strategy) 
which some interviewees believed to provide advantage (e.g. increase winnings) but 
which did not appear to do so and acted to encourage more excessive gambling. 
 
Given lack of research concerning strategies that support control and reduce harm (cf. 
Moore et al., 2012; Blaszczynski et al., 2014), insight provided by this thesis might be 
drawn on to develop policies and interventions which encourage greater control and/or 
positive gambling strategies (e.g. bankroll management) and discourage lesser control 
and/or harmful gambling practices (e.g. chasing practices). It is vital to emphasise, 
however, the need for rigorous evaluation of policies and interventions before 
implementation in order to ameliorate any latent/unintended negative consequences 
which might increase harm. Any suggestions for interventions and policy asserted 
herein, then, are presented as potential recommendations pending evaluation. 
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Implications and recommendations: education 
Practices, skills and competencies more supportive of better regulated and less 
harmful gambling might be promoted through educational strategies. This could involve 
the dissemination of effectual strategies whilst explicating the ineffectiveness and 
dangerousness of others. This would likely not only be beneficial to those who gamble 
(including, though not limited to, those experiencing difficulties/addiction) but also to 
those who have never gambled (or do so occasionally) as some of these will come to 
gamble frequently in future (and are at risk of gambling addiction/harm). Although how 
individuals might be educated in such skills/competencies is not of primary focus in this 
thesis, some discussion of the challenges involved is now provided. 
 
Providing education/information to those who seek recovery support may be relatively 
straightforward as this can be offered in formal treatment or through self-help provision 
online, however very few of those who experience difficulties seek support (Reith, 
2006) and, as those who do tend only to do so after they have experienced significant 
harm (Weinstock et al., 2011), many treatment-seekers are likely to benefit from such 
education/information long before they seek help. Gamblers who do not seek formal 
support (including both those who experience difficulties/addiction and those who do 
not) but who might also benefit are likely more difficult to target. Whilst, at present, 
information tends to be provided in land-based gambling venues (e.g. in the form of 
posters, stickers, and leaflets) (Moodie and Reith, 2009), there is suggestion that few, 
even among those experiencing difficulties, pay attention to the content of this 
information let alone modify their behaviour in response (Monaghan and Blaszczynski, 
2010). Perhaps most difficult to target, are those who do not gamble but may 
eventually do so. 
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The issue of who provides education/information should be considered as this may 
influence effectiveness. In the UK, gambling research, education, treatment and 
support is largely (indeed, almost exclusively) funded directly or indirectly by voluntary 
donations from commercial gambling providers (George and Bowden-Jones, 2016). 
This arrangement has been criticised as open to conflict of interest (George and 
Copello, 2011). For example, one UK-registered charity, the ‘Young Gamblers 
Educational Trust’, with a mission statement to ‘inform, educate and safeguard young 
people against problematic gambling’, was recently criticised in news media for 
accepting donations directly from gambling providers (including Gala Group, Bet365, 
Paddy Power, and Caesars Entertainment) and for having trustees with commercial 
gambling interests (Grierson, 2016). Regardless of whether or not a commercial 
gambling funding source influences educational content, the perception that it does 
might negatively impact on effectiveness. If, for example, the principles of bankroll 
management are presented to individuals in a programme funded in such a way then it 
might be believed that the strategy supports the (financial) interests of commercial 
gambling business and not the gambler. Perhaps, then, the gambler thinks that 
bankroll management reduces the amount of money that gambling providers pay out 
as winnings? They might then consider purposefully acting in direct opposition to ‘beat 
the bookie’ and so decide to place larger wagers more conducive to harm. 
 
Implications and recommendations: (re)designing gambling environments 
to reduce harm among both those who are, and are not, experiencing 
addiction 
Drawing on the risk environment approach (see chapter three; Rhodes, 2009), a 
complementary way of encouraging greater constraint and reducing gambling-related 
harm (among both those who are experiencing addiction and those who are not) is to 
(re)design environments in ways that support the development and performance of 
‘positive’ gambling practices (e.g. bankroll management) and which discourage the 
development and performance of more deleterious ones (e.g. chasing losses). Whilst 
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this would obviously have value for those experiencing significant difficulties, spaces 
designed in such a way might also benefit those who might otherwise come to 
experience difficulties in future. Based on the findings of this thesis, some ideas about 
how gambling environments may be (re)designed will now be briefly discussed and 
prominent issues and potential challenges are highlighted. 
 
Ensure that gambling providers accept smaller wagers 
While recently there have been discussions about decreasing the maximum size of 
wagers permitted in order to reduce harm (Ramesh, 2014; Parke and Parke, 2013), 
findings from this thesis suggest that removing restrictions on the minimum size of 
wagers might also be beneficial. As discussed in chapter six, some interviewees who 
gamble online reported that they tended to wager bets of a few pence (in poker this 
was termed ‘grinding’) and that this supports more constrained gambling expenditure 
and impedes financial harm. Interviewees indicated the placing of smaller wagers, 
particularly those of less than a £1, to be the preserve of online gambling – bets placed 
in offline settings (e.g. betting shops and casinos) tended not to constitute a few pence. 
Two factors may discourage (or prohibit) the placing of smaller bets which may be 
addressed to encourage safer gambling environments. Firstly, some providers and 
even the UK gambling regulator (the Gambling Commission) imposes minimum wagers 
on activities. For example, the minimum stake on ‘category C’ gambling machines, 
which includes ‘fruit-machines’ often found in pubs, is currently set at £1 (Gambling 
Commission, 2016:4). Secondly, cultural expectations in gambling venues may 
discourage placing bets of a few pence. For example, it may be regarded as ‘cheap’ for 
individuals to place relatively small bets or it may not be seen as ‘worthwhile’ to do so if 
the gambler has taken the time/effort to visit the betting shop. 
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Support for bankroll management strategies 
As discussed in chapter six, adherence to bankroll management strategies among 
poker gamblers supports greater constraint, minimises financial losses, and is likely to 
have a similar positive effect when employed by those gambling on other non-poker 
activities. One way of supporting and promoting use of bankroll management strategies 
beyond poker in online spaces might be by building into the website/user interface an 
option to allow customers to limit wagers to a proportion of the funds in their gambling 
account(s). As well as entering a monetary figure for the bet (as is currently the case), 
an option may be provided to place, for example, 5% of the balance of the online 
gambling account. Adhering to this strategy, any losses would mean reductions in the 
size of wagers thereby reducing potential for financial harm. 
 
Restrict access to money within gambling settings 
A common strategy reported by members of the regained control and experiencing 
addiction groups to limit gambling and thereby reduce (financial) harm during periods of 
addiction was to restrict access to money during gambling sessions. Some casino-
going interviewees, for instance, reported that they had often carried only a pre-
specified amount of cash on evenings out when they planned to visit a gambling venue 
(or thought that they might end up doing so) and had left bankcards elsewhere (e.g. at 
home or in the car) or given them to others to look after. As discussed in chapter six, 
though this did not always prevent further gambling (e.g. some reported on occasion 
going home to get bankcards before returning to the casino) it hindered it, slowing it 
down, and provided space for reflection which sometimes led to desistence (at least for 
that session). 
 
It is reasonable to assert, then, that by restricting access to cash withdrawal/debit 
facilities greater constraint would be supported, benefiting those who experience 
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difficulties (and, perhaps, those who do not but might prefer to gamble less). This might 
be achieved through limiting access to money within gambling venues by removing 
ATMs from gambling-focused venues and precluding use of debit/credit cards for 
gambling. Indeed, despite lack of evaluative research (cf. Thomas et al., 2013), the 
removal of ATMs has been adopted by many betting shop chains in the UK (albeit 
voluntarily rather than by statutory requirement) (Parke et al., 2014). Nonetheless, 
these betting shops still tend to accept bets by debit/credit cards and so, in practice, 
the effectiveness of ATM absence may have little influence unless those facilities are 
also removed. Based on interview data, it is reasonable to suggest that designing 
gambling environments so that gamblers must leave the gambling venue if they are to 
gain additional funds required for further gambling may not only slow down gambling 
but provide space for reflection and so support better gambling decisions (e.g. to end 
the gambling session or to reduce wagers). It is important that this intervention is 
thoroughly evaluated, however, as it may be that some gamblers will carry extra cash 
to compensate for restricted access to money, thereby perhaps increasing rather than 
reducing harm.  
 
Strengthen existing ‘budgeting’ facilities offered by providers 
Some interviewees reported making use of deposit limit27 facilities offered by online 
gambling providers to restrict the amount of money that could be spent over a pre-
specified time period. A significant problem with limit-setting facilities is that they can be 
easily subverted (Blaszczynski et al., 2014) as was demonstrated by Keith (regained 
control) who, during periods of difficulty/addiction, often switched between different 
online gambling providers after reaching his arranged deposit limit with each provider 
(see chapter six). 
 
                                                          
27
 Where the amount of money that can be transferred into an online gambling account is limited 
(Nelson et al., 2008) 
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One way of strengthening the effectiveness of existing facilities might be to discourage 
online gamblers from having multiple accounts thereby impeding the ease of which 
those limiting facilities may be undermined. Interviewees did not appear motivated to 
open multiple accounts in order to circumvent pre-set limits but to exploit one-off 
‘welcome bonus’ promotions offered to new customers. They were then left with 
gambling accounts with different providers, impeding the effectiveness of any 
constraints they put on those accounts (e.g. deposit limits) because they were able, 
easily and quickly, to switch between gambling accounts. If introductory 
incentives/promotions were not offered to new customers then gamblers may be less 
likely to open accounts with various providers thereby supporting greater constraint. 
Another, complementary, suggestion might be to encourage bank providers to offer 
facilities to limit transfers to gambling providers. From the author’s personal 
experience, it is far easier, simpler and quicker to open gambling accounts with 
different providers than it is to open multiple bank accounts. This may add an extra 
hindrance to gambling beyond pre-determined limits, particularly if used in conjunction 
with those facilities already offered by gambling providers. 
 
Encourage breaks during gambling sessions 
Interviews suggested taking breaks within gambling sessions to support greater control 
by slowing down gambling and providing time for (better) decisionmaking (see chapter 
six). The availability of other, non-gambling, activities in the gambling space as well as 
non-gambling sub-spaces (e.g. seating away from gambling activities) where time 
could be taken out from gambling was indicated to support break-taking and so greater 
constraint. As such, the provision of non-gambling activities and separate (but nearby) 
non-gambling spaces which encourage gamblers to take breaks is likely to be 
beneficial. However, this recommendation requires particular scrutiny as it might be 
that this provision discourages individuals from leaving gambling places, thereby 
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encouraging heavier gambling for some, or that it makes it more difficult for those 
experiencing addiction to avoid gambling places if they are attempting to do so. 
 
Challenges with (re)designing gambling environments and developing 
effective interventions 
As will now briefly be examined, there are many issues and challenges involved in 
(re)designing gambling environments to support greater control and to reduce harm. 
These include concerns about civil liberties, resistance from gambling providers, rapidly 
changing gambling landscapes and propensity for online providers to be based 
overseas and so often outside of regulatory reach.  
 
Impact on civil liberties 
Many of the suggestions for safer gambling environments presented in this chapter 
impact, to varying extents, on civil liberties. The removal of cash withdrawal facilities 
(e.g. ATMs or debit/credit card use) within gambling venues, for example, would impact 
not only those wishing to constrain their gambling but also on those who do not wish to 
do so (whether or not they are experiencing difficulties). The question of whether or not 
it is reasonable to inconvenience the latter majority to benefit the former minority is a 
valid one and further evaluative/cost-benefit research is required to inform such a 
debate. Most tenable, arguably, would be interventions that benefit those seeking to 
better regulate their gambling but which have little or no inconvenience on those who 
are not. Offering facilities on bank accounts to limit transfers to gambling providers, for 
example, are unlikely to impede the liberty of the latter. 
 
Indeed, another suggestion considered during the writing of this thesis was the removal 
of cash withdrawal facilities nearby gambling venues. However, as gambling venues 
tend to be situated in town centres and on high-streets/thoroughfares (Jones et al., 
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2000; Wardle et al., 2011b) where lack of access to money would likely have negative 
impact on those not gambling and on non-gambling businesses, this would be 
untenable. 
 
Resistance from gambling providers 
Given that those experiencing gambling difficulties are estimated to contribute much 
more to gambling revenues, per capita, than those who are not (Productivity 
Commission, 2010), interventions which reduce harm (and support greater control) are 
likely to impact negatively on those revenues (Williams et al., 2007; Blaszczynski, 
2011; Livingstone and Adams, 2016). Indeed, some measures such as the removal of 
ATMs from gambling venues, have been suggested to reduce revenues from 
customers who do not experience difficulties as well (Thomas et al., 2013). Moreover, 
the (re)designing of gambling spaces as well as the implementation (and operation) of 
programs aimed at supporting control and reducing harm is likely an additional financial 
cost for providers and so will have further negative impact on profits (Ladouceur et al., 
2016). As commercial enterprises, it is reasonable to suggest, then, that such 
implementations may be problematic in terms of profit for gambling providers and 
thereby represent a conflict of interest leading the most effective interventions to be 
resisted. Indeed, some research has indicated that even when harm-reduction 
interventions (e.g. ‘responsible gambling’ signage) are statutory and condition of 
license, these are often flouted (Moodie and Reith, 2009). As such, there is a pressing 
need to ensure compliance with responsible gambling codes and/or regulatory 
requirements (Ladouceur et al., 2016). 
 
Offshore online gambling and regulatory compliance 
In June 2016, there were 2,459 gambling websites that accept gambling from the UK. 
These are mostly based offshore (Online Casino City, 2016) and so outside of the 
regulatory control of individual states (Gainsbury, 2010). Given this, it is difficult to 
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encourage offshore online providers to adhere to regulation pertaining to the markets in 
which they provide services (Ladouceur et al., 2016) and, due to the nature of the 
internet, very difficult to prevent citizens accessing unregulated websites (Gainsbury 
and Wood, 2011). In the UK, gambling providers who adhere to consumer protection 
codes are afforded advertising privileges over those which do not (Gainsbury, 2010). 
Additional incentives should be found to ensure that providers adhere to harm-
reduction codes. 
 
Fast-changing commercial gambling environments: outdated research and 
superseded recommendations 
The propensity for commercial gambling environments to change rapidly with 
technological, marketing, and other innovations (Gainsbury and Wood, 2011), leading 
to changes in how individuals interact with, and gamble within, those environments 
contributes to difficulties in ensuring that interventions and strategies remain effective 
(Ladouceur et al., 2016). Indeed, over time, once effectual policies, interventions and 
strategies might not merely become ineffective but deleterious contributing to harm. As 
such, there is great need for continual (re)evaluation of regulations/interventions 
(Ladouceur et al., 2016). Considered and thorough research and evaluation is often, 
however, a slow process. It takes time to develop proposals, secure funding, 
undertake, write-up, and disseminate/publish research with qualitative studies, 
arguably better suited to the evaluation of interventions, particularly time-consuming. 
Moreover, the translation of research into ‘practice’ (i.e. interventions/policies) also 
tends to be a slow process (Mallonee et al., 2006) which may be compounded by 
resistance from gambling providers and other stakeholders (e.g. governments who 
benefit from gambling taxation). A particular challenge, then, is to produce timely 
research which is also rigorous. 
 
 284 
 
Influence of wider milieu, circumstances and subjectivity on self-
regulation of gambling and addiction recovery 
Beyond the gambling-specific, interviewees of all ideal-types revealed the wider 
aspects of their lives/milieus as well as the nature of their subjectivities to have strong 
influence over the regulation of their gambling and attendant experience of harm (or 
lack thereof). Indeed, as will be become clear, wider qualities of lives and subjectivities 
were found to be far more influential over self-regulation than aspects of immediate 
gambling spaces and gambling practices just discussed. Shortly, recommendations for 
interventions aimed at promoting socio-cultural milieus and subjectivities supportive of 
control, addiction recovery and harm-reduction will be presented. First, however, it is 
worth recapping on the findings/discussion presented in chapter seven.  
 
Socio-cultural milieu and processes 
Particularly fundamental to interviewees’ gambling regulation were found to be the 
nature of their social networks as well as the rationalities (ways of thinking) and cultural 
expectations (values/norms) to which those relationships provide access. Those with 
better control tended to: 
 have social networks less characterised by gambling (i.e. gambling-related 
activities were not central in their social relationships) and; 
 participate deeper in communities (or fields) strongly characterised by 
rationalities and cultural expectations more discouraging and marginalising of 
(heavier) gambling behaviour. 
Members of both the never experienced addiction and regained control groups 
indicated lasting reductions in gambling behaviour, including shifts towards greater 
constraint and control concomitant with recovery, to be underpinned by social and 
cultural processes which resulted in interviewees’ socio-cultural milieus becoming more 
like those bullet-pointed above. Over their life-course (and thus over gambling careers), 
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the social networks of members of these groups tended to become less characterised 
by gambling activities with greater participation in communities which more strongly 
featured rationalities, expectations more discouraging of (heavier) gambling. Members 
of the regained control group suggested that recovery, in particular, tended to involve 
shifting from a state of relative detachment/isolation from non-gambling life during 
periods of difficulty to one of increased participation in more ‘conventional’ life better 
characterised by the dominant, contemporary, rationalities described in chapter one. 
 
Subjectivity: embodied rationalities, expectations and identities  
As argued in chapter one, the character of an individual’s subjectivity (habitus) is 
strongly influenced by the past and present circumstances of their lives (e.g. socio-
cultural milieu) and thereby shapes behaviour/actions. Consistent with this, those with 
greater control tended to express subjectivities better aligned with rationalities and 
expectations more characteristic of the ‘conventional’ communities in which they were 
embedded and participate. In short, those with greater control tended to: 
 embody more ‘prudential’ style mentalities (rationalities) and cultural 
expectations which conflicted with, discouraged and marginalised (heavier) 
gambling. 
 embody sense of self (often characterised by multiplicities of non-gambling 
identities) where gambling was a relatively small part. 
Lasting reductions in gambling behaviour, including shifts towards greater constraint 
and control concomitant with recovery, were suggested to involve alterations in 
subjectivity to be more like those bullet-pointed above. In particular, members of the 
regained control group (i.e. interviewees who experienced recovery) often indicated 
transformations of subjectivity and mentalities away from the more prodigal and 
towards the more prudential. 
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Life-structure 
Interviews indicated life-structures more characterised by, and organised around, non-
gambling, and often quite prosaic, engagements to support more constrained and 
controlled gambling, especially where these were perceived by the agent as 
meaningful, important, and in terms of priorities, responsibilities and commitments (see 
chapter seven). Members of both the never experienced addiction and regained control 
groups suggested reductions in gambling and shifts towards greater control (including 
recovery) to involve accumulation of non-gambling engagements, (re)organisation of 
life-structure around those, and coming to view those (new and existing) engagements 
in terms as just described. 
 
Dominance of wider milieu and subjectivity over the gambling specific 
As noted earlier, findings revealed that though particular gambling strategies and 
qualities of gambling settings were valuable in constraining gambling and reducing 
harm, far more influential over better regulated gambling were found to be qualities of 
interviewees’ subjectivities (including self-identity) and their wider milieus (including life-
structure). The dominance of these, wider, non-gambling specific aspects is illustrated 
in two main ways. 
Firstly, members of the regained control group often reported that they had employed 
the same gambling strategies aimed at supporting greater constraint and reducing 
harm both at time of interview and during periods of difficulties. Indeed, in spite of such 
strategies, these participants indicated that they struggled and failed to bring their 
gambling behaviour under greater control until the advent of wider, non-gambling 
related, changes in the circumstances of their lives (e.g. shifts in social networks to 
become less gambling focused) and in their subjectivities (e.g. coming to more greatly 
embody ways of thinking and cultural expectations which marginalise/problematise 
gambling) (see chapter seven). 
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Secondly, data revealed differentiation between greater and lesser control to have far 
more to do with inequalities of conventional capital and degrees of participation in non-
gambling life than possession of gambling capital and participation in gambling life (see 
chapter seven). Greater participation in non-gambling life and possession of the means 
to participate therein (e.g. conventional capital) appeared to support greater control and 
dissuade from heavier gambling. Interviewees who experienced recovery tended to 
report having lacked more conventional capital and participation in non-gambling life 
during periods of difficulties relative to when they had regained control by time of 
interview. 
 
Recommendations to promote milieus and subjectivities which protect 
against gambling difficulties and encourage recovery among those 
experiencing addiction 
As has been discussed, this thesis has uncovered qualities of milieus and subjectivities 
supportive of greater control and explicated how changes in such qualities encourage 
shifts toward better controlled gambling (including addiction recovery). This knowledge 
may not only be used to aid development of interventions and policies which promote 
lives and subjectivities discouraging of addiction but also interventions/policies which 
support recovery among those who do experience addiction. Some ideas and 
recommendations for such interventions/polices are now offered. 
 
Encourage participation in non-gambling life and the formation of non-gambling 
relationships 
Interview data emphasised that in order to protect against experience of gambling 
difficulties and support addiction recovery, it is imperative that individuals (both 
gamblers and non-gamblers as well as those experiencing addiction and those not) 
participate regularly in non-gambling life and, in particular, within groups/communities 
which feature expectations that marginalise gambling. Those experiencing addiction, 
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as well as those who are not, should be encouraged to maintain engagement in non-
gambling life and those experiencing addiction, in particular, must be supported to 
deepen such participation. 
 
Through greater participation in non-gambling communities, individuals will be better 
able to access resources (or recovery capital; Cloud and Granfield, 2008) which 
promote greater control, prevent slippage into addiction and support addiction 
recovery. Isolation from conventional life should be discouraged as, consistent with the 
past experiences of some members of the regained control group, research suggests 
isolation and social exclusion to increase risk of dependency and addiction (Duffy and 
Baldwin, 2013; Waldorf et al., 1991) as well as to impede recovery (Buchanan, 2004). 
As will be discussed further shortly, interventions that promote participation in non-
gambling life and facilitate the formation of social ties are likely to support the formation 
subjectivities/identities and life-structures of the nature that interviewees suggested to 
be supportive of control and recovery. 
 
Regardless of how greater participation in more conventional life is promoted, of utmost 
importance is that accessible opportunities exist for individuals to engage in non-
gambling related life/social groups and develop meaningful non-gambling related 
relationships. Those who are at greatest risk of addiction, and who may less readily 
recover ‘naturally’, are often aptly described as disadvantaged (Buchanan, 2004) and 
this raises two further important considerations. Firstly, and not least because 
problematic gambling often leads to financial harm (Dickerson, 2003), those who might 
benefit most from services/interventions may be little able to pay for 
services/interventions and so support should be free at the point of use. Secondly, 
those who would benefit most are also more likely to be those who lack employment-
related capital/skills and so any interventions aimed at promoting social connectedness 
which also help develop such resources would likely be doubly beneficial (not only 
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might employment-related training facilitate the formation of social ties within training 
sessions, but such services would help individuals to develop the resources required to 
engage in employment-related communities and this, in turn, is likely to facilitate the 
formation of non-gambling related social ties supportive of recovery/control). 
 
Recommendations for services which would help support recovery and protect against 
addiction could include: 
 Provision of employment-related workshops in community spaces (e.g. 
community centres/libraries). As well as supporting the formation of non-
gambling related relationships (and thereby facilitating social/recovery capital), 
this could help individuals develop resources needed to access employment 
and so access the social networks that go with employment. Such workshops 
could include those aimed at developing IT skills or supporting CV writing. 
 
 ‘Coffee’ mornings/afternoons and other ‘meet-up’ style events. 
 
 Schemes aimed at developing civic engagement/voluntary work in the local 
community. 
 
 Support for the development of local interest groups (e.g. sports groups or DIY 
groups). 
It would also be worth proactively targeting more disadvantaged individuals who are at 
greater risk of gambling addiction in an effort to encourage greater community 
participation and the development of wider social networks. Information about 
interventions could be made available in GP services, community centres, debt advice 
services, at Citizens Advice charities and so forth. 
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Support subjectivities which discourage (heavier) gambling and promote 
recovery 
Consistent with existing literature (Best et al., 2016; Tajfel and Turner, 1979), findings 
from this thesis have indicated that with greater participation in non-gambling related 
social groups/communities, individuals come to develop non-gambling orientated 
subjectivities/identities more supportive of control and recovery. In other words, with 
participation in more conventional/non-gambling life, positive shifts in subjectivity/self-
identity tend to follow. Largely, this appears to be because through such participation 
individuals come to (re)align their own mentalities (ways of thinking) and cultural 
expectations (values/norms) for comportment with those more constraining of gambling 
which are championed in those groups/communities (see chapter seven). 
 
Whilst the most effective way of encouraging the development of subjectivities and 
embodiment of mentalities/expectations more supportive of control/recovery may well 
be to encourage conventional participation, there may be complementary ways to 
support these processes. One idea, for example, is to encourage those in formal 
treatment to spend time reflecting on their non-gambling participation and to think 
about themselves as belonging to the group in question. Doing so may support the 
development of non-gambling identities. 
 
Promote life-structures organised around non-gambling engagements 
Findings suggest that having everyday lives structured more around non-gambling 
engagements (and less around gambling-related ones) is more conducive to control 
and supportive of recovery (see chapter seven). In order to promote recovery for those 
experiencing addiction and to protect others from experiencing addiction in the first 
place, individuals/gamblers should be encouraged to gain and maintain non-gambling 
engagements, think of these in terms of responsibilities or commitments, and organise 
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their lives around these. Many such engagements are likely to go with greater 
participation in non-gambling life as previously recommended. 
 
This recommendation, particularly with regard to gamblers already experiencing 
difficulties, however, requires caution. Some of those who experience difficulties may 
not lack non-gambling engagements but, instead, might be marginalising and failing to 
meet existing ones (see chapter seven). Moreover, while it did not appear the case 
among the present interviewees, literature has suggested that some are motivated to 
gamble more heavily as a way to cope with ‘everyday stresses’ and to ‘escape’ from 
these (Wood and Griffiths, 2007:109). Given these points, it is likely that some, and 
perhaps those who experience the most significant difficulties, might need extra 
support to manage non-gambling engagements including those which might seem 
more mundane/prosaic (e.g. buying and preparing food or paying bills). Without this, it 
is possible that the promotion of non-gambling engagements/commitments could, for 
some, be counterproductive, perhaps encouraging gambling and increasing harm. For 
those engaged in formal treatment, then, it might be worth developing interventions 
(e.g. workshops) which support such everyday engagements. 
 
Other strengths of promoting lives and subjectivities more conducive to 
control   
As well as being more effective in support control, impeding harm, and encouraging 
behaviour change (e.g. recovery; see chapter seven), the recommendations just 
provided go some way to addressing many of the challenges involved in (re)designing 
gambling environments that were discussed earlier. Firstly, they rely little on gambling 
providers to adhere to, and implement, interventions. Although, ethically, providers 
should be held responsible for supporting greater control and reducing harm and so 
must be encouraged (or forced) to engage in such efforts, as was discussed earlier, 
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gambling providers undoubtedly have vested interest in resisting many interventions 
aimed at reducing harm and supporting control because of negative impact on 
revenues. As such, gambling providers may seek to attenuate or pervert 
implementation of interventions in ways which limit effectiveness or, perhaps, increase 
harm. Encouraging the development of wider lives and subjectivities which discourage 
gambling difficulties would help protect gamblers against the resistance of providers to 
effective interventions/policies. 
 
Secondly, those recommendations reduce reliance on the qualities of gambling 
environments to constrain gambling behaviour. As such, gamblers may be less 
vulnerable to shifts in gambling environments which might remove external constraints 
on gambling that some may rely on to regulate their gambling. In other words, by 
encouraging the development of lives more supportive of greater control and protective 
against addictive/problematic consumption, individuals are better placed to weather 
changes in gambling environments than if their gambling was heavily reliant on 
qualities of the gambling environment. 
 
Finally, the development of lives/milieus and subjectivities supportive of better 
regulated and less harmful gambling is likely to have wide-ranging positive influence on 
other aspects of lives far beyond gambling. An abundance of evidence has indicated 
that greater participation in wider social life improves wellbeing and quality of life in a 
myriad of ways. It has been consistently shown, for example, that social 
connectedness supports better mental and physical health (Umberson and Montez, 
2010) and provides access to resources such as social/practical support as well as 
valuable information (e.g. about employment and other opportunities) which can 
improve quality of life in general (Smith and Christakis, 2008; Granovetter, 1973). 
Furthermore, although not the case among the present interviewees, literature has 
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consistently suggested it common for those with gambling difficulties to experience 
other addictions and mental health problems concurrently (Lorains et al., 2011) and so 
shifts in lives/milieu which ameliorate gambling problems may also have positive 
impact on these.  
 
It is important to be clear that the dominance of wider aspects of lives and subjectivities 
does not mean that attempts to support ‘better’ gambling strategies or ‘safer’ gambling 
environments (such as those discussed earlier) are not extremely important for these 
can reduce harm and support constraint, but it does mean that, alongside those 
endeavours, it is crucial that efforts are made to encourage the development of wider 
lives/circumstances and subjectivities in ways which promote greater control (including 
recovery), discourage more excessive gambling, and ameliorate concomitant harm.  
 
Reflections on the application of the theoretical and conceptual 
frameworks (including implications for future work) 
The thesis has been underpinned and guided by theoretical and conceptual 
frameworks (developed in chapters one and three respectively). The application of 
these to the interview data will now be reflected upon. 
 
Reflections on the theoretical framework: a Bourdieusian-Foucauldian 
synthesis 
The theoretical framework, constructed from social theory and taking the form of a 
Bourdieusian-Foucauldian synthesis, set the scene for how (gambling) behaviour and 
addiction was approached throughout the thesis. To develop the framework, Bourdieu’s 
model of social action was supplemented with two bodies of Foucauldian-inspired 
literature: (i) (post)Foucauldian governmentality literature (see chapter one) and (ii) 
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literature presenting addiction as a culture-bound, socially constructed phenomenon 
(see chapter two). In taking this approach, the experience of addiction was approached 
as the embodiment of addiction discourse and dominant contemporary ways of thinking 
or ‘rationalities’ (e.g. neoliberalism, new prudentialism and responsiblisation). 
 
The theoretical framework proved extremely valuable in the thesis and, in particular, for 
the interpretation of gambling behaviour. The Bourdieusian concepts of habitus, 
practice, species of capital (including social, cultural, and symbolic), and field were 
used to analyse and interpret data gathered from interviews (see chapter seven in 
particular). As discussed in chapter seven, a central finding of the thesis was that 
reductions in gambling behaviour (as well as recovery) were strongly promoted by a 
propensity for interviewees to participate more deeply in more ‘conventional’ (and non-
gambling related) fields over their life-courses. This appeared to be largely because 
changes toward deeper participation in non-gambling fields propagated shifts in 
subjectivities/dispositions (‘habitus’) to become more marginalising of (heavier) 
gambling as, through that participation, interviewees indicated coming to embody the 
dominant cultural expectations and ways of thinking (rationalities/mentalities) that 
characterise those more ‘conventional’ fields. It is in this way that the theoretical model, 
synthesising both Bourdieusian and Foucauldian theory, was used to interpret and 
analyse interview data. 
 
The Bourdieusian-Foucauldian theoretical framework has potential to support future 
studies of behaviour and behavioural change with little, if any, amendment. Beyond 
gambling, this would most obviously include a host of other behaviours involving both 
substance and non-substance objects of addiction. Indeed, beyond addictive 
behaviours, the theoretical framework might be usefully applied to many other social 
behaviours. 
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Reflections on the conceptual framework 
The conceptual framework used to guide data collection, interpretation, and analysis 
was developed from Bourdieusian theory as well as existing behaviour change and 
addictions literature (see chapter three). It comprised of: 
 Practices – all patterns of action (e.g. gambling rituals). 
 
 Socio-cultural milieu – the dynamic social and cultural conditions/milieus in 
which the lives of agents are embedded. This includes shifting social 
relationships and changing cultural expectations both of which are constituents 
of the milieus/fields in which agents carry out their day-to-day lives. 
 
 Life-structure – the organisation of agents daily lives including their ‘field of 
engagements’ (Cohen, 1999:230). 
 
 Beliefs – (embodied) cultural expectations as well as rules and conscious 
beliefs/understandings held by agents. 
 
The conceptual framework was first applied in the development of the interview 
schedule (see chapter four). Interview questions and topics focused predominantly on 
relationships between gambling (including changes thereof) and the various 
components of the conceptual framework described above (see Appendix C), the aim 
being to examine how those aspects of interviewees’ lives influence gambling and how 
changes in those aspects influence shifts in gambling behaviour (including those which 
might support recovery from gambling addiction). The resulting interview data was then 
analysed and presented according to the conceptual framework across chapters six 
and seven. Aspects of the conceptual framework focused on in chapter six included 
practices, rules, and conscious beliefs and aspects focused on in chapter seven 
included life-structure and socio-cultural milieu. 
 
The conceptual framework proved a very useful tool for examining and explaining 
gambling behaviour as qualities of most components were found to influence gambling 
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patterns, control (including recovery) and harm. However, interview data indicated that 
not all aspects of the conceptual framework explained control over gambling behaviour 
equally. Aspects of socio-cultural milieu, for example, appeared to have great influence 
over gambling-related control and recovery while there was practically no evidence 
found that gambling-related rules influence control thereby suggesting rules to be poor 
tools for regulating behaviour (see chapters six and seven). The organisation of the 
lives of interviewees (i.e. life-structure), to give another example, was suggested to 
have strong influence over control and recovery whilst gambling-related beliefs 
(including understandings about probability) appeared to have little influence in terms 
of control. To summarise, whilst the conceptual framework proved a powerful tool to 
explain gambling behaviour, some components appeared to have greater explanatory 
power than others. 
 
The conclusion that gambling-related rules have little influence over behaviour might, 
on the one hand, be very surprising as authors of studies examining control over other 
addictive behaviours have concluded rules to be important ‘determinants’ in the self-
regulation of addiction objects (see chapter six. e.g. Zinberg, 1984; Grund, 1993). 
However, on the other hand, it is consistent with Bourdieu’s argument that behaviour 
tends to be pre-reflexive, arising from a ‘practical sense’ rather than conscious rule-
following (Bourdieu, 1987b; chapter one). Given this inconsistency, further research is 
needed to examine the impact of personally held rules on the regulation of gambling 
behaviour, addiction and recovery. 
 
Improvements to the conceptual framework 
The use of the conceptual framework to collect and analyse data highlighted two ways 
in which it may be developed to better support investigation of gambling and other 
behaviours. Firstly, in retrospect, the conceptual framework lumped together the 
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concepts of cultural expectations (values/norms), rules, and conscious beliefs under 
the umbrella of ‘beliefs’. Although all these objects might be considered phenomena 
closely related to mindset/disposition, analysis suggested that, among the 
interviewees, embodied cultural expectations (values/norms) explained gambling 
behaviour and control far better/more than rules and (gambling-related) conscious 
beliefs. As this became clear during analysis, differentiation between these phenomena 
was made in the presentation of findings and in discussion (see chapters six and 
seven). However, if the conceptual framework is used in future studies it should be 
modified from the outset to more strongly distinguish between those objects. Secondly, 
although ‘self-identity’ was not included in the conceptual framework, interviewees 
suggested sense of self to be particularly influential over gambling-related behaviour 
and control. Again, while this was appreciated in the analysis, omission from the 
conceptual framework meant that it was not a prime focus during data 
collection/interviewing. Future studies of gambling behaviour (and of social behaviour 
in general) should be designed to examine the influence of self-identity and, to this end, 
if the conceptual framework is to be used in future research then self-identity should be 
added as a component. 
 
Few members of the experiencing addiction group: implications for 
testing of the theoretical and conceptual frameworks 
As the focus of the thesis was on how greater control over gambling is maintained and 
how recovery is supported, recruitment focused on those with greater control at time of 
interview (i.e. those who had never experienced addiction and those who had regained 
control). For this reason, relatively few interviewees were sought who were 
experiencing addiction (indeed, only three such interviewees were recruited). 
Consequentially, examinations of lesser control relied more heavily on reports provided 
by members of the regained control group about their experiences of addiction than on 
the reports of the experiencing addiction group. Though this worked well, it does mean 
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that the theoretical and conceptual frameworks have been little tested on those 
experiencing gambling addiction and if this had been done different findings may have 
been produced (it cannot be known in which ways). The application of the (revised) 
theoretical/conceptual frameworks to those experiencing addiction would be a suitable 
focus of future research in order to examine how well those models explain lesser 
control among such individuals. 
 
In summary, both the theoretical and conceptual frameworks developed to guide the 
empirical work and analysis in the present thesis have potential to support future 
studies of behaviour and behaviour change. Beyond gambling, these frameworks could 
most obviously be used to study behaviours involving both substance and non-
substance objects of addiction. Indeed, beyond addictive behaviours, the frameworks 
might be usefully applied to many other social behaviours so long as they are 
approached as influenced by social and cultural conditions. Whilst both frameworks 
proved valuable tools, the conceptual framework would benefit from some modification, 
as just described, to improve its usefulness and explanatory power in future studies.  
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Study critique 
The chapter now turns reflect on the limitations of the project and consider what, with 
hindsight, might have been done differently. Positivistic research designs, employing 
probability sampling techniques, yielding quantitative, reproducible, generalisable data 
and findings are usually regarded as the standard against which interpretivist, 
qualitative, designs are compared (Hammersley, 1992a;b; Martin and Stenner, 2004). 
From this standpoint, the lack of replicability, generalisability, and objectivity in the 
present research may be viewed as shortcomings. As these general issues have been 
extensively discussed by others (e.g. Bryman, 2008) there is little to be gained by 
repeating arguments here, but suffice to say that the framing of these characteristics as 
weaknesses is largely dependent on value judgements about the ideals of (social) 
scientific endeavour and of what constitutes ‘quality’ evidence. Nevertheless, as was 
argued in chapter four, an interpretivist, qualitative, research design was chosen to be 
more appropriate than positivistic designs for investigating the complexities of gambling 
behaviour as was the focus in the present study. 
 
Demographic homo/heterogeneity of participants 
All interviewees self-identified as ‘White British’ and all but three as men. The lack of 
women interviewees is likely largely reflective of the recruitment focus on regular 
gamblers, who tend to be men, as well as on those who had experienced gambling 
difficulties who, again, are overwhelmingly men (Wardle et al., 2011a). Similarly, the 
ethnic homogeneity of interviewees is probably product of recruitment strategies 
targeting gamblers domiciled in South Devon where there is a relatively small 
proportion of non-white British residents compared to other regions in England (Smith, 
2010) and likely compounded by the fact that gambling participation rates appear 
highest among ‘White British’ individuals when compared with other ethnic 
classifications (Wardle et al., 2011a). With regard to age, though there was relative 
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variation, interviewees tended to be in their twenties or, to a lesser extent, thirties, and 
no interviewees were aged 55 years or older28. Homogeneity of ethnicity and gender, 
as well as bias towards younger adults, may be viewed as a limitation as with greater 
diversity in those terms additional issues may have been revealed leading to more 
varied findings with greater transferability to a wider range of contexts. Nonetheless, it 
is a strength as the research provides deeper focus on those with particular 
characteristics thereby increasing transferability to those with similar experiences and 
characteristics. With regard to other demographic characteristics, there was far more 
diversity. Interviewees reported a range of educational attainments, employment, 
incomes, and living situations (see chapter five). 
 
Reliance on self-report 
Honesty at interview 
The study relied heavily on honest, open and frank discussion with interviewees. A 
particular concern when interviewing individuals about their participation in stigmatised 
behaviours is that they often have vested interest in downplaying, or keeping hidden, 
stigmatised or embarrassing behaviour for fear of soliciting negative reactions that 
might occur if their actions/feelings are revealed (Napper et al., 2010) and so may be 
reticent about their gambling behaviour, experiences, and any harmful consequences 
(see chapter four). Although such issues may have influenced discussion at interview, 
assurances of anonymity and confidentiality were given to encourage honesty (see 
chapter four) and no indication of deliberate deception among the reports of 
interviewees was noted. Indeed, there was a sense that most interviewees were 
forthcoming, open and some appeared to delight in an opportunity to talk about their 
gambling and experiences. Nonetheless, throughout the research process it was 
                                                          
28
 Fourteen interviewees were in their 20s, six in their 30s, three in their 40s and two in their 
early 50s. 
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appreciated that interviewee statements should be examined in context and not always 
taken literally. 
 
Reliance on recall 
Findings relied on the ability of interviewees to recall information about past 
experiences and behaviour, often relating to periods/events years prior to interview. 
The reliability of memory, however, is often limited – experiences/events may be 
forgotten, misremembered or be (re)interpreted differently with hindsight/retrospectively 
(Dex, 1995). Indeed, comparisons between behavioural tracking data pertaining to 
online gambling accounts and self-report data have indicated that individuals have 
limited ability to recollect specifics of their gambling behaviour (e.g. figures such as 
money lost/spent, money won, or duration of gambling sessions) (Braverman et al., 
2014). The thesis findings, however, relied little on finer details (e.g. monetary values, 
time periods, dates, etc.) but, instead, on broader, less specific, information about 
gambling behaviour, experiences, and living circumstances which may be less open to 
inaccuracies and recall bias. Nevertheless, asking interviewees retrospective questions 
about gambling experiences was the only feasible way to examine how their gambling 
behaviour, feelings, and living circumstances had changed over their gambling careers.  
 
What might have been done differently with hindsight or more resources? 
Better designed data collection instruments 
Though not completely unfamiliar with the literature, the thesis author was not 
particularly well-read in addiction/recovery, gambling, drug use, or behaviour change 
literature when the data collection instruments (i.e. survey script and interview 
schedule) were designed and the interviews conducted. Greater knowledge in these 
areas would, undoubtedly, have contributed to better designed survey and interview 
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scripts. For example, with greater knowledge of life-course literature, interview 
questions might have been directed more towards understanding how social and 
cultural processes influence shifts in gambling behaviour. 
 
 
Inclusion of more interviewees experiencing addiction at time of interview and 
those who had experienced addiction for longer 
As the focus of this thesis was on exploring how those with greater control manage 
their gambling, proportionally few interviewees (a total of three) experiencing gambling 
addiction were recruited for comparison. Initially, there was planned to be roughly 50 
interviewees including approximately 10 who were experiencing addiction at time of 
interview. However, as the thesis took an exploratory approach, largely because of an 
absence of literature about how gamblers regulate their gambling, mitigate harm, and 
come to recover, interviews needed to be quite comprehensive (and thus, lengthy). As 
a result, interviewees averaged 1:04hrs and produced a considerable amount of 
transcription work as well as qualitative data to be managed and analysed. Given time 
constraints on the project, it was decided that the number of potential interviewees 
(including those experiencing addiction) be reduced. A second reason for the lack of 
interviewees experiencing addiction is that relatively few respondents of the recruitment 
survey provided responses suggestive of addiction (at time of survey completion) and 
of these only a proportion indicated interest in a follow-up interview and agreed to take 
part. Although reports provided by members of the regained control group about their 
experiences of difficulties/addiction were drawn on during examinations of lesser 
control, it would have been valuable to examine experience of lesser control by 
recourse of more data gathered from more individuals experiencing addiction at time of 
interview. 
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Of the three interviewees who were identified as experiencing addiction at time of 
interview, two indicated relatively short gambling careers and shorter still durations of 
gambling difficulties. Given that most who experience gambling addiction recover (see 
chapter two), it would have been interesting to recruit interviewees who have failed to 
recover for a relatively long period (e.g. twenty years or so) in order to explore if there 
is anything about their lives, circumstances, or biographies which impedes recovery. 
This would be a valuable focus of future research.  
 
Directions for future research 
As a result of the exploratory nature of this thesis, many areas have been touched 
upon that, if investigated further, would produce knowledge that could be used to 
ameliorate gambling difficulties. Although ideas for future research have been 
signposted throughout the thesis, and in this chapter, in particular, a standalone section 
is provided here to emphasise salient directions/subjects. 
   
Evaluation of recommendations 
There is pressing need for rigorous evaluation of interventions aimed at reducing harm 
and supporting greater control in order to minimise risk of unintended, negative, 
consequences. Indeed, it is not only the recommendations of this thesis that must be 
evaluated but those made by others as well as interventions/policies already 
implemented as these have tended to be based on the commonsense of commentators 
and policymakers rather than on sound evidence or evaluation (Blaszczynski et al., 
2004; Ladouceur et al., 2016). This is exemplified by the oft-recommended harm-
reduction practice of logging gambling expenditure which, among the present 
interviewees, appeared to increase rather than reduce harm by encouraging loss 
chasing (see chapter six). It is also important that evaluative work draws on data 
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collected in ‘natural’ gambling settings rather than under artificial conditions. Too often, 
gambling data is collected using laboratory-based experiments which produce findings 
with little ecological validity. Indeed, Reith (2007a) notes that gambling data collected 
through use of laboratory experiments often conflicts with data collected in real-life 
settings (see e.g. Anderson and Brown, 1984). 
 
Implementation of recommendations 
In order to have impact, the recommendations of this thesis must not only reduce harm 
and support control but must be implemented in such a way as to be effective. Though 
this is obvious, in some areas of public health (e.g. relating to problematic drug use) 
there has often been a policy-implementation gap where the effectiveness of otherwise 
good policy is undermined by poor implementation (Randall, 2011). Further research 
should examine how strategies demonstrated to be effective in reducing harm and 
supporting control can be best implemented. Examples of questions that might be 
considered include: are media campaigns a good way of promoting gambling-related 
harm-reduction practices? Is legislation needed to ensure that gambling providers 
support harm-reduction strategies, or is voluntary compliance enough? How can any 
resistance from gambling providers to harm-reduction strategies be minimised or 
prevented? As Williams et al. (2012) state, the effectiveness of gambling-related harm-
reduction interventions is ‘very much dependent on how it is applied’ (2012:64). 
 
Examination of the relationship between addiction and harm  
In chapter four it was noted that gambling-related harm is, by and large, used as proxy 
for gambling addiction and that this is problematic because those whose gambling 
contributes to significant harm may not always be experiencing addiction. Indeed, 
under some circumstances, impaired self-control (addiction) might not result in 
significant harm if, for example, an individual’s life is structured in such a way that their 
 305 
 
circumstances prevent harm. Having another assume management of money and/or 
pay for one’s living costs, for example, may impede harm despite impaired self-control. 
Furthermore, those whose experience of gambling-related harm is largely due to 
difficulties managing their behaviour may benefit from different interventions to those 
whose gambling contributes to experience of gambling-related harm despite having 
greater control. Given these issues, further research is needed to examine the 
dimensions of control and harm and to explore how they interplay. In particular, it would 
be valuable to explore ways of identifying addiction without relying on harm and of 
differentiating between problematic gamblers with greater and lesser control. 
 
Examine in greater depth the processes of natural recovery 
Although research suggests that those who experience addiction tend to recover and 
do so, by and large, in lieu of formal treatment there has been very little work exploring 
how ‘natural recovery’ occurs (cf. Waldorf et al., 1991; see chapter two). The present 
study helps fill this knowledge gap by suggesting that such recoveries might largely be 
encouraged by social and cultural processes, characteristic of ‘typical’ life-course 
progression, which lead to wider changes in the lives/milieus of individuals and thereby 
discourage ‘addictive’ behaviour via reformations of subjectivity (e.g. shifts in embodied 
cultural expectations and ways of thinking). Further knowledge about how recovery 
occurs would be valuable to help develop strategies and policies better supportive and 
promoting of recovery processes. In particular, research should explore why some fail 
to recover from gambling addiction whilst most do so. Are there, for example, aspects 
of their lives/milieus or subjectivities which hinder the socio-cultural processes of 
recovery? Moreover, is it possible to speed up the underlying processes of natural 
recovery in order to reduce duration of gambling addiction? And if so, how? 
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Development of better techniques for recruiting gamblers for research 
The recruitment of participants who engage in stigmatised behaviours such as 
gambling can be challenging and a hindrance in behavioural research. Gamblers often 
represent ‘hidden’ and ‘hard-to-reach’ participants with those not in formal treatment 
less visible and so harder to recruit (see chapter four). Indeed, gambling research has 
tended to base findings on data collected from more visible and accessible gamblers. 
The subjects of gambling studies have, more often than not, been problem gamblers 
involved in treatment, members of self-help groups, or psychology students (who are 
often expected to participate in studies as part of their university course) (Gainsbury et 
al., 2014b; Bernhard, 2010). However, the extent to which findings based on data 
collected from members of these ‘captive’, visible, and more accessible groups 
resonate with the experiences of the majority gamblers is highly questionable 
(Bernhard, 2010). Gainsbury et al. (2014b), for example, have found that even when 
demographic differences are controlled for, the gambling behaviours of student 
gamblers differ significantly from gamblers in the ‘general population’. Consistent with 
concerns about drug use research (Decorte, 2011), the basing of findings/data on such 
a small minority whose experiences are likely very different from the experiences of 
most gamblers impacts on the transferability/usefulness of research. Given these 
points, the quality of gambling research (and, indeed, research into other stigmatised 
behaviours) is largely dependent on techniques effective in recruiting hidden and hard-
to-reach participants and future work must develop these. 
 
‘Snowball’ or ‘chain referral’ sampling has long proved useful in the recruitment of 
hidden and hard-to-reach participants (e.g. drug use; Waldorf et al., 1991) and was 
used in this study (see chapter four). However, although chain referral techniques have 
potential to recruit gamblers whose experiences are more in keeping with the majority 
of those who are not students and do not participate in treatment, snowball techniques 
have weaknesses. Beyond general criticisms of non-probability sampling (Bryman, 
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2008), the tendency for homophily in social networks (McPherson et al., 2001) may 
result in recruitment of interviewees with similar characteristics and experiences to one 
another thereby producing narrower data and reducing transferability of data/findings. 
Moreover, snowball techniques may have better utility in examining drug use over 
gambling because access to illicit drugs is often predicted upon social ties 
(relationships may often be prerequisite of drug supply; Coomber and Moyle, 2014). 
Although social networks may well be instrumental in beginning gambling (Reith and 
Dobbie, 2011), gamblers are not reliant on ‘supply’ relationships and so may not 
maintain close ties to others thereby making them less reachable using chain referral 
techniques. This study, however, relied little on chain referral techniques and it may 
well be that, despite homophily, such techniques still produce data more transferable 
than those based on members of ‘captive’ groups. 
 
Implications of the survey recruitment method for future projects 
As discussed in chapter four, an online survey, advertised in local print media and on 
social networking websites, was the primary method used to recruit gamblers who had 
never engaged directly with formal treatment services for interview29. Specifically, the 
survey was designed to aid the recruitment of interviewees who fit with one of three 
ideal-types of gamblers: (i) never experienced addiction; (ii) regained control; and (iii) 
experiencing addiction (see chapter four for further detail about the survey and 
recruitment procedures). Whilst it did collect some (quantitative) data on gambling 
patterns and experiences, it was not used to collect data to directly support the findings 
and conclusions of the research – essentially it was used to produce a list of gamblers 
from which interviewees could be recruited. The survey recruitment method proved 
extremely useful and resulted in interviewees who provided valuable data. The 
following discussion serves to reflect on the survey recruitment method with focus on 
                                                          
29
 Although recruitment focused on interviewees who had not participated in formal treatment, 
one interviewee (a member of the experiencing addiction) group had done so (see chapter five). 
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examining use of this method in future research/studies (particularly where non-
treatment, non-captive and/or non-student populations are sought who are 
underrepresented in existing research; see chapter four). 
 
The recruitment method proved extremely valuable in recruiting participants who may 
reasonably be regarded as ‘hidden’ or ‘hard-to-reach’. As well as for the recruitment of 
gamblers, the online survey technique could be used in future studies to recruit other 
non-captive and hidden/hard-to-reach participants who are not engaged with treatment 
services (e.g. individuals struggling with mental health difficulties as well as 
recreational and/or problematic drug users). For example, the present author recently 
co-authored a study which used an online survey, advertised on social media 
platforms, to recruit interviewees who use novel psychoactive substances (Coomber 
and Pyle, 2015). The online survey recruitment method used in this thesis would, 
undoubtedly, be valuable in future studies. 
 
Researchers must be mindful, however, that use of internet methods to recruit 
participants will bias recruitment towards internet users and precludes non-internet 
users (see chapter four). As such, researchers who recruit via an online survey would 
be well advised to consider other, non-internet, recruitment methods alongside. 
Moreover, it should be emphasised that the nature of participants recruited via an 
online survey depends on how, and in which online spaces, the survey is promoted. 
For example, as the survey was targeted at gamblers ‘in general’, relatively few 
respondents were suggested to be experiencing difficulties at the time of their survey 
submission (because most gamblers do not experience difficulties) thereby leading to a 
small ‘pool’ of respondents experiencing addiction who could be invited to interview30. 
                                                          
30
 Of the 206 survey respondents who reported whether or not they had found it difficult to 
control their gambling, only 9 (4.3%) survey respondents provided contact details to be 
contacted for interview and indicated experiencing difficulty controlling their gambling within 3 
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However, if the survey had been promoted on online platforms/spaces frequented by 
those seeking help for gambling difficulties (e.g. internet forums aimed at providing 
support for problematic gambling) then this would have been far more likely to produce 
greater proportions/numbers of survey respondents experiencing addiction. In short, 
the success of the online survey recruitment method depends heavily on how and 
where the survey is promoted and such considerations must be taken into account by 
researchers taking such an approach in future studies 
 
Use of social media for participant recruitment 
This study is one of a recent explosion to use social media to target stigmatised and 
hard-to-reach populations such as those experiencing addiction (Ramo et al., 2014; 
Thornton et al., 2015; Bold et al., 2016), and, seemingly, the only study to date to have 
used social media to recruit interviewees for gambling research. Although this 
produced participants with varied demographic characteristics and gambling patterns 
(see chapter five), in other ways it is likely to have produced quite a limited group (e.g. 
those who use social media) (see chapter four). Future research might explore further 
the utility of social media to recruit participants for gambling research. Some 
researchers have collaborated with gambling providers to recruit participants (Reith 
and Dobbie, 2013; Cassidy, 2014) and despite difficulties negotiating access to 
providers’ customers, this is a valuable strategy with potential to produce useful 
data/findings. As such, future research would likely benefit from greater collaboration 
with gambling providers to gain access to their customers. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
months prior to survey submission. A further 7 (3.4%) indicated experiencing difficulties but did 
not leave contact details for follow-up interview. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has concluded the thesis. The significance and value of the research have 
been emphasised. In particular, key findings were presented and translated into 
recommendations aimed at protecting against experience of gambling addiction, 
reducing harm, and supporting recovery from gambling addiction. Drawing findings 
presented in chapters six and seven together, a dual strategy was called for in order to 
ameliorate and protect against experience of gambling difficulties. Greater control and 
reduction in harm should be facilitated, on the one hand, through promotion of ‘safer’ 
gambling practices and by (re)designing environments in ways more supportive of 
those practices and, on the other, through encouraging the development of wider lives 
and subjectivities discouraging of problematic gambling and supportive of addiction 
recovery. The theoretical and conceptual frameworks developed for the thesis have 
been examined and the study has been critiqued. Limitations of the research have 
been examined and reflection provided on what might have been done differently with 
hindsight and greater resources. The chapter closed with ideas for future research. 
  
 311 
 
References 
 
Abbott, M. (2005). Disabling the public interest: Gambling strategies and policies for 
Britain: A comment on Orford 2005. Addiction, 100(9), 1233-1234. 
Abbott, M. (2006). Do EGMs and problem gambling go together like a horse and 
carriage? Gambling Research: Journal of the National Association for Gambling 
Studies, 18(1), 7-38. 
Abbott, M., McKenna, B., & Giles, L. (2005). Gambling and problem gambling among 
recently sentenced male prisoners in four New Zealand prisons. Journal of Gambling 
Studies, 21(4), 537-558. 
Abbott, M., Romild, U., & Volberg, R. (2014). Gambling and problem gambling in 
Sweden: Changes between 1998 and 2009. Journal of Gambling Studies, 30(4), 985-
999. 
Abbott, M., Volberg, R., Bellringer, M., & Reith, G. (2004a). A review of research on 
aspects of problem gambling. London: Responsibility in Gambling Trust. 
Abbott, M., Williams, M., & Volberg, R. (2004b). A prospective study of problm and 
regular nonproblem gamblers living in the community. Substance Use an Misuse, 39, 
855-884. 
Abrahams, J., & Ingram, N. (2013). The chameleon habitus: exploring local students' 
negotiations of multiple fields. Sociological Research Online, 18(4), unpaginated. 
Abt, V. (1996). The role of the state in the expansion and growth of commercial 
gambling in the United States. In J. McMillen, Gambling cultures: studies in history and 
interpretation (pp. 179-198). London: Routledge. 
Adams, M. (2003). The reflexive self and culture: a critique. The British Journal of 
Sociology, 54(2), 221-238. 
Adams, M. (2006). Hybridizing habitus and reflexivity: towards an understanding of 
contemporary identity? Sociology, 40(3), 511-528. 
Aharon, I., Etcoff, N., Ariely, D., Chabris, C., O'Connor, E., & Breiter, H. (2001). 
Beautiful faces have variable reward value:fMRI and behavioral evidence. Neuron, 32, 
537-551. 
Ahn, A., Tewari, M., Poon, C.-S., & Phillips, R. (2006). The limits of reductionism in 
medicine: could systems biology offer an alternative? PLOS Medicine, 3(6), 709-713. 
Alexander, B. (2001). The myth of drug-induced addiction. a paper delivered to the 
Canadian Senate, (pp. 1-9). 
Alexander, J. (1995). Fin de siècle social theory: Relativism, reduction, and the 
problem of reason. London: Verso. 
Alexander, J. (1996). Critical reflections on “reflexive modernization”. Theory, Culture 
and Society, 13(4), 133–8. 
 312 
 
Alvarez, R., Sherman, R., & VanBeselaere, C. (2003). Subject acquisition for 
web‐based surveys. Political Analysis, 11(1), 23-43. 
American Psychiatric Association (APA). (1980). Diagnostic and statistical manual of 
mental disorders, 3rd ed. Washington, DC. 
American Psychiatric Association (APA). (2013). Diagnostic and statistical manual of 
mental disorders. Arlington: American Psychiatric Publishing. 
Anderson, G. (1998). Fundamentals of educational research. London: Falmer Press. 
Anderson, G., & Brown, R. I. F. (1984). Real and laboratory gambling, 
sensation‐seeking and arousal. British journal of Psychology, 75(3), 401-410. 
Anderson, S., Dobbie, F., & Reith, G. (2009). Recovery from problem gambling: a 
qualitative study . Scottish Centre for Social Research. 
Angier, N. (2002). Why we’re nice: The feel-good factor. International Herald Tribune, 
July 25, 2002, p. 8. 
Aquarius. (2014). Gambling: self-help guide. Retrieved September 11, 2015, from 
Aquarius: http://aquarius.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Aquarius-Gambling-self-
help-guide.pdf 
Archer, M. (1982). Morphogenesis versus structuration: On combining structure and 
action. The British Journal of Sociology, 33(4), 455-483. 
Archer, M. (1988). Culture and Agency: The Place of Culture in Social Theory. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ashley, D., & Orenstein, D. (1998). Max Weber. In D. Ashley, & D. Orenstein, 
Sociological theory: classical statements (pp. 267-307). London: Allyn and Bacon. 
Ashton, M. (2011). Burgered: quality of life and addiction treatment. Available from: 
http://www.fead.org.uk/docs/Burgered%20latest.pdf: FEAD. 
Association of British Bookmakers. (2012, Association of British Bookmakers). ABB 
response to Channel 4's Dispatches programme [Press release]. Retrieved 10 04, 
2012, from http://www.abb.uk.com/news/abb-response-to-channel-4-s-dispatches-
programme/ 
Ball, A. (2007). HIV, injecting drug use and harm reduction: a public health response. 
Addiction, 102, 684-690. 
Bauman, Z. (1989). Hermeneutics and Modern Social Theory. In D. Held, & J. 
Thompson, Social Theory of Modern Societies: Anthony Giddens and his Critics (pp. 
34-55). Cambridge: University of Cambridge. 
BBC. (2012, November 5). Gambling addict tells of fight to save family life. Retrieved 
August 10, 2014, from BBC News: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-20181353 
BBC. (2014, April 30). Councils to get betting shop planning powers. Retrieved March 
04, 2015, from BBC News: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-27225147 
 313 
 
Becker, H. (1953). Becoming a marihuana user. American Journal of Sociology, 59(3), 
235-242. 
Becker, H. (1967). History, culture and subjective experience: an exploration of the 
social bases of drug-induced experiences. Journal of health and social behavior, 8(3), 
163-176. 
Becoña, E. (1993). The prevalence of pathological gambling in Galicia (Spain). Journal 
of Gambling Studies, 9(4), 353-369. 
Bell, D. (1976). The cultural contradictions of capitalism. London: Heinemann. 
Bergler, E. (1943). The gambler: a misunderstood neurotic. Journal of Criminal 
Psychopathology, 4, 370-393. 
Bergler, E. (1958). The psychology of gambling. London: Bernard Hanison. 
Bernhard, B. (2007). The voices of vices: sociological perspectives on the pathological 
gambling entry in the diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders. American 
Behavioral Scientist, 51(1), 8-32. 
Bernhard, B. (2012). This audience is weird: reflections on what we know now in 
gambling research. UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal, 14(2), 69-74. 
Bernstein, R. (1983). Beyond objectivism and relativism: science, hermeneutics, and 
praxis. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Berridge, V. (1979). Morality and Medical Science: Concepts of Narcotic Addiction in 
Britain. Annals of Science, 36, 67-85. 
Berridge, V. (1999). Opium and the People : Opiate Use and Drug Control Policy in 
Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century England. London: Free Association. 
Berridge, V., & Edwards, G. (1981). Opium and the People: Opiate use in nineteenth-
century England. New York: St Martin's. 
Best, D. (2012b). Addiction recovery: a movement for social change and personal 
growth in the UK. Brighton: Pavilion publishing. 
Best, S., & Krueger, B. (2008). Internet survey design. In N. Fielding, R. Lee, & G. 
Blank, The SAGE handbook of online research methods (pp. 217-235). SAGE: London. 
Best, D., Beckwith, M., Haslam, C., Alexander Haslam, S., Jetten, J., Mawson, E., et al. 
(2016). Overcoming alcohol and other drug addiction as a process of social identity 
transition: The Social Identity Model of Recovery (SIMOR). Addiction Research & 
Theory , 24 (2), 111-123 
Best, D., & Lubman, D. (2012). The recovery paradigm: A model of hope and change 
for alcohol and drug addiction. Australian family physician , 41 (8), 593-597. 
Biernacki, P. (1986). Pathways from heroin addiction recovery without treatment. New 
York: Temple University Press. 
Biernacki, P., & Waldorf, D. (1981). Snowball sampling: problem and techniques of 
chain referral sampling. Sociological Methods and Research, 10(2), 141–163. 
 314 
 
Binde, P. (2007). Selling dreams—causing nightmares? On gambling advertising and 
problem gambling. Journal of Gambling Issues(20), 167-192. 
Binde, P. (2009). Gambling motivation and involvement: A review of social science 
research. Swedish National Institute of Public Health. 
Binde, P. (2014). Gambling advertising: A critical research review. London: 
Responsible Gambling Trust. 
Binkley, S. (2009). Governmentality, temporality and practice from the individualization 
of risk to the contradictory movements of the soul. Time & Society, 18(1), 86-105. 
Blanco, C., Ibáñez, A., Sáiz-Ruiz, J., Blanco-Jerez, C., & Nunes, E. (2000). 
Epidemiology, pathophysiology and treatment of pathological gambling. CNS Drugs, 
11, 397-407. 
Bland, R., Newman, S., H, O., & Stebelsky, G. (1993). Epidemiology of pathological 
gambling in Edmonton. Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, 38, 108-112. 
Blaszczynski, A. (1998). Overcoming compulsive gambling: A self-help guide using 
cognitive behavioural techniques. London: Robinson Publishing. 
Blaszczynski, A. (1999). Pathological gambling and obessive-compulsive spectrum 
disorders. Psychological Reports, 84, 107-113. 
Blaszczynski, A. (2011). Harm minimization can be achieved by a symbiosis between 
government, industry and individuals. Addiction, 106(1), 10-12. 
Blaszczynski, A., & Nower, L. (2002). A pathways model of problem and pathological 
gambling. Addiction, 97, 487-499. 
Blaszczynski, A., Ladouceur, R., & Shaffer, H. (2004). A science-based framework for 
responsible gambling: the Reno Model. Journal of Gambling Studies, 20(3), 301-317. 
Blaszczynski, A., McConaghy, N., & Frankova, A. (1991). A Comparison of Relapsed 
and Non-Relapsed Abstinent Pathological Gamblers Following Behavioural Treatment. 
British Journal of Addiction, 86, 1485-1489. 
Blaszczynski, A., McConaghy, N., & Frankova, A. (1991). Control versus abstinence in 
the treatment of pathological gambling: A two to nine year follow-up. British Journal of 
Addiction, 86, 299-306. 
Blaszczynski, A., Parke, A., Parke, J., & Rigbye, J. (2014). Operator-based approaches 
to harm minimisation: summary, review and future directions. London: The Responsible 
Gambling Trust. 
Blaszczynski, A., Sharpe, L., Walker, M., & Sharpe, L. (2005). Withdrawal and 
Tolerance Phenomenon in Problem Gambling. Sydney: University of Sydney. 
Blaszczynski, A., Winter, S., & McConaghy. (1986). Plasma endorphin levels in 
pathological gambling. Journal of Gambling Behavior, 2(1), 3-14. 
Blommaert, M. (2005). Bourdieu the ethnographer. The Translator, 11(2), 219-236. 
 315 
 
Blum, K., Sheridan, P., Wood, R., Braverman, E., Chen, T., & Comings, D. (1995). 
Dopamine D2 receptor gene variants: Association and linkage studies in impulsive-
addictive compulsive behaviour. Pharmacogenetics, 5, 121-141. 
Boland, P. (2008). ‘British drugs policy: problematizing the distinction between legal 
and illegal drugs and the definition of the “drugs problem”’. Probation Journal, 55(2), 
171–87. 
Bold, K., Hanrahan, T., O'Malley, S., & Fucito, L. (2016). Exploring the Utility of Web-
Based Social Media Advertising to Recruit Adult Heavy-Drinking Smokers for 
Treatment. Journal of Medical Internet Research, 18(5), e107. 
Bourdieu, P. (1974). Avenir de classe et causalite du probable. Revue Francaise de 
sociologie, 15(1), 3-42. 
Bourdieu, P. (1977). Outline of a theory of practice [translated by Richard Nice]. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bourdieu, P. (1984). Distinction: a social critique of judgement and taste. London: 
Routledge. 
Bourdieu, P. (1986). The forms of capital. In J. G. Richardson, Handbook of theory and 
research for the sociology of education (pp. 241-258). New York: Greenwood Press. 
Bourdieu, P. (1987a). What makes a social class? On the theoretical and practical 
existence of groups. Berkeley Journal of Sociology, 32, 1-17. 
Bourdieu, P. (1987b). In other words: essays towards a reflexive sociology. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press. 
Bourdieu, P. (1989). Social space and symbolic power. Sociological theory, 7(1), 14-
25. 
Bourdieu, P. (1990). The logic of practice. Cambridge: Blackwell. 
Bourdieu, P. (1996 [1992]). The rules of art: genesis and structure of the literary field. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Bourdieu, P. (1998). Practical reason: On the theory of action. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 
Bourdieu, P. (1998). The State of Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press. 
Bourdieu, P., & de Saint Martin, M. (1982). La Sainte Famille. L'episcopat Francais 
dans le Champ du Pouvoir. Actes de la Rechreche en Sciences Sociales, 44/45, 2-53. 
Bourdieu, P., & Wacquant, L. (1992). An introduction to reflexive sociology. Chicago: 
Chicago University Press. 
Bourdieu, P., & Wacquant, L. (1992). The Purpose of Reflexive Sociology. (The 
Chicago Workshop). In L. Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (pp. 61-215). 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 316 
 
Bourgois, P. (1995). In search of respect: selling crack in El barrio. Cambridge: 
University of Cambridge. 
Bourgois, P., & Schonberg, J. (2007). Ethnic dimensions of habitus among homeless 
heroin injectors. Ethnography, 8(1), 7-31. 
Bourgois, P., & Schonberg, J. (2009). Righteous dopefiend. Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press. 
Brewer, J. (2003). Vignette. In R. Miller, & J. Brewer, The A-Z of social research: A 
dictionary of key social science research concepts (pp. 339-340). London: Sage. 
Brickman-Butta, C. (2012). Not by the book: Facebook as a sampling frame. 
Sociological Methods & Research, 41(1), 57-88. 
British Sociological Association (BSA). (2002, March). Statement for ethical practice for 
the British Sociological Association. Retrieved November 13, 2013, from British 
Sociological Association: 
http://www.britsoc.co.uk/media/27107/StatementofEthicalPractice.pdf 
Bruce, A., & Johnson, J. (1995). Costing excitement in leisure betting. Leisure Studies, 
14, 48–63. 
Bruner, J. (1986). Actual minds, possible worlds. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Bryman, A. (2008). Social research methods. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bryman, A., & Cramer, D. (2011). Quantitative data analysis with IBM SPSS 17, 18, 19. 
London: Routledge. 
Buchanan, J. (2004). Missing links? Problem drug use and social exclusion. Probation 
Journal: The Journal of Community and Criminal Justice , 51 (4), 387-397. 
Burchell, G. (1996). Liberal government and techniques of the self. In A. Barry, T. 
Osbourne, & N. Rose, Foucault and political reason: liberalism, neo-liberalism and 
rationalities of government (pp. 19-36). London: Chicago University Press. 
Callahan, G. (2010). Critical realism . . . or critical idealism? International Journal of 
Social Economics, 37(11), 867-879. 
Campbell, C., & Smith, G. (2003). Gambling in Canada--from vice to disease to 
responsibility: a negotiated history. Canadian Bulletin of Medical History, 20(1), 121-
149. 
Canadian Centre on Substance Abuse (CCSA). (1996). Harm reduction: concepts and 
practice: a policy discussion paper. National Working Group on Policy. 
Cape, G. (2003). Addiction, stigma and movies. Acta Psychiatrica Sacndinavica, 
107(3), 163-169. 
Caspi, A., & Roberts, B. (2001). Personality development across the life course: the 
argument for change and continuity. Psychological Inquiry, 12(2), 49-66. 
 317 
 
Cassidy, R. (2012a). Horse versus machine: battles in the betting shop. Journal of the 
Royal Anthropological Institute, 18(2), 266-284. 
Cassidy, R. (2014). ‘A place for men to come and do their thing’: constructing 
masculinities in betting shops in London. The British Journal of Sociology, 65(1), 170-
191. 
Castellani, B. (2000). Pathological gambling: the making of a medical problem. Albany, 
New York State: New York Press. 
Centre for Substance Abuse Treatment. (2009). Guiding principles and elements of 
recovery-oriented systems of care. Centre for Substance Abuse Treatment. 
Chase, H., & Clark, L. (2010). Gambling severity predicts midbrain response to near-
miss outcomes. The Journal of Neuroscience, 30(18), 6180–6187. 
Christakis, N., & Fowler, J. (2008). The collective dynamics of smoking in a large social 
network. The New England Journal of Medicine, 358(21), 2249-2258. 
Christakis, N., & Fowler, J. (2013). Social contagion theory: examining dynamic social 
networks and human behavior. Statistics in medicine, 32(4), 556-577. 
Clark, F. (2000). The concepts of habit and routine: a preliminary theoretical synthesis. 
The Occupational Therapy Journal of Research, 20, 123S-137S. 
Cloud, W., & Granfield, R. (2008). Conceptualising recovery capital: Expansion of a 
theoretical construct. Substance Use and Misuse, 43, 1971-1986. 
Coffey, A., & Atkinson, P. (1996). Making sense of qualitative Data: complementary 
research strategies. London: Sage. 
Coffey, A., Holbrook, B., & Atkinson, P. (1996). Qualitative data analysis: technologies 
and representations. Sociological Research Online, 1(1), Available at: 
http://www.socresonline.org.uk/1/1/4.html. 
Cohen, P. (1999). Shifting the main purposes of drug control: from suppression to 
regulation of use: Reduction of risks as the new focus for drug policy. International 
Journal of Drug Policy, 10(3), 223-234. 
Cohen, P. (2000). Is the addiction doctor the voodoo priest of Western man. Addiction 
Research, 8(6), 589-598. 
Coleman, J. (1987). Norms as social capital. In G. Radnitzky, & P. Bernholz, Economic 
imperialism: the economic method applied outside the field of economics (pp. 133-
153). New York: Paragon House. 
Collins, S., Clifasefi, S., Logan, D., Samples, L., Somers, J., & Marlatt, A. (2012). 
Current status, historical highlights, and basic principles of harm reduction. In A. 
Marlatt, M. Larimer, & K. Witkiewitz, Harm reduction: pragmatic strategies for managing 
high-risk behaviours (pp. 3-35). New York: Guilford Press. 
Comings, D., Rosenthal, R., Lesieur, H., Rugle, L., Muhleman, D., Chiu, C., et al. 
(1996). A study of the dopamine D2 receptor gene in pathological gambling. 
Pharmacogenetics, 6(3), 223-224. 
 318 
 
Coomber, R. (1997). Using the internet for survey research. Sociological Research 
Online, 2, unpaginated. 
Coomber, R., & Moyle, L. (2014). Beyond drug dealing: Developing and extending the 
concept of ‘social supply’ of illicit drugs to ‘minimally commercial supply’. Drugs: 
education, prevention and policy, 21(2), 157-164. 
Coomber, R., & Pyle, E. (2015). A rapid appraisal of the illicit drug market in the 
borough of Torbay, Devon. Drug and Alcohol Research Service. 
Corbin, J. (1999). The role of habits in everyday life. Pacific Grove, CA: Abstract of 
paper presented at A Synthesis of Knowledge Regarding the Concept of Habit. A 
research conference of the American Occupational Therapy Foundation. 
Craib, I. (1992). Anthony Giddens. London: Routledge. 
Crossley, N. (2001a). The social body: habit, identity and desire. London: Sage. 
Crossley, N. (2001b). The phenomenological habitus and its construction. Springer, 
30(1), 81-120. 
Crotty, M. (1998). The foundations of social research: meaning and perspective in the 
research process. London: Sage. 
Cruickshank, B. (1996). Revolutions within: self government and self esteem. In A. 
Barry, T. Osborne, & N. Rose, Foucault and political reason: liberalism, neoliberalism 
and rationalities of government (pp. 231-251). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Cunnien, A. (1985). Pathological gambling as insanity defense. Behavior Sciences and 
the Law, 3(Winter), 85-101. 
Cunningham, J. (1999). Untreated remission from drug use: The predominant pathway. 
Addictive Behavior, 24, 2267-270. 
Currie, S., & Casey, D. (2007). Quantification and dimensionalization of gambling 
behaviour. In G. Smith, D. Hodgins, & R. Williams, Research and Measurement Issues 
in Gambling Studies (pp. 156-173). New York: Elsevier . 
Custer, R., & Milt, H. (1985). When luck runs out:help for compulsive gamblers and 
their families. New York: Facts on File Publications. 
Daily Mail. (2014, April 05). New rules to halt spread of betting shops which are 
blighting Britain's high streets. Retrieved March 01, 2015, from Daily Mail: 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2597448/New-rules-halt-spread-betting-shops-
blighting-Britains-high-streets.html 
Davies, J. (1997). The myth of addiction. London: Harwood Academic Publishers. 
Dean, M. (2001). Michel Foucault: 'a man in danger'. In G. Ritzer, & B. Smart, 
Handbook of social theory (pp. 324-338). London: Sage. 
Dean, M. (2010). Governmentality: power and rule in modern society. London: Sage. 
Decorte, T. (2001a). Drug users' perceptions of "controlled" and "uncontrolled" use. 
The International Journal of Drug Policy, 12(4), 297-320. 
 319 
 
Decorte, T. (2011). Blinding ourselves with science: the chronic infections of our 
thinking on psychoactive substances. In G. Hunt, M. M, & H. Bergeron, Drugs and 
Culture: Knowledge, Consumption and Policy (pp. 33–51). Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate. 
Deegan, P. (1988). Recovery: The lived experience of rehabilitation. Psychosocial 
Rehabilitation Journal, 11(4), 11-19. 
Delanty, G. (1997). Social science: beyond constructivism and realism. Milton Keynes: 
Open University Press. 
Delfabbro, P., & Winefield, A. (1999). Poker-machine gambling: an analysis of within 
session characteristics. British Journal of Psychology, 90, 425-439. 
Denham, S. (2003). Relationships between family rituals, family routines, and health. 
Journal of Family Nursing, 9(3), 305-330. 
Denzin, N., & Lincoln, Y. (1994). Introduction: entering the field of qualitative research. 
In N. Denzin, & Y. Lincoln, Handbook of qualitative research (pp. 1-22). London: Sage. 
Devereux, E. (1980). Gambling and the social structure: a sociological study of lotteries 
and horseracing in contemporary America. New York: Arno Press. 
Devine, P. (1989). Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and controlled 
components. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56(1), 5-18. 
Dex, S. (1995). The reliability of recall data: a literature review. Bulletin de 
Methodologie Sociologique, 49(1), 58-89. 
Dickerson, M. (1984). Compulsive gamblers. London: Longman. 
Dickerson, M. (1993). Internal and external determinants of persistent gambling: 
problems in generalising from one form of gambling to another. Journal of Gambling 
Studies, 6(3), 225-246. 
Dickerson, M. (2003a). Pathological gambling: what's in a name? or how the United 
States got it wrong. In G. Reith, Gambling: Who wins? Who loses? (pp. 191-206). New 
York: Prometheus.. 
Dickerson, M., & Weeks, D. (1979). Controlled gambling as a therapeutic technique for 
compulsive gamblers. Journal of BehaviorTherapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 10, 
139-141. 
Dickerson, M., & Weeks, D. (1979). Controlled Gambling as a Therapeutic Technique 
for Compulsive Gamblers. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 
10(2), 139-141. 
Dickerson, M., McMillen, J., Hallebone, E., Volberg, R., & Wooley, R. (1997). Definition 
and incidence of problem gambling including the socio-economic distribution of 
gamblers. Melbourne: Victorian Casino and Gaming Authority. 
Dickson, L., Derevensky, J., & Gupta, R. (2004). Harm reduction for the prevention of 
youth gambling problems: lessons learned From adolescent high-risk behavior 
prevention programs. Journal of Adolescent Research, 19(2), 233-263. 
 320 
 
DiClemente, C. (2003). Addiction and change: How addictions develop and addicted 
people recovery. New York: The Guildford Press. 
Dinos, S., Stevens, S., Serfaty, M., Weich, S., & King, M. (2004). Stigma: the feelings 
and experiences of 46 people with mental illness. Qualitative study. British Journal of 
Psychiatry, 184, 176-181. 
Dixon, M., & Schreiber, J. (2004). Near-miss effects of response latencies and win 
estimations of slot machine players. The Psychological Record, 54, 335-348. 
Donovan, J., Jessor, R., & Jessor, L. (1983). Problem drinking in adolescence and 
young adulthood. Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 44(1), 109-137. 
Dowling, N., & Smith, D. (2007). Treatment goal selection for female pathological 
gambling: a comparison of abstinence and controlled gambling. Journal of Gambling 
Studies, 23, 335-345. 
Duncan, D., White, J., & Nicholson, T. (2003). Using internet-based surveys to reach 
hidden populations: case of nonabusive illicit drug users. American Journal of Health 
Behavior, 27, 208-218.. 
Durkheim, E. (1970 [1897]). La Conception Materialiste de I'historie. In J.-F. Filloux, La 
Science Sociale er I'acrion (pp. 245-252). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 
Duffy, P., & Baldwin, H. (2013). Recovery post treatment: plans, barriers and 
motivators. Substance abuse treatment, prevention, and policy , 8 (6), 1-12. 
Dyer, R. (1979). The role of stereotypes. In A. Kuper, & J. Kuper, Images of alcoholism. 
London: BFI. 
Dzik, B. (2006). Between consumption and investment: A new approach to the study of 
the motivation to gamble. Journal of Gambling Issues, 17, no pagination. Available 
from: http://jgi.camh.net/doi/abs/10.4309/jgi.2006.17.4. 
Edwards, G. (1994). Editorial: addiction, reductionism and Aaron's rod. Addiction, 89, 
9-12. 
Elder‐Vass, D. (2007). Reconciling Archer and Bourdieu in an emergentist theory of 
action. Sociological Theory, 25(4), 325-346. 
Elder-Vass, D. (2012). The reality of social construction. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Elford, J., Bolding, G., Davis, M., Sherr, L., & Hart, G. (2004). Web-based behavioral 
surveillance among men who have sex with men: a comparison of online and offline 
samples in London, UK. JAIDS Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes, 
35(4), 421-426. 
el-Guebaly, N. (2005). Are attempts at moderate drinking by patients with alcohol 
dependency a form of Russian roulette? Department of Psychiatry, 50(5), 266-8. 
Elias, N. (1994 [1939]). The civilising process. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. 
 321 
 
Elwood, S., & Martin, D. (2000). "Placing" Interviews: Location and Scales of Power in 
Qualitative Research. Professional Geographer, 52(4), 649-657. 
Erickson, P., Riley, D., Cheung, Y., & O'Hare, P. (1997). Harm reduction: a new 
direction for policies and programs. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Ess, C. (2002). Introduction to special issue on internet research ethics. Ethics and 
Information Technology, 4(3), 177-188. 
Ewald, F. (1991). Insurance and risk. In G. Burchell, C. Gordon, & P. Miller, The 
Foucault effect (pp. 197-210). Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Eynon, R., Fry, J., & Schroeder, R. (2008). The ethics of internet research. In N. 
Fielding, R. Lee, & G. Blank, The SAGE handbook of online research methods (pp. 23-
41). London: SAGE. 
Falconer-Al Hindi, K. (1997). Feminist critical realism: a method for gender and work 
studies in geography. In P. I. Jones, H. Nast, & S. Roberts, Thresholds in Feminist 
Geography (pp. 145-164). Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. 
Faugier, J., & Sargeant, M. (1997). Sampling hard to reach populations. Journal of 
Advanced Nursing, 26, 790–797. 
Fenner, Y., Garland, S., & Wark, J. (2012). Web-based recruiting for health research 
using a social networking site: An exploratory study. Journal of Medical Internet 
Research, 14(1), ONLINE. 
Ferentzy, P., & Turner, N. (2013). The history of problem gambling: Temperance, 
substance abuse, medicine, and metaphors. London: Springer Science & Business 
Media. 
Fiese, B. H., Tomcho, T. J., Douglas, M., Josephs, K., Poltrock, S., & Baker, T. (2002). 
A review of 50 years of research on naturally occurring family routines and rituals: 
Cause for celebration? Journal of Family Psychology, 16(4), 381-390. 
Fiese, B. H., Wamboldt, F. S., & Anbar, R. D. (2005). Family asthma management 
routines: connections to medical adherence and quality of life. The Journal of 
Pediatrics, 146(2), 171-176. 
Fine, G. (2001). Enacting norms: mushrooming and the culture of expectations and 
explanations. In M. Hechter, & K.-D. Opp, Social norms (pp. 139-164). Russell Sage 
Foundation: New York. 
Fisher, S. (1999). A prevalence study of gambling and problem gambling in british 
adolescents. Addiction Research, 7(6), 509-538. 
Forrest, D., & McHale, I. (2011). Gambling and Problem Gambling Among Young 
Adolescents in Great Britain. Journal of Gambling Studies, Epub. 
Foucault, M. (1972). The archaeology of knowledge. London: Tavistock. 
Foucault, M. (1977). Discipline and punish: the birth of the prison. London: Penguin. 
 322 
 
Foucault, M. (1980a). Power/knowledge: selected interviews and other writings 1972-
1977. New York: Pantheon Books. 
Foucault, M. (1980b). Truth and Power. Brighton: Harvester. 
Foucault, M. (1982). The subject and power. In H. Dreyfus, & P. Rabinow, Michel 
Foucault: beyond structuralism and hermeneutics (pp. 208-226). Brighton: Harvester. 
Foucault, M. (1984). Nietzche, genealogy, history. In P. Rabinow, The Foucault reader 
(pp. 76-100). New York: Penguin. 
Foucault, M. (1988). ‘Technologies of the self’ (a seminar with Michel Foucault at the 
University of Vermont, October 1982). In L. Martin, H. Gutman, & P. Hutton, 
Technologies of the self: a seminar with Michel Foucault (pp. 16-49). Amherst, MA: 
University of Massachusetts Press. 
Foucault, M. (1989 [1961]). Madness and Civilization: a history of insanity in the age of 
reason. London: Routledge. 
Foucault, M. (1989). Resume des cours 1970-1982. Paris: Julliard. 
Foucault, M. (1991). Governmentality. In G. Burchell, C. Gordon, & P. Miller, The 
Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (pp. 87-104). Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Foucault, M. (2003). Society must be defended: lectures at the Collège de France, 
1975-76: lectures at the College De France, 1975-76. London: Penguin. 
Foucault, M. (2008). The birth of biopolitics: lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-
1979. Ed. Michael Sennelart. General Editors: Francois Ewald and Alessandro 
Fontana. Trans. Graham Burchell. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
France, A., & Utting, D. (2005). The paradigm of 'risk and protection‐focused 
prevention' and its impact on services for children and families. Children & society, 
19(2), 77-90. 
Fraser, S., Moore, D., & Keane, H. (2014). Habits: remaking addiction. London: 
Palgrave: Macmillan. 
Freud, S. (1928). Dostoevsky and Parricide. In J. Strasky, Complete psychological 
words of Freud, Vol. 21. London: Hogarth Press. 
Fricker, R. (2008). Sampling methods for web and e-mail surveys. In N. Fielding, R. 
Lee, & G. Blank, The SAGE handbook of online research methods (pp. 195-216). 
London: SAGE. 
Furlong, P., & Marsh, D. (2010). A skin is not a sweater: ontology and epistemology in 
polictical science. In D. Marsh, & G. Stoker, Theory and methods in political science 
(pp. 184-211). London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Gainsbury, S. (2010). Response to the productivity commission inquiry report into 
gambling: Online gaming and the interactive gambling act. Journal of the National 
Association for Gambling Studies, 22(2). 
 323 
 
Gainsbury, S., & Wood, R. (2011). Internet gambling policy in critical comparative 
perspective: The effectiveness of existing regulatory frameworks. International 
Gambling Studies, 11(3), 309-323. 
Gainsbury, S., Blankers, M., Wilkinson, C., Schelleman-Offermans, K., & Cousijn, J. 
(2014). Recommendations for international gambling harm-minimisation guidelines: 
Comparison with effective public health policy. Journal of Gambling Studies, 30(4), 
771-788. 
Gainsbury, S., Russell, A., & Blaszczynski, A. (2014b). Are psychology university 
student gamblers representative of non-university students and general gamblers? A 
comparative analysis. Journal of Gambling Studies, 30(1), 11-25. 
Gainsbury, S., Russell, A., Hing, N., Wood, R., Lubman, D., & Blaszczynski, A. (2015). 
How the Internet is changing gambling: Findings from an Australian prevalence survey. 
Journal of Gambling Studies, 31(1), 1-15. 
Gainsbury, S., Wood, R., Russell, A., Hing, N., & Blaszczynski, A. (2012). A digital 
revolution: Comparison of demographic profiles, attitudes and gambling behavior of 
Internet and non-Internet gamblers. Computers in Human Behavior, 28(4), 1388-1398. 
Gambling Commission. (2009, March). In-running (in-play) betting: position paper. 
Retrieved December 02, 2015, from Gambling Commission: 
http://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/pdf/In-
running%20betting%20position%20paper%20-%20March%202009.pdf 
Gambling Commission. (2012). Industry Statistics: April 2008 to September 2011. 
London: The Stationary Office. Available from: 
http://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/pdf/Industry%20Statistics%20-
%20June%202012.pdf. 
Gambling Commission. (2015a). Industry Statistics: April 2010 to March 2015. London: 
The Stationary Office. 
Gambling Commission. (2016). High turnover bingo operators and multioperator self-
exclusion requirements. Consultation response July 2016. Birmingham. 
Garﬁnkel, H. (1967). Studies in ethnomethodology. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Geertz, C. (1975). The interpretation of cultures. London: Hutchinson. 
George, S., & Bowden-Jones, H. (2016). Treatment provision for gambling disorder in 
Britain: call for an integrated addictions treatment and commissioning model. BJPsych 
Bulletin, 40(3), 113-115. 
George, S., & Copello, A. (2011). Treatment provision for Britain’s problem gamblers: 
present gaps and future opportunities. Advances in Psychiatric Treatment, 17(5), 318-
322. 
Gibbs, J. (1965). Norms: the problem of definition and classification. American Journal 
of Sociology, 70(5), 586-594. 
Gibson, B., Acquah, S., & Robinson, P. (2004). Entangled identities and psychotropic 
substance use. Sociology of Health & Illness, 26(5), 597-616. 
 324 
 
Giddens, A. (1979). Central problems in social theory: action, structure, and 
contradiction in social analysis. London: Macmillan Press. 
Giddens, A. (1984). The Constitution of Society. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Giddens, A. (1989). A Reply to my Critics. In D. Held, & J. Thompson, Social Theory of 
Modern Societies: Anthony Giddens and his Critics (pp. 249-301). Cambridge: 
University of Cambridge. 
Gillman, M., Rifas-Shiman, S., Frazier, A., Rockett, H., Camargo Jr, C., Field, A., et al. 
(2000). Family dinner and diet quality among older children and adolescents. Archives 
of Family Medicine, 9(3), 235-240. 
Gilovich, T., & Douglas, C. (1986). Biased evaluations of randomly determined 
gambling outcomes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 22, 228-241. 
Gingold, M. (2000). Hooked on "Requiem for a Dream". Fangorio, 95, 56-60. 
Glaser, B., & Strauss, A. (1967). The Discovery of grounded theory: strategies for 
qualitative research. New York: Aldine de Gruyter. 
Glenn, N. (1980). Values, attitudes, and beliefs. In O. Brim, & J. Kagan, Constancy and 
change in human development (pp. 596-640). Cambridge, MA: Havard University 
Press. 
Glueck, S., & Glueck, E. (1950). Unravelling juvenile delinquency. New York: The 
Common Wealth Fund. 
Glueck, S., & Glueck, E. (1968). Delinquents and non delinquents in perspective. MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Goffman, E. (1963). Stigma: notes on the management of spoiled identity. Eaglewood 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. 
Goffman, E. (1967). Interaction ritual: essays on face-to-face behavior. New York: 
Random House. 
Goffman, E. (1969). Where the action is: three essays. London: Allen Lane. 
Goodman, R. (2000). Fieldwork and reflexivity: thoughts from the anthropology of 
Japan. In P. Dresch, W. James, & D. Parkin, Anthropologists in a wider world: essays 
on field research (pp. 151-165). Oxford: Berghahn Books. 
Gordon, C. (1991). Governmental rationality: an introduction. In G. Burchell, C. Gordon, 
& P. Miller, The Foucault effect: studies in governmentality (pp. 1-51). London: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Gordon, R., Gurrieri, L., & Chapman, M. (2015). Broadening an understanding of 
problem gambling: The lifestyle consumption community of sports betting. Journal of 
Business Research, 68(10), 2164–2172. 
Granovetter, M. (1973). The strength of weak ties. American Journal of Sociology, 
78(6), 1360-1380. 
 325 
 
Grant, A. (2013). Betting on simultaneous events and accumulator gambles. In L. 
Vaughan Williams, & D. Siegel, The Oxford handbook of the economics of gambling 
(pp. 341-369). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Grayling, A. (2005). Berkeley's argument for immaterialism. In K. Winkler, The 
Cambridge Companion to Berkeley (pp. 166-189). Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Greco, M. (1993). Psychosomatic subjects and the 'duty to be well': personal agency 
within medical rationality. Economy and Society, 22(3), 357-72. 
Grierson, J. (2016, August 16). Britain's newest gambling addiction charity funded by 
betting firms. Retrieved November 22, 2016, from The Guardian: 
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/aug/19/britains-newest-gambling-addiction-
charity-funded-industrys-gala-bet365-paddy-power 
Griffiths, M. (1991). Psychobiology of the near-miss in fruit machine gambling. Journal 
of Psychology, 125(3), 347-57. 
Griffiths, M. (1993). Fruit machine gambling: the importance of structural 
characteristics. Journal of Gambling Studies, 9(2), 133-152. 
Griffiths, M. (1994). The role of cognitive bias and skill in fruit machine gambling. British 
Journal of Psychology, 85, 351-369. 
Griffiths, M. (2005). Does advertising of gambling increase gambling addiction? 
International Journal of Mental Health and Addiction, 3(2), 15-25. 
Griffiths, M. (2009). Gambling in Great Britain. In G. Meyer, T. Hayer, & M. Griffiths, 
Problem gaming in Europe: Challenges, prevention, and interventions (pp. 103-121). 
New York: Springer. 
Griffiths, M. (2012b). Gambling, stigma, and the rise of online bingo. i-Gaming 
Business Affiliate, 34-35. 
Griffiths, M. (2014a). Term warfare: ‘Problem gambling’ and ‘gambling addiction’ are 
not the same. [Blog] DrMarkGriffiths. Available at: 
http://drmarkgriffiths.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/term-warfare-problem-gambling-and-
gambling-addiction-are-not-the-same/ [Accessed 19 Aug. 2014]. 
Griffiths, M., & Wood, R. (2001). The psychology of lottery gambling. International 
Gambling Studies, 1(1), 27-45. 
Griffiths, M., Bellringer, P., Farrell-Roberts, K., & Freestone, F. (2001). Treating 
problem gamblers: a residential therapy approach. Journal of Gambling Studies, 17(2), 
161-169. 
Griffiths, M., Parke, A., Wood, R., & Parke, J. (2006). Internet gambling: An overview of 
psychosocial impacts. Gaming Research and Review Journal, 27(1), 27–39. 
Griffiths, M., Parke, J., Wood, R., & Rigbye, J. (2010). Online poker gambling in 
university students: Further findings from an online survey. International Journal of 
Health and Addiction, 8, 82–89. 
 326 
 
Grist, L. (2007). Drugs, the family and recent American cinema. In P. Manning, Drugs 
and popular culture (pp. 177-133). London: Willan Publishing.. 
Grund, J. P. (1993). Drug use as a social ritual. Functionality, symbolism and 
determinants of self-regulation. Rotterdam: University of Rotterdam. 
Grund, J., Ronconi, S., & Zuffa, G. (2013). New approaches in drug policy & 
interventions: Innovative cocaine and polydrug abuse prevention programme. Beyond 
the disease model, new perspectives in HR: towards a self regulation and control 
model. Forum Droghe. 
Gunther, M. (2009). The luck factor: why some people are luckier than others and how 
you can become one of them. London: Harriman House. 
Gutting, G. (2005). Foucault: a very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hacking, I. (2000). The social construction of what? Cambridge, MA: Harvard. 
Haines, K., & Case, S. (2008). The rhetoric and reality of the 'risk factor prevention 
paradigm' approach to preventing and reducing youth offending. Youth Justice, 8(1), 5-
20. 
Hall, S. (1997). The work of representation. In S. Hall, Representation: cultural 
representations and signifying practices (pp. 15-75). London: Sage. 
Hammersley, M. (1992a). What's wrong with ethnography: methodological 
explorations. London: Routledge. 
Hammersley, M. (1992b). Deconstructing the qualitative-quantitative divide. In M. 
Hammersley, What’s wrong with ethnography (pp. 159-173). London: Routledge. 
Hammersley, M. (2007). The issue of quality in qualitative research. International 
Journal of Research & Method in Education, 30(3), 287–305. 
Hammersley, R., & Reid, M. (2002). Why the pervasive addiction myth is still believed. 
Addiction Research and Theory, 10(1), 7-30. 
Harding, W. M., & Zinberg, N. E. (1977). The effectiveness of the subculture in 
developing rituals and social sanctions for controlled drug use. In B. Du Toit, Drugs, 
rituals and altered states of consciousness (pp. 111-113). Rotterdam: Balkema. 
Hart, C., Csete, J., & Habibi, D. (2014). Methamphetamine: fact vs. fiction and lessons 
from the crack hysteria. Open Society Foundations. 
Hartup, W., & Stevens, N. (1997). Friendships and adaptation in the life course. 
Psychological bulletin, 121(3), 355-370. 
Hay, C. (2007). Political ontology. In R. Goodin, & C. Tilley, The Oxford handbook of 
contextual political analysis (pp. 78-96). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Heather, N., & Robertson, I. (1983). Controlled drinking. London: Methuen. 
Heckathorn, D. (1997). Respondent-driven sampling: a new approach to the study of 
hidden populations. Social Problems, 44(2), 174-199. 
 327 
 
Hewson, C., & Laurent, D. (2008). Research design and tools for internet research. In 
N. Fielding, The SAGE handbook of online research methods (pp. 58-78). London: 
Sage. 
Heyman, G. (2013). Quitting drugs: quantitative and qualitative features. Annual 
Review of Clinical Psychology, 9, 29-59. 
Hing, N., Cherney, L., Gainsbury, S., Lubman, D., Wood, R., & Blaszczynski, A. 
(2015c). Maintaining and losing control during Internet gambling: A qualitative study of 
gamblers’ experiences. New Media & Society, 17(7), 1075-1095. 
Hing, N., Holdsworth, L., Tiyce, M., & Breen, H. (2014). Stigma and problem gambling: 
current knowledge and future research directions. International Gambling Studies, 
14(1), 64-81. 
Hing, N., Nuske, E., S. M., & Russell, A. M. (2015a). Perceived stigma and self-stigma 
of problem gambling: perspectives of people with gambling problems. International 
Gambling Studies, 1-18. 
Hing, N., Russell, A. M., Vitartas, P., & Lamont, M. (2015b). Demographic, behavioural 
and normative risk factors for gambling problems amongst sports bettors. Journal of 
Gambling Studies, 1-17. 
Hing, N., Tiyce, M., Holdsworth, L., & Nuske, E. (2013). All in the family: Help-seeking 
by signiﬁcant others of problem gamblers. International Journal of Mental Health and 
Addiction, 11, 396–408. 
Hitlin, S., & Piliavin, J. A. (2004). Values: reviving a dormant concept. Annual Review of 
Sociology, 30, 359-393. 
Hodgins, D., & el-Guebaly, N. (2000). Natural and treatment-assisted recovery from 
gambling problems: a comparison of resolved and active gamblers. Addiction, 95(5), 
777–789. 
Hodgins, D., Wynne, H., & Makarchuk, K. (1999). Pathways to recovery from gambling 
problems: follow-up from a general population. Journal of Gambling Studies, 15, 93-
104. 
Holdsworth, L., Nuske, E., Tiyce, M., & Hing, N. (2013). Impacts of gambling problems 
on partners: Partners’ interpretations. Asian Journal of Gambling Issues and Public 
Health, 3, Non paginated. 
Hollway, W., & Jefferson, T. (2000). Doing qualitative research differently: free 
association narrative and the interview method. London: Sage. 
Home Office. (2001). Gambling Review Report. Norwich: HMSO. 
Horch, J., & Hodgins, D. (2008). Public stigma of disordered gambling: social distance, 
dangerousness and familiarity. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 27(5), 505-
528. 
Horch, J., & Hodgins, D. (2013). Stereotypes of problem gambling. Journal of Gambling 
Studies, 28, 1-19. 
 328 
 
Hoy, D. (1999). Critical resistance: Foucault and Bourdieu. In G. Weiss, & H. Haber, 
Perspectives on embodiment (pp. 3-21). Oxford: Routledge. 
Hughes, K. (2007). Migrating identities: the relational constitution of drug use and 
addiction. Sociology of Health & Illness, 29(5), 673-691. 
Hunt, W., & Bespalec, D. (1974). Relapse rates after treatment for heroin addiction. 
Journal of Community Psychology, 21(1), 85-87. 
Interis, M. (2011). On norms: a typology with discussion. American Journal of 
Economics and Sociology, 70(2), 424-438.. 
Jenkins, R. (1992). Pierre Bourdieu. London: Routledge. 
Jenkins, R. (2014). Social identity. Oxford: Routledge. 
Johansson, A., Grant, J., Kim, S., Odlaug, B., & Götestam, K. (2009). Risk factors for 
problematic gambling: a critical literature review. Journal of Gambling Studies, 25(1), 
67-92. 
Johnson, W., Hicks, B., McGue, M., & Iacono, W. (2007). Most of the girls are alright, 
but some aren’t: Personality trajectory groups from ages 14 to 24 and some 
associations with outcomes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93, 266 –
284. 
Johnstone, B., Leino, E., Ager, C., Ferrer, H., & Fillmore, K. (1996). Determinants of 
life-course variation in the frequency of alcohol consumption: meta-analysis of studies 
from the Collaborative Alcohol Related Longitudinal Project. Journal of Studies on 
Alcohol, 57, 494–506. 
Joinson, A. (1999). Social desirability, anonymity, and Intemet-based questionnaires. 
Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers, 31(3), 433-438. 
Jones, P., Clarke-Hill, C., & Hillier, D. (2000). Viewpoint: back street to side street to 
high street to e-street: sporting betting on the Internet. International Journal of Retail & 
Distribution Management, 28(6), 222-227. 
Joukhador, J., Blaszczynski, A., & Maccallum, F. (2004). Superstitious beliefs in 
gambling among problem and non-problem gamblers: Preliminary data. Journal of 
Gambling Studies, 20(2), 171-180. 
Kalant, H. (2009). What neurobiology cannot tell us about addiction. Addiction, 105, 
781-789. 
Kapp, J., Peters, C., & Oliver, D. (2013). Research recruitment using Facebook 
advertising: big potential, big challenges. Journal of cancer education, 28(1), 134-137. 
Keane, H. (2003). Critiques of harm reduction, morality and the promise of human 
rights. International Journal of Drug Policy, 14(3), 227-232. 
Kelle, U. (1997). Theory building in qualitative research and computer programs for the 
management of textual data. Sociological Research Online, 2(2), Available from: 
http://www.socresonline.org.uk/2/2/1.html. 
 329 
 
Kelle, U. (2004). Computer-assisted qualitative data analysis. In C. Seale, G. Gobo, J. 
Gubrium, & D. Silverman, Qualitative Research Practice (pp. 443-460). London: Sage. 
Kemshall, H., Marsland, L., & Boeck, T. (2006). Young people, pathways and crime: 
beyond risk factors. Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology, 39(3), 354-370. 
Kerr, W., Fillmore, K., & Bostrom, A. (2002). Stability of alcohol consumption over time: 
Evidence from three longitudinal surveys from the United States. Journal of Studies on 
Alcohol, 63, 325–333. 
King, A. (2000). Thinking with Bourdieu against Bourdieu: a ‘practical’ critique of the 
habitus. Sociological Theory, 18(3), 417-433. 
King, A. (2004). The structure of social theory. London: Routledge. 
Kolata, G. (2002). Runner's high? Endorphins? Fiction, some scientists say. New York 
Times, May 21, 2002, p. D1. 
Koski-Jannes, A. (2002). Social and personal identity projects in the recovery from 
addictive behaviours. Addiction Research and Theory, 10(2), 183-202. 
Kraut. (2004). Psychological research online: report of board of Scientific Affairs' 
Advisory Group on the conduct of rResearch on the internet. American Psychologist, 
59(2), 105. 
Krefting, L. (1991). Rigor in qualitative research: the assessment of trustworthiness. 
The American Journal of Occupational Therapy, 45(3), 214-222. 
Laansoo, S., & Niit, T. (2009). Coountry report: Estonia. In G. Meyer, T. Hayer, & M. 
Griffiths, Problem gambling in Europe: Challenges, prevention, and interventions (pp. 
37-52). New York: Springer. 
Ladouceur, R. (2005). Controlled gambling for pathological gamblers. Journal of 
Gambling Studies, 21(1), 51-59. 
Ladouceur, R., Blaszczynski, A., Shaffer, H., & Fong, D. (2016). Extending the Reno 
Model: Responsible gambling evaluation guidelines for gambling operators, public 
policymakers, and regulators. Gaming Law Review and Economics, 20(7), 580-586. 
Ladouceur, R., Gosselin, P., Laberge, M., & Blaszczynski, A. (2001). Dropouts in 
clinical research: Do results reported in the field of addiction reflect clinical reality. The 
Behavior Therapist, 24, 44-46. 
Ladouceur, R., Lachance, S., & Fournier, P. (2009). Is control a viable goal in the 
treatment of pathological gambling. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 47, 189-197. 
Lamaison, P., & Bourdieu, P. (1986). From Rules to Strategies: an Interview with Pierre 
Bourdieu. Cultural Anthropology, 1(1), 110-120. 
Lamont, M., Hing, N., & Gainsbury, S. (2011). Gambling on sport sponsorship: A 
conceptual framework for research and regulatory review. Sport Management Review, 
14(3), 246-257. 
 330 
 
LaPlante, D., Nelson, S., LaBrie, R., & Shaffer, H. (2008). Stability and progression of 
disordered gambling: lessons from longitudinal studies. Canadian Journal of 
Psychiatry, 53(1), 52-60. 
Latour, B. (1986). Visual cognition: thinking with hands and eyes. In H. Kulick, 
Knowledge and Society Volume 6. Houston: Rice University Press. 
Laub, J., & Sampson, R. (1993). Turning points in the life course: why change matters 
to the study of crime. Criminology, 31(3), 301-325. 
Laub, J., & Sampson, R. (2003). Shared beginnings, divergent lives: Delinquent boys 
to age 70. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Laudet, A. (2007). What does recovery mean to you? Lessons from the recovery 
experience for research and practice. Journal of Substance Abuse Treatment, 243-256. 
Lawler, S. (2014). Identity: sociological perspectives. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Lemert, E. (1951). Social pathology: a systematic approach to the theory of sociopathic 
behavior. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Lemke, T. (2001). 'The birth of bio-politics': Michel Foucault's lecture at the Collège de 
France on neo-liberal governmentality. Economy and Society, 30(2), 190-207. 
Lenton, S., & Single, E. (1998). The definition of harm reduction. Drug and Alcohol 
Review, 17, 213-220. 
Lesieur, H. (1977). The chase: career of the compulsive gambler. Anchor Press. 
Lesieur, H., & Rosenthal, R. (1991). Pathological gambling: a review of the literature. 
Journal of gambling studies, 7, 5-39.. 
Letherby, G., Scott, J., & Williams, M. (2013). Objectivity and subjectivity in social 
research. London: Sage. 
Levine, H. (1978). The discovery of addiction: changing conceptions of habitual 
drunkenness in America. Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 15, 493-506. 
Levy, N. (2012, February 07). Explainer: does luck exist? Retrieved July 07, 2015, from 
The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/explainer-does-luck-exist-5139 
Light, R. (2007). The Gambling Act 2005: regulatory containtment and market control. 
The Modern Law Review, 70(4), 626-653. 
Lincoln, Y., & Guba, E. (1985). Naturalistic inquiry. Beverly Hills: Sage. 
Lincoln, Y., Lynham, S., & Guba, E. (2011). Paradigmatic controversies, 
contraditctions, and emerging confluences, revisited . London: Sage. 
Lindesmith, A. (1938). A Sociological Theory of Drug Addiction. American Journal of 
Sociology, 43(4), 593-609. 
Lippmann, W. (1965). Public opinion. New York: Macmillan. 
 331 
 
Littlefield, A., Sher, K., & Wood, P. (2009). Is “maturing out” of problematic alcohol 
involvement related to personality change? Journal of abnormal psychology, 118(2), 
360-374. 
Liu, W., Lee, G. P., Goldweber, A., Petras, H., Storr, C. L., Ialongo, N. S., et al. (2013). 
Impulsivity trajectories and gambling in adolescence among urban male youth. 
Addiction, 108(4), 780-788. 
Livingstone, C., & Adams, P. (2016). Response to commentaries—clear principles for 
gambling research. Addiction, 111(1), 16-17. 
Lloyd, R., & Salzberg, H. (1975). Controlled social drinking: an alternative to abstinence 
as a treatment goal for some alcohol abusers. Psychological Bulletin, 82, 815-842. 
Lobsinger, C., & Bechett, L. (1996). Odds on to break even: A practical approach to 
gambling awareness. Canberra, Australia : Relationships Australia. 
Lorains, F., Cowlishaw, S., & Thomas, S. (2011). Prevalence of comorbid disorders in 
problem and pathological gambling: Systematic review and meta‐analysis of population 
surveys. Addiction, 106(3), 490-498. 
Lumsden, J. (2007). Online-questionnaire design guidelines. In R. Reynolds, R. 
Woods, & J. Baker, Handbook of research on electronic surveys and measurements 
(pp. 44-64). London: Idea Group. 
Luong, G., Charles, S., & Fingerman, K. (2011). Better with age: Social relationships 
across adulthood. Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, 28(1), 9-23. 
Lupton, D. (1999). Risk and sociocultural theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Lupton, D. (2006). Risk and governmentality. In J. Cosgrave, The sociology of risk and 
gambling reader (pp. 85-99). Oxford: Routledge. 
Lyng, S. (2005). Edgework: the sociology of risk taking. London: Psychology Press. 
MacAndrew, C., & Edgerton, R. (1969). Drunken comportment: A social explanation. 
Chicago: Aldine. 
Malaby, T. (2003). Gambling life: dealing in contingency in a Greek city. Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press. 
Malinowski, B. (1948). Magic, science and religion and other essays. Glencoe, Illinois: 
The Free Press. 
Mallonee, S., Fowler, C., & Istre, G. (2006). Bridging the gap between research and 
practice: a continuing challenge. Injury prevention, 12(6), 357-359. 
Maloff, D., Becker, H., Fonaroff, A., & Rodin, J. (1980). Informal social controls and 
their influence on substance use. In D. Maloff, & P. Levison, Issues in controlled 
substance use: papers and commentary, conference on issues in controlled substance 
use (pp. 5-35). Washington DC: National Academy of Sciences. 
 332 
 
Mariezcurrena, R. (1994). Recovery from addictions without treatment: Literature 
review. Scandinavian Journal of Behaviour Therapy, 23, 131-154. 
Marini, N. (2000). Social values and norms. In E. Borgotta, & R. Montgomery, 
Encyclopedia of sociology (pp. 2828-2040). New York: Macmillan. 
Markowitz, F. (1998). The effects of stigma on the psychological well-being and life 
satisfaction of persons with mental illness. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 
39(4), 335-347. 
Martin, A., & Stenner, P. (2004). Talking about drug use: what are we (and our 
participants) doing in qualitative research? International Journal of Drug Policy, 15(5), 
395-405. 
Mazzocchi, F. (2008). Complexity in biology. Exceeding the limits of reductionism and 
determinism using complexity theory. EMBO Rep, 9(1), 10-14. 
McCarty, D., Caspi, Y., Panas, L., Krakow, M., & Mulligan, D. (2000). Detoxification 
centers: who's in the revolving door? Journal of Behavioral Health Services & 
Research, 27(3), 245-256. 
McGowan, V. (2004). How do we know what we know? epistemic tensions in social 
and cultural research on gambling 1980-2000. Journal of Gambling Issues(11). 
McGowan, V., Droessler, J., Nixon, G., & Grimshaw, M. (2000). Recent research in the 
socio-cultural domain of gaming and gambling: an annotated bibliography and critical 
overview. Edmonton, AB: Alberta Gaming Research Institute. 
McIntosh, J., & McKeganey, N. (2000). Addicts' narratives of recovery from drug use: 
constructing a non-addict identity. Social Science & Medicine, 50(10), 1501-1510. 
McIntosh, J., & McKeganey, N. (2001). Identity and recovery from dependent drugs 
use: the addict's perspective. Drugs: Education, Prevention and Policy, 8(1), 47-59. 
Mckeganey, N., Morris, Z., Neale, J., & Robertson, M. (2004). What are drug users 
looking for when they contact drug services: abstience or harm reduction? Drugs: 
Education, Prevention, and Policy, 11(5), 423-435. 
McMillen, J. (1996). Understanding gambling: history, concepts and theories. In J. 
McMillen, Gambling cultures: studies in history and interpretation (pp. 6-39). London: 
Routledge. 
McMillen, J., Marshall, D., & Murphy, L. (2004). The use of ATMs in ACT gaming 
venues: an empirical study. Centre for Gambling Research, Australian National 
University. 
McMurran, M. (1994). The psychology of addiction. London: Taylor and Francis. 
McNay, L. (1994). Foucault: a critical introduction. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
McPherson, M., Smith-Lovin, L., & Cook, J. (2001). Birds of a feather: Homophily in 
social networks. Annual review of sociology, 27(1), 415-444. 
Mead, G. (1934). Mind, self and society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 333 
 
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962 [1945]). Phenomenology of Perception. Atlantic Highlands, 
N.J.: Humanities Press. 
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1964). Signs. Evanston: Northwerstern University Press . 
Mestrovic, S. (1998). Anthony Giddens: the last modernist. London: Routledge. 
Miles, S., Anderson, A., & Meethan, K. (2002). The changing consumer: markets and 
meanings. London: Routledge. 
Miller, P., & Rose, N. (2008). Governing the present: administering economic, social 
and personal life. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Miller, P., Johnston, J., McElwee, P.R, & Noble, R. (2007). A pilot study using the 
internet to study patterns of party drug use: processes, ﬁndings and limitations. Drug 
and Alcohol Review, 26(2), 169-74. 
Miller, W., & Page, A. (1991). Warm turkey: other routes to abstinence. Journal of 
substance abuse treatment, 8, 227-232. 
Mills, C. (1959). The sociological imagination. London: Oxford University Press. 
Monaghan, S., & Blaszczynski, A. (2010). Impact of mode of display and message 
content of responsible gambling signs for electronic gaming machines on regular 
gamblers. Journal of Gambling Studies, 26(1), 67-88. 
Moodie, C., & Reith, G. (2009). Responsible gambling signage on electronic gaming 
machines, before and after the implementation of the United Kingdom Gambling Act: 
an observational study. International Gambling Studies, 9(1), 5-17. 
Moore, D. (1993). Beyond Zinberg's 'social setting': a processual view of illicit drug use. 
Drug and Alcohol Review, 12, 413-421.. 
Moore, S., Thomas, A. C., Kyrios, M., & Bates, G. (2012). The self-regulation of 
gambling. Journal of Gambling Studies, 28(3), 405-420. 
Morrison, R. (2014, June 18). Jersey offering 'no help' for gambling addicts. Retrieved 
August 10, 2014, from BBC News: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-jersey-
27886679 
Mouzelis, N. (2007). Habitus and reflexivity: restructuring Bourdieu's theory of practice. 
Sociological Research Online, 12(6), Available at 
http://www.socresonline.org.uk/12/6/9.html. 
Mugford, S. (1993). Harm reduction: Does it lead where its proponents imagine? In N. 
Heather, A. Wodak, E. Nadelmann, & P. O’Hare, Psychoactive drugs and harm 
reduction. From faith to science. London: Whurr Publishers. 
Munting, R. (1996). An economic and social history of gambling in Britain and the USA. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Napper, L., Fisher, D., Johnson, M., & Wood, M. (2010). The reliability and validity of 
drug users' self reports of amphetamine use among primarily heroin and cocaine users. 
Addictive Behaviors, 35(4), 350-354. 
 334 
 
Nasir, S., Rosenthal, D., & Moore, T. (2011). The social context of controlled drug use 
amongst young people in a slum area in Makassar, Indonesia. International Journal of 
Drug Policy, 22(6), 463-470. 
Nasir, S., Rosenthal, D., & Moore, T. (2014). “It’s not easy but it's still possible to be an 
abstainer here”: Non-Drug Use Among Young Men in a Slum Area in Makassar, 
Indonesia. International Journal of Criminology and Sociology, 3, 336-347. 
National Centre for Responsible Gambling (NCRG). (2013, May 19). The evolving 
defintion of pathological gambling in the DSM-5 [Blog]. Retrieved August 14, 2015, 
from NCRG: http://blog.ncrg.org/blog/2013/05/evolving-definition-pathological-
gambling-dsm-5 
National Research Council. (1999). Pathological gambling: a critical review. 
Washington, DC: National Academy Press. 
Nazarewicz, P. (2012). Building a Bankroll Full Ring Edition: Proven strategies for 
moving up in stakes playing no limit hold'em online. Georgia: Mt Micro Poker. 
Neal, P., Delfabbro, P., & O'Neil, M. (2005). Problem gambling and harm: Towards a 
national definition. Melbourne: Office of Gaming and Racing. 
Neale, J., Nettleton, S., & Pickering, L. (2011). Recovery from problem drug use: What 
can we learn from the sociologist Erving Goffman? Drugs: education, prevention and 
policy, 18(1), 3-9. 
Nelson, S., LaPlante, D., Peller, A. J., Schumann, A., LaBrie, R. A., & Shaffer, H. 
(2008). Real limits in the virtual world: self-limiting behavior of Internet gamblers. 
Journal of Gambling Studies, 24(4), 463-477. 
Nettleton, S., Neale, J., & Pickering, L. (2011). I don’t think there’s much of a rational 
mind in a drug addict when they are in the thick of it’: towards an embodied analysis of 
recovering heroin users. Sociology of health & illness, 33(3), 341-355. 
Newman, O. (1972). Gambling: hazard and reward. London: Athlone. 
Nicholson, T., White, J., & Duncan, D. (1999). A survey of adult recreational drug use 
via the World Wide Web: The DRUGNET study. Journal of Psychoactive Drugs, 31(4), 
415-422. 
Nosek, B., Banaji, M., & Greenwald, A. (2002). E‐research: ethics, security, design, 
and control in psychological research on the internet. Journal of Social Issues, 58(1), 
161-176. 
Nower, L., & Blaszczynski, A. (2008). Recovery in pathological gambling: an imprecise 
concept. Substance Use & Misuse, 43(12), 1844-1864. 
Oberhauser, A. (1997). The home as 'field': households and homework in rural 
Appalachia. In J. P. Jones, H. J. Nast, & S. M. Roberts, Thresholds in feminist 
geography: difference, methodology, and representation (pp. 165-182). Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield. 
O'Connor, J., & Dickerson, M. (2003). Definition and measurement of chasing in off-
course betting and gaming machine play. Journal of Gambling Studies, 19(4), 359-386. 
 335 
 
Ofcom. (2013). Trends in advertising activity – gambling. London: Independent 
Regulator and Competition Authority for the UK Communications Industries (Ofcom). 
Availabe from: http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/research/tv-
research/Trends_in_Ad_Activity_Gambling.pdf. 
Ohtsuka, K., & Chan, C. C. (2010). Donning red underwear to play mahjong: 
Superstitious beliefs and problem gambling among Chinese mahjong players in Macau. 
Gambling Research, 22(1), 18-33. 
O'Malley, P. (1996). Risk and responsibility. In A. Barry, T. Osbourne, & N. Rose, 
Foucault and political reason (pp. 189-207). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
O'Malley, P. (2008). Governmentality and risk. In J. Zinn, Social theories of risk and 
uncertanity: an introduction (pp. 52-75). Oxford: Blackwell. 
Opp, K.-D. (2001). How do norms emerge? An outline of a theory. Mind and Society, 
2(3), 101-128. 
Orford, J. (2001b). Excessive appetites: a psychological view of addictions (2nd ed.). 
London: Wiley. 
Orford, J. (2005a). Disabling the public interest: gambling strategies and policies for 
Britain. Addiction, 100, 1219-1225. 
Orford, J. (2005b). Complicity on the river bank: the search for the truth about problem 
gambling: reply to the commentaries. Addiction, 100(9), 1235-1239. 
Orford, J. (2011). An unsafe bet?: The dangerous rise of gambling and the debate we 
should be having. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 
Orford, J. M. (1996). Drinking and gambling: A comparison with implications for 
theories of addiction. Drug and Alcohol Review, 15(1), 47-56. 
Orford, J., & Keddie, A. (1986). Abstinence or controlled drinking in clinical practice: 
indications at initial assessment. Addictive Behaviors, 11(2), 71-86. 
Orford, J., Sproston, K., Erens, B., White, C., & Mitchell, L. (2003). Gambling and 
Problem Gambling in Britain. Hove: Brunner-Routledge. 
Parke, A., Harris, A., Parke, J., Rigbye, J., & Blaszczynski, A. (2014). Facilitating player 
control in gambling. The Journal of Gambling Business and Economics, 8(3), 36-51. 
Parke, J., & Griffiths, M. (2007). The role of structural characteristics in gambling. In G. 
Smith, D. Hodgins, & R. Williams, Research and measurement issues in gambling 
studies (pp. 211-243). New York: Elsevier. 
Parke, J., & Parke, A. (2013). Does size really matter? a review of the role of stake and 
prize levels in relation To gambling-related harm. The Journal of Gambling Business 
and Economics, 7(3), 77-110. 
Parkin, S. (2013). Habitus and drug using environments. health, place and lived-
experiences. Surrey: Ashgate. 
 336 
 
Parkin, S., & Coomber, R. (2010). Fluorescent blue lights, injecting drug use and 
related health risk in public conveniences: Findings from a qualitative study of micro-
injecting environments. Health and Place, 16(4), 629–637. 
Parrott, A., Buchanan, T., Scholey, A., Heffernan, T., Ling, J., & Rodgers, J. (2002). 
Ecstasy/MDMA attributed problems reported by novice, moderate and heavy 
recreational users. Human Psychopharmacological, 17(6), 309-12. 
Parsons, T. (1937 [1968]). The structure of social action. A study in social theory with 
special reference to a group of recent European writers. London: Free Press. 
Parsons, T. (1951 [1991]). The social system. London: Routledge. 
Parsons, T. (1966). Societies: evolutionary and comparative perspectives. Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall. 
Parsons, T., & Shills, E. (1951). Values, motives, and systems of action. In T. Parsons, 
& E. Shills, Toward a general theory of action (pp. 247-275). New York: Harper. 
Pearce, J. (2013). Using social identity theory to predict managers’ emphases on 
ethical and legal values in judging business issues. Journal of Business Ethics , 112 
(3), 497-514. 
Pearson, G. (1987). Social deprivation, unemployment and patterns of heroin use. In N. 
Dorn, & N. South, A land fit for heroin (pp. 62-94). London: Macmillan. 
Peele, S. (1985). The meaning of addiction. Compulsive experience and its 
interpretation. Lexington: Lexington Books. 
Peele, S. (2001). Is gambling an addiction like drug and alcohol addiction? Developing 
realistic and useful conceptions of compulsive gambling. Journal of Gambling Issues, 
3(1), Non paginated. 
Petry, N. (2006). Should the scope of addictive behaviors be broadened to include 
pathological gambling? Addiction, 101(1), 152-160. 
Petry, N., Blanco, C., Auriacombe, M., Borges, G., Bucholz, K., Crowley, T., et al. 
(2013). An overview of and rationale for changes Proposed for pathological gambling in 
DSM-5. Journal of Gambling Studies. 
Philips, J. (2002). Technical reason in the DSM-IV: An unacknowledged value. In J. 
Sadler, Descriptions of prescriptions (pp. 76-95). Baltimore: The John Hopkins 
University Press. 
Pitts, J. (2003). The new politics of youth crime: discipline or solidarity? Lyme Regis, 
Dorset: Russell House Publishing. 
Popay, J., Williams, G., Thomas, C., & Gatrell, T. (1998). Theorising inequalities in 
health: the place of lay knowledge. Sociology of Health & Illness, 20(5), 619-644. 
Powell, D. (1973). A pilot study of occasional heroin users. Archives of General 
Psychiatry, 28, 586-594. 
 337 
 
Preston, J., & Epley, N. (2005). Explanations versus applications the explanatory 
power of valuable beliefs. Psychological Science, 16(10), 826-832. 
Prins, E. (2008). "Maturing out" and the dynamics of the biographical trajectories of 
hard drug addicts. Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung/Forum: Qualitative Social 
Research, 9(1), Online: http://www.qualitative-
research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/322/705. 
Pritchard, D., & Smith, M. (2004). The psychology and philosophy of luck. New Ideas in 
Psychology, 22(1), 1-28. 
Prochaska, J., & DiClemente, C. (1983). Stages and processes of self-change of 
smoking: toward an integrative model of change. Journal of Consulting and Clinical 
Psychology, 51(3), 390-395. 
Prochaska, J., Di Clemente, C., & Norcorss, J. (1992). In Search of How People 
Change: Applications to Addictive Behaviours. American Psychologist, 47, 1102-1114. 
Productivity Commission. (2010). Gambling. Productivity Commission inquiry report. 
Canberra, Australia: Productivity Commission. 
Putnam, R. (2000). Bowling alone: the collapse and rivaval of American community. 
New York: Simon and Schuster. 
Quintero, G. (2000). “The lizard in the green bottle”:“aging out” of problem drinking 
among Navajo men. Social Science & Medicine, 51(7), 1031-1045. 
Rabinow, P. (1984). The Foucault reader: an introduction to Foucault's thought, with 
major new unpublished material. London: Penguin. 
Rachlin, S., Halpern, A., & Protnow, S. (1986). Pathological gambling and criminal 
responsibility. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 31(January), 235-240. 
Racing Post. (2013). Cards help. Retrieved March 16, 2016, from Racing Post (Online): 
http://www.racingpost.com/horses2/cards/help.sd 
Radburn, B., & Horsley, R. (2011). Gamblers, grinders, and mavericks: The use of 
membership categorisation to manage identity by professional poker players. Journal 
of Gambling Issues(26), 30-50. 
Radcliffe-Brown, A. (1952). Structure and function in primitive society. London: Cohen 
and West. 
Ramesh, R. (2013, December 13). Rise of the machines puts punters at bigger risk, 
says gambling addict. Retrieved August 10, 2014, from The Guardian: 
http://www.theguardian.com/society/2013/dec/13/gambling-addiction-fixed-odds-
betting-terminals 
Ramesh, R. (2014, April 30). Maximum cash stake on fixed-odds betting terminals to 
be restricted. Retrieved November 22, 2016, from The Guardian: 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/apr/30/maximum-stake-fixed-odds-betting-
terminals-restricted 
 338 
 
Ramo, D., Hall, S., & Prochaska, J. (2010). Reaching young adult smokers through the 
Internet: Comparison of three recruitment mechanisms. Nicotine & Tobacco Research, 
12(7), 768–775. 
Ramo, D., Rodriguez, T., Chavez, K., Sommer, M. J., & Prochaska, J. (2014). 
Facebook recruitment of young adult smokers for a cessation trial: methods, metrics, 
and lessons learned. Internet Interventions, 1(2), 58-64. 
Randall, N. (2011). Drug policy and rationality: An exploration of the research–policy 
interface in Ireland. Drugs: education, prevention and policy, 18(4), 285-294. 
Rankin, H. (1982). Control rather than abtsinence as a goal in the treatment of 
excessive gambling. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 20, 185-187. 
Read, J. (2009). A genealogy of homo-economicus: neoliberalism and the production 
of subjectivity. Foucault Studies, 6, 25-36. 
Recher, J., & Griffiths, M. (2012). An exploratory qualitative study of online poker 
professional players. Social Psychological Review, 14(2), 13-25. 
Reinarman, C. (2004). Public health and human rights: the virtues of ambiguity. 
International Journal of Drug Policy, 15, 239-241. 
Reinarman, C. (2005). Addiction as accomplishment: The discursive construction of 
disease. Addiction Research & Theory, 13(4), 307-320. 
Reinarman, C., & Levine, H. (1997). Crack in context: demon drugs and social justice. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Reinarman, C., & Levine, H. (2004). Crack in the rearview mirror: deconstructing drug 
war mythology. Social Justice, 31(2), 182-199. 
Reith, G. (1999). The age of chance: gambling in Western culture. London: Routledge. 
Reith, G. (2004). Consumption and its discontents: addiction, identity and the problems 
of freedom. The British Journal of Sociology, 55(2), 283-300. 
Reith, G. (2006). Research on the social impacts of gambling. Edinburgh: Scottish 
Executive Social Research. 
Reith, G. (2007a). Situating gambling studies. In D. Smith, D. Hodgins, & R. Williams, 
Research and measurement issues in gambling studies (pp. 3-32). London: Elsevier. 
Reith, G. (2007b). Gambling and the contradictions of consumption. American 
Behavioural Scientist, 51(1), 33-55. 
Reith, G., & Dobbie, F. (2011). Beginning gambling: The role of social networks and 
environment. Addiction Research and Theory, 19(6), 483-493. 
Reith, G., & Dobbie, F. (2012). Lost in the game: narratives of addiction and identity in 
recovery from problem gambling. Addiction Research and Theory, 20(6), 511-521. 
Reith, G., & Dobbie, F. (2013). Gambling careers: a longitudinal, qualitative study of 
gambling behaviour. Addiction Research and Theory, 21(5), 376-390. 
 339 
 
Rhodes, S., Bowie, D., & Hergenrather, K. (2003). Collecting behavioural data using 
the world wide web: considerations for researchers. Journal of Epidemiology & 
Community Health, 57, 68–73. 
Rhodes, T. (2002). The ‘risk environment’: a framework for understanding and reducing 
drug-related harm. International Journal of Drug Policy, 13(2), 85-94. 
Rhodes, T. (2009). Risk environments and drug harms: a social science for harm 
reduction approach. International Journal of Drug Policy, 20, 193-201. 
Rhodes, T., & Simic, M. (2005). Transition and the HIV risk environment. BMJ, 331, 
220-223. 
Rhodes, T., Singer, M., Bourgois, P., Friedman, S., & Strathdee, S. (2005). The social 
structural production of HIV risk among injecting drug users. Social Science and 
Medicine, 61, 1026-1044. 
Rhodes, T., Stimson, G., Moore, D., & Bourgois, P. (2010). Qualitative social research 
in addictions publishing: creating an enabling journal environment. The International 
journal on drug policy, 21(6), 441. 
Rice, J. (1992). Discursive formation, life stories, and the emergence of co-
dependency. Sociological Quarterly, 33, 337-364. 
Riley, D., & O'Hare, P. (2000). Harm reduction: history, defintion and practice. In J. 
Inciardi, & L. Harrison, Harm reduction: national and international perspectives (pp. 1-
26). London: Sage. 
Ritzer, G. (2000). Sociological Theory. London: McGraw-Hill. 
Ritzer, G., Goodman, D., & Wiedenhoft, W. (2001). Theories of consumption. In G. 
Rtizer, & B. Smart, Handbook of social theory (pp. 410-427). London: Sage. 
Roberts, B., Caspi, A., & Moffitt, T. (2001). The kids are alright: growth and stability in 
personality development from adolescence to adulthood. Journal of personality and 
social psychology, 81(4), 670-683. 
Roberts, B., Walton, K., & Viechtbauer, W. (2006). Patterns of mean-level change in 
personality traits across the life course: a meta-analysis of longitudinal studies. 
Psychological bulletin, 132(1), 1-25. 
Robins, L. (1973). A Follow-up of Vietnam Drug Users. Special Action Office 
Monograph, series A, no. 1. Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President. 
Robins, L. (1993). Vietnam veterans' rapid recovery from heroin addiction: a fluke or 
normal expectation? Addiction, 88(8), 1041-1054. 
Robins, L. (2010). Vietnam veterans three years after vietnam: how our study changed 
our view of heroin. The American Journal on Addictions, 19, 203–211. 
Robins, L., & Slobodyan, S. (2003). Post-Vietnam heroin use and injection by returning 
US veterans: clues to preventing injection today. Addiction, 98, 1053-1060. 
 340 
 
Robins, L., Davis, D., & Goodwin, D. (1974b). Drug Use in the U.S. Army Enlisted Men 
in Vietnam: A Follow-up on thier Return Home. American Journal of Epidemiology, 99, 
235-249. 
Robins, L., Davis, D., & Nurco, D. (1974a). How permanent was Vietnam drug 
addiction? American Journal of Public Health, 64(12), 38-43. 
Robins, L., Helzer, J., Hesselbrock, M., & Wish, E. (2010 [1977]). Vietnam Veterans 
Three Years after Vietnam: How our Study Changed our View of Heroin. The American 
Journal of Addictions, 19, 203-211. 
Robinson, T., & Berridge, K. (2003). Addiction. Annual Review of Psychology, 54, 25-
53. 
Roccas, S., Sagiv, L., Schwartz, S. H., & Knafo, A. (2002). The big five personality 
factors and personal values. Personality and social psychology bulletin, 28(6), 789-801. 
Rockloff, M., & Dyer, V. (2007). An experiment on the social facilitation of gambling 
behavior. Journal of Gambling Studies, 23(3), 1-12. 
Rødner, S. (2005). “I am not a drug abuser, I am a drug user”: A discourse analysis of 
44 drug users’ construction of identity. Addiction Research & Theory, 13(4), 333-346. 
Rogers, N., Button, E., & Hume, A. (2005). Safe as houses: an exploration of the link 
between gambling and homelessness. Adelaide: Department for Families and 
Communities: Research Report for the South Australian Government Department of 
Families and Communities. 
Room, R. (1984). Alcohol problems and the sociological constructivist approach: 
quagmire or a path forward? Revised from a paper presented at Alcohol Epidemiology 
Section Meetings of the International Council on Alcohol and Addictions, 4-8 June 
1984, Edinburgh, Scotland. Retrieved from www.robinroom.net/quagmire.pdf. 
Room, R. (1985). Dependence and society. British Journal of Addiction, 80, 133-139. 
Room, R. (2003). The Cultural framing of addiction. Janus Head, 6(2), 221-234.. 
Rose, N. (1996). Governing 'advanced' liberal democracies. In A. Barry, T. Osborne, & 
N. Rose, Foucault and political reason: liberalism, neo-liberalism and rationalities of 
government (pp. 37-64). London: University of Chicago. 
Rose, N. (1999). Governing the soul: the shaping of the private self. London: Free 
Association Books. 
Rosecrance, J. (1985). Compulsive gambling and the medicalization of deviance. 
Social Problems, 32(3), 275-284. 
Roy, A., Adinoff, B., Roehrich, L., Lamparski, D., Custer, R., Lorenz, V., et al. (1988). 
Pathological gambling. A psychobiological study. Archives of General Psychiatry, 
45(4), 369-373. 
Rubin, A. (1982). Beating the odds: compulsive gambling as insanity defense. 
Connecticut Law Review, 14, 341-367. 
 341 
 
Sampson, R., & Laub, J. (1992). Crime and deviance in the life course. Annual Review 
of Sociology, 18, 63-84. 
Sampson, R., & Laub, J. (2003). Life‐course desisters? Trajectories of crime among 
delinquent boys followed to age 70. Criminology , 41 (3), 555-592. 
Sampson, R., & Laub, J. (2005). A life-course view of the development of crime. Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science , 602, 12-45. 
Schillewaert, N., Langerak, F., & Duhamel, T. (1998). Non-probability sampling for 
WWW surveys: a comparison of methods. Journal of Market Research, 40, 307-322. 
Schlosser, J. A. (2013). Bourdieu and foucault: a conceptual integration toward an 
empirical sociology of prisons. Critical Criminology, 21(1), 31-46. 
Schmidt, W. (1997). World-Wide Web survey research: benefits, potential problems, 
and solutions. Behavior research methods, instruments, & computers, 29, 274-279. 
Schütz, A. (1962). Collected papers I: the problem of social reality. The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhof. 
Schütz, A. (1982). Life forms and meaning structure. London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul. 
Schwandt, T. (1994). Constructivist interpretivist approaches to human inquiry. In N. 
Denzin, & Y. Lincoln, Handbook of qualitative research (pp. 118-137). London: Sage. 
Schwartz, M., Wiggins, O., & Norko, M. (1989). Prototypes, ideal types, and personality 
disorders. The return to classical psychiatry. Journal of Personality Disorders, 3, 1-9.. 
Scott, J. (2000). Rational choice theory. In G. Browing, A. Halcli, & F. Webster, 
Understanding contemporary society: theories of the present (pp. 126-138). London: 
Sage. 
Seale, C. (1999). The quality of qualitative research. London: Sage. 
Searle, J. (1995). The construction of social reality. New York: The Free Press. 
Seidel, J., & Kelle, U. (1995). Different functions of coding in the analysis of textual 
data . In U. Kelle, Computer-aided qualitative data analysis: Theory, methods and 
practice (pp. 52-61). London: Sage. 
Sewell, W. J. (1992). A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation. 
American Journal of Sociology, 98(1), 1-29. 
Shaffer, H. (2005). From disabling to enabling the public interest: natural transitions 
from gambling exposure to adaptation and self‐regulation. Addiction, 100(9), 1227-
1230. 
Shaffer, H., & Korn, D. (2002). Gambling and related mental disorders: A public health 
analysis. Annual review of public health, 23(1), 171-212. 
Shaffer, H., LaBrie, R., & LaPlante, D. (2004b). Laying the foundation for quantifying 
regional exposure to social phenomena: considering the case of legalised gambling as 
a public health toxin. Psychology of Addictive Behaviours, 18(1), 40-48. 
 342 
 
Shaffer, H., LaPlante, D., LaBrie, R., Kidman, R., Donato, A., & Stanton, M. (2004a). 
Toward a syndrome model of addiction: Multiple expressions, common etiology. 
Harvard Review of Psychiatry, 12, 367–374.. 
Shilling, C. (1992). Reconceptualising structure and agency in the sociology of 
education. British Journal of Sociology of Education, 13(1), 69-87. 
Shilling, C. (2003). The body and social theory. London: Sage. 
Shilling, C. (2008). Changing bodies: habit, crisis and creativity. London: Sage. 
Simmonds, L., & Coomber, R. (2009). Injecting drug users: a stigmatised and 
stigmatising population. International Journal of Drug Policy, 20(2), 121-130. 
Slutske, W. (2006). Natural recovery and treatment-seeking in pathological gambling: 
results of two U.S. national surveys. American Journal of Psychiatry, 163, 297-302. 
Slutske, W. (2007). Logitudinal studies of gambling behavior. In G. Smith, D. Hodgins, 
& R. Williams, Research and measurement issues in gambling studies (pp. 127-154). 
London: Elsevier. 
Slutske, W., Blaszczynski, A., & Martin, N. (2009). Sex differences in the rates of 
recovery, treatment-seeking, and natural recovery in pathological gambling: results 
from an Australian community-based twin survey. Twin Research and Human 
Genetics, 12, 425-432. 
Slutske, W., Piasecki, T., Blaszczynski, B., & Martin, N. (2010). Pathological gambling 
recovery in the absence of abstinence. Addiction, 105, 2169-2175. 
Smart, B. (2002). Michel Foucault. London: Routledge. 
Smith, E. (2010). Portrait of the South West. United Kingdom: Office for National 
Statistics. 
Sobell, L., Ellingstand, T., & Sobell, M. (2000). Natural recovery from alcohol and drug 
problems: Methodological review of the research. Addiction, 749-764. 
Spates, J. (1983). The sociology of values. Annual review of sociology, 9, 27-49. 
Spear, B. (1994). The early years of the 'British System' in practice. In J. Strang, & M. 
Gossop, Heroin addiction and drug policy: the British System (pp. 3-28). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Sproston, K., Erens, B., & Orford, J. (2000). Gambling behaviour in Britain: results from 
the British Gambling Prevalence Survey. London: National Centre for Social Research. 
Stake, R. (1995). The art of case study research. Sage: London. 
Stevenson, J. (2000). Addicted: The myth and menace of drugs in film . London: 
Creation Books. 
Stewart, C. (1999). Investigation of cigarette smokers who quit without treatment. 
Journal of Drug Issues, 29, 167-186. 
 343 
 
Stimson, G. (1994). Minimizing harm from drug use. In J. Straing, & M. Gossop, Heroin 
addiction and drug policy: the British System (pp. 248-256). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Stones, R. (2005). Structuration Theory. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Storer, J., Abbott, M., & Stubbs, J. (2009). Access or adaptation? A meta-analysis of 
surveys of problem gambling prevalence in Australia and New Zealand with respect to 
concentration of electronic gaming machines. International Gambling Studies, 9(3), 
225-244. 
Strang, J. (1993). Drug use and harm reduction: responding to the challenge. In N. 
Heather, Psychoactive Drugs and Harm Reduction: From Faith to Science (pp. 3-20). 
London: Whurr Publishers. 
Swartz, D. (1997). Culture & Power: the Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago. 
Swartz, D. (2002). The sociology of habit: The perspective of Pierre Bourdieu. 
Occupational Therapy Journal of Research, 22, 62S-69S. 
Sweetman, P. (2003). Twenty-first century dis-ease? Habitual reflexivity or the reflexive 
habitus. Sociological Review, 51, 528-549. 
Swidler, A. (1986). Culture in action: symbols and strategies. American Sociological 
Review, 51(2), 273-286. 
Szasz, T. (1976). Ceremonial Chemistry: The Ritual Persecution of Drugs, Addicts, and 
Pushers. New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday. 
Taber, J., McCormick, R., & Ramirez, L. (1987). The prevalence and impact of major 
life stressors among pathological gamblers. The International Journal of Addictions, 22, 
71-79. 
Tajfel, H. (1982). Social psychology of intergroup relations. Annual Review of 
Psychology , 33, 1-39. 
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. Austin, 
& S. Worchel, The social psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 33-47). Monterey, CA: 
Brooks/Cole. 
Tammi, T., & Hurme, T. (2007). How the harm reduction movement contrasts itself 
against punitive prohibition. International Journal of Drug Policy, 18, 84-87. 
Taxman, F., Cropsey, K., Young, D., & Wexler, H. (2007). Screening, assessment, and 
referral practices in adult correctional settings: A national perspective. Criminal Justice 
and Behavior , 34 (9), 1216-1234. 
Taylor, S. (2008). Outside the outsiders: Media representations of drug use. Probation 
Journal, 55(4), 369-387. 
Thomas, A., Moore, S., Kyrios, M., Bates, G., Meredyth, D., & Jessop, G. (2010). 
Problem gambling vulnerability: The interaction between access, individual cognitions 
and group beliefs/preferences. Final report prepared for the Victorian Government, 
 344 
 
Office of Gaming and Racing, Department of Justice. Available from: 
http://www.responsiblegambling.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/Problem_Gambling_Vulne
rability.pdf. 
Thomas, A., Pfeifer, J., Moore, S., Meyer, D., Yap, L., & Armstrong, A. (2013). 
Evaluation of the removal of ATMs from gaming venues in Victoria, Australia. 
Department of Justice. 
Thomas, S., Lewis, S., Duong, J., & McLeod, C. (2012a). Sports betting marketing 
during sporting events: a stadium and broadcast census of Australian Football League 
matches. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health, 36(2), 145-152. 
Thompson, J. (1991). Editor's Introduction. In P. Bourdieu, & J. Thompson, Language 
and Symbolic Power (pp. 1-31). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Thornton, L., Harris, K., Baker, A., Johnson, M., & Kay‐Lambkin, F. (2015). Recruiting 
for addiction research via Facebook. Drug and Alcohol Review, 35(4), 494-502. 
Threadgold, S. (2006). Habitus, governmentality and young people’s engagement with 
September 11. Conference paper presented at Australasian Political Studies 
Association conference, University of Newcastle.  
Toneatto, T., & Nguyen, L. (2007). Individual characteristics and problem gambling 
behaviour. In G. Smith, D. Hodgins, & R. Williams, Research and measurement issues 
in gambling studies (pp. 280-303). London: Academic Press. 
Toneatto, T., Cunningham, J., Hodgins, D., Adams, M., Turner, N., & Koski-Jannes, A. 
(2008). Recovery from problem gambling without formal treatment. Addiction Research 
and Theory, 16(2), 111-120. 
Toneatto, T., Sobell, L., Sobell, M., & Rubel, E. (1999). Natural recovery from cocaine 
dependence. Psychology of Addictive Behaviour, 13, 259-268. 
Trebach, A. (1982). The heroin solution. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Trier-Bieniek, A. (2012). Framing the telephone Framing the telephone centred tool for 
qualitativeresearch: a methodological discussion. Qualitative Research, 12(6), 630–
644. 
Turner, J. (1991). Social influence. Milton Keynes: Open University Press. 
Turner, N., & Horbay, R. (2004). How do slot machines and other electronic gambling 
machines actually work? Journal of Gambling Issues, 11. 
UK Drug Policy Commission Recovery Consensus Group (DPCRCG). (2008). A vision 
of recovery. London: UK Drug Policy Commission. 
Umberson, D., & Montez, J. (2010). Social relationships and health a flashpoint for 
health policy. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 51(1), 54-66. 
Urbanoski, K., & Rush, B. (2006). Characteristics of people seeking treatment for 
problem gambling in Ontario: trends from 1998 to 2002. Journal of Gambling 
Issues.(16). 
 345 
 
Vaillant, G. (2003). A 60-year follow-up of alcoholic men. Addiction, 98, 1043-51. 
Valverde, M. (1998). Diseases of the will: alcohol and the dilemmas of freedom. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Van den Eynden, V., Corti, L., Woollard, M., Bishop, L., & Horton, L. (2011). Managing 
and sharing data. Retrieved March 28, 2017, from UK Data Archive: http://www.data-
archive.ac.uk/media/2894/managingsharing.pdf 
Van de Ven, W. (2012). The social reality of truth: Foucault, Searle, and the role of 
truth within social reality [Unpublished master’s thesis]. The Netherlands: Tilburg 
University. 
Veblen, T. (1994 [1899]). The theory of the leisure class. New York: Penguin Books. 
Vehovar, V., & Manfreda, K. (2008). Overview: online survey. In N. Fielding, R. Lee, & 
G. Blank, The SAGE handbook of online research (pp. 177-194). London: SAGE. 
Verges, A., Jackson, K., Bucholz, K., Grant, J., Trull, T., Wood, P., et al. (2012). 
Deconstructing the age-prevalence curve of alcohol dependence: why “maturing out” is 
only a small piece of the puzzle. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 12(2), 511-523. 
Vyse, S. (1997). Believing in magic: the psychology of superstition . Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Wacquant, L. (1989). Toward a reflexive sociology: a workshop with Pierre Bourdieu. 
Sociological Theory, 7(1), 26-63. 
Wacquant, L. (1992). Towards a social praxeology: the structure and logic of 
Bourdieu's sociology. In P. Bourdieu, & L. Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive 
Sociology (pp. 2-59). Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Wacquant, L. (2008). Pierre Bourdieu. In R. Stones, Key sociological thinkers (pp. 261-
277). Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Wainright, S., Williams, C., & Turner, B. (2006). Varieties of habitus and the 
embodiment of ballet. Qualitative Research, 6(4), 535-558. 
Wainwright, S., & Forbes, A. (2000). Philosophical problems with social research on 
health inequalities. Health Care Analysis, 8(3), 259-277. 
Wakefield, J. (1997). Diagnosing DSM-IV--Part I: DSM-IV and the concept of disorder. 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 35(7), 633-49. 
Waldorf, D., & Biernacki, P. (1981). The natural recovery from opiate addiction: some 
preliminary findings. Journal of Drug Issues, 11(1), 61-76. 
Waldorf, D., Reinarman, C., & Murphy, S. (1991). Cocaine changes: The experiences 
of using and quitting. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
Walker, M. (1992). Irrational thinking among slot machine players. Journal of Gambling 
studies, 8(3), 245-261. 
Walker, M. (1992). The psychology of gambling. Oxford: Pergamon Press. 
 346 
 
Warburton, H., Turnball, P. J., & Hough, J. M. (2005). Occasional and controlled heroin 
use: Not a problem? Joseph Rowntree Foundation. 
Wardle, H., Keily, R., Thurstain-Goodwin, M., & Astbury, G. (2011b). Machines 
Research 1: Mapping the social and economic characteristics of high density machine 
locations. London: Responsible Gambling Fund. 
Wardle, H., Moody, A., Spence, S., Orford, J., Volberg, R., Jotangia, D., et al. (2011a). 
British Gambling Prevalence Survey 2010. London: National Centre for Social 
Research. 
Wardle, H., Seabury, C., Ahmed, H., Payne, C., Byron, C., Corbett, J., et al. (2014). 
Gambling behaviour in England and Scotland: Findings from the Health Survey for 
England 2012. London: NatCen. 
Washington, A. (1989). Cocaine addiction: Treatment, recovery and relapse protection 
. New York: W.W. Norton. 
Weber, M. (1949[1904]). Objectivity in social science and social policy. In E. Shils, & H. 
. Finch, The methodology of the social sciences. New York: Free Press. 
Weber, M. (1958 [1904]). The Protestant work ethic and the spirit of capitalism. New 
York: Scribner. 
Weber, M. (1968 [1922]). Economy and society: an outline of interpretive sociology. 
New York: Bedminster Press. 
Webster, C., MacDonald, R., & Simpson, M. (2006). Predicting criminality? Risk 
factors, neighbourhood influence and desistance. Youth Justice, 6(1), 7-22. 
Weinberg, D. (2000). "Out there": the ecology of addiction in drug abuse treatment 
discourse. Social Problems, 47(4), 606-621. 
Weinberg, D. (2002). On the embodiment of addiction. Body & Society, 8(4), 1-19. 
Weinberg, D. (2011). Sociological perspectives on addiction. Sociology Compass, 5(4), 
298-310. 
Weinberg, D. (2013). Post-humanism, addiction and the loss of self-control: Reflections 
on the missing core in addiction science. International Journal of Drug Policy, 24(3), 
173-181. 
Weinstock, J., Burton, S., Rash, C., Moran, S., Biller, W., & Krudelbach, N. (2011). 
Predictors of engaging in problem gambling treatment: Data from the West Virginia 
problem gamblers help network. Psychology of Addictive Behaviors, 25(2), 372-379. 
Wetherell, M. (2001). Themes in discourse research. In M. Wetherell, S. Taylor, & S. 
Yates, Discourse theory and practice: a reader (pp. 14-28). London: Sage. 
White, K. (2002). An introduction to the sociology of health and illness. London: Sage. 
Wiebe, J., Single, E., & Falkowski-Ham, A. (2001). Measuring gambling and problem 
gambling in Ontario. Report to the Ontario Problem Gambling Research Centre. 
 347 
 
Wiggins, O., & Schwartz, M. (1994). The limits of psychiatric knowledge and the 
problem of classification. In J. Sadler, O. Wiggins, & M. Schwartz, Philosophical 
perspectives on psychiatric diagnostic classification (pp. 89-103). Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press. 
Wildman, R. (1999). Gambling: an attempt at integration. Edmonton: Wynne 
Resources. 
Williams, M., & May, T. (1996). Introduction to the philosophy of social research. 
London: Routledge. 
Williams, M., Proetto, D., Casiano, D., & Franklin, M. (2012). Recruitment of a hidden 
population: African Americans with obsessive-compulsive disorder. Comtemporary 
Clinical Trials, 33(1), 67-75.. 
Williams, R., Simpson, R., & West, B. (2007). Prevention of problem gambling. In G. 
Smith, D. Hodgins, & R. Williams, Research and measurement issues in gambling 
studies (pp. 399-435). London: Elsevier. 
Williams, R., West, B., & Simpson, R. (2012). Prevention of problem gambling: a 
comprehsive review of the evidence and identified best practices. Ontario Problem 
Gambling Research Centre and the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long Term Care. 
Winick, C. (1962). Maturing out of narcotic addiction. Bulletin on narcotics, 14(1), 1-7. 
Winick, C. (1964). The life cycle of the narcotic addict and of addiction. U.S. Bullentin 
on Narcotics, 16(1). 
Winstock, A., Mitcheson, L., Ramsey, J., Davies, S., Puchnarewicz, M., & Marsden, J. 
(2011). Mephedrone: use, subjective effects and health risks. Addiction, 106(11), 1991-
1996. 
Wood, R., & Griffiths, M. (2007). A qualitative investigation of problem gambling as an 
escape‐based coping strategy. Psychology and Psychotherapy: theory, research and 
practice, 80(1), 107-125. 
Wood, R., & Williams, R. (2009). Internet gambling: prevalence, patterns, problems and 
policy options. Guelph, Canada: Ontario Problem Gambling Research Centre and 
Ontario Ministry of Health and Long Term Care. 
Wood, R., & Williams, R. (2011). A comparative profile of the Internet gambler: 
Demographic characteristics, game-play patterns, and problem gambling status. New 
Media & Society, 13(7), 1123-1141. 
World Health Organisation (WHO). (1999). The health of indigenous peoples. Geneva: 
WHO. 
Yin, R. (2014). Case study research: Design and methods (5th Edition ed.). London: 
Sage. 
Zinberg, N. (1984). Drug, Set, and Setting: The Basis for Controlled Intoxicant Use. 
Yale University Press: London. 
 348 
 
Zola, I. (1963). Observations on gambling in a lower-class setting. Social Problems, 
10(4), 353-361. 
Zuffa, G., & Ronconi, S. (2015). Cocaine and stimulants, the challenge of self-
regulation in a harm reduction perspective. Epidemiology, Biostatistics and Public 
Health, 12(1). 
 
  
 349 
 
  
 350 
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Recruitment survey script 
Welcome 
This research aims to better understand engagement with gambling. For more 
information about the project click here and select the 'research' tab. For media 
coverage click here 
Anyone who participates in any form of gambling can take part (examples: bingo, 
scratch cards, card games, fruit machines, arcades/casinos, sports and any others). 
There are 17 questions and it takes around 5 minutes to complete. You will remain 
anonymous and all information will be kept confidential. 
For further information email Ed Pyle from Plymouth University: 
ed.pyle@plymouth.ac.uk 
1. Have you ever gambled on activities other than the National Lottery? 
o Yes 
o No 
(If no, skip to Q3) 
2. In the past 3 months have you gambled on any activities other than the 
National Lottery? 
o Yes 
o No 
3. How would you describe your patterns of gambling? (select most 
relevant) 
I gamble at least: 
o Once a week 
o Once a fortnight 
o Once a month 
o Once every three months 
o Twice a year 
o Once a year 
o Less than once a year 
o Never 
(If any response except ‘once a week’, skip to Q5) 
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4. On average, how many times a week do you gamble on activities other 
than the National Lottery? 
o 0 
o 1 
o 2 
o 3 
o 4 
o 5 
o 6 
o 7 
o 8 
o 9 
o 10 or more 
5. Would you say that you do not gamble for a while but every now and 
again have gambling 'session'? 
o Yes 
o No 
 
6. When you gamble would you say that you are in control of your 
gambling? 
 
o Yes. Complete control 
o Some control 
o No. No control 
7.  Do you have any ways of managing or controlling your gambling? Please 
explain 
(Examples might include: setting aside money just for gambling; not gambling 
while drinking; gambling with other people or gambling alone; avoiding 
particular places or games...). 
 
8. Have there been periods lasting 2 weeks or longer when you spent a lot of 
time thinking about your gambling experiences or planning out future 
gambling ventures or bets? 
Yes, in my lifetime Yes, in the past 3 months No. Never 
 
9. Have you tried to stop, cut down, or control your gambling? 
Yes, in my lifetime Yes, in the past 3 months No. Never 
 
10. Have you gambled as a way to escape from personal problems? 
Yes, in my lifetime Yes, in the past 3  No. Never 
 
  
11. Has there been a period when, if you lost money gambling one day, 
you would return another day to get even? 
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Yes, in my lifetime Yes, in the past 3 months No. Never 
 
12. Have you lied to family members, friends, or others about how 
much you gamble or how much money you lost on gambling? 
Yes, in my lifetime Yes, in the past 3 months No. Never 
 
13. Has your gambling caused serious or repeated problems in your 
relationships with any of your family members or friends? 
Yes, in my lifetime Yes, in the past 3 months No. Never 
 
14. Have you found it difficult to control your gambling? 
Yes, in my lifetime Yes, in the past 3 months No. Never 
 
15. Have you felt that you have a gambling problem? 
Yes, in my lifetime Yes, in the past 3 months No. Never 
 
16. Would you be willing to discuss your experiences of gambling 
further? 
o Yes* 
o No 
*You will be compensated £10 for your time and knowledge. Conversations will be 
informal. You can change your mind at any time without reason 
 
Note: compensation can be provided to a third-party (e.g. family member/friend) if you 
prefer. The identities of people taking part will be kept anonymous and information 
gathered will be confidential. 
17. Please provide contact details. Note: you do not have to provide 
your full name 
 
Name (only for contact purposes):  
Phone no/email:  
Town/City: 
 
18. You can withdraw at any time without giving reason. Thank you! 
Do you have any comments that you would like to add? 
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Appendix B: Interviewee information sheet 
 The identity of all participants is completely confidential and will not be passed 
on to anyone else. 
 
 The information collected will be anonymised and no individual will be 
recognisable from the research. 
 
 The aim of the research is to better understand people’s engagement with 
gambling.  
 
About the interview 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this interview. It will focus on your experiences of 
gambling and your circumstances in general. The interview will last approximately 45 
minutes and on completion you will receive £10 for your time and knowledge (this 
money can be paid to a third-party if you wish). Everything we discuss – and even the 
fact that you have participated – is confidential. Neither your name nor any other 
identifying information will be included in any research outputs. With your permission, I 
would like to audio-record the interview. The recording will be typed out and your name 
will not be included on the transcription. The recording will be deleted after the 
research is finished. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you whether you take part or not. If you take part and change your mind and 
decide you don’t want to be involved any more then you can withdraw your information 
at any time without giving any reason for this. 
 
What does the interview involve? 
The ‘interview’ can be thought of as an informal discussion guided by some pre-defined 
questions. Questions focus on your gambling experiences and your broad 
circumstances/lifestyle. It will last for around 45 minutes and you will receive a 
contribution of £10 for completing the interview (this can be paid to a third party if you 
wish). 
 
What are the benefits of taking part in the research?  
This information could be used in interventions with problem gamblers to help them to 
bring their gambling under control. It potentially could be used to inform government 
policy related to gambling with a view to reduce the likelihood of risk and harm related 
to problem gambling. 
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Who will see the information I have given? Will I be identified in the 
written reports from the study? 
All information received from participants will be treated with the strictest confidence. 
As the principle researcher I will ensure all names and details are made anonymous 
and you can be sure that absolutely no details will be passed on to anyone else. You 
will not be identifiable from the research and all place names and recognisable 
elements will be changed. I will not tell anyone that you have taken part. All recordings 
will be destroyed after the research has finished. 
 
Please Note: If you agree to take part you will be advised 
I have a responsibility towards your own and others’ well-being while you are involved 
in the research. If you tell me that you are committing harm to yourself or others then I 
have a duty to make this known. 
 
Further information about the research  
The research is being conducted by a PhD researcher called Ed Pyle from Plymouth 
University. 
For more information contact: ed.pyle@plymouth.ac.uk or call 01752 586985 
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Sources of support for problem gambling   
 
GamCare 
If you have questions or concerns about your own gambling or about that of a friend or 
family member you can contact GamCare www.gamcare.org 
GamCare offers free and confidential support, information and advice on problem 
gambling either via telephone 0808 8020 133, online, forums and chatrooms as well as 
a texting service. It can also include direction to chat room forums and printed 
information depending on what you need and when. 
GamCare can refer you to other sources of help and also tell you what support may be 
available locally. This can include referral to sources of help about money and debt 
advice, along with identifying other suitable forms of personal help such as counselling, 
and crisis support. GamCare also offers free face-to-face and online counselling for 
those affected by a gambling problem either directly or via its network of treatment 
providers across Britain. 
 
Gamblers Anonymous 
Gamblers Anonymous is a group of men and women who have joined together to 
tackle their own gambling problem and help others do the same. The website provides 
advice for problematic gamblers and their families: www.gamblersanonymous.org.uk/. 
 
Gambling Therapy 
Gambling Therapy is run by the Gordon Moody Association and offers a multilingual 
service, making help and support accessible should your first language not be English. 
Their services include online advice and practical and emotional support for individuals 
through a helpline, online support groups, a forum, and a database of useful resources. 
www.gamblingtherapy.org.uk  
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Appendix C: Interview schedule 
Demographics 
1. Name/identification ___________ 
2. Gender:  Male   Female 
3. Age _______ 
4. Ethnicity________  
5. Occupation/ Education/How do you spend time ____________ 
a. Full/part-time? 
6. Days a week worked (mean)_________ Hours a week worked (mean) 
__________  
7. Household income (approx. before tax): __________ (Weekly/Monthly/Yearly. 
del as appropriate) 
 
8. Highest educational attainment_________________________ 
9. Locality________ How long lived here? _________ 
 
10. Residence: Who lives in your household? 
a. What relationship are they to you? (dependents/family; friends...) 
b. How long have you lived like this? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
11. Do you have any other family close by? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
12.  Kind of accommodation________________________ (e.g. house/flat etc.).  
a. Type of lease________________ (e.g. rent/ownership/shared 
house/managed accommodation) 
 
13. Marital/relationship status/partner ____________ 
 
Gambling history/career – Gambling ‘story’ 
14. Could you talk me through your ‘gambling story’? 
a. When did you first gamble? (What type of gambling?; Where?; Who 
with?) 
 
b. (If early experience was with family) was gambling an integral and 
‘routine’ part of family life? Was it a ‘social’ activity? 
 
c. When did you first start gambling regularly? (What type of gambling? 
Where? Who with?) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Where did you learn how to gamble? (Did someone teach you?; Not just 
rules but strategies too) (Prompts: friends; family; work colleagues etc.). 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 359 
 
16. Have you ever sought information about how to gamble? (Prompts: online; 
forums; books; TV; radio; friends/family?) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. What do you (or did you like) about gambling?  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. Why did/do you continue to gamble? (Prompts: enjoyment; make money…). 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Gambling patterns 
The following questions concern your current and past gambling patterns with a 
specific focus on how your gambling has changed. 
19. What gambling activities do you currently participate in and what activities 
have you participated in, in the past? 
 
National lottery; Another Lottery; Scratch-cards; Football Pools; Bingo; Slot/fruit 
machines; Fixed odds betting terminals; Horse races; Dog races; Sports betting (which 
Betting on non-sports; Casino games; Poker at pub/club; Private betting; Online slot 
machine; Other____________ 
 
20. (If current/past differ) then why is this? (Prompts: Why do you no longer 
participate in them?; Why do you participate in different activities now?). 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. How do you place bets? Did this differ in the past? Over-the-counter; Online 
(Wifi/wired); mobile; telephone; postal; interactive television; other 
 
22. Where do you currently place bets? Where in the past? 
Home; Work; supermarket; Casino; betting shop; online. 
 
 
23. When and how frequently do you take part in current activities? (Note for 
each activity)  
Activity When and time of day 
(e.g. weekdays/weekends 
during the day/evening…). 
Frequency (how 
often day/week) 
Description 
(e.g. large 
infrequent 
bets / small 
frequent bets)  
Size? 
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Prompts: Are there some times during the day, week, month, or season when you’re 
inclined to participate in a particular form of gambling over another form?) 
_____________________________________________________________________
________ 
 
24. Have these patterns (i.e. when/how frequently) differed in the past? (Note for 
each activity)  
Activity When and time of day 
(e.g. weekdays/weekends 
during the day/evening…). 
Frequency (how 
often day/week) 
Description 
(e.g. large 
infrequent bets 
/ small 
frequent bets) 
Size? 
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
Prompts: were there some times during the day, week, month, or season when you 
were inclined to participate in a particular form of gambling over another form?) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
25. What type of bets do you place? And have you placed in the past? 
Betting types Currently Past 
Straight bet on overall outcome   
Parlay/accumulator bet (i.e. 
predicting the outcomes of 
multiple events) 
  
Spread-betting   
In-play betting (i.e. laying bets 
while event is in-play)  
  
Betting on various outcomes 
within an event (e.g. goal in last 
X minutes; X player will score)  
  
 
a. Why these types of bets?____________________________  
 
26. Have you ever spent whole days gambling?  
a. Or part of the day gambling? 
Recently or in the past? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
27. When you gamble is gambling the focal activity or is it secondary? (Prompts: 
for example when going to the pub).  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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28. Is your gambling planned or is it spontaneous? 
a. Has this always been the case? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
29. How long have you followed your current pattern of gambling?_______ (Weeks) 
a. Does your gambling follow a consistent pattern or does it vary? 
(Prompt: Some weeks do you gamble more frequently than other 
weeks?) 
 
Was this the same in the past? Talk me through any changes….. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
b. Do you think these patterns are influenced by anything? 
[Prompt: working patterns; other responsibilities/commitments; 
finances; sporting events etc.). 
[Prompts: geographical move? (proximity; accessibility); change in 
social circle; change in friends; starting new job/school/education; 
change in health; having children, becoming carer; breaking up 
relationships/starting relationships; change in interests; changes in 
domestic or living situation?] 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
30. How often do you think about or plan bets/gambling? 
a. In the past have you thought about or planned bets/gambling 
more often than you do now? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
(Gambling places/spaces) 
(Immediate social-setting/space) 
I am interested in how your circumstances, friendships and relationships have 
changed – particularly since you started gambling. This is the focus of the following 
questions. 
 
31. Do you have any friends who gamble?  
a. Do you have friends who do not gamble?  
b. Of those who currently gamble (or have done in the past) would 
you say that any gamble problematically? Or have gambled 
problematically in the past? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
32. Does anyone in your family gamble? (Prompts: what type of gambling) 
a. To your knowledge, has anyone in your family gambled 
problematically? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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33. Who do you currently gamble with? 
Relationship  
 Never  Rarely  Sometimes Regularly  Mostly Always 
Alone       
Friends       
Work colleague       
‘Partner’       
Acquaintance       
Strangers       
Family members       
Mix  
Give details: 
 
      
 
b. (If friends/acquaintances) How did you first meet these people? 
(Prompt: school friends; work colleagues etc.). [How long have you  
known them]. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
34. (If friends/acquaintances) Do you spend time doing non-gambling activities with 
these friends/acquaintances? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
35. Thinking back to past gambling, have you continued to gamble with the same 
people or have those you gamble with changed over time? 
a. How has this changed? 
 
 
Relationship  
 Never  Rarely  Sometimes Regularly  Mostly Always 
Alone       
Friends       
Work colleague       
‘Partner’       
Acquaintance       
Strangers       
Family members       
Mix  
Give details: 
 
      
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
36. When you gambled in the past, would you say that you had a higher or lower 
proportion of friends who gamble than you do now? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Prompts: 
a. Do you think this is because your friends have started/stopped 
gambling? 
b. OR because your friendship group has changed? 
c. Another reason?  
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_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
37. You said you currently gamble with [insert relationship ‘types’ here – Q33], is 
this a single social ‘group’ that you gamble with or various different groups of people? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
a. Have you always had a single core group of people that you 
gamble with? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
b. (If a single core group) how do the people in this group know 
each other? 
(Prompts: school; employment; residence…) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
c. Do they/would they gamble or socialise together without you? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
38. At the ‘gambling event’ do you gamble with these people? 
a. Do arrive with these people or meet them there? 
b. Do you tend to all leave together or leave separately at different 
times? 
Has this always been the case? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
39. Are there any specific gambling activities that you avoid? 
a. Why? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
40. Do you think that being in the presence of different people influences the way 
you gamble? 
Prompts:  
a. Are there any social situations that you avoid when gambling? 
(Prompts): gambling with opposite sex; with friends/family; with 
particular friends or family 
 
b. Are there some places that you would gamble with particular 
people but not with others?  
(Who/what relationship? Why is this?) 
c. Are there some gambling activities that you participate in with 
particular people but not with others?  
(Who/what relationship? What activities? Why is this?) 
 
d. When you gamble with particular people do you: 
i. Spend more money gambling than with others?  
(Who/what relationship? Why is this?) 
ii. Spend more time gambling than with others?  
(Who/what relationship? Why is this?) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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41. (If have friends/family who do not gamble) Do you gamble in the presence of 
non-gambling friends/family members etc.? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
42. Has anyone (e.g. friends/family) tried to constrain or control your gambling (e.g. 
in terms or money or time spent)?  
a. How did they do this? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
b. How did you react to this?  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
(Places) 
43. You mentioned that you gamble in [insert place(s)]. Are there any places where 
you would not gamble? (Probe: why?) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
44. (If mobile gambles) in what places do you gamble? (Prompts: e.g. work? on 
public transport? home?) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
And in what situations? (Prompts: When waiting for something/killing time? when in 
the presence of others? Alone?) 
a. Are there places where you do not/would not gamble on mobile? 
b. Are there particular (social-)situations where you would/would 
not gamble? 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
45. (If mobile gambles) What services to you use to gamble? (Prompts: gambling 
apps; Facebook website/app; book-makers websites…) [Get detail]  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
46. (If non-mobile internet gambling) in what places do you gamble? (Prompts: 
e.g. work; home) 
 
And in what situations? (Prompts: When waiting for something/killing time?; when in 
the presence of others? Alone?) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
47. You said that you gamble in ______ [place] on _______ [activity]. If you were to 
go to _______ [another place where gambling is peripheral – e.g. bowling alley or 
motorway services], do you think that you would gamble there? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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(Immediate physical-setting/place) 
48. Do you use any recreational drugs/medication when gambling? Or have you in 
the past? 
a. Why? (Prompts: helps relax; socialise; etc.). 
b. Do you think that this has any influence on control over your 
gambling? 
c. Do you think that it has any influence over how you gamble? 
(e.g. how much money/time spent etc). 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
49. Do you drink alcohol when you gamble? Or have you in the past? 
a. If yes (currently), do you think this influences your control over 
gambling? 
b. If no (have in past), do you think this influenced control over 
your gambling? 
c. If no (never), why? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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(Wider physical-setting/place) 
50. Do you have ‘easy’ access to gambling? 
a. Do you live/work near places with gambling? (Whether focal 
activity such as bookmakers or peripheral activity such as in a pub). 
 
Have you always?/How has your access changed? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
b. Do you have access to the internet at work or home?; do you 
gamble online? 
If access to internet and do not gamble, then…why? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
51. Do you have to go out of your way to gamble/bet?/Make a ‘special effort’ to 
gamble? 
(e.g. deviate from your normal routine [work/shopping/home etc.]).  
a. Do you have to travel far in order to gamble? 
b. Has this always been the case?; Or has this changed over time? 
[e.g. was it a constraint once and now less so?]. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
(Changes in environment – most applicable to those who have been gambling pre-
gambling act 2005) 
 
52. Since you started gambling have you noted any changes in the gambling 
environment? 
(e.g. 24 hour opening hours; mobile gambling; TV gambling; advertising; internet 
access; geographical move; opening of new gambling provision) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
a. Do you think any of these changes have impacted on how you gamble? 
(Or made it more difficult for you to control your gambling?) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
b. How have you coped with (overcome/reacted to) these changes?  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Routines / structure of lifestyle 
The following questions focus on the structure of your life and how gambling fits into it.  
53. Talk me through a typical day? (Prompts: How is it structured? Do you have 
‘particular’ routines?). 
a. Typical day when you gamble? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
b. How does this compare to a day when you do not gamble? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
54. How do you spend time when not working? 
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(Prompts: Watch films/TV/radio; cooking; sporting events; gambling; any hobbies/past-
times?). 
a. Where do you spend your time?  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
55. How does gambling fit into your life?  
(Probe: does gambling fit around other commitments/responsibilities or do other 
commitments fit around gambling?) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Control: regulation, loss, and regaining control 
56. Have you found it difficult to control your gambling? 
Yes, in my lifetime Yes, in the past 3 
months 
No. Never 
 
(If yes…) 
a. Have you experienced numerous periods of impaired control? (or 
loss of control) How long did these periods last? 
b. Have you experienced: 
i. Periods of heavier gambling? 
ii. Periods of lighter gambling? 
iii. Periods of cessation/abstinence? 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
57. Have you felt that you have a gambling problem? 
Yes, in my lifetime Yes, in the past 3 
months 
No. Never 
 
58. (If experienced and recovered from periods of problematic gambling) how 
do your routines compare to when you were gambling problematically? 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
59. (If experienced and recovered from periods of problematic gambling) 
Have your domestic circumstances (e.g. living situation) changed at all compared to 
when you gambled problematically? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
60. Have you ever tried to stop, cut down, or control your gambling? (NODS 
Q4) 
Yes, in my lifetime Yes, in the past 3 
months 
No. Never 
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a. (If ‘Yes’)… 
i. Cut down or Stop? 
ii. Why?; What motivated you? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
b. How successful was this? Can you describe what you did?  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
61. (If reports experiencing impaired control…) Were there any periods after 
you experienced impaired control where you regained control and continued to 
gamble? 
a. How did you regain control? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
62. Have you ever received any help/support for problematic gambling? 
Prompts: 
a. Could include asking friends/family to look after money 
b. Self-help: e.g. books; internet; forums. 
c. Support groups: e.g. GA 
d. Formal treatment/counselling/ CBT etc. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
63. Did you seek this support? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
64. Was this support effective? (e.g. if friends and family, were they supportive?)  
_____________________________________________________________________  
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[Gamblers who acknowledge loss of control ONLY ] 
65. Could you talk me through how you initially lost control of your 
gambling/gambled problematically? 
a. Were there any wider social circumstances/life events 
associated with this problematic gambling? 
(Prompt: did anything in your life change apart from gambling? e.g. 
changes in social-relationships/meeting new friends; moving; 
bereavement; marriage; work etc.). 
 
66. When you were gambling problematically was there anything that made it more 
difficult to stop gambling problematically? 
i. Social circumstances? (e.g. social-relationships; relationships 
with people who still gamble/gamble heavily) 
ii. Life-events (e.g. bereavement; marriage; health problems etc.) 
iii. Working patterns; new job/responsibilities 
 
67. Were there any gambling or non-gambling factors that made control attempts 
easier (/helped you to bring your gambling under control?) (Prompts: working patterns, 
relationships).  
 
[Those who have experienced periods of problematic 
gambling/loss of control and periods of regained control]   
68. Could you tell me about how you regained control over your gambling? 
a. Do you think that the change from problematic to non-
problematic gambling was associated with any particular 
events/changes in circumstances in your life? (Prompts: changes in 
social-relationships/meeting new friends; moving; bereavement; 
marriage etc.).   
 
[Those who have never experience period(s) of problematic 
gambling] 
 
69. You have reported never having experienced periods of problematic gambling. 
Is this correct? 
 
70. Some people are unable to gamble without problems; why do you think you 
have managed to gamble without it becoming problematic while others cannot? 
 
Management/regulation techniques/strategies 
71. When you gamble are there any other activities that you engage/participate in? 
(e.g. talking to people, drinking, smoking, watching others gamble, engaging in non-
gambling activities, taking breaks from gambling etc.). 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
72. Is there anything you do in an effort to keep to financial limits or spend less? 
 370 
 
a. (Prompts: e.g. not using debit or credit cards; not borrowing 
money; not exceeding your own set ‘buy-in’ limits….). 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
73. Financial provision: 
a. Do you take debit cards/credit cards/cash when you gamble? 
b. Do you set financial limits on your gambling? [Do you stick to 
these? how do you know you have stuck to them?] 
c. Is there anything that makes sticking to financial limits difficult? 
[Prompts: encouragement to gamble from others; alcohol; access to 
cash machines]. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
74. Time provision 
a. Do you set time limits on your gambling [Do you stick to these?] 
b. Is there anything that makes sticking to these limits difficult? 
[Prompts: encouragement from others; alcohol]. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
75. Is there anything you do to keep within gambling time-limits? (Prompts: keep 
an eye on the time?). 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
76. How do you decide when to stop gambling? (Prompts: time exceeded; 
responsibilities e.g. work/children; financial limits; boredom) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
77. Do you have any strategies aimed at winning in [insert activity participant 
engages in] or any other gambling activities? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
78. Do you have any strategies aimed at reducing losses? (E.g. watching fruit 
machines to see which one has not paid out (yet) [which may not be effective]). 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
79. Some find that engaging in non-gambling activities (e.g. reading, TV, video-
games…) are effective ways of ‘distracting’ from gambling. Do you use any similar 
‘distraction’ strategies? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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Gambling Rules/Sanctions 
80. Do you have any personal rules about when you will or will not gamble? 
(Prompt: e.g. never at particular times of the day e.g. lunchtime; never 
when their kids are around) 
 
  What is the purpose of these rules? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
81. Do you have any advice on how to gamble ‘safely’/ reduce harm/ stay in 
control? 
Prompt: If someone you knew was about to start gambling on [participant’s main 
gambling activity] what advice would you give?  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
82. Do you know of anyone who gambles problematically? (Prompt: Can be the 
present-self for problematic gamblers and the past-self for ex-problem gamblers) 
a. If yes. Can you explain what signs there are that someone might be a 
problematic gambler? 
Prompt: In other words, how do you know whether or not someone is in control of 
their gambling or is a problematic gambler? (or how do you know whether or not 
someone is a problematic gambler/addicted to gambling or not?) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
b. How would you know if someone is a problematic gambler or could not control 
their gambling without asking them? (Prompt: what are visual signs of 
uncontrolled gambling? What behavioural signs are there of 
controlled/uncontrolled problematic/non-problematic gambling?) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
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Gambling screen (NODS full) 
1. Have there been periods lasting 2 weeks or longer when you spent 
a lot of time thinking about your gambling experiences or planning out future 
gambling ventures or bets? 
Yes, in my lifetime Yes, in the past 3 
months 
No. Never 
 
2. Have there ever been periods lasting two weeks or longer when you spent 
a lot of time thinking about ways of getting money to gamble with? 
Yes, in my lifetime Yes, in the past 3 
months 
No. Never 
 
 
3. Have there ever been periods when you needed to gamble with increasing 
amounts of money or with larger bets than before in order to get the same 
feeling of excitement? 
Yes, in my lifetime Yes, in the past 3 
months 
No. Never 
 
 
4. Have you ever tried to stop, cut down, or control your gambling? 
YES GO TO 5; NO GO TO 8 
   
Yes, in my lifetime Yes, in the past 3 
months 
No. Never 
 
5. On one or more of the times when you tried to stop, cut down, or control 
your gambling, were you restless or irritable? 
Yes, in my lifetime Yes, in the past 3 
months 
No. Never 
 
6. Have you ever tried but not succeeded in stopping, cutting down, or 
controlling your gambling? 
YES GO TO 7; NO GO TO 8 
Yes, in my lifetime Yes, in the past 3 
months 
No. Never 
 
7. Has this happened three or more times? 
Yes, in my lifetime Yes, in the past 3 
months 
No. Never 
 
8. Have you ever gambled as a way to escape from personal problems? 
Yes, in my lifetime Yes, in the past 3 
months 
No. Never 
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9. Have you ever gambled to relieve uncomfortable feelings such as guilt, 
anxiety, helplessness, or depression? 
Yes, in my lifetime Yes, in the past 3 
months 
No. Never 
10. Has there ever been a period when, if you lost money gambling one day, 
you would return another day to get even? 
Yes, in my lifetime Yes, in the past 3 
months 
No. Never 
 
11. Have you ever lied to family members, friends, or others about how much 
you gamble or how much money you lost on gambling? 
Yes, in my lifetime Yes, in the past 3 
months 
No. Never 
YES GO TO 12; NO GO TO 13 
 
 
12. Has this happened three or more times? 
Yes, in my lifetime Yes, in the past 3 
months 
No. Never 
 
13. Have you ever written a bad check or taken something that didn’t belong 
to you from family members or anyone else in order to pay for your gambling? 
Yes, in my lifetime Yes, in the past 3 
months 
No. Never 
 
14. Has your gambling ever caused serious or repeated problems in your 
relationships with any of your family members or friends? 
Yes, in my lifetime Yes, in the past 3 
months 
No. Never 
 
 
15. (ANSWER ONLY IF YOU ARE IN SCHOOL [full-time education]) Has your 
gambling caused you any problems in school, such as missing classes or days 
of school or your grades dropping? 
Yes, in my lifetime Yes, in the past 3 
months 
No. Never 
 
16. Has your gambling ever caused you to lose a job, have trouble with your 
job, or miss out on an important job or career opportunity? 
Yes, in my lifetime Yes, in the past 3 
months 
No. Never 
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17. Have you ever needed to ask family members or anyone else to loan you 
money or otherwise bail you out of a desperate money situation that was largely 
caused by your gambling? 
Yes, in my lifetime Yes, in the past 3 
months 
No. Never 
 
18. Have you experienced any addictions? (Prompt: now or in the past?) [E.g. 
Tobacco; alcohol; illicit drugs]  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Finishing 
19. Is there anything that you would like to add? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Thanks for taking part! [Give compensation].  
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Appendix D: Supplementary survey analysis  
This appendix details the findings of the online survey which was used to recruit most 
(19 of 25) of the interviewees. The survey collected quantitative data about gambling 
patterns and though analyses of this data have value (e.g. providing indication of the 
gambling patterns of potential interviewees), the project aims are better addressed 
through qualitative analysis of interview data (see chapter four). As such, survey 
analysis is presented here for the interested reader rather than in the main text of the 
thesis.  
The survey analyses: 
1. Provide overview of reported gambling patterns and experiences of gambling 
difficulties (difficulty of control and/or harm) among survey respondents with 
particular emphasis on those who agreed to be contacted for interview as it was 
these that interviewees were primarily drawn. 
 
2. Explore any evidence that gambling patterns and difficulties differed between two 
groups: 
a. Respondents who chose to remain anonymous and did not agree to be 
contacted for interview; 
b. Respondents who left contact details and expressed interest in being 
interviewed. 
As will be discussed, these groups did not differ in terms of statistical significance 
according to reported gambling frequency, experience of difficulty of control, and/or 
experience of problematic gambling. Those who reported typically gambling 10 
times or more per week were slightly more likely to report difficulty controlling their 
gambling and/or felt their gambling was problematic and those who reported 
difficulty controlling their gambling and/or problematic gambling were, perhaps 
surprisingly, more likely to provide contact details and agree to be contacted for 
interview though this difference was not statistically significant. 
 377 
 
The survey did not gather demographic data and while this data may have been useful 
to ensure that interviewees with a range of demographic characteristics were recruited 
it was not crucial to the aims and objectives of the present research (see chapter four). 
It is held that far more important than recruitment on the basis of demographic 
characteristics was according to gambling patterns and indication of experiences of 
control/harm. The survey fulfilled this objective by facilitating the recruitment of 
gamblers according to the ideal-type criteria with a range of gambling patterns 
including those engaged in heavier and others in lighter patterns of gambling. 
 
Survey responses 
There were 266 responses. Of these 15 were removed because they only answered 
the first question and 12 were removed because they had never gambled on activities 
other than the National Lottery31 leaving 239 remaining cases on which analysis was 
conducted. Of these, 206 respondents completed the entire survey while 33 dropped 
out leading to missing data. Some of the 206 respondents who completed the survey 
skipped questions which contributed to more missing data, though this was minimised 
by designing the survey so that many of the questions were compulsory for progression 
through the survey and submission of data (Best and Krueger, 2008). 
206 respondents reported whether or not they had found it difficult to control their 
gambling. Of these: 
 16 (7.8%) reported that they had experienced difficulty controlling their 
gambling in the 3 months prior to survey; 
 38 (18.4%) reported that they had experienced difficulty controlling their 
gambling in their lifetime but not in the 3 months prior to survey; 
                                                          
31
 It was decided that individuals who only gamble on the National Lottery would be excluded as 
research suggests that individuals rarely find this difficult to control (see chapter four; Griffiths, 
2012b). 
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 152 (73.8%) reported that they had never experienced difficulty controlling their 
gambling. 
These groups give an indication of addiction experience. It is reasonable to suggest 
that many of those who reported experiencing difficulty controlling their gambling within 
the 3 months prior to survey were likely to be experiencing addiction; many of those 
who reported having difficulty controlling their gambling in the past but not within the 3 
months prior to survey were likely to have regained control; and many of those who 
reported never having experienced difficulty controlling their gambling were unlikely to 
have ever experienced gambling addiction. That said, survey responses were not relied 
upon as evidence of experience of addiction – addiction experience and categorisation 
into the idea-type groups was accomplished through interview. Nonetheless, when all 
those survey respondents who were identified as potentially valuable interviewees took 
part in interview, interviews revealed that their addiction status was consistent with 
what their survey responses had indicated. The addiction status of the survey 
respondents who did not take part in interview cannot be known. 
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Frequency of gambling 
In order to recruit interviewees with a range of gambling patterns, survey respondents 
were asked how often they typically gamble (see table D.1 below). 94 (39.3%) reported 
gambling at least once a week. 
Table D.1 Typically reported frequency of gambling among survey respondents 
Gambling pattern. At 
least… 
Frequency Percentage 
Never 2 0.8 
Less than once a year 12 5.0 
Once a year 15 6.3 
Twice a year 12 5.0 
Once every three months 28 11.7 
Once a month 39 16.3 
Once a fortnight 37 15.5 
Once a week 94 39.3 
Total (n) 239 100.0 
 
Table D.2 (below) shows how many times a week those who reported gambling at least 
once a week reported typically gambling. Just under a quarter of respondents (23.3%, 
n=21) respondents reported gambling 10 or more times per week. 
Table D.2 Number of times a week respondents who gamble at least once a week 
typically gamble 
Number of times a week Frequency Percentage 
1 10 10.6 
2 16 17.0 
3 17 18.1 
4 13 13.8 
5 6 6.4 
6 3 3.2 
7 4 4.3 
10 21 22.3 
Total (n) 90 100 
NB: 4 respondents who reported gambling at least once a week did not specify how 
many times a week they typically gamble and no respondents reported gambling 8 or 9 
times per week 
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Comparison between typical frequency of gambling per week and reports of 
difficulty controlling gambling 
It would be reasonable to expect that those who had experienced difficulty controlling 
their gambling gamble more often. To explore this, comparison was made between 
reported typical frequency of gambling per week and reported experience of control 
over gambling. A total of 75 respondents reported how many times they typically 
gamble per week and whether or not they had experienced difficulty controlling their 
gambling (see table D.3 below). 
 
Table D.3 Experience of control over gambling compared with typical gambling 
frequency per week 
 
 Control over gambling  
Frequency 
of gambling 
per week 
Experienced 
difficulty of 
control within 
past 3 
months 
Experienced period 
of difficulty of 
control but not in 
past 3 months 
Never experienced 
loss of control 
Total 
 n % n % n %  
1 1 10 2 11.76 5 10.42 8 
2 2 20 3 17.65 9 18.75 14 
3 0 0 2 11.76 11 22.92 13 
4 1 10 3 17.65 7 14.58 11 
5 2 20 0 0 4 8.33 6 
6 1 10 1 5.88 1 2.08 3 
7 0 0 2 11.76 2 4.17 4 
10+ 3 30 4 23.53 9 18.75 16 
Total 10 100 17 100 48 100 75 
NB: No respondents reported gambling 8 or 9 times a week 
 
 
Bivariate analyses 
Pearson’s chi-square test was used to explore the relationship between (i) reported 
typical frequency of gambling per week and (ii) reported difficulty of control over 
gambling. The rationale was to investigate whether or not there was any indication that 
experience of difficulty of control (or lack thereof) differed, significantly, in terms of 
frequency of gambling among survey respondents. Restrictions on the use of the chi-
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square test32 required that the full 8 categories of frequency of gambling per week 
variable be collapsed (Bryman and Cramer, 2011:150) and this was done by 
dichotomising the frequency of gambling per week variable into (i) 1-5 times per week 
and (ii) 6-10+ times per week. The results (χ²= 2.018, 2 d.f. and p>0.05 [0.365]) 
suggested that, for the sample of 75 respondents (table D.3, above), no statistically 
significant difference in the relationship between frequency per week gambling and 
experience of difficulty controlling their gambling was indicated. 
This may be surprising because it suggests that, for the survey respondents, lack of a 
strong association between reported typical gambling frequency and experience of 
difficulty of control over gambling (or lack thereof). This does not necessarily mean that 
there was no association but that if there was, it was very small and not indicated to be 
strong enough to be statistically significant. While there were too few respondents who 
reported gambling typically 10+ per week and who reported indication of experience of 
control over gambling for statistically significant comparisons to be made with others 
who reported different typical frequencies, analysis did indicate that a slightly greater 
proportion of respondents who reported having experienced difficulty controlling their 
gambling within the past 3 months reported gambling 10+ times a week at time of 
interview: 30%, compared with 23.53% of those who reported having experienced 
difficulty of control in the past (beyond 3 months prior to interview) and with 18.75% of 
those who reported lack of difficulty controlling their gambling. Particularly interesting 
was that analysis suggested that there were some respondents (n=9) who indicated 
typically gambling 10+ times per week but who reported never having had difficulty 
controlling their gambling, as well as others (n=4) who indicated typically gambling 10+ 
times per week and have regained control. Thus survey responses provided the first 
indication from the present data that there may exist what might be described as more 
frequent gamblers many of whom have never experienced difficulty controlling their 
gambling and some of whom appear to have regained control after a period of difficulty. 
 
Potential interviewees 
 
Survey respondents 
To aid interviewee recruitment, the survey solicited contact details and expression of 
interest in taking part in a follow-up interview. A total of 105 respondents provided 
contact details and, of these, 99 indicated that they would be willing to be contacted for 
                                                          
32
 That is, the criterion to have a maximum of expected cell frequencies of 5 or greater (Bryman 
and Cramer, 2011). 
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interview. Of the 6 respondents who left contact details but did not wish to be contacted 
for interview survey there were no indications that this was because they were 
experiencing addiction and for this reason preferred not to take part: 3 reported never 
experiencing difficulty controlling their gambling, 3 reported experiencing difficulty 
controlling their gambling in their lifetime, but not in the 3 months prior to survey (and 
so none reported experiencing difficulty controlling their gambling within the 3 months 
prior to survey). Table D.4 (below) compares the typical gambling patterns of those 99 
who agreed to be contacted for follow-up interview and the 140 who did not leave 
contact details/did not agree to be contacted for interview in an effort to ascertain 
whether the gambling patterns of these two groups differed. 
 
Table D.4 Comparison of patterns of gambling among survey respondents who 
agreed to follow-up interview and those who did not leave contact details/did not 
agree to be contacted for follow-up interview 
 
 Survey respondents who agreed to 
be contacted for follow-up and left 
contact details 
Those who did not agree 
to be contacted for 
follow-up/did not leave 
contact details 
Gambling 
pattern. 
Typically at 
least… 
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
Once a week 46 46.5 48 34.3 
Once a fortnight 19 19.2 18 12.9 
Once a month 16 16.2 23 16.4 
Once every 
three months 
9 9.1 19 13.6 
Twice a year 4 4.0 8 5.7 
Once a year 3 3.0 12 8.6 
Less than once 
a year 
2 2.0 10 7.1 
Never 0 0 2 1.4 
Total (n) 99 100.0 140 100 
 
Table D.5 (below) shows how many times a week those who gamble at least once a 
week typically gamble for both those who agreed to be contacted for follow-up 
interview and those who did not. 
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Table D.5 Number of times a week respondents who gamble at least once 
a week gamble 
 Survey respondents who agreed to 
be contacted for follow-up and left 
contact details 
Those who did not agree 
to be contacted for 
follow-up/did not leave 
contact details 
Number of 
times a week 
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
1 3 6.67 7 15.6 
2 7 15.55 9 20 
3 8 17.77 9 20 
4 9 20 4 8.9 
5 4 8.88 2 4.4 
6 3 6.66 0 0 
7 3 6.66 1 2.2 
10+ 8 17.78 13 28.9 
Total (n) 45 100 45 100 
NB: one respondent reported typically gambling once a week but did not report how 
many times and so is missing 
. 
 
 
 
Bivariate analyses 
Pearson’s chi-square test was used in order to explore the relationship between (i) 
reported typical frequency of gambling per week and (ii) whether or not respondents 
agreed provided contact details and agreed to be contacted for interview. This was to 
investigate whether or not there was any evidence that those who agreed to be 
contacted for follow-up interview differed, significantly, in terms of frequency of 
gambling. Due to aforementioned expected cell frequency restriction on use of the chi-
square test, the full 8 category of frequency of gambling per week variable was 
collapsed (Bryman and Cramer, 2011:150) by dichotomising the frequency of gambling 
per week variable into (i) 1-5 times per week and (ii) 6-10+ times per week. Results 
(χ²= 0.00, 1 d.f. and p>0.05 [1.00]) suggested that, for these 90 respondents (see table 
D.5, above), no statistically significant difference in the relationship between agreement 
to be contacted for follow-up interview and typical frequency of gambling per week 
dichotomised as 1-5 times per week and 6-10+ times per week was indicated.  
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It was also possible to investigate the relationship between agreement to be contacted 
for follow-up interview and reported typical frequency of gambling per week as 
dichotomised into (i) 1-9 times per week and (ii) 10+ times per week while maintaining 
the maximum of 20% expected frequencies of greater than five criterion33. This allowed 
exploration of whether or not there was significant difference between these two 
categories of typical gambling frequency in terms of agreement to be contacted for 
follow-up interview but, again, indicated no statistically significant difference between 
the variables (χ²=1.553, 1 d.f. and p>0.05 [0.213]). 
 
While any differences were not great enough to be statistically significant, for those 
who reported gambling 10+ times per week, most, 61.90% (n=13), did not agree to be 
contacted for follow-up interview. It might have been reasonable to posit that these 
respondents did not wish to be interviewed because of potential for embarrassment or 
shame, however, as of these thirteen: 5 did not complete the survey (and thus did not 
report their experiences of control nor reach the option to leave contact details); 6 
reported that they had never experienced difficulty controlling their gambling; and 2 
reported having found it difficult to control their gambling within 3 months prior to 
survey (and none reported having experienced difficulty of control in their lifetime but 
not in the 3 months prior to interview), it appears that most who indicated typically 
gambling 10+ per week had never experienced addiction and that only 2 were 
experiencing addiction at the time of survey. This suggests that potential for 
stigmatisation or shame was probably not a significant reason for declining to take part 
in interview. Indeed, while not a statistically significant association, analysis of all 90 
respondents who reported whether or not they agreed to be contacted for interview, 
and who reported their experience of control over gambling, suggested that both those 
who had experienced difficulty controlling their gambling in the 3 months prior to survey 
                                                          
33
 It was not possible to categorise/dichotomise responses in the same way with reported 
experience of difficulty controlling gambling as the dependent variable because this increased 
the number of expected cell frequencies greater than 5 over the 20% of all cells threshold. 
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and/or in their lifetime were actually more likely to agree to be contacted for interview 
than those who reported never having experienced any difficulty. Over half (56.25%) of 
those who had experienced difficulty controlling their gambling in the 3 months prior to 
survey agreed to be contacted for interview and a similar proportion (55.25%) of those 
who reported difficulty controlling their gambling in their lifetime (but not in the 3 months 
prior to survey) agreed to be contacted for interview. Proportionally less (45.39%) of 
those who had never experienced difficulty of control agreed to be contacted for 
interview. 
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Appendix E: Rules aimed at constraining gambling and/or reducing 
gambling related harm 
 
Table E.1 Rules aimed at constraining gambling and/or reducing gambling related 
harm 
 
 
Table continued on next page 
  
Rule (paraphrased) Reported by members of...group 
Never 
experienced 
addiction 
Regained 
control 
Experiencing 
addiction 
Gambling spending limits       
Have in mind a spending limit 
when gambling and keep to it   
Carry a pre-specified sum of 
money when going gambling and 
do not spend more 
  
Only gamble what you are 
prepared to lose 
 
  
Follow strict bankroll 
management wagering limits 
(poker gamblers only) 
 
  
Do not spend more than you can 
afford to lose 
 
  
Use deposit limit functionality 
offered by online gambling 
providers 
  

  
Do not chase losses/Do not 
‘double up’ wagers after losses  
  
Have only one online gambling 
account 
  

  
If you win, take the money and 
stop gambling.  
  

  
        
General money management       
Budget for living expenses      
Pay bills and other living 
expenses before gambling  
  
Never gamble with credit (e.g. 
loans or overdraft) 
  

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Table E.1 continued   
Rule (paraphrased) Reported by members of...group 
Never 
experienced 
addiction 
Regained 
control 
Experiencing 
addiction 
Mind-set related rules       
Treat gambling expenditure like 
other leisure expenditure 

    
Do not gamble with a view to make 
money 
 
  
Always keep in mind that you might 
lose 

    
Do not gamble if you are relying on 
winnings 
  

  
Assume you are going to lose   

  
Keep gambling fun; do not gamble 
unless you enjoy it 
  

  
Keep in mind that some of the 
enjoyment comes from risking what 
you cannot afford to lose 
  

  
        
Social-context/setting       
If recovering from gambling 
addiction, break relationships with 
friends if they gamble 
  

  
Do not let gambling ‘take over’ your 
life. 
  

  
        
Prohibitive rules       
Do not gamble at all     

If experienced a gambling problem 
in the past, avoid the activity with 
which you had the problem 
  

  
 
 
 
 
